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ABSTRACT 
Of the findings, the European Commission established in its report on Energy Sector 
Inquiry, market manipulation constituted a major concern for the functioning and 
integrity of EU energy sectors.  The Commission argued that the responsibility for 
high prices in wholesale energy markets could be attributed to manipulative practices 
of energy incumbents and the trust in the operation of operation of sector was largely 
compromised, due to these practices. Remedies, EU competition law provided, were 
considered as insufficient to resolve these shortcomings and thus should be 
supplemented with regulatory-based tools. The findings of the Energy Sector Inquiry 
and subsequent consultation documents by multiple EU institutions paved the way 
for the adoption of the Regulation on wholesale energy market integrity and 
transparency, REMIT, which incorporated into an anti-manipulation rule, specifically 
designed to prohibit and prosecute manipulative practices in EU wholesale energy 
markets. Nevertheless, as EU case law on market manipulation has yet to develop 
and there are uncertainties with respect to the concept of market manipulation. 
Furthermore REMIT does not preclude the jurisdiction of EU competition law, 
questions arise as to the scope and the extent of the application of this prohibition. 
Throughout its chapters, this thesis explores the scope of and the case law on 
market manipulation to determine what types of market practices are regarded as 
manipulative and thus prohibited under anti-manipulation rules. It also focuses on the 
interplay between REMIT and EU competition law and evaluates factors and 
circumstances that determine when and what market misconduct can be subject to 
enforcement proceedings under both anti-manipulation and antitrust rules. As the 
development of a single, coherent, rulebook that can be relied upon by market 
participant is fundamental for the functioning of EU wholesale energy markets, the 
thesis, finally, provides proposals and measures that can mitigate and resolve the 
legal uncertainties regarding the regulatory framework REMIT established. 
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I.1. GENERAL 
Energy has always been one of the main instruments driving the political 
environment of the European continent. It was at the centre of the negotiations after 
World War II, and the organisation founded thereafter was named “the European 
Community of Steel and Coal” 1  explicitly signifying the importance of the 
management of European energy resources. The political and economic integration 
objectives later expanded to cover other fields and markets, and the importance of 
energy in European integration started decreasing, due to the importation of new 
energy resources such as oil and natural gas which operated closely in relation to 
geo-political dimensions. There were several factors that gave rise to concerns about 
the sustainability, security and reliability of these products. Europe lacked the 
domestic energy resources to meet its energy demands and had been relying 
heavily on external suppliers. The distances between resource-endowed countries 
and demand centres as well as the political volatility in some of the supplier and 
transit countries put energy trade issues into a more political context that was 
outside the Community’s integration competences. This resulted in national energy 
markets being managed through state-owned, vertically integrated companies which 
were active in all areas of energy business with exclusive rights related to production, 
supply, transmission and distribution of energy products. 
After the discovery of new energy reserves which alleviated the prospect that scarce 
energy resources as well as the 1987 Single European Act2 which embraced the 
policy of creating a single European market and required the abolishment of state-
owned monopolies, the structure of European energy markets started to change. 
Ever since 1990, when the first directive3 that set forth rules on transparency in 
electricity and natural gas prices was adopted, EU energy markets have been 
subject to continuous sets of directives and regulations that aim at, inter alia, 
ensuring sustainability, security and competitiveness in energy supplies in and to the 
EU 4 . Competitive energy markets, in which prices for energy products are 
                                                          
1 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 18 April, 1951) 
2 Single European Act (Luxembourg, 1986) 
3 Council Directive 1990/377/EEC of 29 June, 1990 concerning a Community procedure to improve the 
transparency of gas and electricity prices charged to industrial end-users, OJ L 185, 17.7.1990 
4 Throughout the EU’s liberalisation agenda, three sets of regulatory packages, establishing rules for natural 
gas and electricity, were adopted. The first package, in 1996, consisted of two directives: Directive 96/92/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December, 1996 concerning common rules for the internal 
17 | P a g e  
 
determined on the basis of market forces, were considered fundamental for a secure 
and sustainable supply of energy products.  
Several regulatory and competition mechanisms were employed to pursue these 
energy policy objectives 5 . Vertically integrated companies, which had been 
designated as national monopolies and dominated national energy markets, were 
dismantled through different sets of unbundling measures6 that separated network 
activities and transmission business from energy production and supply. The regime 
for the use of energy transmission networks was determined on the basis of third-
party access rights requiring transmission system operators to provide non-
discriminatory transmission service to all market participants who wish to transport 
their supplies through relevant transmission networks7.  The European Commission 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
market in electricity OJ L 27, 30 January, 1997; Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 June, 1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas OJ L 204, 21 July 1998. 
The second package involved Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June, 
2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC, OJ L 176, 
15 July, 2003; Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June, 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC OJ L 176, 15 
July, 2003; Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June, 2003 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, OJ L 176, 15 July, 2003; 
Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September, 2005 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks OJ L 289 3.11.2005. Finally, the third package, 
which repealed the second package and is currently in force, was introduced in 2009, comprising: Directive 
2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July, 2009 concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas; Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July, 
2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity; Regulation (EC) 2009/715 on conditions 
for access to natural gas transmission networks; Regulation (EC) 2009/714 on conditions for access to the 
network for cross-border exchanges in electricity.     
5 For the development of regulatory and competition mechanisms applied to EU energy markets see; Peter D. 
Cameron, Competition in Energy Market: Law and Regulation in the European Union (2nd ed., OUP 2007); 
Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay (eds), The EC Law of  Competition (OUP 2007), 1361-1473; Bram Delvauz et al., 
(eds), EU Energy Law and Policy Issues (Intersentia 2013); Angus Johnston & Guy Block, EU Energy Law, (OUP 
2012);  Francois Leveque, ‘Antitrust Enforcement in the Electiricty and Gas Industries: Problems and Solutions 
for the EU’ (2006) 19/5 The Electricity Journal 27 
6 The Third Energy Package provides three models for the structure and management of transmission system 
operators; Ownership Unbundling, Independent System Operator, Independent Transmission Operator. See, 
Directives 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC. See; Jones, Christopher (ed), The Internal Energy Market: The Third 
Liberalisation Package, (3rd ed., Claeys & Casteels 2014)  
7 Transmission business is a natural monopoly and the duplication of transmission networks is not 
economically feasible. Therefore, the undistorted third party access to the existing transmission infrastructure 
is a prerequisite for the introduction of competition into energy markets. See also; Alexander Schaub, 
‘Competition Policy and Liberalisation of Energy Markets’ (Speech At European Utilities Circle, 2000), 4 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2000_023_en.pdf; Philip Lowe, ‘Effective Unbundling of 
Energy Transmission Networks: Lessons learned from the Energy Sector Inquiry’ (2007) 1 Competition Policy 
Newsletter 23; Adrien de Hauteclocque & Kim Talus, ‘Third Party Access: A Comparative Study on Access 
Regimes in EU Electricity Grids and Natural Gas Pipelines’ (2011) 9/3 OGEL 1. 
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also actively enforced its authority under Articles 101 and 102 and the Merger 
Regulation8.  
Continuous liberalisation of energy markets resulted in alterations in market designs. 
In electricity, the effective enforcement of EU regulations and third party access 
regimes across the EU under liberalisation packages and electricity network codes 
such as capacity allocation and congestion management mechanisms 9  and 
requirements for grid connection of generators10, led to a convergence of market 
structures among Member States11. The majority of electricity markets in the EU 
have been designed as energy-only markets where electricity supply has been 
carried out in day-ahead, and intraday markets and the balancing of network 
systems has been secured through balancing markets12.  Day-ahead and intraday 
markets are spot markets, in which market participants bid and offer their electricity 
supply and demand with respective prices connected to them. In balancing markets, 
transmission system operators increase or decrease electricity supply and/or 
demand to ensure system reliability and security, through market-based mechanisms.  
In natural gas, the liberalisation packages sought to introduce entry-exit zones and 
hub-based trading13. Accordingly, several zones and hubs were established on the 
basis of energy consumption and the availability of transmission networks. The 
functioning and operability of these zones were later regulated under gas network 
codes14. Trading of natural gas was projected to take place in these hubs with the 
introduction and increased use of standardised short-term contracts such as “Within-
                                                          
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January, 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L24/1  
9 Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July, 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and 
congestion management [2015] OJ L197/24 
10 Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/631 of 14 April, 2016 establishing a network code on requirements for 
grid connection of generators [2016] OJ L112/1 
11 Francisco Enrique Gonzales-Diaz, ‘EU Policy on Capacity Mechanisms’ in Leigh Hancher, Adrien De 
Hauteclocque and Malgorzata Sadowska (eds), Capacity Mechanisms in the EU Energy Market: Law, Policy, and 
Economics (OUP 2015), 3 
12 Petri Mantysaari, EU Electricity Trade Law; The Legal Tools of Electricity Producers in the Internal Electricity 
Market (Springer 2015), 13 
13 Regulation (EC) 2009/715. See also; Katja Yafimava, ‘The EU Third Package for Gas and the Gas Target Model: 
major contentious issues inside and outside the EU’ [2013] OIES Paper: NG 75, 3 
14 See: Commission Regulation (EU) No 984/2013 of 14 October, 2013 establishing a Network Code on Capacity 
Allocation Mechanisms in Gas Transmission Systems and supplementing Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council [2013] OJ L273/5; Commission Regulation (EU) No 312/2014 of 26 
March, 2014 establishing a Network Code on Gas Balancing of Transmission Networks [2014] OJ L91/15; 
Commission Regulation (EU)  2015/703 of 30 April, 2015 establishing a network code on interoperability and 
data exchange rules [2015] OJ L113/13  
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day”, “Day-Ahead”, “Balance of Week”, “Weekend” and “Working Days Next Week”15. 
Within-day and day-ahead markets were regarded as balancing mechanisms 
through which the transmission system operators ensure system security16.  
The advent of financial energy derivatives also introduced major ramifications to the 
functioning of EU energy markets. Trading of futures17, option18, swaps19 and other 
contracts provided several risk management mechanisms through which energy 
market participants can hedge their financial risks. The availability of financial 
instruments related to the fundamentals of energy markets also resulted in new 
actors engaging in speculative trading, deriving profits from price arbitrage. These 
contracts are traded in several multilateral and organised trading platforms either 
through exchanges in which market operators take responsibility for counterparty 
risks or through brokers who only contribute the conclusion of agreements without 
being involved in the financial risks inherent to them.  
After the publication of the Energy Sector Inquiry in 200720 and several consultation 
documents from the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the 
European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG)21  and the European 
                                                          
15 Patrick Heather, ‘The Evolution and Functioning of the Traded Gas Market in Britain’ [2010] OIES Paper: NG 
44, 7 
16 Article 7, Commission Regulation (EU) No 312/2014 of 26 March, 2014 establishing a Network Code on Gas 
Balancing of Transmission Networks [2014] OJ L91/15  
17 Futures are standardised contracts whose delivery date, location, quality, and quantity are determined by 
market places, such as exchanges. For example a NYMEX NG Futures Contract means a sale or buy of 10,000 
million British thermal unit (mmBtu) to be delivered at Henry Hub in Louisiana. NYMEX Exchange Rulebook 220 
Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/NYMEX/2/220.pdf  
18 Options are agreements, according to which paying a fixed price, called a ‘premium’, the buyer of the 
agreement receives rights but not obligations to receive or make delivery of a certain product at certain time 
period at a certain price. For example, in an option, trader A, the buyer of an option contract, pays a premium, 
P, to trader B, the seller, in return for a right, but not an obligation, to deliver a certain amount of product X at 
price Y, at a certain expiration day. When the expiration day comes, if the market price for product X is lower 
than Y, trader A profits from this option contract.   
19 Swaps are agreements between two parties who exchange price risks in relation to certain products over a 
determined time period. For example, in a swap agreement, trader A and trader B enter into an agreement, 
according to which A pays to B, the market price for product X, while trader B pays to A the market price for 
product Y for a certain period of time. The trader who receives more than it pays profits from this swap 
agreement.    
20 Communication from the European Commission (COM(2006) 851 Final), “the Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 
of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors”, (hereinafter “the Inquiry”) 
21 Committee of European Securities Regulators and the European Regulators' Group for Electricity and Gas, 
‘CESR and ERGEG advice to the European Commission in the context of the Third Energy Package; Response to 
Question F.20’ (Market Abuse, October 2008) (hereinafter CESR and ERGEG)  
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Commission22, which recommended the adoption of a tailor-made legal framework to 
govern and ensure competitive trading in EU wholesale energy products, in 2011, 
the EU adopted the ‘Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and 
Transparency’ (hereinafter REMIT)23. REMIT applies to both electricity and natural 
gas wholesale markets and does not provide a distinction based on hub-based, spot 
market or bilateral trading. Its prohibitions on market manipulation and insider trading 
are applicable to national markets, irrespective of the level of market liberalisation. 
Nevertheless, in practice, these types of practices often take place in established 
trading platforms in which market participants simultaneously engage in buy and sell 
orders to earn profit from either their output or price arbitrage. Prices in these 
markets are set through the aggregation of bids and offers by market participants 
and each transaction has a direct impact on these market prices. Therefore REMIT’s 
rules on market manipulation and insider trading are particularly relevant for trading 
in spot markets for electricity and hubs for natural gas.  
This does not mean that REMIT is inapplicable to bilateral wholesale electricity and 
natural gas transactions. These trades can also be subject to anti-manipulation and 
insider trading proceedings, if they are connected to trades in electricity spot markets 
and natural gas hubs and are part of a scheme that aims at deriving profits from 
cross-market price relations. This is increasingly relevant with the use of prices that 
are set in electricity spot markets or natural gas hubs as benchmarks in bilateral 
transactions are growing.  
The convergence of national natural gas markets fell behind that of EU electricity 
markets. Even though several trading hubs were established, only the north-western 
hubs have been relatively active in natural gas trading. The majority of hub-based 
trading takes place in two national hubs, National Balancing Point (NBP) in the UK 
and Title Transfer Facility (TTF) in the Netherlands24. The share of exchange-traded 
natural gas contracts in these hubs reaches respectively 49 per cent and 25 per cent 
of overall traded natural gas volumes and the rest is carried out through Over-The-
                                                          
22 European Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying Document to the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on energy market integrity and 
transparency COM(2010) (REMIT Impact Assessment) 
23 Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the  Council of 25 October, 2011 on 
wholesale energy market integrity and transparency 
24 European Commission, ‘Quarterly Report on European Gas Markets’ (2015), 9(1) Market Observatory for 
Energy, 24 
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Counter (OTC) trading25. The NBP and the TTF have been followed by other active 
hubs, such as the NetConnect Germany (NCG) and Gaspool in Germany, 
Zeebrugge in Belgium, PEG Nord in France 26. Other hubs, such as those AOC in 
Spain, VPGS in Poland, and GTF in Denmark have been inactive27.  
The reasons that led to different levels of liquidity at hub-based trading vary across 
the EU.  In hubs, where the liquidity in trading of natural gas products is high, 
liberalisation of national natural gas markets predates the EU’s liberalisation 
packages. For example, in the UK, despite several sectoral and financial upheavals28, 
the NBP has been active in natural gas trading since the 1990’s, long before hub-
based trading was introduced into EU directives and regulations, while in other 
Member States, such as in the Baltic regions, Ireland, Portugal and Romania, natural 
gas hubs have yet to be developed29. Furthermore, it is not possible to discuss a 
homogenous natural gas market across the Member States. EU natural gas markets 
are mostly import-based, supplying a major part of their natural gas demand from 
external resources30 and the market for imported natural gas is far from competitive31. 
National priorities as to natural gas supply also reflect to security of supply concerns 
rather than Union-wide policies. While some Member States enjoy competition in 
energy supply with balanced energy mix32, abundant market players33 and diversified 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 Dr. Albrecht Wagner, ‘Functioning of European Gas Wholesale Markets’ (Wagner, Elbling & Company 
Management Advisors, Quantitative Study, Brussels, 15 May, 2014), 5 
27 Patrick Heather, ‘The Evolution of European Traded Gas Hubs’ [2015] OIES Paper: NG 104, 18 
28 Such as the collapse of Enron in 2001 and the near collapse of Eastern Gas Markets in 2002 which caused the 
withdrawal of several US-based market participants from trading in the NBP. See: Patrick Heather, (2010) 35 
29 Patrick Heather, (2015) 18 
30 In 2015, indigenous natural gas production accounted for only 27 per cent of gas supply in the EU. BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy (65th edn, June, 2016) 
31 The share of the two biggest natural gas suppliers, Russia and Norway, exceeds 76 per cent of overall 
imported natural gas in the EU. Ibid.. See also; David A. Wood, ‘Natural Gas Imports to Europe: The Frontline of 
Competition between LNG and Pipeline Supplies’ (2016) 36 Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 
A1-A4 
32 In the United Kingdom, the share of natural gas in domestic electricity generation is less than 30 per cent 
used in domestic electricity generation. The other energy resources in the UK’s energy mix include, solid fuels 
with 39 per cent, nuclear with 19 per cent, renewables with 13 per cent and others with one per cent. In 
Lithuania, the share of natural gas in electricity generation is 58 per cent, followed by renewables with 32 per 
cent and others with five per cent. It is important to note that Lithuania’s dependency on Russian natural gas is 
100 per cent. See; European Commission, ‘EU Energy Markets in 2014’ (Luxembourg 2014)    
33 In the UK, the share of the biggest six upstream producers of natural gas is limited to the field in the UK and 
Norwegian continental shelfs and only Centrica can be regarded as having an appreciable market power, 
holding 12 per cent market share in the UK and 2 per cent in the Norwegian continental shelf. OFGEM, ‘State 
of the Market Assessment’, [2014], 88. In Lithuania, on the other hand, the two biggest natural gas suppliers 
AB Lietuvos dujos and UAB Dujotekana serve 99 per cent of natural gas sold to Lithuanian wholesale gas 
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energy supplies from multiple resources34, others are greatly vulnerable to energy 
shortages due to their insufficient fixed infrastructure and dependency on a single 
energy supplier35 . It is very difficult to introduce efficient competitive hub-based 
trading in a national natural gas market with insufficient network capacity, limited 
market participants who are dependent on limited external suppliers. Dimensions in 
market conditions between member states result in differences in the functioning of 
national natural gas markets.  
Since spot market trading in electricity markets is more prevalent via the 
development of energy-only markets across the EU and hub-based trading is 
generally concentrated in north-western Europe in the NBP and the TTF, REMIT and 
its anti-manipulation and insider trading prohibitions will initially be more effective in 
electricity markets. The extent that REMIT applies to natural gas markets depends 
on the functioning and the development of hub-based trading in the EU. It is not 
possible to discuss an established hub-based market mechanism across the EU and 
case law on market manipulation in EU natural gas markets has yet to develop.  
Therefore, in the EU context, the main focus of the thesis is on electricity markets 
and practices that perpetrators employ to manipulate these markets. The thesis also 
discusses market manipulation in the natural gas sector. The relation between anti-
manipulation rules and natural gas markets is evident in the US which had liberalised 
its natural gas markets long before the EU’s liberalisation packages36. In its analysis 
on US case law on energy market manipulation, the thesis discusses manipulative 
practices in natural gas hubs in greater detail. However, in the EU context, the thesis 
does not address natural gas markets in the same way as it deals with electricity 
markets.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
market and gas consumers. the National Commission for Energy Control and Prices, (NCC), ‘Annual Report on 
Electricity and Natural Gas Markets of the Republic of Lithuania to the European Commission’ [2014], 44   
34 For example, the UK natural gas markets are mostly competitive with diversified energy supplies, and high 
levels of liquidity. Natural gas is supplied from several resources including field on the UK and Norwegian 
continental shelf, LNGs from global gas fields as well as via interconnectors lining the UK with Belgium and 
Netherlands. 
35 Some Baltic states and Bulgaria to which Russia is the sole natural gas supplier, appeared to be greatly 
vulnerable, during 2009 gas crisis, and longer cut offs resulted in deep economic depression and even 
humanitarian concerns as many people could not afford to heat their households in these countries. See; 
Edward Christie, ‘Energy Vulnerability and EU-Russia Energy Relations’ (2009) 5/2 Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 225. See also; European Commission, ‘EU Energy Markets in 2014’ (Luxembourg 2014) 
36 Henry Hub has been an active natural gas market since the early 1980’s. See; Shi Xunpeng, ‘Development of 
Europe’s gas hubs: Implications for East Asia’ [2016] Natural Gas Industry 357. 
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I.2. WHY REMIT?      
Even though the EU’s liberalisation of energy markets has not provided the same 
results in all Member States, the share of short-term energy products traded in 
organised trading platforms is increasing37, leading to new market entries and more 
liquidity38. Hub-based pricing in energy contracts has become dominant across the 
EU39, while oil-price indexation has been in decrease for over ten years, available in 
remaining long-term supply contracts40. In electricity, convergence of market designs 
across the EU is more successful with the introduction of energy-only markets and 
market coupling41. The volume of electricity supplied through spot electricity markets 
and exchanges increases and prices set on the basis of merit orders in spot markets 
also determine those in OTC bilateral electricity contracts42.  
The regulatory framework, before the adoption of REMIT, had included only 
structural remedies including unbundling measures, transparency rules and third-
party access rights to ensure the competitiveness of EU energy markets. Market 
practices that distort functioning of these markets had been prosecuted under 
national network codes or general antitrust law if they also constituted violation of 
national and/or EU competition law. In their advice document43, CESR and ERGEG 
                                                          
37 Supra note 24  
38 Dr. Albrecht Wagner, (2014). For example, ‘churn rate’, which is the number of trades taking place between 
the date that energy contract are issued and the date they are settled or delivered, is used to calculate the 
liquidity in energy markets. Accordingly, in markets where hub-based trading is developed, such as in the UK 
and the Netherlands, the churn rates are significantly higher than less-liberalised markets. See; Patrick Heather, 
(2010) 35   
39 Patrick Heather, (2015) 12 
40 Even though oil-price indexation did not reflect demand and supply and market fundamentals in natural gas, 
long-term supply contracts often included such clauses for pricing due to the lack of efficient natural gas-based 
pricing mechanisms. See; Ibid., 2 See also; Jonathan P. Stern, ‘Continental European Long-Term Gas Contracts: 
Is a Transition Away from Oil Product-Linked Pricing Inevitable and Imminent?’ (2009) Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies; Jonathan P. Stern & Howard V Rogers, ‘The Transition to Hub-Based Gas Pricing in Continental 
Europe’ (2011) Citeseer 
41 Market coupling is a process designed by the EU for the convergence of exchange-traded electricity prices 
on a regional basis. Accordingly, several regional electricity exchanges are integrated through an implicit cross-
border allocation mechanism, allowing market participants from different regional markets to participate in 
coupled electricity markets. In these coupled markets, undertakings in a specific coupled market can bid in  
each day-ahead and intraday markets. The process resulted in the emergence of several coupled markets, such 
as: Central Western Europe (CWE), encompassing Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland; 
British Isles, the UK and Ireland; Northern Europe, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, 
Sweden. For the full account about the market coupling process see; 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/Electricity/Regional_initiatives/Cross_Regional_Roadmaps/Pages/1.-Market-
Coupling.aspx   
42 European Commission, ‘Quarterly Report on European Electricity Markets’ (2016), 9(4) Market Observatory 
for Energy, 14 
43 CESR and ERGEG, (2008), 26 
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concluded that certain types of market misconduct were neither regulated nor 
prohibited under energy market regulation and the scope of financial market 
regulation, 2003 Market Abuse Directive44 (MAD 2003 hereinafter), was also limited, 
as it applies only to financial instruments and derivatives traded in regulated 
markets45. Market misconduct such as capacity withholding practices and cross-
market manipulative practices that exploit price relations between different wholesale 
energy markets was not prosecutable under the financial regulatory framework. 
CESR and ERGEG proposed a tailor-made regulatory framework applicable to all 
types of wholesale energy products including physical wholesale energy contracts 
and also financial wholesale energy contracts traded in OTC markets, which were 
outside the scope of MAD 200346.    
 
Market participants raised several concerns about the adoption of a new tailor-made 
regulatory framework47.  They stressed that the proposed rules would cause over-
regulation which could hamper new investments and market entries and introduce 
                                                          
44 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing 
and market manipulation (market abuse) [2003] OJ L96/16  
45 Regulated market is described by the EU as “a multilateral system operated and/or managed by a market 
operator, which brings together or facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and selling 
interests in financial instruments (…) with its non-discretionary rules”. Directive 2014/65/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May, 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 
2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (recast), [2014] OJ L173/348. Exchanges are the prominent examples of 
regulated markets, in which several financial and physical energy products are also traded. European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) and Nasdaq Commodities OMX are of the major European exchanges where financial and 
physical electricity and natural gas products are traded.   
46 Supra note 43  
47 Ibid., 3 
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additional regulatory costs to be incurred by energy consumers48. Market practices 
that, according to CESR and ERGEG, necessitated the adoption of the proposed 
framework were already proscribed under national market rules and network codes 
governing the operation of trading activities and transmission networks 49 . 
Furthermore, market participants pointed out that EU competition law was still 
applicable to wholesale energy markets and there were substantial economic and 
regulatory risks in applying competition law with an overlapping sector-specific 
regime 50 . The proposed framework would result in potential problems such as 
conflict of laws, questions of the designation of competent authorities, costs attached 
to additional requirements and new regulatory barriers to entry 51 . It was also 
asserted that the relevant provisions and prohibitions such as insider trading and 
market manipulation were traditionally designed to address concerns about financial 
markets and thus not appropriate for the regulation of electricity and natural gas 
which have been predominantly physical markets52.  
In evaluating whether a particular market is susceptible to regulation, the 
Commission applies an analysis involving three criteria 53 . First the Commission 
assesses if high and permanent barriers to entry, whether of legal, regulatory or 
structural nature, are present. Second, the analysis explores whether the structure of 
markets is such that they do not result in effective competition without a regulatory 
intervention. Finally, the Commission identifies whether competition law, alone, 
would constitute a sufficient remedy in ensuring competitiveness of these markets. 
The market participants’ assertion that relevant market practices identified in CESR-
                                                          
48 Association of Energy Producers, ‘AEP Response to CESR/ERGEG Consultation on Market Abuse’ (2008), 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_CONSULT/CLOSED%20PUBLIC%20CONSULTATIONS/
CROSSSECTORAL/Financial%20Services/Market%20abuse%20framework/RR/AEP.pdf  
49 British Energy, ‘CESR / ERGEG consultation paper on draft advice to the European Commission proposing an 
EU market abuse framework for energy markets’ (2008),  
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_CONSULT/CLOSED%20PUBLIC%20CONSULTATIONS/
CROSSSECTORAL/Financial%20Services/Market%20abuse%20framework/RR/E08-PC-30%20-%2004 
50 Association of Energy Producers, (2008) 
51 EnBW, ‘Response by EnBW on the CESR and ERGEG advice to the European Commission in the context of the 
Third Energy Package’ (2008), 
http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_CONSULT/CLOSED%20PUBLIC%20CONSULTATIONS/
CROSSSECTORAL/Financial%20Services/Market%20abuse%20framework/RR/EnBW%20Consultation%20on%2
0Market%20Abuse%20Response.2008.08.22.pdf  
52 Ibid. 
53 Section 9, Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets 
within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
networks and services, O.J. 2003, L 114/45 
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ERGEG’s advice document were already prosecutable under competition law was 
thus important in assessing whether a tailor-made regulation was necessary to 
ensure competitiveness of markets54. In its impact assessment, the Commission 
concluded that rules that govern the operation of wholesale energy markets did not 
suffice to ensure their effective functioning55. The findings of CESR-ERGEG in their 
advice document and the Commission in its impact assessment later paved the way 
for the adoption of REMIT. 
The scope of REMIT encompassed wholesale energy products that were not 
regulated under MAD 200356. The Regulation did not provide any differentiation 
between OTC and Exchange trading as to physical wholesale energy products. All 
contracts that involve physical delivery of electricity or natural gas in relation with a 
sell and purchase activity were in-scope of REMIT. As to financial wholesale energy 
products, the differentiation between OTC and Exchange trading determined the 
applicable regulatory framework. While exchange-traded financial wholesale energy 
contracts were under the jurisdiction of MAD 2003, OTC-traded financial contracts 
were regulated under REMIT. 
   
In 2014, the EU put forward a new set of financial regulatory instruments, including, 
inter alia, Market in Financial Instruments Regulation 57 , Market in Financial 
                                                          
54 Association of Energy Producers, (2008); EnBW, (2008); British Energy, (2008). 
55 Supra note 22 
56 Article 1(2), Regulation 1227/2011 
57 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May, 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 OJ L173/84 
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Instrument Directive 58 , Market Abuse Regulation 59  (MAR) and Market Abuse 
Directive 201460 (MAD II), which together repealed and replaced MAD 2003. This 
new regulatory framework brought about significant recalibrations to the scope of 
REMIT. First, the new regulation adopted a new trading venue classification 
significantly limiting the scope of OTC trading61. Several transactions that take place 
outside of the regulated markets and exchanges were included in the regulatory 
oversight through the concepts of ‘Multilateral Trading Facilities’ (MTFs) 62  and 
‘Organised Trading Facilities’ (OTFs)63. In addition, MAR introduced an exclusive 
authority over financial instruments, irrespective of the platforms through which they 
are traded64. All financial instruments including financial wholesale energy products 
traded in exchanges, MTFs, OTFs and OTC markets, were in-scope of MAR’s rules 
on insider trading and market manipulation65. This recalibration significantly limited 
the jurisdiction of REMIT with respect to the prohibitions of insider trading and 
market manipulation in financial wholesale energy markets.  
                                                          
58 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May, 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (recast), [2014] OJ L173/348 
59 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April, 2014 on market 
abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, [2014] OJ L173/1 
60 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April, 2014 on criminal sanctions 
for market abuse (market abuse directive), [2014] OJ L173/179 
61 Article 4(1) Directive 2014/57/EU  
62 “(M)ultilateral trading facility’ or ‘MTF’ means a multilateral system, operated by an investment firm or a 
market operator, which brings together multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial 
instruments (…) with non-discretionary rules (…)”. Article 4(1)(22), Directive 2014/57/EU 
63 “(O)rganised trading facility’ or ‘OTF’ means a multilateral system which is not a regulated market or an MTF 
and in which multiple third-party buying and selling interests (…) are able to interact in the system (…)”.Article 
4(1)(23), Directive 2014/57/EU 
64 Article 2(1), Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 
65 Article 2(2), Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 
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As of 2017, REMIT and MAR are the two fundamental regulatory instruments that 
proscribe market manipulation in wholesale energy markets at EU level. While the 
anti-manipulation prohibition of REMIT applies to practices that involve physical 
wholesale energy contracts, that of MAR has jurisdiction over financial wholesale 
energy contracts, such as energy futures, swaps and options contracts. Spot 
commodity products such as contracts that lead to the physical delivery of a certain 
product can also be in-scope for MAR, if it is established that trading in these 
products has an impact on related financial instruments over which MAR has 
exclusive jurisdiction. However, this jurisdiction is not applicable to wholesale 
physical energy products, as there is a carve-out provision that exempts these 
products from MAR’s jurisdiction66. As a sector-specific, tailor-made framework for 
wholesale energy markets, the thesis focuses on REMIT’s anti-manipulation regime. 
Nevertheless, the legal regime established under MAR is also discussed in detail as 
it has important implications with respect to the prosecution of manipulative practices 
in wholesale energy markets.    
I.3. WHY MARKET MANIPULATION? 
The extent of market practices addressed by REMIT is broad. The Regulation 
introduced several prohibitions and obligations with which market participants in EU 
energy markets are required to comply. The thesis discusses these obligations and 
prohibitions briefly but critically, asserting that the way they are described and 
incorporated in the Regulation leads to uncertainties with respect to their 
                                                          
66 Article 2(2)(a), Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 
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implementation in EU wholesale energy markets. Lack of clarifications about the 
concepts of market manipulation, insider trading and inside information renders their 
application problematic. Undertakings operating in wholesale energy markets may 
find themselves subject to investigations without knowing that their conduct could 
constitute a breach of provisions under REMIT. Liquidity levels may further reduce 
and prices for energy may increase as a result. Providing a general discussion on 
these obligations and prohibitions helps the thesis demarcate the objectives that 
REMIT seeks to accomplish with respect to energy market liberalisation. However, 
particular focus is given to REMIT’s anti-manipulation rules and the concept of 
market manipulation.  
There are several reasons for the thesis to follow this path. First, it is hardly possible 
for a single thesis to discuss a comprehensive legal analysis encompassing all 
obligations and prohibitions set forth under REMIT. There are significant questions 
and uncertainties with respect to the application of data disclosure obligations as the 
prohibition of insider trading and the case law on these issues has yet to develop. 
The legal questions, such as what type of information is required to be made public 
under data disclosure obligations or which market practices can account for a 
violation of insider trading prohibitions under REMIT, should be addressed through 
an extensive legal analysis which assesses the features of relevant information, 
which would give rise to concerns about information asymmetry and unfair market 
conditions. Such an analysis cannot be dealt with in a single chapter nor as part of 
this thesis without limiting the scope of its anti-manipulation analysis.  
Second, the arguments about the concept of market manipulation raised during the 
consultation period clearly showed that there were significant uncertainties with 
which, market participants were concerned.67. Even though it has been prohibited 
and prosecuted under US law for over a century68, the concept is rather new in the 
EU context, as the first provision that prohibited market manipulation at EU level was 
                                                          
67 Supra note 54 
68 Cotton Futures Act of 1914 was one of the early attempts to proscribe manipulative practices. Pub. L. No. 
174, 38 Stat. 693 (Aug. 18, 1914). See; Jerry Markham, Law Enforcement and the History of Financial Market 
Manipulation, (M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2015), 36 
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adopted in financial market regulation and no longer than 15 years ago 69 . 
Furthermore, in contrast to the US, the case law on market manipulation in the EU is 
very limited, involving only a few disputes where competent authorities found a 
violation in accordance with relevant anti-manipulation rules. There are two cases in 
relation with the obligations and prohibitions adopted under REMIT; Ellering and 
Iberdrola. While the former involves a claim by Estonian Competition Authority that 
the defendant failed to comply with REMIT’s data disclosure obligations, the latter 
relates to a market manipulation claim by Spanish Competition Authority which 
asserted that the defendant violated REMIT’s anti-manipulation rules70. There are 
significant questions as to the type of market practices that constitutes market 
manipulation and the legal methodologies adopted for the prosecution of these 
practices. The complexity of these questions is further elevated with increasing level 
of market monitoring by sector-specific regulators which would give effect to more 
enforcement proceedings under REMIT’s prohibition of market manipulation. 
Therefore an extensive legal analysis that the thesis incorporates is fundamental in 
exploring the implications of anti-manipulation rules in EU wholesale energy markets.  
Finally, the interplay between EU competition law and REMIT with respect to the 
prosecution of anti-manipulation practice is more direct than those as to the 
enforcement of data disclosure obligations and insider trading prohibitions. The 
majority of market practices that are considered manipulative under REMIT and 
MAR can also give effect to antitrust proceedings as violations of Articles 101 and 
102. This results in overlaps between the jurisdictions of sector-specific regulators 
and competition authorities. To what extent anti-manipulation rules and EU 
competition law are applied concurrently without giving effect to the ne bis in idem 
principle is a major concern that was raised during the consultation period, prior to 
the adoption of REMIT and discussed in greater detail in this thesis. Again, the 
increasing number of investigations of possible breaches of anti-manipulation rules, 
in parallel with the growth in monitoring activities by regulators, deems it necessary 
to conduct an extensive legal analysis that evaluates the dimensions of such 
                                                          
69 Market Abuse Directive of 2003 was the first EU level regulatory instrument that incorporated a prohibition 
of market manipulation. The prosecution of insider trading, on the other hand, is older, dating back the 1989 
Insider Dealing Directive  89/592/EEC [1989] OJ L334/30 
70 See; First Economic Sanctions for REMIT Breaches in Europe, (Lexology, 16 February 2016), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=66b554d0-514c-40b3-b4fb-67374a43b111   
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concurrency. In this respect, it is the objective of this thesis to provide this extensive 
legal analysis and help market participants and other interested parties conceive the 
risks inherent in this new regulatory framework.  
I.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Multiplicity of applicable jurisdictions proscribing manipulative practices constitutes 
the major concern the thesis focuses on. In so doing, it seeks to answer the following 
questions. 
I.4.1. What Does REMIT Regulate? 
Asking this question, this thesis aims at exploring the scope of REMIT in regulating 
wholesale energy markets. It includes further definitions and explanations about the 
concepts of wholesale energy markets, wholesale energy products, inside 
information, and market manipulation. The main resources the thesis consults with, 
other than REMIT itself, in providing relevant definitions are EU soft law instruments 
such as, the advice document71 by the CESR-ERGEG and the guidance document72, 
published by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).  The 
guidance provides further definitions and explanations as to the concepts, 
obligations and prohibitions introduced under REMIT. Even though the Agency 
stresses that the guidance is a non-binding document73, that is, national regulators 
and other competent authorities can conclude decisions which are not in compatible 
with the approach taken by the Agency, it provides important legal implications as to 
market, products and practices to which REMIT is applicable.  Such analysis is 
fundamental to evaluate the regulatory regime established under REMIT. 
I.4.2. What are the Obligations and Prohibitions Incorporated under REMIT? 
The regulatory framework under REMIT is not limited solely to the prohibition of 
market manipulation. In fact, the regulation introduced two additional legal 
instruments in regulating EU wholesale energy markets. First, REMIT introduced an 
insider trading prohibition, which proscribes the use of certain types of non-public 
market information for economic benefits74. Second the Regulation put forward data 
                                                          
71 Supra note 21 
72 ACER, Guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the  
Council of 25 October, 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency, (4th edn, 2016) 
(hereinafter ACER’s Guidance) 
73 Ibid., 6 
74 Article 3, Regulation 1227/2011 
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disclosure obligations under which wholesale energy market participants are 
required to publish certain types of market information 75 . Together with the 
prohibition of market manipulation76, these provisions constitute the ‘three pillars’ of 
the legal framework that regulates trading in EU wholesale energy markets. The 
thesis does not discuss these provisions in great detail. Yet a brief discussion on the 
functioning of these provisions in relation to the prohibition of market manipulation is 
important to comprehend the integrity of the regulatory framework.  
I.4.3. How Does REMIT Define Market Manipulation?   
Incorporating an anti-manipulation rule, specifically for wholesale energy markets, 
REMIT introduces a set of definitions to describe market manipulation77. The thesis 
explores the aspects of these definitions, along with examples of manipulative 
practices, provided by ACER’s guidance 78 . An analysis of REMIT’s definitions 
provides insight into the approach taken by the EU on the prohibition of manipulative 
practices and evaluates whether this approach suffices to establish a prima facie 
case for the enforcement of the relevant anti-manipulation rule. 
I.4.4. What is Market Manipulation? 
Given the findings of the analysis on the definitions provided under REMIT, the 
thesis investigates other approaches to defining market manipulation developed in 
academic literature and case law. Even though, legal discussions on the features of 
market manipulation in the EU are immature, relevant academic literature and case 
law guidance in the US is diverse. Accordingly, the thesis engages into a detailed 
analysis on the concept of market manipulation as described in US academic 
literature and case law.  
I.4.5. How are US Anti-Manipulation Rules Applied to Energy Markets? 
Finding that US academic literature and case law did not produce a common 
approach in defining market manipulation and the application of the available 
definitions depended on several factors such as relevant markets, products and 
jurisdictions, the thesis examines how these definitions were applied to US energy 
markets. The findings of this analysis have important implications for the application 
                                                          
75 Ibid., Article 4 
76 Ibid., Article 5 
77 Ibid., Recitals 13 and 14 
78 ACER, (2016), 36-40 
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of REMIT’s anti-manipulation rule to EU wholesale energy markets. This analysis 
enables the thesis to reveal what types of activities were regarded as manipulation 
under relevant prohibitions and what types of legal methodologies have been used in 
identifying manipulative practices. This sheds light upon market practices that can be 
prosecutable under REMIT’s anti-manipulation rules and factors that should be taken 
into account in relevant anti-manipulation investigations. 
I.4.6. What are the Implications of US Case Law for EU Wholesale Energy 
Markets? 
Evaluating wholesale energy markets in the EU vis-à-vis those in the US, the thesis 
identifies that there are significant differences in legal methodologies employed by 
relevant competent authorities, enforcing respective anti-manipulation rules. The 
reasons that lead to these differences vary. Energy market designs, the formulation 
of market manipulation prohibitions and the designation of regulatory authorities that 
oversee energy market activities, are among the factors that differentiate the 
prosecution of manipulative practices in the US. Taking these differences into 
account, the thesis explores the types of manipulative practices that market 
participants can perpetrate in EU wholesale energy markets. 
I.4.7. What Types of Practices Result in the Concurrent Application of 
Competition Law 
The thesis identifies that the profitability of manipulative practices depends on 
perpetrators’ ability to secure certain price levels with respect to wholesale energy 
products. Therefore some price fixing manipulative schemes can also constitute 
violations of EU competition law. Accordingly, the thesis assesses how Articles 101 
and 102 can be applicable to such practices along with an analysis of legal 
approaches taken by competition authorities at EU and national level to the 
prosecution of price fixing market practices.   
I.4.8. How is the Concurrency Dealt With in EU Law?    
The concurrent application of EU competition law with sector-specific regulation is 
not a phenomenon peculiar for energy market regulation. Previously, EU courts 
addressed concurrency in the telecommunications sector which had been subject to 
a liberalisation process very similar to that experienced in the energy sector. The 
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findings of these cases have serious legal implications as to how a market practice 
can give effect to proceedings under both REMIT and EU competition law.  
I.4.9. When Does Concurrency Give Rise to Concerns about Ne Bis In Idem?  
The ne bis in idem principle, the EU equivalent of double jeopardy doctrine, means 
that market participants who have been tried for an alleged offence cannot be 
subject to legal proceedings twice for the same conduct. As certain market practices 
can result in enforcement actions from both competent regulators and competition 
authorities, the thesis deems it important to include a legal analysis of whether a 
concurrent application of EU competition law and anti-manipulation rules gives rise 
to concerns about ne bis in idem principle. 
I.4.10. How Can the Concerns about the Multiplicity of Applicable 
Jurisdictions be Mitigated?   
Legal discussions addressed throughout the chapters manifest that the concerns 
about multiplicity of applicable jurisdictions raised by market participants, prior to the 
adoption of REMIT, are not unfounded. The availability of measures, mitigating the 
economic and regulatory risks arising from this dual application such as, inter alia, 
over-regulation, decreased liquidity, and hampered investment, is fundamental for 
the operation of EU wholesale energy markets. The thesis sets forth a set of 
measures that can mitigate these concerns.  
I.5. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis adopted a doctrinal research methodology with an extensive comparative 
case law analysis to evaluate the concept of manipulation and manipulative market 
practices. An empirical study with an extensive exposure to trading practices in 
energy markets and the operation of organised market places in which energy 
products are traded could play a major role in comprehending the functioning of EU 
wholesale energy markets and the legal implications that new anti-manipulation rules 
in REMIT provided. Nevertheless, the thesis did not involve this type of empirical 
study due to time and monetary constraints. Such a study should include substantive 
analysis of energy prices in relation to market fundamentals that change 
considerably in different days of months and different seasons of years. Empirical 
analysis should clearly establish the types of trading behaviour carried out by 
different types of market participants on the basis of  alterations in demand of and 
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supply for energy. Time and financial resources that should be invested in such type 
of study is well beyond the limits of this thesis.    
REMIT is the main resource that this thesis employs in addressing the concept of 
market manipulation prohibition in the EU context. The Regulation included several 
definitions and explanations to ensure an effective application of the prohibition. 
Further guidance is derived from the consultation documents prepared by ACER79, 
CESR-ERGEG 80 , and the European Commission 81 , which are fundamental to 
comprehend the underlying factors that led to the adoption of REMIT. The thesis 
addresses, to a great extent, the advice ACER’s document, incorporating several 
examples of types of market manipulation. Even though it is a non-binding 
instrument, the document is of great important as it functions as guidance on which 
national competent authorities can rely, in enforcing obligations and prohibitions 
adopted under REMIT. In order to offer a detailed understanding of the concept, the 
thesis secondarily discusses financial regulation and, in particular, MAR, and MAD 
2003 whose anti-manipulation provisions served as the basis for the introduction of 
the concept in REMIT82.   
Apart from the guidance derived from the regulatory and EU soft law instruments, 
academic literature on the application and the functioning of REMIT is scarce. Even 
though certain aspects of the regulation were addressed in several books authored 
by, Petri Mantysaari83, Christopher Jones84, Kim Talus85, Martha Roggenkamp et 
al.86, Leigh Hancher et al.87, the main academic resource that provides a detailed 
analysis of obligations and prohibitions under REMIT and is used extensively by this 
thesis, is the article by R. Feltkamp and C.A.M. Musialski88. A book by John Ratliff 
                                                          
79 ACER, (2016) 
80 CESR and ERGEG, (2008) 
81 Supra note 22 
82 Regine Feltkamp & Cecile Musialski, ‘Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale Electricity Market: New 
rules for a better functioining market?’ [2013] Oil, Gas & Energy Law 1, 16 
83 Petri Mantysaari, (2015), 535-539   
84 Christopher Jones (ed), EU Energy Law, Volume II, EU Competition Law and Energy Markets, 
(Claeys&Casteels 2016) 
85 Kim Talus, Introduction to EU Energy Law, (OUP 2016) 
86 Martha Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell,  Anita Ronne, Inigo del Guayo (eds), Energy Law in Europe (OUP 
2016) 
87 Leigh Hancher, Adrien De Hauteclocque and Malgorzata Sadowska (eds), Capacity Mechanisms in the EU 
Energy Market: Law, Policy, and Economics (OUP 2015) 
88 Regine Feltkamp & Cecile Musialski, ‘Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale Electricity Market: New 
rules for a better functioining market?’ [2013] Oil, Gas & Energy Law 1 
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and Roberto Grasso89, which is announced to be published in September 2017, is 
expected to provide a substantial contribution to the effective understanding of the 
regulatory framework that governs EU wholesale energy markets. Yet, as of May 
2017, the academic literature on the application and functioning of REMIT is very 
limited.  
The lack of guidance on how market manipulation prohibition is applied to EU 
wholesale energy markets necessitates the adoption of a comparative analysis. This 
thesis incorporates US case law on market manipulation to enrich its evaluation of 
manipulative practices in energy markets. There are three fundamental reasons that 
persuaded this thesis to use US case law as an instrument of comparative study. 
First, the concept has been heavily discussed in US case law and academic 
literature. Second, anti-manipulation rules have been effectively enforced in US 
energy markets and thus US case law provides an insight into how undertakings can 
perpetrate manipulation in energy markets. Finally, certain US cases which involved 
findings of manipulation with respect to practices in US energy markets were cited by 
EU institutions in their soft law instruments to highlight the necessity of REMIT as a 
tailor-made legal framework. 
The thesis also takes into account the differences between US and EU energy 
markets, such as market designs, and structure of regulatory oversight, that affect 
and determine the means undertakings can employ in perpetrating manipulation. For 
example, while hub-based trading, financial energy products have been effectively 
used in the majority of natural gas markets in the US, bilateral and long-term 
contracts still dominate natural gas markets in the EU 90 . On the other hand, 
continuous liberalisation of electricity markets has led to convergence of energy-only 
markets across the EU, this has not been the case for US electricity markets which 
still suffer divergent market designs. This results in alterations in the levels of 
enforcement of anti-manipulation rules. While, anti-manipulation proceedings in the 
US mostly involve practices in natural gas markets, in the EU, REMIT is expected to 
be more effective in electricity markets.  
                                                          
89 John Ratliff, Roberto Grasso, Insider Trading and Market Manipulation in the European Wholesale Energy 
Markets – REMIT (Claeys & Casteels 2017) (forthcoming) 
90 Adrien de Hauteclocque & Jean-Michel Glachant, ‘Long-term energy supply contracts in European 
Competition Policy: Fuzzy not Crazy’, (2009) 37 Energy Policy 5399 
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Even though there is only one case in which a national competent authority 
concluded a violation of REMIT’s anti-manipulation provision, the thesis establishes 
that the relevant misconduct, which is capacity withholding, has been prevalent in 
EU wholesale energy markets and had been subject to several antitrust proceedings, 
prior to the adoption of REMIT. In this respect, the thesis engages in an extensive 
case law analysis under EU competition law91, including several decisions at both 
national and EU level and discussing the relevant antitrust methodologies. As to 
manipulative practices, other than capacity withholding, this thesis provides several 
scenarios through which market participants can seek to derive benefits, on the 
basis of its study on US case law.  
In its analysis of EU case law, the thesis establishes that the majority of market 
practices that can be considered as manipulative under REMIT can also give effect 
to antitrust proceedings under Articles 101 and/or 102. In order to address the 
duplication of applicable jurisdictions, the thesis explores the aspects of the 
concurrent enforcement of sector-specific regulation and EU competition law. The 
EU telecommunications sector, in which regulatory and competition authorities 
continuously exercised their jurisdictions concurrently and imposed remedies for the 
same market misconduct offers important legal conclusions as to how REMIT’s anti-
manipulation rules and EU competition law are applied concurrently. To what extent 
this concurrency gives rise to concerns about ne bis in idem principle constitutes the 
major focus of this thesis. The legal analysis on practices that can be prosecuted 
under both REMIT and EU competition law shows that certain measures should be 
adopted to mitigate these concerns.   
It is not the objective of this thesis to introduce a new market manipulation definition 
that applies to all types of manipulative practices. Neither does it suggest a definition 
that is applicable only to EU wholesale energy markets. Given that the academic 
literature on market manipulation is rife with definition proposals all of which have 
also been criticised on the grounds that they do not address all types of manipulative 
practices, the thesis adopts a case law analysis focusing on the types of market 
                                                          
91 Even though the term, EU competition law, infers a legal concept extending beyond EU antitrust rules, 
Articles 101 and 102, this thesis uses these two concepts interchangeably for the purposes of its legal analysis, 
as other topics of EU competition law, such as state aids, mergers, and grants of special and exclusive rights 
are not included in the objectives of this thesis.   
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practices that have been regarded as manipulative under relevant anti-manipulation 
rules. The findings of this analysis indicate that several market practices that are 
considered as types of market manipulation also constitute violations of EU 
competition law. As the EU’s approach to concurrency does not prevent the 
multiplicity of these jurisdictions, the thesis offers a set of policy recommendations 
which requires strong cooperation and coordination between regulatory and 
competition authorities, in compliance with the principle laid down in Recital 20 of 
REMIT92. While it is suggested certain types of market practices should be left under 
the jurisdiction of EU competition law, the thesis asserts that certain market practices 
should be subject to solely anti-manipulation proceedings, even if they also 
constitute a violation of antitrust rules. In order to give effect to this coordination, the 
adoption of a “Memorandum of Understanding” between regulatory and competition 
authorities is suggested. The thesis concludes that such an approach would serve as 
an effective mitigation measure and help the development of a single, transparent 
rulebook that  market participants can rely on while operating in wholesale energy 
markets.  
I.6. ORIGINALITY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis constitutes an original contribution to the academic literature on EU 
energy markets. There are three fundamental contributions that this thesis offers for 
the regulation of EU wholesale energy markets. First, the thesis is the first study 
which incorporates a comparative case law analysis on the enforcement of 
manipulative practices in EU and US energy markets. Even though a brief discussion 
on the comparison between US and EU anti-manipulation rules has been presented 
by some authors93 , a detailed inquiry of case law on market manipulation that 
encompasses both the US and the EU was missing. In this regard, this thesis 
constitutes an important contribution to the academic literature on both market 
manipulation and EU energy markets.  
                                                          
92 “It is important that the Commission and the Agency work closely together in implementing this Regulation 
and consult appropriately with the European Networks of Transmission System Operators for Electricity and for 
Gas and the European Securities and Markets Authority established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (ESMA), with national regulatory authorities, competent financial 
authorities and other Member State authorities such as national competition authorities, and with stakeholders 
such as organised market places (e.g. energy exchanges) and market participants”. Recital 20, Regulation 
1227/2011 
93 Shaun Ledgerwood & Dan Harris, ‘A Comparison of Anti-Manipulation Rules in US and EU Electricity and 
Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal for a Common Standard’, (2012), Energy Law Journal, 33/1 
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The concept of market manipulation is a rather new phenomenon in the EU vis-à-vis 
the US. The first provision that prohibits market manipulation was adopted in 2003 
and its scope was very limited, encompassing products only traded in regulated 
markets and exchanges. The adoption of REMIT is more recent. Even though it has 
been in force since 2011, the deadline by which Member States are required to 
empower their national regulatory or competition authorities with monitoring and 
enforcement competences became due in 2016. The obligations and prohibitions 
adopted under the Regulation have led to only two cases so far, and it is not possible 
to speak of a rapid development of a case law that can shed light upon how these 
obligations and prohibitions are enforced in EU wholesale energy markets. ACER’s 
guidance document constitutes the only resource that market participants can resort 
to in avoiding breaching the rules under REMIT. The uncertainties with respect to the 
application of the regulation are further elevated by the multiplicity of applicable 
jurisdictions and the Commission’s approach, so far, falls short of eliminating such 
uncertainties.  
Second, this thesis represents the first study that identifies a prima facie case for the 
establishment of market manipulation under REMIT. The uniformity of the legal 
methodology that national competent authorities follow in investigating market 
practices is fundamental for the enforcement of anti-manipulation rules across the 
EU. There are several factors, such as differences in the designation of national 
authorities with the competences to enforce REMIT and the lack of a EU-wide 
regulator with enforcement powers, that render a uniform application of REMIT’s 
anti-manipulation rules across the EU difficult. Therefore the determination of a 
common legal methodology that can be followed by national competent authorities in 
their enforcement proceedings is fundamental for uniformity in the application of 
REMIT.  
In its annual report94, ACER noted that in 2015, there were 26 possible breaches of 
REMIT’s anti-manipulation rule, and the number of such notifications was expected 
to increase, given growing awareness of the implementation of REMIT in the 
wholesale energy markets. Despite ACER’s concerns about varying levels of 
                                                          
94 ACER, REMIT Annual Report 2016, 7 October 2016, 41 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/official_documents/acts_of_the_agency/publication/remit%20annual%20report%
202016.pdf 
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implementation95, majority of member states transposed REMIT into their national 
legislation and the application of REMIT is moving forward96.  National regulatory or 
competition authorities have recently been granted with powers to enforce the new 
anti-manipulation regime in wholesale energy markets. To what extent the 
obligations and prohibitions under REMIT can be applied at national level without 
giving rise to concerns about diverging implementation procedures and multiple 
application jurisdictions remains to be seen. This thesis constitutes an important 
contribution to the academic literature on REMIT, through seeking to unravel these 
concerns.        
Finally, this thesis represents the first study that evaluates the new anti-manipulation 
regime under REMIT through an in-depth analysis of its interplay with EU 
competition law. Even though several concerns about the overlapping jurisdictions of 
anti-manipulation and antitrust rules have been raised by some commentators97 and 
market participants98, an extensive study that discusses the aspects of this interplay 
has been missing. Through its analysis of manipulative practices, in connection with 
their legal implications as to the application of EU competition law, the thesis fills a 
major gap in the academic literature that addresses the regulation of EU wholesale 
energy markets.  
The academic literature on the regulation of wholesale energy markets in the EU is 
scarce. As discussed, the article99 by R. Feltkamp and C.A.M. Musialski constitutes 
the only study that incorporates specific discussion on the legal regime established 
under REMIT. This thesis finds that the article provides a normative study of the 
relevant obligations and prohibitions with very limited analysis of case law. 
Explanations and examples, the thesis provides, are mostly based on ACER’s 
demarcation of manipulative practices. The legal implications of REMIT on EU 
                                                          
95 The Agency, in its annual report in 2016, stated that transposition of enforcement and sanctioning powers 
by Member States can vary and coherence in the implementation of prohibitions and obligations at national 
level was a prerequisite for the effective application of REMIT in the EU. See;  Ibid., 84.  
96 Council of European Energy Regulators, ‘CEER Memo on REMIT Implementation at National Level’, Ref:C14-
MIT-55-03 (Brussels, 2014). 
97 John Ratliff & Roberto Grasso, ‘REMIT – EU Legislation on Insider Trading and Market Manipulation in 
Wholesale Energy Markets Adopted’ (2011) WilmerHale 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=87107    
98 Supra note 54  
99 Regine Feltkamp & Cecile Musialski, ‘Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale Electricity Market: New 
rules for a better functioining market?’ [2013] Oil, Gas & Energy Law 1 
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wholesale energy markets are also discussed in several books on EU energy law. 
However, the information in these books is dispersed across several chapters and is 
far from providing a coherent, in-depth analysis on the legal framework REMIT 
established. 
I.7. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The first chapter discusses REMIT, in general. It addresses the legal regime through 
exploring data disclosure obligations, insider trading and market manipulation 
prohibitions, which serve as the ‘three pillars’ of the new regulatory framework, 
applicable to EU wholesale energy markets. The chapter incorporates a textual 
analysis, evaluating the details of the definitions and explanations provided by the 
Regulation and identifying that legal uncertainties with respect to the definitions and 
the scope of REMIT are not limited only to the concept of market manipulation but, in 
fact, apply to the whole regulatory framework. It also addresses financial regulatory 
and competition jurisdictions applicable to EU wholesale energy markets. This 
chapter concludes that sector-specific regulators and competition authorities can 
open proceedings concurrently for the same market practices, and explores the 
approach taken by the EU court to the concurrency to evaluate the concurrent 
application of REMIT and EU competition law. 
The second chapter examines market manipulation prohibition, establishing an 
extensive literature review, along with discussions in case law. The majority of the 
academic literature and case law analysis is from the US, due to its long history of 
market manipulation prosecution. Therefore, the chapter also discusses how anti-
manipulation rules have been formed and applied in the US. It also finds that 
establishing a definition of manipulation that applies to all types of manipulative 
activities for commentators and US courts has proved to be very difficult. This has 
resulted in ramifications in the approaches and definitions adopted by different 
regulatory authorities.  
Finding that US case law has continuously prosecuted manipulative practices under 
relevant anti-manipulation rules, the thesis, in the third chapter, explores how anti-
manipulation rules have been enforced in US energy markets. This chapter includes 
an extensive case law analysis encompassing different types of manipulative 
practices with a detailed discussion of legal methodologies that regulatory authorities 
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have adopted. It also gives an insight into the types of physical and financial 
instruments that market participants have employed in devising their manipulative 
schemes. The case law analysis and the legal discussions provided in this chapter 
offer fundamental implications as to the types of manipulative practices that can be 
perpetrated in EU wholesale energy markets.   
The fourth chapter discusses the enforcement and the prosecution of manipulative 
practices in the EU. The chapter looks at EU case law on manipulative practices in 
comparison with the approach taken by US authorities in prosecuting similar 
practices. Despite the differences between the two legal systems, this chapter 
identifies that US case law on energy market manipulation offers important legal 
implications as to the prosecution of manipulative practices in EU wholesale energy 
markets. Several scenarios are discussed and evaluated in relation to the definitions 
provided in REMIT and ACER’s guidance document. The legal analysis put forward 
in this chapter shows that the majority of practices that can constitute a violation of 
REMIT’s anti-manipulation rules may also give effect to proceedings under antitrust 
rules which result in concerns about duplicative jurisdictions and double jeopardy/ne 
bis in idem principle.  
The final chapter involves conclusions, policy recommendations to mitigate legal 
uncertainties arising from REMIT and related legal topics that can be subject to 
further research projects.  In this chapter, the thesis highlights that there are 
significant problems and ambiguities related to the regulatory framework established 
by REMIT, and the effective functioning of this framework requires prompt mitigation 
measures that can be adopted and exercised in harmony at both national and EU 
level. This chapter proposes that while certain types of market practices should be 
dealt with under REMIT’s anti-manipulation rules, others can be prosecuted more 
efficiently by competition authorities. 
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1. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE TO EU WHOLESALE 
ENERGY MARKETS 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The energy liberalisation process resulted in the dematerialisation of energy 
markets100, leading to the separation of electricity and natural gas contracts from 
physical delivery. These contracts started to be traded as commodities, separately 
from the physical underlying products, in multilateral trading facilities, designed to 
render energy trading standardised and efficient. Continuous convergence of 
national energy markets through liberalisation resulted in the designation of common 
market models such as mandatory pools, called ‘Energy-Only’ markets, for electricity 
and ‘Gas Target Model’ for natural gas. The aim of these regulatory instruments has 
been to establish a market structure, which provides a level playing field for 
electricity and natural gas trading. 
Energy regulatory packages101  have not constituted the only instruments for the 
liberalisation of energy markets. Competition law rules have also played a major role 
in ensuring that market players act in a competitive manner within European energy 
markets. Competences that the European Commission have held as to the 
functioning of competition in the EU are diverse. It can initiate proceedings against 
market participants and member states as well as adopt measures to design national 
or regional markets through its authorities under merger regulation 102 , state aid 
provisions103, and antitrust rules104. After the publication of the ‘Energy Sector Inquiry’ 
in 2007105 (the Sector Inquiry), the Commission increased its intervention in national 
energy markets through merger controls 106 , commitment 107  and infringement 
decisions108. Nevertheless these decisions constituted only ex-post remedies and did 
                                                          
100 CESR and ERGEG (2008), 7 
101 Supra note 4  
102 Supra note 8 
103 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Articles 107, 108, and 109, 
[2012] OJ C326/47 
104 Ibid., Articles 101, 102, and 106, [2012] OJ C326/47 
105 Supra note 20  
106 Sydkraft/Graninge (Case COMP/M.3268) Commission Decision 2003/297/EC OJ C 297/22; EDP/ENI/GDP 
(Case COMP/M.3440) Commission Decision 2005/801/EC, [2005] OJ L302/69; E.ON/MOL (Case COMP/M.3696) 
Commission Decision 2006/622/EC OJ L253/20; RWE/Essent (Case COMP/M.5467) Commission Decision 
23/06/2009 OJ C222/1; EDF/British Energy (Case COMP/M.5225) Commission Decision 22/12/2008 OJ C38/8 
107 German Electricity Wholesale Market (COMP/39.388) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C36/8; Distigaz 
(COMP/37.966) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C9/8; Swedish Interconnectors (Case COMP/39.351) 
Commission Decision [2010] OJ C 239/4 
108 E.ON/GDF (COMP/39.401) Commission Decision [2009] OJ C248/5; Greek lignite (COMP/38.700) 
Commission Decision [2009] OJ C243/5 
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not establish a specific legal framework to deal with anti-competitive practices in 
European energy markets.  
The evolution of energy markets has led to concerns as to whether the existing 
regulatory and antitrust provisions are sufficient to address the integrity of newly 
established energy markets and market abuses that cause inefficiencies and 
imbalances in the functioning of demand and supply. Noting the information 
asymmetry inherent in the market due to a high degree of vertical integration, which 
enables energy undertakings to share fundamental information as to capacity of 
production and transmission infrastructures with affiliates under the same energy 
undertakings109, the Sector Inquiry110 found that the then-existing legal framework, 
which applied to energy markets did not suffice to prevent incumbent undertakings 
from exercising their market power and thus influencing electricity and natural gas 
prices 111 . Consequently, in 2008, the Commission sought consultation with the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the European Regulators’ 
Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) as to the applicability and effectiveness of 
the then-existing legal framework in ensuring the competitiveness of European 
energy markets. The advice112  given by CESR and ERGEG to the Commission 
proposed the adoption of a tailor-made legal framework to specifically address 
inefficiencies in the European wholesale energy markets, which later paved the way 
for the adoption of the Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and 
Transparency (REMIT) in 2011. 
This chapter aims to identify the framework by the REMIT which was designed under 
the guidance of the consultation process between the Commission, CESR and 
ERGEG. In so doing, it first circumscribes the scope of the regulation identifying 
what type of products, markets and market behaviours are included and addressed 
within the new framework. Noting that REMIT has three important pillars in regulating 
the wholesale energy markets, the chapter focuses on the first pillar, disclosure 
obligations, including the types of information, which market participants have a duty 
                                                          
109 The Inquiry, 188 
110 Published in 2007, the Inquiry was an energy sector specific document addressing the reasons why 
consumers are not reaping the full benefits of liberalisation in the energy markets. The Inquiry focused on 
areas, in which competition is not functioning effectively and the barriers that prevent effective competition in 
the energy markets. Ibid., 4 
111 Ibid., 124-125 
112 CESR and ERGEG (2008)  
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to make public. The second pillar of the framework established by REMIT, the 
prohibition of insider trading, identifies the features needed for information to qualify 
as inside information, along with the concerns raised by market participants on legal 
ambiguity with respect to the definitions given by REMIT and the guidance 113 
published by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).  
Next, the chapter addresses the prohibition of market manipulation, providing a legal 
analysis on the market behaviours classified under REMIT. Examples are also given 
by ACER in its guidance document shedding light upon how the National Regulatory 
Agencies should interpret market behaviours in the enforcement of REMIT at the 
national level. After discussing REMIT and its scope, this chapter explores other 
regulatory instruments applicable to EU wholesale energy markets. Certain 
definitions and rules under financial market regulation constitute great importance to 
comprehend the legal regime REMIT established. The chapter also provides details 
about the pertinence of EU competition law rules as to their application in regulated 
markets. The adoption of REMIT does not preclude the possibility that the market 
practices may also give effect to proceedings under antitrust rules. The multiplicity of 
applicable jurisdictions often leads to concerns about duplicative proceedings and 
double jeopardy/ne bis in idem principle. In this regard, the chapter discusses the 
concurrent application of EU competition law and sector-specific regulation and the 
approach adopted by EU courts in addressing ne bis in idem principle.  Finally the 
analysis provides the basis for some conclusions on the effectiveness of the 
regulatory framework.     
1.2. REMIT 
1.2.1. General 
REMIT is a regulatory framework, specifically tailored for the European wholesale 
electricity and natural gas markets. As the majority of its legal context and definitions 
are based on MAD 2003114, which also provided a legal framework for information 
disclosure, and the prohibition of insider trading and market manipulation, REMIT 
                                                          
113 ACER has published four editions of Guidance on the application of REMIT. As non-binding and drafted 
using non-legal terminology, Guidance is referred to National Regulatory Agencies to promote coordination 
and consistency. See: Supra note 72  
114 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January, 2003 on insider dealing 
and market manipulation (market abuse) [2003] OJ L96/16.  This directive was later repealed by Regulation 
(EU) No 596/2014  
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was structured to specifically address the transparency and integrity of the European 
energy markets. According to the “Advice Document”, prepared by the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the European Regulators’ Group for 
Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) for the European Commission, MAD was not sufficient 
to deal with information asymmetries, insider dealing and market manipulation in the 
electricity and gas markets, as it only addresses trading in financial markets and has 
a limited disclosure obligation to market participants115. Additionally the position of 
issuer, who is responsible for information disclosure within this context is not present 
in energy markets. Identifying that only a small proportion of energy transactions is 
covered by the existing regulatory framework, CESR and ERGEG, in their advice 
document recommended the adoption of a tailor made legal framework to address 
transparency and market integrity in energy markets, which may be attributed to the 
rationale behind the adoption of REMIT. 
1.2.2. Scope of REMIT 
According to Article 1(2) of REMIT, the regulation applies to trading in “wholesale 
energy products”, while the provisions on insider trading, Article 3 of REMIT, and 
market manipulation, Article 5 of REMIT, are not applicable to the wholesale energy 
products to which Article 9 of MAD applies, the obligation to publish inside 
information, Article 4 of REMIT, applies to all trading in energy markets including the 
transactions within the context of Article 9 of MAD, which states that the directive 
applies to “any financial instrument admitted to trading on a regulated market in at 
least one Member State, or for which a request for admission to trading on such a 
market has been made, irrespective of whether or not the transaction itself actually 
takes place on that market”. (italics added) The transactions that are deemed to be 
financial instruments within the context of Article 9 of MAD were listed under article 
1(3) of MAD, including derivatives on commodities, options, swaps and other 
instruments traded in a regulated market. Article 1(4) of MAD referred to Article 4(1) 
of Directive 2004/39/EC (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive – called MiFID 
2004 hereinafter), which identified the concept of a ‘regulated market’ as “(…) a 
multilateral system operated and/or managed by a market operator, which brings 
together or facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and selling 
                                                          
115 CESR and ERGEG, (2008) 15 
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interests in financial instruments (…)”116. Accordingly, Articles 3 and 5 of REMIT 
were not applicable to financial energy products such as derivatives, options and 
swaps if the trading in these products takes place in regulated markets, e.g. power 
exchanges, while information disclosure obligation is not subject to such restriction.  
The financial energy derivatives, options and swaps that were not traded in regulated 
markets remained within the scope of REMIT. Several financial energy products that 
were traded bilaterally or in multilateral trading facilities that did not fulfil the 
requirements of regulated markets were still subject to Articles 3 and 5 of REMIT. 
The Commission’s impact assessment found that only 16 per cent of trading in 
energy products were regulated under MAD 2003, and the remaining 84 per cent of 
trading in energy products were out-scope of then-existing financial market 
regulation which, according to the Commission, necessitated the adoption of REMIT 
as a tailor-made regulatory framework for energy markets117. MAD 2003 was later 
repealed by Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, Market Abuse Regulation118 (hereinafter 
MAR) and Directive 2014/57/EU, Market Abuse Directive119 (hereinafter MAD 2014) 
which together expanded the scope of market manipulation prohibition under new 
financial market regulation and started to extensively regulate all  financial energy 
products, irrespective of venues they are traded in. This recalibration considerably 
limited the scope of REMIT’s insider trading and market manipulation prohibitions.  
1.2.2.1. Wholesale Energy Products 
In order to circumscribe the scope of REMIT, identifying the concept of “wholesale 
energy products” within the meaning of Article 1(2) of REMIT is crucial. In Article 2(4), 
REMIT lists the following instruments irrespective of how and where they are traded:  
(a) contracts for the supply of electricity or natural gas where delivery is in the 
Union; 
(b) derivatives relating to electricity or natural gas produced, traded or 
delivered in the Union; 
                                                          
116 Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April, 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC OJ L 145, 
(30.4.2004) 
117 REMIT Impact Assessment (2010), 13 
118 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014  
119 Directive 2014/57/EU  
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(c) contracts relating to the transportation of electricity or natural gas in the 
Union; 
(d)  derivatives relating to the transportation of electricity or natural gas in the 
Union120. 
As the supply of electricity and natural gas to final users, including industrial, 
commercial and household energy consumers, is understood within the retail section 
of the energy supply chain, the contracts or derivatives with respect to the supply of 
energy to these consumers are not wholesale energy products and therefore remain 
outside the scope of REMIT. However, in line with the Commission’s practice of 
relevant market analysis in energy cases121, attributing certain industrial customers, 
annual energy consumption of which exceeds 600GW, to the wholesale markets, 
REMIT states that supply and distribution of energy to final consumers, whose 
energy consumption is greater than 600 GW are also within the scope of wholesale 
energy products.122   
The definition given in Article 2(4) raises several questions with respect to the scope 
of the provisions in practice. From a legal perspective, derivatives are also a type of 
contract. The grounds on which Article 2(4) differentiates between contracts and 
derivatives is important for the application of the regulation. The reading of the Article 
suggests that what distinguishes contracts from derivatives is whether the energy 
subject to contracts or derivatives is physically delivered. Such an interpretation is 
problematic in practice as derivatives, despite being financial instruments, may also 
lead to physical deliveries in the energy transactions 123 . Furthermore, market 
manipulation and insider trading prohibitions under MAR do not provide a 
differentiation between financial energy products on the basis of physical settlement. 
All derivatives, swaps and options contracts that are physically delivered are also in-
scope for MAR. Demarcating derivatives and contracts on the basis of physical 
delivery, gives rise to questions as to the applicable regulatory jurisdictions and the 
scope of REMIT. Neither REMIT nor the ACER’s guidance provides clear guidance 
                                                          
120 Article 2(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011  
121 Accordingly, the Commission focuses on whether the large industrial customers are supplied by the traders 
or companies at the wholesale level, or by the distribution companies in the retail markets. See: EDF/British 
Energy (Case COMP/M.5224) Commission Decision 22/12/2008, OJ C38/8 
122 Article 2(5), Regulation No 1227/2011.  
123 Regine Feltkamp & Cecile Musialski, ‘Integrity and Transparency in the EU Wholesale Electricity Market: 
New rules for a better functioning market?’ [2013] Oil, Gas & Energy Law 1, 7 
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on how the concepts of contracts and derivatives are to be determined within the 
wholesale energy markets.  
The reading of the Article also suggests that the scope of wholesale energy products 
is limited only to the trade in contracts or derivatives for supply, or demand for, or 
relating to electricity and natural gas124. This implies that REMIT does not apply to 
trade in underlying energy products and the physical trade of electricity and natural 
gas remains outside its scope. In other words, it is the contracts and derivatives that 
are regarded as wholesale energy products within the scope of REMIT, rather than 
physical products of electricity and natural gas. Accordingly a long-term energy 
supply contract that involves two parties transacting for delivery of energy products 
for a certain time period would be left outside the scope of wholesale energy 
products. Such an interpretation results in complexities in the application of REMIT 
to certain physical energy contracts such as spot contracts in wholesale energy 
markets. Exclusion of these contracts from the concept of wholesale energy products 
would significantly reduce the scope of REMIT. No clear guidance that indicates 
what type of contracts can be considered as in-scope within the meaning of Article 
2(4) is present under the current regulatory framework and it is hardly reasonable to 
expect a common legal approach developed at national level, which deals with 
market abuse in the European energy markets.   
The subparagraph of Article 2(5) stipulates that “contracts for the supply and 
distribution” of energy products to end-users whose consumption levels are greater 
than 600GW are regarded as wholesale energy products. In its document, Questions 
and Answers on REMIT, ACER concludes that this article means that both electricity 
and natural gas distribution networks and distribution system operators are 
considered final users and therefore remain outside the scope of REMIT, unless their 
capacity exceeds the relevant threshold125. However, in practice, the distribution 
system operators (DSOs) often participate in the wholesale energy markets to buy 
the energy products to supply their final users and fulfil their contractual 
                                                          
124 Ibid.  
 
125 Questions & Answers on REMIT, (20th Edition), see; https://www.acer-remit.eu/portal/custom-
category/remit_questions, 12 
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obligations126 . Excluding the contracts that the DSOs enter into to supply their 
customers will result in a very limited scope for the application of REMIT. Such an 
interpretation is also not in compliance with the relevant definition of final consumers 
as articulated under Directives 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC, which identify the final 
consumer as “a customer purchasing electricity or natural gas for his own use”127. 
Therefore, the ACER’s consideration of DSOs as final consumers causes further 
uncertainties as to the application of REMIT.   
In practice, certain electricity generation units or natural gas suppliers may also enter 
into transactions in the wholesale market for their own use, such as to cover their 
production losses or to carry out their operations. To what extent these market 
participants can be considered final users or such contracts can be regarded as 
wholesale energy products, is an open question. Again, neither REMIT nor ACER’s 
guidance provides enough advice for the national regulatory authorities to interpret 
how the relevant REMIT provisions will be applied in such circumstances.  
1.2.2.2. Wholesale Energy Markets 
In order to evaluate how different wholesale energy products are interlinked and 
certain behaviours affect the relevant prices of these products, defining wholesale 
energy markets where the competition between these products take place is crucial 
for the legal analysis of market manipulation and insider trading carried out under 
REMIT.  According to Article 2(6); “wholesale energy market means any market 
within the Union on which wholesale energy products are traded”. Such a definition 
is very broad, encompassing both commodity and financial markets. In its guidance, 
ACER lists examples for the identification of the relevant markets: 
• Balancing markets for the trading of electricity or natural gas with delivery in 
the Union;  
• Intraday or within-day markets for the trading of electricity or natural gas with 
delivery in the Union;  
• Day-ahead or two-day-ahead markets for the trading of electricity or natural 
gas with delivery in the Union, including week-end products;  
                                                          
126 See: Petri Mantysaari, (2015), 535-539   
127 Article 2(9), Directive 2009/72/EC; Article 2(27), Directive 2009/73/EC  
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• Physical markets for the trading of electricity or natural gas with delivery in the 
Union, including markets for physical forward contracts and non-standardised 
long-term contracts;  
• Markets for the transportation capacities of electricity or natural gas in the 
Union; 
• Derivatives markets relating to electricity or natural gas produced, traded or 
delivered in the Union, including financial OTC markets;  
• Derivatives markets relating to the transportation of electricity or natural gas in 
the Union128. 
The ACER’s list is not exhaustive129 and does not provide a comprehensive analysis 
of wholesale energy markets. First, it does not discuss the geographic aspects of 
energy markets. The demarcation of wholesale energy markets largely depends on 
the availability of transmission networks. While some wholesale energy products are 
limited to only sub-national markets, others may be supplied in national or even 
regional wholesale energy markets. Second, ACER does not address how wholesale 
energy markets may differentiate or converge on the basis of a time period when 
wholesale energy products are supplied. Generally, during hours when demand for 
energy products is not high, wholesale energy markets may encompass wider 
geographic regions. For example, in Nordic countries, wholesale electricity market 
may include multiple national energy markets, as capacity in cross-border 
interconnectors is not congested as a result of electricity flow130. This is changed 
during peak hours when demand for electricity is at its highest. In these hours, the 
cross-borders interconnectors do not suffice to transmit enough volumes of electricity 
to supply demand and wholesale energy markets become national or even sub-
national on the basis of congestion levels at national transmission grids.  
One can argue that ACER only sheds light upon what constitutes wholesale energy 
markets and is not expected to provide a detailed analysis of factors that determine 
the scope of wholesale energy markets, which differ on a case-by-case basis across 
the EU. It is true that it is not reasonable for ACER to establish a common framework 
for wholesale energy markets whose scopes differ considerably based on market 
                                                          
128 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 16  
129 “The Agency’s understanding is that the definition of wholesale energy markets furthermore includes, 
among others, but is not limited to: (…)”, Ibid., 15  
130 Sydkraft/Graninge, para. 12 
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structures and conditions. However, identifying the factors that affect the interplay 
and demarcation of wholesale energy markets is fundamental for the evaluation of 
market manipulation and other market abuse prohibitions. REMIT and ACER’s 
guidance provides little understanding on the approach that should be taken by the 
national regulatory agencies in applying REMIT. It is hardly possible to derive from 
the wording of the definition an approach on how the national regulatory agencies 
can develop a common understanding for identifying the relevant wholesale energy 
markets. Given the lack of a common understanding on how REMIT will be applied 
in identifying the relevant wholesale energy markets, it is futile to expect that there 
will be a consistent legal approach adhered to by the national regulatory agencies. 
The importance of the establishment of a common methodology in identifying 
wholesale energy markets is discussed in greater detail in the following sections. 
Articles and descriptions included in ACER’s guidance, such as the concepts of 
trading, wholesale energy products and energy markets, are designed in very broad 
terms. While REMIT provides only limited guidance in explaining these concepts, the 
descriptions and examples given by ACER in its guidance paper, whose purpose is 
to assist national regulatory authorities in carrying out their duties established under 
REMIT, are far from illuminating such controversies. Even though it stresses that 
providing a legal interpretation of REMIT is not its intention in developing the 
guidance paper, ACER should provide a more detailed legal approach to assist 
national regulatory authorities in the application of REMIT at the national level.    
1.2.3. Data Disclosure   
1.2.3.1 General 
In the final report of the Energy Sector Inquiry, the Commission found that “(t)here is 
a general perception that generation data of vertically integrated incumbents is first 
shared with affiliates and not necessarily at all with other market participants, which 
undermines confidence in the wholesale  markets” 131 . Vertically integrated 
companies, which own assets in generation and transmission as well as distribution 
of energy products, hold a favourable position with respect to market information 
fundamental for the functioning of the market. Holding a better position in accessing 
information valuable for anticipating price movements leaves other market 
                                                          
131 The Inquiry, 188. 
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participants making poor trading decisions and making the European energy markets 
less competitive. Referring to the findings of the Energy Sector Inquiry, CESR and 
ERGEG, in their advice document, considered information asymmetry within the 
energy sector as a market failure, noting that such asymmetry, linked to poor levels 
of transparency, would facilitate the exercise of insider trading and market 
manipulation 132 . Furthermore, the lack of information and an efficient market 
monitoring practice needed by the national regulatory authorities would result in 
market abuse and the exercise of market power in the European energy markets 
would remain undetected and unprosecuted133. Identifying that then-existing legal 
provisions and guidelines on the obligations of transparency do not suffice to provide 
a level playing field for the market participants, CESR and ERGEG proposed the 
inclusion of new transparency obligations into the new tailor-made legal framework, 
specifically designed for the energy markets, involving the disclosure of information 
on fundamental data such as the availability of generation, transmission and storage 
capacities134.  The legal framework proposed in the advice document was later 
adopted under REMIT.  
1.2.3.2. The Obligation  
Article 4(1) of REMIT requires that “(m)arket participants shall publicly disclose in an 
effective and timely manner inside information which they possess in respect of 
business or facilities which the market participant concerned, or its parent 
undertaking or related undertaking, owns or controls or for whose operational 
matters that market participant or undertaking is responsible, either in whole or in 
part. Such disclosure shall include information relevant to the capacity and use of 
facilities for production, storage, consumption or transmission of electricity or natural 
gas or related to the capacity and use of LNG facilities, including planned or 
unplanned unavailability of these facilities”. Accordingly, a market participant which is 
in possession of and under obligation to disclose inside information is obliged to do 
so in an effective and timely manner. REMIT does not give further guidance on when 
and how a disclosure activity may constitute effective and in time.  
                                                          
132 CESR and ERGEG (2008), 9 
133 Ibid.,  10 
134 Ibid.,  16 
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Stressing that the disclosure should be as wide as possible, ACER, in its guidance 
notes that disclosure of information via reporting platforms, such as trade 
repositories, may constitute effective within the meaning of Article 4(1)135. ACER 
introduces a dual approach for market participants to follow in fulfilling their 
disclosure obligations. Accordingly, a market participant should use transparency 
platforms that are operated by transmission system operators, power exchanges or 
third parties, to meet disclosure requirements. If such transparency platforms do not 
exist, market participants can publish inside information on their websites. Again 
market participants should take necessary measures to make sure that the 
disclosure of inside information through their websites is as wide as possible136.  
1.2.3.3. Inside Information 
1.2.3.3.1. Definition 
The definition of inside information is fundamental to comprehend the scope of the 
obligation. REMIT gives the meaning of inside information as:  
a) information, which is required to be made public in accordance with 
Regulations (EC) No 714/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009, including 
guidelines and network codes adopted pursuant to those Regulations; 
b) information relating to the capacity and use of facilities for production, 
storage, consumption or transmission of electricity or natural gas or related 
to the capacity and use of LNG facilities, including planned or unplanned 
unavailability of these facilities; 
c) information which is required to be disclosed in accordance with legal or 
regulatory provisions at Union or national level, market rules, and 
contracts or customs on the relevant wholesale energy market, in so far as 
this information is likely to have a significant effect on the prices of 
wholesale energy products; and 
                                                          
135 The disclosure practice is also required to meet criteria of minimum quality requirements. See Guidance on 
the application of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October, 
2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (4th Edition), 17 June 2016, 42-43 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/remit/Documents/REMIT%20ACER%20Guidance%203rd%20Edition_FINAL.pdf 
136 Ibid.,  
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d) other information that a reasonable market participant would be likely to 
use as part of the basis of its decision to enter into a transaction relating to, 
or to issue an order to trade in, a wholesale energy product137. 
The disclosure obligation for the information listed in a) and c) stems from existing 
transparency regulations as adopted under the Third Energy Package and network 
codes, such as congestion management and capacity allocation mechanisms138. 
Including such information within the scope of inside information, REMIT aims at 
disclosure of this transparency information in coherence with the disclosure of other 
information deemed to be fundamental for the functioning of energy markets. The 
scope of information listed in b) and d), on the other hand, is broadly defined and 
may involve any information that has price effects within the wholesale energy 
markets.  
1.2.3.3.2. Examples of Inside Information 
REMIT’s definition of inside information gave rise to concerns about the 
categorisation of confidential information that is fundamental for practicing business 
in wholesale energy markets as inside information within the meaning of reporting 
obligations. Noting that the relevant definition does not apply to confidential 
information that should not be public for the purpose of market participants’ trading 
strategy, ACER provided a list of information, which has a significant effect on prices 
in the wholesale energy markets:  
• Information relating to the capacity and use of facilities for production of 
electricity or natural gas, including planned and unplanned unavailability of 
these facilities; 
• Information relating to the capacity and use of facilities for storage of 
electricity or natural gas, including planned and unplanned availability of these 
facilities;  
• Information relating to the capacity and use of facilities for consumption of 
electricity or natural gas, including planned and unplanned unavailability of 
these facilities;  
                                                          
137 Article 2(1), Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 
138 Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July, 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and 
congestion management, OJ L197/24  
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• Information relating to the capacity and use of facilities for transmission, 
including planned or unplanned unavailability of these facilities;  
• Information relating to the capacity and use of LNG facilities, including 
planned and unplanned unavailability of these facilities;  
• Information required to be issued in accordance with legal or regulatory 
provisions at Union, or National level;  
• Information required to be issued in accordance with Market Rules;  
• Information required to be issued in accordance with Contracts; - Information 
required to be issued in accordance with Customs on the market;  
• other information that a reasonable market participant would be likely to use 
as part of the basis of its decision to enter into a transaction relating to, or to 
issue an order to trade in, a wholesale energy product139. 
1.2.3.3.3. Concerns about the Concept of Inside Information 
The extent of information required to be made public in accordance with REMIT 
causes some concerns from the energy sector, especially from the producers. As 
can be seen from ACER’s guidance, the main focus was directed to the question of 
availability with respect to the existing capacity of certain infrastructure, such as 
generation, transmission and storage. During the negotiations, prior to the 
development of the advice document, CESR and ERGEG received reports of serious 
concerns from market participants as to the disclosure of information on planned and 
unplanned outages in generation facilities140. It is asserted that the generator should 
not be deprived of the right to manage the risks arising from the operation of their 
assets. Disclosing the information on planned or unplanned outages in power 
generation without having the opportunity to secure their contractual and economic 
positions would place the energy producers in the position of distressed buyers of 
energy141.  Accordingly such a requirement would further deter competition and 
distort the operation and prices of the market.  
                                                          
139 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 28  
140 For all the responses from invited market participants, see; https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-
news/consultations/joint-consultation-cesr-and-ergeg-advice-european-commission-in-context  
141 See, in particular; Association of Electricity Producers’ Response to CESR/ERGEG Consultation on Market 
Abuse; British Energy, CESR/ERGEG consultation paper on draft advice to the European Commission proposing 
an EU market abuse framework for energy markets; EDF Trading, CESR and ERGEG advice to the European 
Commission in the context of the Third Energy Package: Market Abuse. See:  
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In order to address such concerns expressed by the market participants, Article 4(2) 
of REMIT submits that:  
“a market participant may under its own responsibility exceptionally delay the 
public disclosure of inside information so as not to prejudice its legitimate 
interests provided that such omission is not likely to mislead the public and 
provided that the market participant is able to ensure the confidentiality of that 
information and does not make decisions relating to trading in wholesale 
energy products based upon that information”.  
The decision of when and how the submission of relevant information to the national 
regulatory agencies and ACER is delayed is under the discretion of market 
participants. In its guidance, ACER notes that market participants must ensure that 
the relevant information is made public after the legitimate positions are taken and 
secured142. Whether or not Article 4(2) should be or is applied in a legitimate way 
can be determined ex-post.143    
ACER’s role in collecting all the relevant information from market participants and 
monitoring the market with respect to abusive practices is important for the well-
functioning of European energy markets. It is ACER’s duty to collect and screen the 
information acquired from the market and ensure that national regulatory authorities 
carry out their monitoring and enforcement activities in coordination with each other. 
Stressing that the wholesale energy markets across the EU are increasingly 
integrated in a manner that a market abuse exercised in a market affects the price of 
energy in other markets, ACER is of the view that a holistic approach with respect to 
monitoring market conduct is essential. According to Article 4 of Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014, ACER can also request certain 
contracts and details of transactions to be reported on an ad-hoc basis144. However, 
ACER lacks competence in investigating market abuse and prosecuting market 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/consultations/joint-consultation-cesr-and-ergeg-advice-european-
commission-in-context  
142 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 18  
143 Ibid., 44  
144 The details of reportable wholesale energy products and fundamental data are defined by the Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014 of 17 December, 2014 on data reporting implementing Article 
8(2) and Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
wholesale energy market integrity and transparency, OJ. L 363/121. 
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participants under REMIT.  According to Article 18 of REMIT, it is national regulatory 
authorities’ duty to establish rules on the enforcement and penalties levied on market 
participants for any infringement of REMIT. How market abuse is prosecuted and 
what sanctions as well as remedies are available for the prohibited conduct will be 
dealt with and are open to interpretation by the national regulatory authorities.   
1.2.4. Insider Trading 
1.2.4.1. General 
The perpetration of insider trading practices constitutes a major way for market 
participants to exploit information asymmetry, which predominantly exists in EU 
energy markets due to pre-liberalisation market structures and directly threatens the 
policy of liberalised, integrated and harmonised wholesale energy markets in the 
EU145. The concept of insider trading is described as a situation in which perpetrators 
who detect differences between the value and the price of wholesale energy 
products on the basis of undisclosed information, and engage in transactions to 
derive profits from this information 146 . Providing a detailed legal and economic 
analysis on insider trading practices is not among the purposes of this thesis as, 
despite being closely related, the law of insider trading prohibitions is distinct from 
that of market manipulation and cannot be dealt with in a single thesis. However, 
identifying the legal framework under REMIT, with respect to obligations and 
prohibitions that market participants are required to adhere to in energy markets, is 
fundamental in understanding the rationale behind the adoption of market 
manipulation rules.  
1.2.4.2. The Prohibition 
Article 3(1) of REMIT prohibits three types of behaviour carried out by persons who 
have inside information on wholesale energy products: 
(a) “using that information by acquiring or disposing of, or by trying to acquire or 
dispose of, for their own account or for the account of a third party, either 
                                                          
145 CESR-ERGEG (2008), para. 28 
146 Emilios E. Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis, (OUP 
2005), 79 
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directly or indirectly, wholesale energy products to which that information 
relates;  
(b) disclosing that information to any other person unless such disclosure is made 
in the normal course of the exercise of their employment, profession or duties;  
(c) recommending or inducing another person, on the basis of inside information, 
to acquire or dispose of wholesale energy products to which that information 
relates”. 
The main prohibition in Article 3(1) is the use of inside information. The term ‘use’, in 
a broader context may cover a wide range of commercial activity extending to 
corporate behaviour, which is not necessarily regarded as abusive within the context 
of REMIT. In order to understand the extent of the prohibition of insider trading, it is 
important to determine whether the wording of “by acquiring or disposing of, or by 
trying to acquire or dispose of,” is included in an illustrative or exclusive manner. The 
interpretation of the article in an exclusive manner results in an exclusion of negative 
acts such as a failure to acquire or dispose of wholesale energy products147. A 
person within the context of Article 3 of REMIT may decide not to acquire or dispose 
of wholesale energy products in accordance with the implications derived from the 
use of inside information. A strict reading of Article 3(1)(a) will not apply to such 
market practices, even though the person acting in the wholesale energy markets 
used inside information. In its guidance, ACER interprets the article in the strict 
sense, stating that “(a)rticle 3(1)(a) of REMIT not only prohibits using inside 
information by acquiring or disposing of wholesale energy products (…), but also 
prohibits using inside information by trying to acquire or dispose of wholesale energy 
products (…)”148.  Accordingly, the prohibition included in Article 3(1)(a) only applies 
to the use of inside information while acquiring or disposing of or trying to acquire of 
dispose of the wholesale energy markets. Other types of using inside information in 
transactions with respect to the wholesale energy products, such as refraining from 
                                                          
147 Regine Feltkamp & Cecile Musialski, (2013), 23 
148 Guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October, 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (4th Edition), 17 June, 
2016, 48 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/remit/Documents/REMIT%20ACER%20Guidance%203rd%20Edition_FINAL.pdf 
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engaging in certain transactions with using inside information remain outside the 
scope of REMIT149. 
Whether or not the use of inside information causes a price impact or an economic 
profit is irrelevant with respect to the prohibition included in Article 3 of REMIT. It is 
even irrelevant whether the person entered into transactions concerning wholesale 
energy products due to reasons acquired through the use of inside information150. 
The article only prohibits the use of inside information by certain persons, while 
entering into specified transactions.  The evaluation of whether a person who has 
inside information on a specific wholesale energy product actually uses this inside 
information, while acquiring or disposing of or trying to acquire or dispose of that 
wholesale energy product is fundamental for the application of the prohibition of 
insider trading. The lack of clarification brings further legal questions as to who has 
the burden to prove that a person used inside information when acquiring or 
disposing of wholesale energy products or whether there is a presumption that a 
person who possesses inside information is regarded as in violation of Article 3 of 
REMIT when acquiring or disposing of or trying to acquire or dispose of wholesale 
energy products to which the information is related. Neither REMIT nor the guidance 
document published by ACER provides an assessment on when insider trading has 
taken place and how the legal responsibility for its violation can arise.  
The prohibition of insider trading does not require that persons as listed under Article 
3(2) of REMIT intentionally committed one or more of the behaviours addressed in 
Article 3(1). A specific intent element that refers to a person’s consciousness in 
violation of the prohibition is absent. Accordingly, the national regulator has no 
obligation to prove that the person in question used the relevant inside information 
intentionally in, for example, acquiring or disposing of wholesale energy products151. 
This is in line with the approach taken in MAD 2003 and preserved in MAR to the 
prohibition of insider trading152.  
 
                                                          
149 Regine Feltkamp & Cecile Musialski, (2013), 28 
150 Ibid., 23 
151 Ibid.,  
152 Article 2, Directive 2003/6/EC; Articles 7, 8, Regulation No 596/2014. See also; Emilios E. Avgouleas, (2005), 
252 
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1.2.4.3. Information Concerned 
According to subparagraph of Article 2(1) of REMIT, the information listed is 
regarded as inside information, if it is; 
• of a precise nature, 
• not made public, 
• related directly or indirectly to one or more wholesale energy products, 
• made public, would be likely to significantly affect the prices of those 
wholesale energy products.  
REMIT, in the third subparagraph of Article 2(1), further provides an explanation on 
how and when the information is deemed to be of a precise nature: Accordingly, 
“(i)nformation shall be deemed to be of a precise nature if it indicates a set of 
circumstances which exists or may reasonably be expected to come into existence, 
or an event which has occurred or may reasonably be expected to do so, and if it is 
specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of that 
set of circumstances or event on the prices of wholesale energy products”. 
Statements or claims with questionable accuracy and sources, vague indications and 
rumours that are not distinct and specific enough to direct market participants to 
have a particular opinion on its effect on the prices of wholesale energy products will 
not be considered as inside information153. REMIT does not provide details with 
respect as to when the information is of a precise nature and how it is regarded as 
having been made public or having a significant impact on prices of energy products. 
In its guidance document, ACER elaborates the definitions given in REMIT and 
provides further explanations as to the characteristics of inside information.   
ACER provides that the information will be regarded as public if it is available to the 
‘broad trading public’. Accordingly, the information, which is known by a relatively 
small number of market participants or is open to a specific group of traders, such as 
publishing the information through exchanges, which is available only to exchange 
members, will not be deemed public within the context of REMIT154.  Whether or not 
the information is made public by the market participant, who is responsible for 
publishing the information or by a third party is irrelevant for the determination of 
                                                          
153 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities  and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn, OUP 2014) 720 
154 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 29  
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inside information155.  However, the partial disclosure of relevant information does 
not relieve the market participant of infringing the prohibition of insider trading, if it 
uses the information not made public during the partial disclosure156. 
In order to be inside information within the context of Article 2(1) REMIT, information 
would also be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of wholesale energy 
products, if it were made public157. Whether or not the disclosure did result in a price 
effect on wholesale energy products is irrelevant for the determination of this 
requirement158. As information listed under the subparagraph of Article 2(1) is open 
to interpretation, what type of information can be deemed to be or under what 
circumstances information can qualify as inside information are the questions that 
need to be answered to have an insight into the legal implications of REMIT. In its 
guidance document, ACER provides that it perceives the requirement of a significant 
price effect as an instrument to limit the scope of information with respect to 
wholesale energy markets. Accordingly only important information, which has or will 
potentially have a significant impact on the prices of wholesale energy products, will 
be regarded as inside information, while the information, which has no or only a 
negligible price effect will be outside the scope of the prohibition included in Article 3 
of REMIT.  
Ex-ante determination of information that is likely to or potentially affects the prices of 
wholesale energy products requires a legal assessment of the relationship between 
information and the economic effects of using that information within the relevant 
wholesale energy market. In the guidance document, noting that experience will 
provide clear implications as to which kind of information would be likely to cause 
significant price effects, ACER states that the following data can be used as 
indications as to the effects likely to take place as a result of the use of inside 
information:  
• “the type of information is the same as information which has, in the past, had 
a significant effect on prices; 
                                                          
155 Ibid.  
156 Ibid., 30  
157 Ibid.  
158 C-45/08 Spector Photo Group NV, Chris Van Raemdonck v Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en 
Assurantiewezen (CBFA) [2009], ECR I-12073, para 69 
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• pre-existing analysts research reports, price reporter publications and 
opinions indicate that the type of information in question has effects on prices; 
•  the market participant itself has already treated similar events as inside 
information; 
• another reasonable market participant has already treated similar events as 
inside information.159. 
Accordingly ex-post considerations derived from previous experiences may be 
regarded as indications of inside information likely to affect the prices of wholesale 
energy products. However, such an approach, while constituting a part of the legal 
analysis to be carried out, may mislead the regulators and market participants. The 
consequences under which a use of information causes price differentials may differ 
on a case-by-case basis. While any historical comparison might show that a use of 
information had once had a price impact in certain demand and supply conditions, a 
similar use of information may have no price impact under different market 
conditions. There is not enough guidance as to how a direct relationship between the 
use of information and the price impact on wholesale energy products is established 
and to what extent a price differential can be regarded as significant within the 
context of Article 2(1).  As the definitions provided are subjective and provide no 
effective criteria, the application of REMIT in the energy sector may result in 
unnecessary disclosure of strategic data or a failure to detect use of information 
which has significant price effects, both of which further distort competition in 
wholesale energy markets. 
1.2.4.4. Persons Concerned 
It is important to note that the prohibition of insider trading is not only applicable to 
market participants active in the wholesale energy markets. Article 3(2) specifically 
provides that the prohibition identified in Article 3(1) applies to the following persons 
when they have inside information to which the wholesale energy products relates:     
(a) “members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of an 
undertaking;  
(b) persons with holdings in the capital of an undertaking;  
                                                          
159 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 32  
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(c) persons with access to the information through the exercise of their 
employment, profession or duties;  
(d) persons who have acquired such information through criminal activity;  
(e) persons who know, or ought to know, that it is inside information”160.   
The list of persons who may be deemed to be responsible for insider trading is 
formulated in a way that encompasses a broader range of legal and natural people, 
who are directly or indirectly concerned with trading in wholesale energy markets, 
such as external consultants and legal advisors 161 .  Accordingly, the mere 
possession of inside information by persons listed in (a), (b), (c), (d) is sufficient to 
prove that such persons violated the prohibition of insider trading when they 
committed behaviours included in Article 3(1). With respect to “persons who know, or 
ought to know, that it is inside information”, there is a legal uncertainty as to how the 
possession of such knowledge is determined and when such a person is regarded 
as one who ought to know that it is inside information. Whether the legal analysis 
carried out to identify whether the person knows or ought to know that the relevant 
data is inside information stipulates an intent element that is also important for the 
application of Article 3 of REMIT. Again in its guidance document, ACER provides no 
further explanation or clarification with respect to the approach to be taken by the 
national regulators in developing their respective legal analyses.  
1.2.5. Market Manipulation 
1.2.5.1. General 
The prohibition of market manipulation is an important aspect of the new legal 
framework established by REMIT. In CESR-ERGEG’s advice document and the 
impact assessment by the Commission, manipulative practices are regarded as a 
major problem within wholesale energy markets, distorting prices and hedging 
mechanisms as well as lowering trust and liquidity in energy markets162. Such market 
practices would be left undetected and/or unprosecuted without a legal framework 
tailored to detect and prosecute them163. The conclusions of CERS-ERGEG and the 
Commission in their respective advice documents paved the way for the adoption of 
                                                          
160 Article 3(2), Regulation No 1227/2011 
161 Regine Feltkamp & Cecile Musialski, (2013), 26 
162 REMIT Impact Assessment (2010), 29; CESR and ERGEG (2008), paras. 26-44 
163 CESR and ERGEG (2008), para. 37 
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REMIT in 2011. The prohibition is included in Article 5 of REMIT, according to which 
“(a)ny engagement in, or attempt to engage in, market manipulation on wholesale 
energy markets shall be prohibited”. It is the objective of this thesis to discover the 
legal implications that new anti-manipulation rules under REMIT would have in 
dealing with anti-competitive practices in EU wholesale markets. Therefore, it is 
important to understand how the prohibition of market manipulation is defined and 
designed under REMIT.    
1.2.5.2. Definition of Market Manipulation 
Even though the concept of market manipulation is a contentious subject that has 
been heavily discussed by the legal and economic literature164, which are provided in 
detail in the following section, REMIT provides definitions and examples of market 
manipulation that give insight into what type of actions are deemed to be 
manipulative in relation to wholesale energy markets. Article 2(2) gives the meaning 
of manipulation as;  
(a) “entering into any transaction or issuing any order to trade in wholesale 
energy products which: 
(i) gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply 
of, demand for, or price of wholesale energy products;  
(ii) secures or attempts to secure, by a person, or persons acting in 
collaboration, the price of one or several wholesale energy products at 
an artificial level, unless the person who entered into the transaction or 
issued the order to trade establishes that his reasons for doing so are 
legitimate and that that transaction or order to trade conforms to 
accepted market practices on the wholesale energy market concerned; 
or  
                                                          
164 See: Craig Pirrong, ‘Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis and a Proposed 
Alternative’ (1994) 51/3 Washington and Lee Law Review 945; Albert S. Kyle and S. Viswanathan, ‘How to 
Define Illegal Price Manipulation’ (2008) 98/2 American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 278; Shaun D. 
Ledgerwood & Paul R. Carpenter, ‘A Framework for the Analysis of Market Manipulation’ (2012) 8/1 Review of 
Law & Economics 253; Frank A. Wolak and Robert H. Patrick, ‘The Impact of Market Rules and Market 
Structure on the Price Determination Process in the England and Wales Electricity Market’ (1997); Severin 
Borenstein and James Bushnell, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California’s 
Electricity Industry’ (1999), Journal of Industrial Economics, 47; Scott M. Harvey and William W. Hogan, 
‘Further Analysis of the Exercise of Market Power in the California Electricity Market (2001)   
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(iii) employs or attempts to employ a fictitious device or any other form 
of deception or contrivance which gives, or is likely to give, false or 
misleading signals regarding the supply of, demand for, or price of 
wholesale energy products; 
or 
(b) disseminating information through the media, including the internet, or 
by any other means, which gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading 
signals as to the supply of, demand for, or price of wholesale energy 
products, including the dissemination of rumours and false or 
misleading news, where the disseminating person knew, or ought to 
have known, that the information was false or misleading”. 
This article provides two categories for market manipulation; transaction-based 
market manipulation and information-based market manipulation165. In the former, 
perpetrators engage in transactions, either deceptive or not, to manipulate wholesale 
energy markets through giving false or misleading signals to the market as to levels 
of supply and demand as well as the availability of production, storage or 
transportation capacity. The latter, on the other hand, does not require the existence 
of a transaction for the perpetration of market manipulation. Instead, market 
participants manipulate wholesale energy markets via dissemination of false or 
misleading information, which could result in erroneous implications as to the 
fundamentals of the respective wholesale markets for other market participants. 
As mentioned above, serious concerns were raised by market participants during the 
consultation period prior to the formulation of REMIT166. The majority of responses 
submitted by market participants to the CESR and ERGEG, stressed that since the 
very term, manipulation, suggests the concealment of important misconceptions and 
ambiguities with respect to market behaviours, a new tailor-made legal framework 
should clearly define what types of market conduct can be deemed manipulative and 
what really separates a legitimate trading activity from market manipulation within the 
                                                          
165 The structure of Article 2(2) of REMIT was different from market manipulation prohibition under Article 1(2) 
of MAD 2003, which used also a fraud-based formulation of market manipulation in addition to transaction-
based, information-based definitions. This formulation was also preserved in Article 9 of MAR with one 
significant recalibration, which is the introduction of benchmark manipulation. For detailed discussion, see; 
section 1.3.5.2.2. 
166 Supra note 140  
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boundaries of wholesale energy markets167. The question of how to identify strategic 
withholding of production capacity and energy supply in the wholesale markets to 
move the price of relevant products to the desired levels was heavily discussed in 
the consultation process. It is important to note that outages in production or supply 
have important implications as to market fundamentals, which leads to price 
movements. Determining when the energy producers and suppliers withhold their 
supply capacity to sustain their maintenance or to benefit from the lack of efficient 
supply and illiquidity of markets is fundamental to designating behaviour as market 
abuse. According to the Commission’s Energy Sector Inquiry, there are two ways 
that market participants in the wholesale energy markets can drive energy prices to 
levels which benefit positions held by themselves:  
i. “either by withdrawing capacity (which may force recourse to more 
expensive sources of supply); or 
ii. by imposing high prices when they know their production is 
indispensable to meet demand”168. 
In competitive markets, the market power of incumbents is constrained by potential 
competition as high prices above competitive levels would attract new investors and 
entries into the markets169. This is not the case for the energy markets as they are 
capital intensive industries requiring high investment costs for potential entries170. 
Undertakings with market power or even monopoly power can freely exercise 
monopoly pricing behaviour without restraints from would-be competitors171 . The 
ability of energy producers and suppliers to move prices based on their will is further 
elevated by the fact that the demand for energy is inelastic with respect to price 
increases, which provides a vertical feature as to the demand and supply curve, 
different from other markets172.  Benefiting from the lack of competitive restraints 
                                                          
167 Such a concern is analogous to the rationale behind the formulation of competition law rules, which are 
designed to prevent on the one hand punishing market participants involved on legitimate market activities, 
(Type 1 Error, False Positive), on the other acquitting traders acting, in fact, in an anti-competitive manner 
distorting the market (Type 2 Error, False Negative). Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, (2014), EU Competition 
Law; Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford 5th ed.)  
168 The Inquiry, 132-133 
169 There are three main competitive contracts to which firms are subject; demand substitutability, supply 
substitutability, potential competition. See; Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the 
purpose of Community competition law [1997] OJ C372/5, para 13 
170 CESR and ERGEG, (2008), para 43 
171 Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, (2014), 87 
172 Petri Mantysaari, (2015), 62   
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available in the market, incumbent generators and suppliers are able to manipulate 
prices easily in the wholesale energy markets. 
1.2.5.3. Examples of Market Manipulation 
Even though the main issue discussed heavily within the consultation process was 
how to identify whether withholding of generation capacities was based on legitimate 
foundations, the concept of market manipulation involves a wider reach within REMIT. 
Dividing manipulative behaviours into transaction-based and information-based, 
Article 2(2) gives a broad definition of market manipulation involving any market 
behaviour that either provides false or misleading signals as to the fundamentals of 
the market  or secures the prices at an artificial level. In order to provide further 
details on what type of behaviours may constitute market manipulation, REMIT itself 
gives examples in its Recitals 13 and 14. Accordingly the types of market 
manipulation are;  
“placing and withdrawal of false orders; spreading of false or misleading 
information or rumours through the media, including the internet, or by 
any other means; deliberately providing false information to undertakings 
which provide price assessments or market reports with the effect of 
misleading market participants acting on the basis of those price 
assessments or market reports; and deliberately making it appear that 
the availability of electricity generation capacity or natural gas availability, 
or the availability of transmission capacity is other than the capacity 
which is actually technically available where such information affects or is 
likely to affect the price of wholesale energy products”173.  
Furthermore, examples of market manipulation include market behaviours that 
secure “a decisive position over the supply of, or demand for, a wholesale energy 
product which has, or could have, the effect of fixing, directly or indirectly, prices or 
creating other unfair trading conditions; and the offering, buying or selling of 
wholesale energy products with the purpose, intention or effect of misleading market 
participants acting on the basis of reference prices” 174.  The guidance given by 
                                                          
173 Recital 13, Regulation No 1227/2011  
174 Recital 14, Regulation No 1227/2011 
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REMIT as to the concept of market manipulation is more about the ex-post analysis 
that sheds light upon market conditions succeeding market manipulation. It also 
provides no detail as to what type of implications can be interpreted as ‘false or 
misleading signals’ or when and how the price of a wholesale energy product is 
deemed to be at ‘an artificial level’175. In its guidance document, ACER submits 
further examples of market manipulation derived from the National Regulatory 
Agencies’ experience in the energy industry and the experience of financial 
authorities in financial markets176. Based on the classification of manipulative conduct 
given in Article 2(2), ACER provides these examples under four sub-headings177;  
i) False/misleading transactions, 
ii) Price positioning, 
iii) Transactions involving fictitious devices/deception, 
iv) Dissemination of false and misleading information.    
1.2.5.3.1. False/Misleading transactions  
ACER gives three market manipulation schemes as examples of false or misleading 
transactions178. These are; 
• wash trades, 
• improper matched orders and, 
• placing orders with no intention of executing them. 
Wash trades occur when a market player enters into transactions with no material 
effects, such as no changes in financial interests, or risks or the interest and risks 
take place only between the colluding parties of the transactions to affect the price of 
the relevant wholesale energy product179. Such transactions involve no economic 
exchange yet mislead other market participants into thinking that the trading volume 
of the relevant wholesale energy product has increased and greater trading activity is 
taking place, which results in price movements within the wholesale energy markets 
                                                          
175 The requirement of an artificial price for the determination of market manipulation has been heavily 
discussed in US case law and is often construed as problematic as relevant economic analysis carried out in the 
legal proceedings would result in further methodological problems as to what type of data should be 
considered as an indicator of manipulative conduct. For details see; Craig Pirrong, (1994), 960-968.   
176 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 39  
177 Ibid., 37-39  
178 Ibid., 37  
179 Ibid.  
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as to the relevant product.  Improper matched orders can also be included in wash 
trades, since this also involves no material effects, financial interests, risks and 
economic exchange between the colluding parties. In such transactions, in fact, some 
actual trading does take place in the market, yet the order is succeeded by an 
offsetting trade for the same price and volume in a way that no change in financial 
benefits occurs between the parties of the transaction. According to US case law180, 
ACER’s classification of wash trades, improper matched orders and placing orders 
with no intention of executing them as false/misleading transactions under Article 
2(2)(a)(i) is erroneous. Since they do not involve material effects and price risks that 
are inherent in other transactions, these types of trades are generally considered 
closed market transactions which are dealt with in Article 2(2)(a)(iii) rather than 
Article 9(2)(a)(i)181.  
ACER’s identification of ‘placing orders with no intention of executing them’ as false 
or misleading transactions, gives rise to legal questions as to when and how such 
orders can be deemed manipulative. As will be seen in the following chapters182, 
placing orders with no intention of executing them is, in fact, a common practice in 
both physical and financial markets as such transactions allow their parties to hedge 
financial risks arising from vulnerabilities in the market prices as the result of 
inefficiencies, e.g. shortages or illiquidity. The majority of the transactions taking 
place in futures markets as well as the practice of virtual bidding183 for the purpose of 
converging prices to interrelated markets are examples of placing orders with no 
intention of executing them. Assuming such practices constitute manipulation would 
result in great discontent from the market as they are fundamental instruments used 
by market participants to hedge their financial risks and future positions. Compliance 
with ACER’s explanation, that is “(t)he intention is not to execute the order but to give 
a misleading impression that there is demand for supply of the wholesale energy 
product at that price”184, to Article 2(2) of REMIT is also questionable as is the intent 
element, which will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters, which is irrelevant 
                                                          
180 See; Sundheimer v. CFTC, 688 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 112 (1983); United States v. 
Radley, 659 F. Supp. 2d 803 (S.D. Tex. 2009) 
181 See sections; 3.2.3. and 4.3.4.1. 
182 See section; 3.3.2.3.6.  
183 See; Shaun D. Ledgerwood and Johannes P. Pfeifenberger, ‘Using Virtual Bids to Manipulate the Value of 
Financial Transmission Rights, (2012) Brattle Group. 
184 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 37  
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with respect to identifying a market conduct as manipulative under the legal 
framework established by REMIT. ACER’s identification of intent as a requirement to 
conclude that market participants, placing orders and not executing them, violate 
Article 5 is not in compliance with REMIT. 
1.2.5.3.2. Price Positioning  
ACER gives the following market behaviours as examples for price positioning: 
• Marking the close; 
• The abusive squeeze; 
• Cross-market manipulation; 
• Actions undertaken by persons that artificially cause prices to be at a level not 
justified by market forces of supply and demand, including actual availability of 
production, storage or transportation capacity, and demand (physical 
withholding)185. 
Marking the close is a type of manipulation where a market participant engages in a 
number of transactions near the close of the market to affect the closing or settlement 
price of the relevant wholesale energy product. As discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapter186, this type of market manipulation was historically considered as a 
clear example of trade-based market manipulation and was a feature of securities 
markets187. The effect of excessive bids and offers made at the close of market is 
further elevated by other market fundamentals such as the market power held by the 
executing party, the level of concentration in the relevant market or the degree of 
liquidity existing in trading activities with respect to the relevant wholesale energy 
product. Even though such manipulation may take place in a heavily traded market, 
the ability of a market participant to move prices requires holding substantial market 
power as other market participants, not knowing the motivation of the relevant bids 
and offers made by the manipulator, will develop assumptions from prices at the 
close of the market.  
                                                          
185 Ibid., 38-39  
186 See section; 2.3.3.4.2.1. 
187 Emilios E. Avgouleas, (2005), 133. For the economics of trade-based manipulation see; Franklin Allen & 
Douglas Gale, ‘Stock-Price Manipulation’ (1992) 5/3 The Review of Financial Studies 503, 515-520 
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The abusive squeeze, also known as the corner, involves a market participant who 
takes a large long position as to the relevant wholesale energy product, accumulating 
large futures contracts with certain delivery dates, which forces other market 
participants who hold short positions to physically deliver the energy products. The 
short positions, unable to deliver the relevant energy product within the relevant 
geographic market due to illiquidity or market tightness, are required to buy back their 
short contracts at higher costs from the market participant with the large long position. 
In order to squeeze the market, the cornering market player must hold substantial 
market power as benefitting from the squeeze requires that the market players, other 
than the cornering player lack the relevant energy product to supply and cannot bring 
additional supplies from the markets other than the relevant markets without incurring 
an exceptional financial burden188.   
Cross-market manipulation requires an action by a trader in a primary market, which 
affects prices of an energy product in a linked market, in which the trader also holds 
positions, whose value benefits from the action in the primary market. Accordingly the 
manipulator enters into a transaction at a loss in the primary market. This is not 
problematic, because in most competitive markets, nearly half the transactions are 
closed at a financial loss. An undertaking can also incur losses due to legitimate 
reasons such as the need for liquidation. What makes such a transaction suspicious 
is that perpetrators engage in such loss-making transactions on a continuous basis 
and yet they profit from a financial positions in linked markets whose values are 
derived from these loss-making transactions in primary markets189. However, it is not 
enough to hold the party responsible whose behaviour in a market at a loss derives 
profits from the positions held in a linked market. This is also a common practice in 
the wholesale energy markets where the market players legitimately enter into such 
transactions at a loss to hedge their financial risks. The intent of a market participant 
entering into transaction is determinative in identifying the relevant market behaviour 
is manipulative or not. However, the prohibition of market manipulation as articulated 
in REMIT does not require national competent authorities to prove that the market 
participant intentionally or at least recklessly entered into manipulative conduct. 
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Therefore on what basis market behaviour is evaluated as to whether it constitutes 
market manipulation is missing within the current legal framework. 
The last example for price positioning ACER gives is the practice of physical 
withholding, where the generator of electricity or wholesale supplier of natural gas or 
an owner of transmission or storage infrastructure does not offer its capacity to the 
market in order to drive the price of the relevant wholesale energy product higher so 
that it can optimise its benefits from the market in exchange for creating imbalances 
between demand and supply fundamentals. Capacity withholding practices were 
considered a change in the market fundamentals, affecting generation availability 
and thus a major factor in the determination of price levels at energy markets190. In its 
guidance document, ACER states that such withholding accounts to market 
manipulation only if it is carried out without justification and “with the intention” of 
increasing prices 191 . The intent element is very important in evaluating market 
manipulation to determine whether withholding occurred due to maintenance 
concerns or it is practiced as a means to maximise profits in exchange for distorting 
demand and supply in the market. Even though ACER’s mention of the intent 
element is crucial for the legal approach taken by the national regulatory agencies in 
enforcing market manipulation rules, its compliance with the framework established 
by REMIT is open to discussion, since the latter does not provide a requirement that 
market participants have specific intent in manipulating wholesale energy markets192. 
1.2.5.3.3. Transactions Involving Fictitious Devices  
The following behaviours are given by ACER as examples of market manipulation: 
• Scalping 
• Pump and Dump 
• Circular Trading 
• Pre-arranged trading 
                                                          
190 CESR and ERGEG (2008), para. 32. 
191 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 38  
192 OFGEM warned market participants to be careful when they are trading in energy markets since the REMIT 
does not require intent to hold market participants liable for market manipulation. See: REMIT Open Letter 
September 2015, 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgempublications/96553/20150814remitopenletterseptember2015-pdf 
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Scalping involves dissemination of false and misleading information, in order to move 
prices in a direction that is favourable to the position held or a transaction planned by 
the disseminating market participant 193 . Such manipulation occurs, for example, 
when a market participant who has a position in the futures market disseminates 
false information about its production or supply volumes to move prices in the futures 
market, which is determined on the basis of implications from the production or 
available supply levels. Pump and dump, a scheme similar to scalping, is a market 
manipulation in which the market participant buys a large volume of wholesale 
energy product and then disseminates false information, which increases the price of 
the relevant wholesale energy product194. Accordingly, the manipulator buys a large 
volume of wholesale energy products, (such as collecting futures contracts, or 
entering into long-term supply contracts as a buyer of energy products at lower 
prices), and disseminates false information, (such as its demand for energy 
increased considerably for a certain period of time), which misleads the other market 
players into believing that the actual value of the given energy product is higher. The 
manipulator then sells the product at the higher price. 
In circular trading, the manipulator knowing that an offsetting long position is ready to 
be held takes a short position with respect to a wholesale energy product195. Similar 
to the wash trades and improper matched orders in circular trading, there are no 
financial risks for either party and transactions are carried out to influence market 
prices with the impression that a trading takes place as to the relevant wholesale 
energy product. Pre-arranged trading consists of two market participants, who agree 
to trade which each other at pre-arranged prices to exclude other competitors from 
the market where the pre-arranged trading takes place or is linked to it196. ACER also 
provides that if it is carried out according to the rules of the relevant market place, the 
pre-arranged trading can be considered as an accepted market practice and 
legitimate197. 
 
                                                          
193 Supra note 191   
194 Ibid.  
195 Ibid. 
196 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 38-39  
197 Ibid. 
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1.2.5.3.4. Dissemination of false and misleading information 
The manipulation schemes given so far by ACER in its guidance document represent 
transaction-based manipulation, which involve a transaction undertaken by one or 
multiple market participants to distort the market fundamentals. In the dissemination 
of false and misleading information, market participants do not necessarily need to 
carry out a transaction to manipulate the market198. A mere spreading of false or 
misleading information through the media, failing to disclose price sensitive 
information, or a market behaviour which does not correspond to the concept of 
transaction, e.g. the movement of physical commodity stock having implications for 
commodity future markets, can be manipulation in the category of the dissemination 
of false and misleading information.  
1.2.5.4. Attempt to Manipulate 
REMIT also prohibits the attempt by market participants to manipulate the wholesale 
energy markets. According to the definition in Article 2(3), an attempt to manipulate 
the wholesale energy markets involves; 
(a) “entering into any transaction, issuing any order to trade or taking any 
other action relating to a wholesale energy product with the intention of: 
(i) giving false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for 
or price of wholesale energy products; 
(ii) securing the price of one or several wholesale energy products at 
an artificial level, unless the person who entered in to the 
transaction or issued the order to trade establishes that his 
reasons for doing so are legitimate and that that transaction or 
order to trade conforms to accepted market practices on the 
wholesale energy market concerned; or 
(iii) employing a fictitious device or any other form of deception or 
contrivance which gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading 
signals regarding the supply of, demand for, or price of wholesale 
energy products 
or 
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(b) disseminating information through the media, including the internet, or by 
any other means with the intention of giving false or misleading signals 
as to the supply of, demand for, or price of wholesale energy products”.  
The main distinction between the prohibitions of market manipulation and an attempt 
to manipulate is REMIT’s inclusion of the ‘intent’ element in the definition of the latter 
concept. Article 2(3) specifically notes that market participants would be liable for the 
prohibition of attempting to manipulate only if they enter into false or misleading 
transactions or disseminate false or misleading information ‘intentionally’. It is 
reasonable to assume that the prohibition of an attempt to manipulate intrinsically 
involves an intent element, yet a clear inclusion of the intent element under Article 
2(3) has implications as to why such an inclusion is not present under Article 2(2), the 
prohibition of market manipulation. ACER in its guidance document mentions intent 
elements with respect to the perpetration of market manipulation199. This position is 
also supported by some commentators200 who argued that the reading of the Article 
implies an intent element to prove that a market manipulation has taken place. 
Nevertheless such a conclusion can also apply to Article 2(3) of REMIT. The notion 
of making an attempt intrinsically includes an intent element to prove that the 
manipulator tried to execute the prohibited behaviour. This did not prevent REMIT 
from including the intent element under Article 2(3). Accordingly, while requiring the 
presence of intent with respect to the prohibition of an attempt to manipulate, REMIT 
does not include such a requirement under the prohibition of market manipulation. 
The importance of the intent element in defining and dealing with market 
manipulation will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters201. However, 
REMIT’s omission of the intent element in market manipulation raises several 
problems in establishing a common legal approach that national competent 
authorities could adopt in dealing with market abuse in the wholesale energy markets. 
 
 
 
                                                          
199 Ibid., 37  
200 Leigh Hancher, ‘Energy Markets: A legal Perspective on Market Abuse (REMIT)’ (Florence, April 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3tSmdPtTG1k 
201 See section; 2.3.3.4.1.2. 
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1.3. FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION 
1.3.1. General 
The rules that prohibit manipulative activities in European wholesale energy markets 
are not limited to those adopted under REMIT. The prohibitions on market 
manipulation and insider trading which are called market abuse, have been included 
in several pieces of EU-wide legislation which, to a certain extent, were also 
applicable to wholesale energy markets before the adoption of REMIT. Early 
attempts to prevent market manipulation were generally made under the regulation 
of financial markets202 seeking to establish a level playing field for the trading of 
equities, such as stocks and shares and non-equity products, bonds, structured 
finance products, and derivatives. The majority of energy traded across the EU has 
remained outside the scope of financial regulation, as it has mostly taken place at 
OTC level rather than in regulated multilateral trading venues. Nevertheless, certain 
wholesale energy contracts traded as commodity products in early European power 
exchanges, such as Nord Pool, in-scope to these financial regulatory instruments203.  
1.3.2. Background 
The EU’s regulation of financial markets dates back to the 1966 Segre Report204, 
proposed by a group of experts appointed by the European Commission (the 
Commission) finding that progress in the development of a European capital market 
fell far behind the EU’s economic union agenda, and a closer cooperation in national 
economic policies was a prerequisite for the establishment of a monetary union205.  
The succeeding development in financial markets had not come before the CJEU’s 
1985 decision in Casis De Dijon206, in which the court held that products produced 
and traded in one member state should be admitted to other member states without 
additional regulatory requirement creating a thrust on the side of member states for 
more coordination in the development of harmonised regulatory frameworks. In 1989, 
the Commission adopted its first EU-wide legislation on financial markets, the Insider 
                                                          
202 Directive 2003/6/EC  
203 In identifying its scope, MAD 2003 referred to Annex 1, Section C of Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID 2004)  
204 Report by a Group of Experts Appointed by the EEC Commission, the Development of a European Capital 
Market (1966) (Segre Report) 
205 Ibid., 15 
206 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Casis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649. 
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Dealing Directive207 which aimed at deterring market participants from the use of 
inside information in a manner arbitraging information asymmetry in European 
financial markets. Leaving vast areas of financial regulation unharmonised, the 
directive was later regarded as inadequate in promoting the integration of financial 
markets208. 
The major changes in the EU’s financial landscape during the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s, such as the adoption of the euro as a single currency for member states and 
developments in technical capacity for cross-border investment services promoting 
pan-European trading of financial products, led to the introduction of the first 
European rulebook for EU financial markets209 which incorporated MAD 2003210, and 
MiFID 2004211. While the former provided a market abuse regime that would play a 
central role in the development and the harmonisation of national laws on the 
prohibition of insider trading and market manipulation, the latter addressed the 
provision of cross-border investment services and the regulation of trading venues. 
Adopted in the form of directives 212 , this first regulatory framework conferred 
discretion on member states in designing their financial markets regulation, ensuring 
that national priorities should not hamper the harmonisation of national financial 
frameworks and efficient functioning of cross-border investment services. In order to 
oversee the harmonisation process, Article 65 of MiFID 2004 required the 
Commission to provide reviews assessing the application of the directive’s rules in 
European financial markets.   
1.3.3. Regulatory Reform 
In its 2010 consultation on the MiFID I Review213, and subsequent proposals214 and 
impact assessments for the MiFIR and MiFID II Directive215, findings of which paved 
                                                          
207 Council Directive of 13 November, 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing 89/592/EEC [1989] OJ 
L334/30, (Insider Dealing Directive) 
208 Niamh Moloney, (2014) 707 
209 Ibid., 24 
210 Directive 2003/6/EC  
211 Directive 2004/39/EC  
212 According to article 288 of the TFEU, both regulations and directives are binding instruments that EU 
institutions adopt in the development of EU policies in particular areas. While regulations are directly 
applicable in all Member States, directives set out policy purposes, leaving the choice of form and methods to 
the national authorities.    
213 European Commission, Public Consultation. Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2010)  
80 | P a g e  
 
the way to the corresponding regulatory framework of financial markets, the 
Commission concluded that despite the evidence that there had been significant 
developments with respect to lower transaction costs and greater competition in 
financial transactions, the MiFID I needed to be revised and updated to ensure that 
the majority of transactions and financial instruments traded in financial markets 
remained within the scope of market regulation and divergences in the application of 
the regulatory provisions at national level would be kept to a minimum216. The reform 
agenda was based on the regulatory atmosphere during the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the subsequent 2009 G20 summit in Pittsburgh 
which discussed the underlying reasons for the financial breakdown in global 
markets and proposed a series of measures for members to take, in dealing with the 
recession and reforming financial markets regulation217.   
The findings of the G20 Summit and the Commission’s subsequent MiFID I review 
identified that the current regulatory structure of financial markets was susceptible to 
market abuse practices 218 . Only the financial instruments that were traded in 
regulated markets such as stock and commodity exchanges and multilateral trading 
facilities which were operated by investment firms on a non-discriminatory basis, 
were under regulatory oversight, leaving a vast amount of financial instruments 
traded in market platforms in other regulated and multilateral market venues outside 
the scope of MiFID I, which gave rise to concerns about information asymmetry and 
market abuse in financial markets219. Furthermore, the divergence in the application 
of financial markets regulation at national level and the lack of coordination between 
cross-border regulatory authorities allowed market participants to engage in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
214 European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets 
in financial instruments and amending Regulation [EMIR] on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories, COM (2011) 652/4 (2011 MiFIR Proposal); European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, COM (2011) 656/4 (2011 MiFID II Proposal) 
215 European Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in financial instruments [Recast] and the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in financial instruments 
COM (2011) 656/4 (2011 MiFID II/MiFIR Impact Assesment) 
216 2011 MiFID II/MiFIR Impact Assesment, 5 
217 Pittsburgh G20 Summit, September 2009, Leaders’ Statement, Strengthening the International Financial 
Regulatory System, https://www.oecd.org/g20/summits/pittsburgh/G20-Pittsburgh-Leaders-Declaration.pdf  
218 2011 MiFID II Proposal, 6; Pittsburgh G20 Summit, (2009), para 13.  
219 Article 1, Directive 2004/39/EC, MiFID I.  
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regulatory arbitrage and to exploit the differences between national approaches to 
financial regulation220.    
The policy recommendations proposed by the G20 reform agenda plus the  
subsequent proposals and impact assessments, resulted in the adoption of a series 
of regulatory measures, including the Market Abuse Regulation 2014221 (MAR 2014) 
and the Market Abuse Directive 2014222 (MAD 2014) which together replaced MAD I. 
MAD/MAR 2014 brought new types of market abuse as well as financial instruments 
within their scope with the Market in Financial Instruments Regulation 223  and 
Directive 2014224 (hereinafter MiFIR/MiFID 2014) providing a new type of trading 
venue classification that encompasses a wider scope for financial instruments 
including those that were not regulated under MiFID 2004. Furthermore, the EU 
adopted a new regulation for derivatives contracts, Regulation No 648/2012, (EMIR), 
which provided a data reporting regime to enhance market transparency with respect 
to all derivatives transactions traded in the EU225. Accordingly, all market participants 
who trade derivatives contracts in either trading venues identified under MiFID/MiFIR 
2014 or OTC markets through bilateral trading, are under an obligation to report the 
details of their transactions to competent trade repositories. The data reporting 
obligation is designed to extend the regulatory oversight over financial instruments 
and markets which are outside the scope of MiFID/MiFIR 2014, yet still have an 
impact on the competitiveness and functioning of in-scope financial markets. At the 
institutional level, the European Securities and Markets Authority, (ESMA), 
designated as the new EU-wide market authority overseeing the functioning and 
competitiveness of financial markets as well as ensuring close cooperation between 
national regulatory agencies, is in place with respect to enhancing Pan-European 
transparency levels and detecting market abuse226.  
It is important to note that the reforms of financial market regulation came after the 
adoption of REMIT which also covered market abuse provisions and data reporting 
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obligations with respect to wholesale energy products including physical and 
financial energy supply contracts. In their advice document of 2008 227 , 
CESR/ERGEG found that the majority of wholesale energy products had been 
traded in OTC markets and thus was outside the scope of MAD I, as the latter was 
not applicable to OTC traded contracts228. MAD I followed MiFID I’s classification of 
trading venues which was applied only to regulated markets and multilateral trading 
facilities229. The MiFID/MiFIR 2014 developed a new trading venues classification, 
called ‘Organised Trading Venues’, which covered all transactions and contracts 
traded in a trading platform other than regulated markets or multilateral trading 
facilities230. The transactions and contracts which were regarded in OTC markets in 
the previous regime have become in-scope for financial regulation under a different 
trading venue classification. MAR 2014 also followed this new classification231.  
REMIT’s scope was limited to products which were not regulated by MAD I232. After 
the adoption of MAR 2014, the new regulatory reforms broadened the scope of the 
market abuse regime, which affected and further limited the scope of REMIT. Certain 
financial wholesale energy products that were regarded as OTC under MAD I and 
MiFID I under the jurisdiction of REMIT, are now included in the new financial 
regulation and thus are within the scope of MAR 2014. Certain data reporting 
obligations and market abuse practices which were under REMIT’s regulatory 
authority prior to the adoption of MAR 2014, are now in-scope under the new 
financial regulation.  
In this section, the chapter does not delve into the details of obligations that each of 
these new regulatory instruments might present with respect to financial market 
regulation, as evaluating financial markets as a whole is not one of this thesis’ 
objectives. Rather, the chapter addresses the legal implications that the new 
financial regime provides within the context of REMIT and European wholesale 
energy markets. In so doing, the chapter briefly discusses the data reporting 
obligations that form the part of each regulatory instrument with respect to the 
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financial markets to show that the problem of overlapping jurisdictions is not limited 
to the context of market abuse regimes and is, in fact, endemic within the regulation 
of financial markets as a whole. Particular focus is given to the market abuse regime 
adopted under MAR 2014 as it directly affects and recalibrates REMIT’s jurisdictional 
dimension. The demarcation of market abuse regimes applicable to wholesale 
energy markets will provide greater clarity on the scope of REMIT and the types of 
market manipulation that would be enforceable under the REMIT framework.  
1.3.4. MiFID/MiFIR 2014 
1.3.4.1. General 
Replacing MiFID I, MiFID/MiFIR 2014 brought significant changes to financial 
markets regulation providing a broader regulatory framework, governing trading in 
financial markets with more interventionist features233. The new regime consists of 
two sets of legislation. MiFID II provides rules on the authorisation and operation of 
investment firms, market operators and data reporting service providers as well as 
supervision, cooperation and enforcement by competent authorities234. These rules 
are included in the form of a directive as some degree of discretion was deemed to 
be appropriate with respect to their implementation at national level. MiFIR 
establishes a framework with respect to disclosure obligations and non-
discriminatory access to clearing services and to trading in benchmarks235, which will 
be applicable directly at the national level as uniformity in the implementation of 
these rules is regarded as essential.  
1.3.4.2. Recalibrations 
Of the changes that MiFID/MiFIR 2014 has brought with respect to financial market 
regulation, the new trading venue classification is the major one which recalibrates 
the extent and the scope of other legislation and regulatory authorities at both 
national and union level. There are three different regulatory regimes designated for 
the trading venues included in the framework. The first regime applies to trading in 
multilateral markets which are; 
(i) Regulated Markets, 
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(ii) Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs), and 
(iii) Organised Trading Facilities (OTFs)236. 
According to Article 4(1)(21) of MiFID II, a regulated market is “(…) a multilateral 
system operated and/or managed by a market operator, which brings together or 
facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and selling interests in 
financial instruments (…)” in a non-discretionary manner.  The feature that 
distinguishes regulated markets from the MTFs is that the regulated markets can 
also operate as primary markets in which new equities and/or non-equity products 
are first introduced. The MTFs also function as regulated markets operated by a 
market operator or investment firms bringing together multiple third parties in the 
trading of financial instruments in a non-discretionary manner, but they can only 
operate as secondary markets where financial instruments are traded from their first 
issuance at the primary market until their expiration or maturity date.   
One of the striking features of the new regulatory regime under MiFID/MiFIR 2014 is 
the introduction of the OTFs, a new venue classification designated to bring all OTC 
transactions traded in organised trading platforms under regulatory oversight, 
corresponding to the objectives laid down in the G20 Summit237. Article 4(1)(23) 
defines OTF as “ (…) a multilateral system which is not a regulated market or an 
MTF and in which multiple third-party buying and selling interests in bonds, 
structured finance products, emission allowances or derivatives are able to interact 
(…)”  OTFs are regulated as MTFs and regulated markets with two distinguishing 
features. First, OTFs can operate on a discretionary basis238 meaning that they enjoy 
a limited degree of discretion in matching bids and orders in their trading data. 
Second, OTFs cannot offer trading of equity or equity-like products such as 
depositary receipts, exchange-traded funds and certificates239. This limitation was 
accepted after long negotiations between the European Council and Parliament on 
the grounds that due to their discretionary nature, which would create deficiencies in 
the quality of transparency data, price formation of equity and equity-like products 
which can be distorted under OTF markets240.    
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The other two regulatory regimes set forth under MiFID/MiFIR 2014 are designed to 
capture, to a certain extent, the OTC transactions that are not traded in multilateral, 
organised trading platform as in OTFs. The first regime applies to Systematic 
Internalisers (SIs), which are investment firms who on a systematic basis, deal with 
their clients’ bids and orders through their own portfolio without operating a 
multilateral system241. The second regime relates to bilateral OTC trading which is 
outside the scope of operational and trading venue obligations under MiFID/MiFIR 
2014. The new financial market regulation seriously restricts the extent of the 
bilateral OTC market, stipulating that only financial instruments other than equity and 
equity-like products can be traded bilaterally in OTC markets242.  If an investment 
firm who wishes to trade equity and equity-like products through OTC markets, can 
do so only through the Systematic Internaliser, under which they are obliged to follow 
regulatory obligations with respect to authorisation and transparency provision under 
MiFID/MiFIR 2014. For non-equity instruments, such obligations do not apply to 
market participants in bilateral OTC trading. However, it is important to note that 
these market participants are required to follow data reporting obligations for 
derivatives under EMIR243.  
1.3.4.3. Financial Instruments 
The scope of the new financial market regulation is governed by financial 
instruments enumerated under MiFID 2014 Annex I, Section C. Accordingly, financial 
instruments under the new regime are: 
1) “Transferable securities; 
2) Money-market instruments; 
3) Units in collective investment undertakings; 
4) Options, futures, swaps, forward rate agreements and any other derivative 
contracts relating to securities, currencies, interest rates or yields, emission 
allowances or other derivatives instruments, financial indices or financial 
measures which may be settled physically or in cash; 
5) Options, futures, swaps, forwards and any other derivative contracts relating 
to commodities that must be settled in cash or may be settled in cash at the 
                                                          
241 Article 1(20), Directive 2014/65/EU 
242 Article 23, Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 
243 Regulation No 648/2012 
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option of one of the parties other than by reason of default or other 
termination event; 
6) Options, futures, swaps, and any other derivative contract relating to 
commodities that can be physically settled provided that they are traded on a 
regulated market, a MTF, or an OTF, except for wholesale energy products 
traded on an OTF that must be physically settled; 
7) Options, futures, swaps, forwards and any other derivative contracts relating 
to commodities, that can be physically settled not otherwise mentioned in 
point 6 of this Section and not being for commercial purposes, which have the 
characteristics of other derivative financial instruments; 
8) Derivative instruments for the transfer of credit risk; 
9) Financial contracts for differences; 
10) Options, futures, swaps, forward rate agreements and any other derivative 
contracts relating to climatic variables, freight rates or inflation rates or other 
official economic statistics that must be settled in cash or may be settled in 
cash at the option of one of the parties other than by reason of default or other 
termination event, as well as any other derivative contracts relating to assets, 
rights, obligations, indices and measures not otherwise mentioned in this 
Section, which have the characteristics of other derivative financial 
instruments, having regard to whether, inter alia, they are traded on a 
regulated market, OTF, or an MTF; 
11) Emission allowances consisting of any units recognised for compliance with 
the requirements of Directive 2003/87/EC (Emissions Trading Scheme)”244. 
In point “6”, the list includes a specific carve-out provision for wholesale energy 
derivatives which excludes wholesale energy derivatives that must be settled 
physically. Accordingly, wholesale energy derivatives that can be settled financially 
are in-scope for the new financial markets regulation. Whether or not a contract must 
be settled physically is determined by criteria established by ESMA, according to 
which an energy derivative contract must be settled physically if:  
(I)  it contains provisions which ensure that parties to the contract have 
proportionate arrangements in place to be able to make or take delivery of 
the underlying commodity;  
                                                          
244 Annex I, sect. C, Directive 2014/65/EU 
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(II) it establishes unconditional, unrestricted and enforceable obligations of the 
parties to the contract to deliver and take delivery of the underlying 
commodity;  
(III) it is not possible for either party to replace physical delivery with cash 
settlement; and 
(IV) the obligations under the contract cannot be offset against obligations from 
other contracts between the parties concerned, without prejudice to the 
rights of the parties to the contract, to net their cash payment obligations245. 
Such a formulation confers on MiFID/MiFIR 2014 a considerable authority over 
wholesale energy derivatives, such as swaps, options and futures which are often 
settled financially and traded in regulated markets, MTFs, OTFs and SIs. What types 
of derivative contracts will be considered outside the scope of financial markets 
regulation remains to be seen.   
1.3.5. MAR/MAD 2014 
1.3.5.1. General 
The Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) is the cornerstone in regulating market abuse 
in European financial markets. Providing prohibitions on market manipulation and 
insider trading along with disclosure obligations with respect to inside information 
that are directly applicable at national level, MAR replaced MAD I on the ground, that 
the latter as a directive, led to divergences in the interpretation and the 
implementation of national market abuse regimes. The necessity for the revision of 
MAD I was stressed in the Commission’s consultation document in 2010 which 
identified that the regulatory gaps in the market abuse regime with respect to trading 
venues and financial instruments along with limited and diverging enforcement 
powers at the national level posed great challenges for the functioning and the 
integrity of EU financial markets246.  The scope of MAD I was limited to financial 
instruments admitted or who had requested for admission to trading on a regulated 
market, leaving financial markets under certain trading venues, such as MTFs and 
OTC trading, and certain types of financial instruments, such as contracts for 
differences, credit default swaps, climatic derivatives and emission allowances, 
                                                          
245 Final Report ESMA's Technical Advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR of 19 December 2014, 
ESMA/2014/1569 406 
246 European Commission, Public Consultation on A Revision of the Market Abuse Directive, [2010], 13 
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unregulated247. MAR is accompanied by the Market Abuse Directive of 2014 (MAD II) 
which introduced criminal sanctions for perpetrators of market manipulation and 
insider trading248. MAD II provides some degree of flexibility for member states in 
their implementation of criminal sanctions. Accordingly, national regulators are 
obliged to impose criminal sanctions against market abuse when it is established 
that the effects of such misconduct are severe to the extent that they threaten the 
integrity and functioning of financial markets as a whole. 
1.3.5.2. The Scope of the New Market Abuse Regime 
MAR provides significant reforms to the scope of market abuse regimes for financial 
markets regulation. MAR does not expressly list in-scope products, enabling national 
regulators to exercise their authority over a wide range of products including credit 
default swaps, contracts for difference and emission allowances249. Products traded 
on MTFs and OTFs, which were left unregulated by MAD I are now in-scope. In 
principle, the market abuse regime does not directly apply to commodity spot 
markets where commodities such as agricultural products are traded, settled and 
delivered physically. However, the new regime extends its regulatory grip over these 
markets when they affect the value of derivatives or other financial instruments 
traded in in-scope trading venues250. The prohibitions of market manipulation and 
insider trading are applicable to spot commodity products, if it is established that 
transactions in these products are likely to have an impact on the value of in-scope 
financial instruments.  
1.3.5.2.1. Carve-Out Provision 
MAR includes a carve-out provision for non-financial wholesale energy markets. 
According to Article 2 of MAR, its prohibitions on insider trading and market 
manipulation do not apply to wholesale energy commodities, even if they have an 
effect on MAR’s in-scope products.  Article 2(4) of REMIT identifies wholesale 
energy commodities as contracts for the supply of electricity or natural gas where 
delivery is in the EU and contracts relating to the transportation of electricity and 
natural gas are also in the EU. Nevertheless, MAR’s carve-out provision does not 
include wholesale energy derivative contracts. Options, futures, swaps and any other 
                                                          
247 Articles 1(3) and 9 of Directive 2003/6/EC 
248 Directive 2014/57/EU  
249 Niamh Moloney, (2014), 715 
250 Article 2(2)(a), Regulation No 596/2014 
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derivatives of contracts relating to electricity or natural gas traded or delivered in the 
European Union or relating to the transportation of electricity or natural gas in the 
European Union are in-scope financial instruments under the new market abuse 
regime.  
Article 1(2) of REMIT exempts financial wholesale energy products from the 
prohibitions of market manipulation and insider trading and defines financial 
wholesale energy products as financial instruments to which Article 9 of MAD I 
applies. The scope of Article 9 applies to all financial instruments traded in regulated 
markets, excluding those traded in MTFs and OTFs. This resulted in the application 
of REMIT to financial wholesale energy products which were not traded in regulated 
markets. The new market abuse regime has brought a significant recalibration in the 
scope of REMIT. Under MAR, financial instruments are identified as any financial 
contract traded in regulated markets, MTFs or OTFs251. The prohibitions on insider 
trading and market manipulation of MAR are applicable to all wholesale energy 
derivatives. Whether or not these derivatives must be settled physically is irrelevant 
to the application of MAR. This directly contradicts MiFID/MiFIR 2014 which 
considers wholesale energy derivatives that must be settled physically as not being 
financial products252 and creates inconsistency and ambiguity for the establishment 
of a single rulebook for the financial market and wholesale energy market regulation 
in the EU. 
1.3.5.2.2. Benchmark Manipulation 
The prohibition of market manipulation under MAR retains the previous formulation 
of MAD I with a one significant calibration. Article 12 of MAR identifies market 
manipulation as:  
a) transactions that give or are likely to give false or misleading signals as to the 
supply of, demand for, or price of, or  secure or are likely to secure the price 
of one or several in-scope financial or non-financial products , unless the 
reasons for engaging in such transactions are legitimate; 
                                                          
251 Article 2(1), Regulation No 596/2014  
252 Annex I, sect. C, Directive 2014/65/EU 
90 | P a g e  
 
b) transactions or any other activities that affect or are likely to affect the price of 
one or more in-scope financial and non-financial products through the 
employment of fictitious device or any other deception or contrivance; 
c) dissemination of information through media, internet or other means of 
telecommunication that gives or is likely to give false or misleading signals as 
to the supply of, demand for, or price of, an in-scope financial or non-financial 
product where the person who disseminated the information knew, or ought to 
know, that the information was false or misleading.  
In addition, Article 12(1)(d) introduces a new type of market manipulation, called 
‘Benchmark manipulation’, defined as ;  
“(…) transmitting false or misleading information or providing false or 
misleading inputs in relation to a benchmark where the person who made 
the transmission or provided the input knew or ought to have known that it 
was false or misleading, or any other behaviour which manipulates the 
calculation of a benchmark”. 
Benchmark manipulation involves perpetrators reporting transactions that do not 
represent true forces of demand and supply in markets to benchmark publishing 
indices which are used as reference prices with respect to relevant products and 
relevant markets. The rationale behind this type of manipulation is to move these 
benchmark prices at a level that is profitable for other positions whose value is 
determined by a reference to benchmark prices. The global rate-fixing scandals with 
respect to Libor and Euribor interest rates253  and significant growth in the use of 
indices and benchmarks experienced in recent years for pricing and risk 
management purposes in financial instruments254 gave rise to concerns about the 
applicability of market manipulation prohibition under MAD I to market practices that 
manipulate and distort indices and benchmark prices255, which provided a major 
                                                          
253 The scandal involved, inter alia, submission of interest rates which were different from those used by the 
perpetrator banks in practice. The European Commission levied fines worth €1.71 billion with respect to the 
alleged abusive practices. See; Commission, Press Release 4 December 2013 (IP/13/1208)  
254 The estimated size of the benchmark industry is worth €1,000 trillion. European Commission, Staff Working 
Document Impact Assessment, Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts 
(SWD (2013) 336/2), (Benchmark Proposal Impact Assessment), 6  
255 Benchmark Proposal Impact Assessment, (2013), 1. See also; European Commission Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on indices used as benchmarks in financial 
instruments and financial contracts, COM(2013) 641 final, 2 
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impulse for the EU to introduce an anti-manipulation provision specific to this type of 
manipulative activity.  
The adoption of a benchmark manipulation on the grounds that that MAD I did not 
address this type of market manipulation,  has two important legal implications for 
the prohibition of market manipulation under REMIT. First, the concept of benchmark 
manipulation constitutes a type of cross-market manipulation through which 
perpetrators seek to exploit price relations between different products and markets. 
The existing US case law on energy market manipulation shows that, in the majority 
of cross-market manipulation cases, perpetrators aim at distorting indices which 
operate as benchmark prices to seek further profits from their related financial and 
physical positions256. The introduction of benchmark manipulation, which is a clear 
example of cross-market manipulation, as a separate type of market manipulation on 
the grounds that this misconduct was not addressed under MAD I, gives rise to 
concerns about the prosecution of cross-market manipulation under REMIT which 
derived its anti-manipulation regime from MAD I. In its Recital 13, REMIT provides 
that “(…) (m)anipulation and its effects may occur across borders, between electricity 
and gas markets and across financial and commodity markets (…)”.  ACER also 
considers cross-market manipulation as an example of price positioning and thus 
prosecutable under Article 2(2)(a)(ii)257. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that 
REMIT is applicable to cross-market manipulation. Second, the introduction of 
benchmark manipulation under MAR distinguishes it from other types of cross-
market manipulation, as MAR also includes the prohibition on price positioning258. 
Accordingly REMIT does not include benchmark manipulation, while specifically 
addressing price positioning259. This leads to the conclusion that while it prohibits 
cross-market manipulation as price positioning, REMIT does not apply to benchmark 
manipulation since it does not specifically include such a prohibition in its anti-
manipulation rules.  
                                                          
256 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,086 (2007); Amaranth Advisors L.L.C. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 
61,085 (2007); Total Gas & Power North America Inc., et al., 155 FERC ¶61,105 (2016); BP America Inc., BP 
Corporation North America et al., 144 FERC ¶ 61,100 (2013); Barclays Bank PLC, Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, et 
al., 141 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2012). 
257 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 38 
258 Article 12(1)(a)(ii), Regulation No 596/2014 
259 Article 2(2)(a)(ii), Regulation No 1227/2011 
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One can argue that REMIT’s lack of authority over benchmark manipulation does not 
constitute any practical importance for the prosecution of such manipulative 
schemes as they often involve wholesale energy derivatives and are therefore 
prosecutable under MAR. It is true that the manipulative activities aimed at distorting 
benchmark prices to profit from financial wholesale energy products are regulated 
under MAR and therefore prosecutable under its benchmark manipulation. However, 
changes in price benchmarks can result in profits from a greater range of portfolios 
also involving non-financial wholesale energy products. Article 2(2)(a) clearly 
stresses that non-financial wholesale energy products are excluded from the scope 
of MAR’s prohibitions on market manipulation and insider trading, even if these 
products have an effect on the price or value of in-scope financial instruments. For 
example, a benchmark price with respect to a wholesale energy product can be used 
as a reference for a bilateral OTC wholesale energy contract where the parties of the 
contract have an incentive to change benchmark prices and which is outside the 
scope of MAR. In these transactions, REMIT is the only regulatory instrument to 
prevent exploitation of these price relations between non-financial contracts and 
benchmarks.  If REMIT is considered as not applicable to these manipulative 
practices as it does not have a specific prohibition, a major type of market 
manipulation may go unpunished in the wholesale energy markets.   
A positive answer for the applicability of REMIT to benchmark manipulation leads to 
concerns about a possible jurisdictional overlap between MAR and REMIT. The 
profitability of a benchmark manipulation depends on, inter alia, the diversity of 
portfolios held by perpetrators. Such portfolios can include wholesale derivative 
contracts such as swaps, options, or futures, as well as physical contracts on 
supplying a certain amount of energy at a certain delivery period, such as intraday, 
day-ahead, weekly, monthly or yearly contracts. As long as these values are priced 
by reference to a specific benchmark, market participants who hold positions in 
these contracts will have an incentive to drive up or down the price of this specific 
benchmark. A market participant can have positions in both financial and non-
financial contracts, which together derive their value from benchmark prices. When a 
market participant engages in conduct aimed at driving up or down a benchmark 
price to profit from the resultant financial and non-financial positions, the 
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manipulative activity can fall under the jurisdictions of both MAR260 and REMIT261. 
One can argue that, in such a case, MAR is applicable, as Article 1(2) of REMIT 
provides that the provisions under REMIT are without prejudice to MAD I which is 
replaced by MAR. This will result in an extension in the regulatory authority of MAR 
in cases of benchmark manipulation. 
1.3.5.2.3. A Hypothetical Scenario 
Consider a market participant who engages in physical transactions in wholesale 
energy products and reports these transactions to indices which provide benchmark 
prices for the relevant wholesale energy products. The same market participant also 
holds financial positions such as swaps and physical positions such as forward 
contracts which are together priced with reference to the benchmark price. In order 
to derive profit from its physical (forward contracts) and financial (swaps) positions, 
the market participant engages in loss-making physical transactions and reports 
them to indices to move the benchmark prices up or down. The only ground for the 
applicability of MAR to these transactions is the existence of financial positions from 
which the market participant derives profits, as the loss-making physical transactions 
are not in-scope for MAR. If it is established that the aim of the manipulation was to 
derive profits only from physical positions rather than financial positions or the 
market participant does not hold any financial position related to physical 
transactions, the prosecution depends on the applicability of REMIT’s jurisdiction to 
benchmark manipulation. The application of MAR to this scenario results in an 
extension of the MAR’s jurisdiction within the context of benchmark manipulation, as 
neither the transactions reported by the market participant nor the positions from 
which profits are derived are an in-scope instrument for MAR. The application of 
MAR to this case contradicts MAR itself as Article 2(2)(a) directly provides that its 
anti-manipulation rule, Article 12, does not apply to non-financial wholesale energy 
products even if they affect the price or value of in-scope financial products.  If it is 
found that the market participant also held and derived profit from financial positions 
as a result of the loss-making transactions, the question still remains as to whether 
the prohibition of benchmark manipulation under MAR is applicable as a whole or 
rather to the profits derived from financial instruments. If the latter is correct, the 
                                                          
260 Article 12(1)(d), Regulation No 596/2014 
261 Article 2(2)(a)(ii), Regulation No 1227/2011 
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applicability of anti-manipulation rules under REMIT and cooperation between ACER 
and the ESMA and national competent authorities responsible for the enforcement of 
these jurisdictions are key issues for the effective application of anti-manipulation 
rules in wholesale energy markets.   
1.3.5.2.4. Competent Authorities 
Article 22 of MAR requires each member state to designate an administrative 
competent authority which will monitor market behaviours and enforce anti-
manipulation and insider trading provisions when a market abuse is detected. These 
authorities are monitored by the ESMA, the financial competent authority at EU-wide 
level which supervises national authorities and governs cooperation among multiple 
competent authorities in multiple member states to ensure that market monitoring 
duties and enforcement of market abuse provisions are integrated at EU level without 
giving effect to regulatory arbitrage262. In wholesale energy markets, the involvement 
of ACER in this cooperation process is fundamental, as these markets are subject to 
market abuse provisions under both REMIT and MAR. As discussed above, the 
existing financial market regime suffers a lack of clarity and overlapping jurisdictions 
and it is difficult to mention a single rulebook that governs European financial market 
regulation. European wholesale energy markets are not exempt from this regulatory 
complexity. The integrated approach with respect to the application of anti-
manipulation to wholesale energy markets at both national and EU-wide levels 
largely depends on effective and consistent coordination between ACER and the 
ESMA. These two institutions entered into a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ on 18 
July, 2013 concerning consultation and cooperation with respect to their regulatory 
responsibilities in EU wholesale energy markets. The extent that this cooperation 
succeeds remains to be seen.  
1.4. EU COMPETITION LAW 
1.4.1. General 
Even though the application of EU competition law to practices in EU energy markets 
is not a new phenomenon as it dates back to Costa v Enel263 in 1964 in which the 
                                                          
262 Recital 11, Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010  
263 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. It is a landmark case in EU law, as the CJEU established the 
supremacy of EU rules over domestic law.  
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defendant objected to the nationalisation of electricity markets in Italy, the 
Commission’s first intervention to regulate energy markets came three decades 
later264. Regulatory practices were followed by antitrust intervention through which 
the Commission sought to support its liberalisation agenda and oversee the 
functioning of energy markets 265 . Especially after the adoption of Regulation 
1/2003 266 , which granted the Commission the powers to issue sector inquiries, 
commitment decisions and structural remedies, energy markets and practices have 
increasingly become subject to the antitrust proceedings under EU competition law. 
The Commission’s authority over the structure of EU energy markets was also 
approved in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty267, which included a new chapter on energy 
conferring competences on the Commission to;  
“(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;  
   (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; and  
 (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development 
of new and renewable forms of energy; and 
 (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks”268.  
1.4.2. The Application of Competition Law 
In order to pursue such objectives the Commission opened several proceedings to 
prosecute cartels 269  and abuses of dominance 270 , to control mergers 271  and to 
supervise state aids 272 . Regulation 1/2003 provides two separate enforcement 
procedures for the enforcement of competition law. First, Article 7 allows the 
                                                          
264 Council Directive 1990/377/EEC; Council Directive 1990/547/EEC of 29 October 1990 on the transit of 
electricity through transmission grids, OJ L 313, 13.11.1990; Council Directive 1991/296/EEC of 31 May 1991 
on the transit of natural gas through grids OJ L 147, 12.6.1991 
265 Ulrich Scholz & Stephan Purps, ‘Application of EU Competition Law in the Energy Sector’ (2015) 6/3 Journal 
of European Competition Law & Practice 200, 209 
266 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16.12.2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1 
267 Treaty of Lisbon, Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C306/1 
268 Article 194, TFEU 
269 E.ON/GDF (Case COMP/39.401) Commission Decision [2009] OJ C248/5; Power Exchanges (Case AT/39.952) 
Commission Decision [2014] OJ C334/5 
270 German Electricity Wholesale Market (COMP/39.388) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C36/8; German 
Electiricty Balancing Market (COMP/39.389) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C36/8  
271  Sydkraft/Graninge (Case COMP/M.3268) Commission Decision 2003/297/EC [2003] OJ C297/22; 
EDP/ENI/GDP (Case COMP/M.3440) Commission Decision 2005/801/EC [2005] OJ L302/69 
272 AB Klaipedos nafta (Case S.A. 36740) Commission Decision [2013] 2013/N; Investment Contract (early 
Contract for Difference) for the Hinkley Point C New Nuclear Power Station (Case S.A. 3497) Commission 
Decision 2013/C (ex 2013/N) [2014] OJ C69/60 
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Commission or national competent authorities to issue infringement decisions 
establishing that defendants violated relevant provisions under EU competition law. 
As a result of infringement decisions, defendants can be sanctioned behavioural 
remedies and if these remedies are not effective, structural remedies273. Article 9, on 
the other hand, enables the Commission or national competent authorities to 
conclude ‘Commitment Decisions’, according to which the Commission and national 
competent authorities can accept commitments offered by defendants. Once they 
are accepted, the commitments become binding on defendants274. It is important to 
note that commitment decisions do not include the conclusion of an infringement by 
the defendants and unless a certain set of circumstances are present, they cannot 
be reopened275.  
EU competition law is generally applied by national competition authorities at 
national level and the European Commission at EU level. While the jurisdictions that 
national competition authorities can exercise are limited to national or regional scope, 
the Commission investigates cases in which anti-competitive practices affect trade 
between more than three member states276, or EU-wide enforcement is required for 
efficient prosecution 277 . Competences that competition authorities hold, under 
Regulation 1/2003, in enforcing EU competition law are parallel278. One important 
distinction is that national competition authorities do not have the legal authority to 
conclude non-infringement decisions279. A national competition authority can find that 
there are no grounds for an infringement decision about a given market conduct. 
However, only the Commission can conclude that a certain market practice does not 
constitute a violation and infringement of EU competition law.  
In addition to national competition authorities and the Commission, national 
regulatory authorities, such as the ‘Office of Gas and Electricity Markets’ in the UK, 
can also be conferred on enforcement powers to prosecute practices within their 
                                                          
273 Article 7(1), Regulation 1/2003 
274 Article 9(1), Regulation 1/2003 
275 Article 9(2)(c), Regulation 1/2003 
276 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities [2004] OJ C101/43, para. 
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277 Ibid., para, 15 
278 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, (2014), 1051 
279 Case C-375/09, Prezes Urzedu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentow v. Tele2 Polska sp. Z o.o., now Netia SA 
[2011] ECR I-3055 
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relevant regulatory jurisdictions280. A national regulator which encompasses powers 
to enforce EU competition law can prosecute anti-competitive practices within their 
jurisdictional scope without the need for referring the conduct to the national 
competition authority and they are considered a national competent authority with 
respect to EU competition law analysis. This is not the case for all member states. In 
Germany and France, for example, competition law enforcement is under the 
jurisdiction of national competition authorities, while the authority of sector-specific 
regulators is limited to the enforcement of relevant regulations281. There are also 
other domestic regimes such as those adopted in Spain and the Netherlands in 
which national competition authorities also incorporate regulatory enforcement 
authorities and responsibilities282. According to Regulation 1/2003, Member States 
are allowed to determine which authority will enforce EU competition law and what 
mechanisms will be applied for the investigation and the prosecution of anti-
competitive practices 283 . Therefore, in referring to the authorities that enforce 
competition law, the thesis uses the term ‘national competent authorities’ rather than 
directly addressing national competition or regulatory authorities.  
1.4.3. The Multiplicity of Jurisdictions 
As discussed, there are multiple jurisdictions applicable to wholesale energy markets. 
In addition to those articulated under REMIT, MiFID/MiFIR 2014, MAR and EMIR 
also put forward data foreclosure obligations and market manipulation and insider 
trading prohibitions that apply to wholesale energy products, along with financial 
instruments. Therefore, market misconduct in a wholesale energy market can be in-
scope for both energy and financial market regulations and also subject to 
proceedings under EU competition law, if it constitutes a violation of one or both 
antitrust rules, Articles 101 and 102. This results in parallel enforcement proceedings 
in which regulatory frameworks and competition law are applied to the same market 
misconduct by different competent authorities. For example, in some member states, 
where national regulatory authorities also possess authority to enforce competition 
                                                          
280 Renato Nazzini, Concurrent Proceedings in Competition Law: Procedure, Evidence and Remedies (OUP 2004), 
57 
281 Cosmo Graham, ‘UK: The Concurrent Enforcement by Regulators of Competition Law and Sector-Specific 
Regulation’ (2016) 7/6 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 407, 407 
282 Ibid., 407 
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law, such as the UK, misconduct can be prosecuted under either competition law or 
the regulatory framework, while in others, where the enforcement authority is under 
sector-specific regulation and is also incorporated in national competition authorities, 
such as Spain, the decision to determine the applicable framework is bestowed upon 
national competition authorities.  
Even though in its Recital 29, REMIT provides that: “(n)ational regulatory authorities, 
competent financial authorities of the Member States and, where appropriate, 
national competition authorities should cooperate to ensure a coordinated approach 
to tackling market abuse on wholesale energy markets which encompasses both 
commodity markets and derivatives markets”284, it does not provide guidance on how 
a coordinated approach can be developed within competent authorities. The absence 
of a coherent framework that specifically establishes competences in wholesale 
energy markets results in concerns about the concurrent application of competition 
rules and sector-specific regulation and double jeopardy or the principle of ne bis in 
idem. In this respect, a legal analysis of the concurrency of competition and sector-
specific rules is of great importance in evaluating to what extent the legal approach 
developed in EU law suffices to tackle market manipulation in wholesale energy 
markets. 
1.4.4. Concurrency of the Applicable Jurisdictions 
1.4.4.1. Parameters of Concurrency 
The multiplicity of available jurisdictions results in legal and regulatory uncertainties 
with respect to the development of a single rulebook that can be followed by market 
participants. The same market conduct that is prohibited under REMIT can also be 
subject to proceedings by financial regulators under financial regulation 
(MiFID/MiFIR 2014, MAR and EMIR) and by competition authorities at EU and 
national level under EU Competition Law. Certain market practices may even lead to 
conflicting decisions by different jurisdictional authorities. This is particularly relevant 
for data disclosure obligations, as the disclosure of certain market information that is 
required under REMIT and financial market regulation can result in the 
Commission’s or national competition authorities’ intervention under EU competition 
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law285. Since the focus of this thesis is mainly the prohibition of market manipulation 
and its enforcement and prosecution in wholesale energy markets, the interplay 
between competition law and data disclosure obligations as well as insider trading is 
not discussed in detail. Nevertheless, it is important to note that overlapping 
jurisdictions with respect to data disclosure obligations under REMIT, financial 
regulation and EU Competition Law clearly illustrate how the uncertainties with 
respect to the legal framework applicable to wholesale energy markets are pervasive 
and not limited solely to the prohibition of market manipulation.  
 
Concurrency has many facets. Several authorities can claim jurisdiction over the 
same market practices by the same market participants on several grounds. First, 
concurrency can take place when multiple regulators exercise their authority. This 
was particularly the case in the US, as both the CFTC and FERC considered 
themselves competent in prosecuting manipulative practices in wholesale energy 
markets. Secondly, two different national competition authorities can assert 
jurisdiction over a manipulative conduct. Such concurrency can occur in two ways; 
horizontally and vertically 286 . Horizontal concurrency involves two competition 
authorities from different national jurisdictions. For example a manipulative conduct 
may affect two different national markets and give rise to proceedings by the national 
competition authorities in these markets. Vertical concurrency, on the other hand, 
involves manipulative conduct that is prosecuted by both national competition 
authorities at national level and the Commission at EU level. Finally, concurrency 
can also occur between competition and regulatory authorities. Accordingly market 
misconduct can become subject to proceedings by regulatory and competition 
authorities under relevant regulation and/or EU competition law.  
 
The chapter does not provide detailed analysis on the concurrent application of 
competition law by different competition authorities. This type of concurrency was 
addressed in the Commission’s notices on the cooperation between the Commission 
                                                          
285 For detailed discussion see; John Ratliff, ‘Transparency under REMIT and EU Competition Law’ (2015) ½ 
Competition Law and Policy Debate, 82 
286 See; D. Geradin & R. O’Donoghue, ‘The Concurrent Application of Competition Law and Regulation: The 
Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector (2005) 1/2 Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 355, 410 
100 | P a g e  
 
and the courts287 and on cooperation within the network of competition authorities288, 
which together stipulate the case allocation between competition authorities. 
Accordingly cases brought into notice are prosecuted by the well-placed competition 
authority which would be designated on the basis of facts. Again the chapter 
provides very limited analysis on the concurrency between regulators. As discussed 
above, there are several issues where jurisdictions of financial and energy markets 
regulators overlap and the development of the case law on how case allocation 
should be determined depends on the functioning of memoranda of understanding289, 
published by ACER, ESMA and national regulatory authorities.  This chapter focuses 
on the concurrency between EU competition law and market regulation. The 
question of what types of manipulative practices can lead to proceedings under 
REMIT, MAR and EU Competition Law is delved into in following sections290. The 
analysis of the concurrent application of competition law and sector-specific 
regulation and its legal implications as to the prosecution of market manipulation in 
wholesale energy markets are fundamental to understanding the interplay between 
antitrust rules and energy market regulation. 
1.4.4.2. Concurrent Application of Competition Law and Sector-
Specific Regulation 
Concurrency is not limited to energy markets and can occur in any market, subject to 
sector-specific regulation. This is especially the case when state authorities engage 
in liberalisation policies to introduce competition in sectors which were previously 
dominated by legal monopolies with exclusive rights. Market practices which were 
allowed under monopolistic market conditions have been no longer considered legal 
and are thus prohibited under liberalising regulations. Nevertheless, opening of these 
ex-monopolistic markets also results in intervention by competition authorities which 
are no longer bound by exemptions provided for ex-monopolies allowing them to 
                                                          
287 Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States 
in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC [2004] OJ C101/54  
288 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities [2004] OJ C101/43 
289 Memorandum of Understanding between ESMA and ACER concerning the consultation and cooperation 
regarding their regulatory responsibilities in relation to EU wholesale energy markets, 18 July, 2013; 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding between the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
and National Regulatory Authorities and market monitoring bodies concerning cooperation and coordination 
of market monitoring under Regulation (EU) No. 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (REMIT), 23 August, 2013   
290 See chapter 4.  
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operate without being subject to antitrust rules. This results in double-regulation of 
these newly-liberalised markets. A market practice that is prohibited under regulation 
may also lead to opening of proceedings under competition law.  
In the US, concurrency is not allowed when the court established that a given market 
conduct is under strict scrutiny by sector-specific regulation. There are two cases in 
which the US courts were asked to apply competition law to a conduct which was 
already prohibited and remedied under regulation. In Trinko, the US Supreme Court 
refused to uphold a complaint alleging that the defendant violated Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act by failing to provide third party access to its fixed telecommunication 
infrastructure291. The court held that the relevant telecommunications market was 
under a strict regulatory regime under the Telecommunications Act of 1996292 and 
the misconduct at issue had already been remedied in according with the regulatory 
obligations293. The court suggested that “(a)ntitrust analysis must always be attuned 
to the particular structure of the industry at issue”294. The availability of a regulatory 
framework established to deter and remedy anti-competitive harm rendered the 
additional protection from antitrust enforcement negligible295. Accordingly, the court 
deemed it unnecessary to apply antitrust rules to an anti-competitive conduct which 
had already been prohibited and remedied under the sector-specific regulation296.  
In Credit Suisse297, the Supreme Court followed the same approach and further 
stressed that the existence of a sector-specific regulation and the availability of a 
sector-specific regulator that continuously supervised and enforced its authority over 
the regulated market resulted in an ‘implied immunity’ from the application of antitrust 
rules298 . The case involved allegations of anticompetitive practices in securities 
markets which were strictly regulated by the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act 
                                                          
291 Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP, 3540 US 398 (2004) 
292 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56 
293 The defendant was required to pay more than $10 million to other market participants under state and 
federal regulation. Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP, 3540 US 398,  403-404 
(2004)  
294 Ibid.,  
295 Ibid.,  
296 Ibid.,  
297 Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC, et al. v. Billing et al., 127 S.Ct. 2383 (2007), Credit Suisse Securities (USA) 
LLC v. Billing  551 U.S. 264 (2007) 
298 Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC, et al. v. Billing et al., 127 S.Ct. 2383, 2389 (2007) 
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of 1934299. The court required four conditions to be met to conclude the implied 
immunity from antitrust rules. First, the availability of a sector-specific regulator 
supervising market activity was necessary. Second, it must be shown that the 
regulatory authority enforced its authority over the given market misconduct. Third, a 
potential conflict between the regulatory framework and antitrust rules must affect 
the regulator’s jurisdictional authority. Finally, the Court required that there must be a 
serious risk of conflict the antitrust and regulatory regimes300. Applying a very lenient 
approach to the evaluation of the third and fourth elements, the Court concluded that 
all of these requirements were present in the current case and thus antitrust rules 
could not be applicable to the relevant market misconduct under implied immunity301. 
The CJEU’s approach to concurrency is different from that of the US Supreme Court. 
EU case law identifies three situations in which EU courts are barred from applying 
EU competition law and sector-specific regulation concurrently to a particular market 
misconduct. First, EU competition law cannot be applied to regulated markets, if the 
regulatory framework includes an explicit derogation for that purpose302. Second, EU 
competition law is not applicable to a regulated market which is not open to 
competition303. This is particularly the case in markets which are dominated by de 
jure or de facto monopolies304. Third, EU competition law cannot be applied to a 
market conduct which is required under sector-specific regulation305. This type of 
exception is called ‘State Action Defence’306 and can be invoked only when it is 
established that market participants engage in an anti-competitive conduct to comply 
with their obligations required under the regulatory framework. In other words, the 
regulatory framework must deprive market participants of the ability to act 
independently in the market with respect to the contested misconduct307.   
In conflicts where any of these exceptions are not present, both EU competition law 
and sector-specific regulation can be applied to the same market misconduct and 
                                                          
299 The Securities Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R.  § 240.10b-5 (2011)  
300 Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC, et al. v. Billing et al., 127 S.Ct. 2383, 2397 (2007) 
301 Ibid. 
302 Case T-398/07 Spain v. Commission [2012] EU:T:2012:173, para. 55 
303 Case T-360/09 E.ON Ruhrgas AG and E.ON AG v. Commission [2012] EU:T:2012:332, para. 84   
304 Niamh Dune, Competition Law and Economic Regulation: Making and Managing Markets (CUP, 2015), 216 
305 Joined Cases C-359/95 & C-379/95 P Commission v. Ladbroke Racing Ltd., ECR I-6265 para. 33 
306 See; Fernando Castillo De La Torre, ‘State Action Defence in EC Competition Law’ (2005) 28/4 World 
Competition 407  
307 Niamh Dune, Competition Law and Economic Regulation: Making and Managing Markets (CUP, 2015), 217 
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market participants. The telecommunications sector is illustrative of the approach 
taken by EU courts to concurrency. In Deutsche Telekom308, the CJEU identified that 
the defendant could autonomously act to refrain from breaching EU competition law 
rules without violating their obligations under the relevant regulatory framework for 
the telecommunications sector and thus could not invoke State Action Defence to 
avoid paying penalties309. The ability of market participants to act autonomously was 
interpreted very broadly. Even if the extent to which market participants could act 
autonomously was small under relevant regulatory frameworks, they can still be 
refused the right to invoke State Action Defence310. Whether or not contested market 
behaviour has been remedied under the regulatory framework is  also irrelevant for 
the concurrent application311. Accordingly the defendants could still be fined for a 
breach of competition law, even if a remedy for the misconduct has been provided 
under the regulatory framework.  
The difference between US and EU case law on concurrency is strongly related to 
the difference between legal approaches to the question as to whether there is a 
hierarchy between competition law and sector-specific regulation. US case law does 
not discuss a hierarchy between these two legal instruments312. The Sherman Act 
does not have any supremacy over the Telecommunications Act of 1996, EPAct 
2005 or other sector-specific regulatory frameworks. This is not the case in EU law. 
While the majority of sector specific regulatory frameworks have been adopted in 
secondary legislation such as directives and regulations which require further 
legislative actions for their implementation at national law, competition rules are 
based on primary legislation in the EU Treaty313. EU courts acknowledge that the 
treaty rules prevail over domestic rules 314 . This is also supported by several 
directives and regulations which specifically provide that their rules and provisions 
are applied without prejudice to the application of EU competition law315.  The lack of 
a deference mechanism in EU case law, and the courts’ insistence on the 
                                                          
308 C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission (2010) ECR I-9555 
309 Ibid., paras. 84-89 
310 Niamh Dune,(2015), 218 
311 Telekomunikacja Polska (Case COMP/39.525) Commission Decision [2011] OJ C327/7 para. 131, 138 
312 D. Geradin & R. O’Donoghue, (2005), 418 
313 Ibid. 
314 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 593; Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others v. Bundeskartellamt 
[1969] ECR 1, 13-15  
315 Article 1(2), Regulation 1227/2011 
104 | P a g e  
 
concurrency results in the duplication of proceedings and thus gives rise to concerns 
about double jeopardy/ne bis in idem principle. 
1.4.4.3. Ne Bis In Idem Principle 
Originating in criminal law, the principle of ne bis in idem or double jeopardy is 
related to the right of a person not to be subject to multiple investigations or 
prosecutions for the same offence316. The principle was also included in Article 4(1) 
of Protocol No 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 317, and also in Article 50 of European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights318. In PVC (No 2) the CJEU adopted a very limited approach to 
the application of this principle in EU competition law319. The Court defined the 
principle as it “merely prohibits a fresh assessment in depth of the alleged 
commission of an offence which would result in the imposition of either a second 
penalty, in addition to the first, in the event that liability is established a second time, 
or a first penalty in the event that liability not established by the first decision is 
established by the second”320. Accordingly if the courts find that a decision of the 
Commission must be rejected due to procedural flaws without further evaluation of 
legal liability attributed to defendants, the ne bis in idem principle does not apply and 
new proceedings can be opened.  
The CJEU’s decision in PVC (No 2) is related to multiple antitrust proceedings and 
does not directly address the concurrent application of competition law and sector-
specific regulation. It is Aalborg Portland 321 , in which the CJEU elaborated on 
concurrency and established a three-fold criteria to evaluate whether the principle of 
ne bis in idem was violated as a result of multiple proceedings under competition law 
and sector-specific regulation. In order to invoke the double jeopardy defence, 
defendants must show that three elements present in concurrent proceedings are 
the same: (i) persons; (ii) facts; and (iii) the legal interests protected. In 
                                                          
316 Renato Nazzini,(2004), 115 
317 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the European Human Rights 
Convention) (Rome, 4 November 1950), Protocol No 7  
318 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/1 
319 Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P, C-251/99 P, C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P 
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) v. Commission of the European Communities (PVC No 2) [2002] ECR I-
8375. See also; Renato Nazzini, (2004), 55 
320 PVC No 2, para. 61 
321 Case C-204/00 P Aalborg Portland A/S et al. v. Commission [2004] ECR I-123 
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Telekomunikacja Polska322, the Commission applied these three-fold criteria to the 
defendant, the incumbent telecommunications operator in Poland which had been 
previously investigated and remedied under national regulations due to its continuing 
failure to provide third party access to its fixed broadband infrastructure.   
Evaluating whether the defendant’s failure constituted a refusal to supply in violation 
of Article 102 of TFEU, the Commission concluded that even though the defendant’s 
conduct had been previously prosecuted under national regulations, fulfilling the first 
and the second elements of the criteria, the legal interests protected by the 
regulation and competition law were different and thus ne bis in idem principle could 
not hinder the proceedings brought under EU competition law323. According to the 
Commission, the aim of EU competition law was “to preserve undistorted competition 
within the European Union”, while that of Polish telecommunications regulation was 
to include “other objectives such as "development and use of modern 
telecommunications infrastructure, maximum benefits for users in terms of choice, 
price and quality of telecommunications services and net neutrality” 324. To what 
extent the available rules on the prohibition of market manipulation give rise to 
concerns about the principle of ne bis in idem is addressed in greater detail in the 
following sections325. 
1.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the legal framework established by REMIT, which 
consists of three important pillars addressing the transparency and integrity of 
wholesale energy markets across the EU. The main objective of the regulation is to 
provide a common regulatory approach taken by the National Regulatory Agencies to 
ensure confidence and a fair as well as competitive interplay between demand and 
supply in the wholesale energy markets326. This is important as national energy 
markets across the EU are increasingly integrated with each other and market 
conditions and inefficiencies in one jurisdiction influence market conditions and prices 
                                                          
322 Telekomunikacja Polska (Case COMP/39.525) Commission Decision [2011] OJ C327/7 
323 Ibid., paras. 138 - 139 
324 Ibid., para. 138 
325 See; section 4.3.5. 
326 Recital 1, Regulation No 1227/2011.  
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in others327. Accordingly, disclosure obligations and prohibitions of insider trading and 
market manipulation are adopted to ensure that wholesale energy trading across the 
EU is carried out via a common, well-established legal approach, which clearly 
identifies and proscribes market behaviours that are regarded as market abuse. 
However this chapter argues that the concepts and definitions introduced under 
REMIT are far from being precise and thus fulfilling the designated objectives.  
As to information disclosure and the prohibition of insider trading, REMIT set very 
broad obligations and definitions leading to further ambiguities and concerns of 
potential collusion among market participants benefitting from higher levels of 
transparency. Even though REMIT provides a list of inside information and therefore 
should be made public, the obligations and definitions are designed very broadly and 
cause greater uncertainties as to what type of information might qualify as inside 
information and as to what sanctions and remedies should be provided in the case of 
non-compliance. As the guidance document published by ACER also fails to clarify 
the concepts presented or provide further explanation as to the definitions given 
under REMIT, it is not reasonable to expect the development of a common approach 
across national jurisdictions in addressing information asymmetry and insider trading 
in the wholesale energy markets. 
REMIT provided a definition for the prohibition of market manipulation and ACER 
also gave further details as to what types of activities can be deemed to be 
manipulative under these definitions. The concept was first included in the EU 
context with the adoption of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) in 2004, from which 
REMIT derived its definitions of market abuse. The scope of MAD was limited to 
financial markets and did not apply to wholesale energy products328. The chapter 
shows that the examples and classifications provided under REMIT and ACER are 
far from establishing a legal methodology to be followed by competent authorities in 
                                                          
327 The trade of energy through exchanges provides an effective means for price convergence. For example, in 
the electricity markets, market coupling, which designates the volumes and the prices based on the marginal 
pricing principle, is performed under two procedures; the Central West Europe (CWE) including Germany, 
France and Benelux countries and the European Market Coupling (EMCC), encompassing CWE and Scandinavia. 
For the full account of the market coupling process see; 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/Electricity/Regional_initiatives/Cross_Regional_Roadmaps/Pages/1.-Market-
Coupling.aspx 
328 As mentioned, according to Article 9 of MAD 2003, wholesale energy products that are traded in regulated 
markets are within the jurisdiction of Directive’s market manipulation rules.  
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prosecuting market manipulation. The necessary guidance in EU case law with 
respect to identifying what type of market behaviours can constitute manipulation, 
how to detect them and what makes existing market designs and structures practical 
for market manipulation is missing.  
The regulatory and legal frameworks applicable to EU wholesale energy markets are 
not limited to REMIT. Several rules under financial regulation and EU competition law 
constitute great importance in establishing the legal regime that govern the energy 
sector. Nevertheless, the chapter shows that uncertainties remain, as to the scope of 
the existing legal framework that applies to wholesale energy. Several wholesale 
energy products are under the jurisdiction of multiple regulatory and competition 
authorities. While energy market regulators are entitled to monitor and ensure the 
functioning of wholesale energy markets, financial regulators also exercise close 
market oversight in wholesale financial contracts such as options, swaps and futures. 
Finally, competition authorities at both national and EU levels oversee both financial 
and energy markets and intervene when a violation of competition law rules is 
alleged.  
Energy market participants are obliged to follow several requirements and obligations 
provided under MiFID/MiFIR 2014, MAR/MAD 2014, REMIT and competition law. EU 
courts’ approach to the concurrent application of competition law and sector-specific 
regulation further elevates the uncertainties with respect to establishing the 
applicable legal regimes. The availability of these multiple jurisdictions renders a 
uniform and transparent single rulebook that an energy market participant can rely on 
when operating in energy markets a still distant dream. 
Addressing certain examples of market manipulation derived from the experience of 
the national regulatory agencies, the guidance document published by ACER also 
fails to provide a common understanding of a legal approach in dealing with market 
manipulation across the EU. Many of the examples given as market manipulation can 
also be part of legitimate trading activity and the document does not provide any 
explanation on how a market behaviour is deemed to be manipulative and on what 
basis a market conduct can be separated from legitimate trading. As REMIT does not 
include an intent element in its legal analysis, a demarcation of market behaviours 
with respect to their economic effects on the wholesale energy markets is needed to 
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determine whether they are manipulative or not. However, to what extent the existing 
legal tools are sufficient to deliver such demarcation is questionable.  
The existing case law on market manipulation in EU wholesale energy markets 
involves only one case, Iberdrola, in which the defendant was found liable for 
violating Article 5 of REMIT through perpetrating capacity withholding practices in 
Spanish wholesale energy markets 329 . Given the growing level of transparency 
through data disclosure obligations and market oversight, the number of proceedings 
brought against market participants for possible breaches of anti-manipulation rules 
is envisaged to increase330. Nevertheless, questions as to what types of market 
practices can be considered manipulative under REMIT remain unanswered. Since 
EU case law on market manipulation has yet to be developed, the need for an 
extensive legal analysis on market manipulation beyond the EU is blatantly obvious 
to understand how market manipulation can be a concern in energy markets. 
In this regard, US case law on market manipulation in energy markets provides an 
insight into how energy markets can become subject to market manipulation and 
what types of market misconduct can result in proceedings under anti-manipulation 
rules. In the following chapter, the thesis first discusses the rules that prohibit market 
manipulation under US statutes and attempts to define and clarify the concept in 
academic literature. The findings of the next chapter clearly show that defining a 
single common definition of market manipulation has been also problematic in the 
United States where the prosecution of market manipulation took place before 
anywhere else in the world and the concept is historically known to be rife with 
uncertainties and ambiguities 331. In the following chapter, the thesis delves into the 
application and formulation of these anti-manipulation rules under US case law. Even 
though there are significant differences between REMIT’s formulation of market 
manipulation as transaction-based and information-based and the evolution of the 
                                                          
329 Peter Willis & Hermenegildo Altozano, ‘Spanish authority fines Iberdrola €25m in first REMIT market 
manipulation infringement decision’ (Bird&Bird, 4 February, 2014) 
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2016/spain/spanish-authority-fines-iberdrola-25m-in-first-remit-
infringement-decision 
330 John Ratliff & Roberto Grasso, ‘REMIT – Implementing Measures Clarifying Data Reporting Obligations’ 
(2015) WilmerHale 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=17179876224  
331 In Cargill v. Hardin, the Eighth Circuit noted that “The methods and techniques of manipulation are limited 
only by the ingenuity of man”. Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). 
See; Shaun Ledgerwood & Dan Harris, (2012). 
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concept in US case law, the analysis and arguments provided in the following 
chapters are of great importance in understanding how the legal framework 
established by REMIT will be applied to EU wholesale energy markets and what 
types of market practices may result in proceedings by competent authorities under 
the prohibition of market manipulation. 
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2. ANTI MANIPULATION LAW: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Even though it has been generally considered the main culprit for crashes and 
dysfunction in financial markets332 , the regulation of financial markets has been 
historically rife with confusion about what constitutes market manipulation. In Cargill, 
the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, stated that “(t)he methods and 
techniques of manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of man”. 333  The 
inefficiencies in legal standards categorising manipulative behaviours have caused 
case law and legal literature to develop an abstract “I know it when I see it” 334 
approach that provides very limited guidance to market participants on how to 
operate in the market without breaching anti-manipulation laws335. Since legal and 
economic theories have failed to remove the uncertainties in the application of anti-
manipulation rules to market behaviour, many commentators have taken it upon 
themselves to develop frameworks to define and identify market manipulation.  
In order to analyse the practice of market manipulation and functioning of REMIT 
more efficiently, this paper provides a detailed analysis of the identification and 
classification of market manipulation as developed in case law as well as legal 
discussions introduced by many commentators as to the problems and uncertainties 
with respect to the application of the concept. In the second section, the chapter 
covers the development of anti-manipulation law in the US. The third section 
introduces a traditional understanding of and legal discussion on the categorisation 
of market manipulation in US case law providing the classification of fraud-based 
and artificial price-based manipulation.  The fourth section discusses the 
reconceptualisation attempts of market manipulation by legal commentators 
proposing alternative definitions and frameworks for the functioning of markets. The 
fifth section comprises of the conclusions. 
                                                          
332 During the tumultuous times of the ‘Great Depression’ and ‘Wall Street Crash’ in the 1920s and the 1930’s, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his speech to US Congress, stated that (t)he people of this country are, in an 
overwhelming majority, fully aware of the fact that unregulated speculation in securities and in commodities 
was one of the most important contributing factors in the artificial and unwarranted boom which had so much 
to do with the terrible conditions of the years following 1929”. See; Jerry Markham, (2015), 66 
333 Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972) 
334 “Sophisticated economic justification for the distinctions made in this area of law may at times seem 
questionable. Sometimes the know it when you see it test appears most useful” Frey v. CFTC, 931 F.2d 1171, 
1175 (7th Cir. 1991) 
335 Jerry Markham, (2015), 211 
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2.2. THE CONCEPT OF MARKET MANIPULATION 
The concept of market manipulation, though at the centre of current legal discussion, 
is not a new phenomenon. In the United States, where the early attempts to 
prosecute market manipulation date back to the Revolution336, the perpetration of 
market manipulation has been subject to regulatory and judicial oversight since the 
operation of pools, earlier in the nineteenth century, where issuers and speculators 
traded physical and financial products heavily 337 . It was believed that the price 
fluctuations in these pools caused by the manipulative behaviour of market 
participants in the early decades of the twentieth century led to the stock market 
crash in 1929 and eventually, the ‘Great Depression’ of the 1930’s338. This was 
followed by the prohibition of market manipulation by the Securities Exchange Act339 
(SEA) in 1934 and the Commodity Exchange Act340 (CEA) in 1936. The formulation 
of these two statutes was different. While the former proscribed fraud-based market 
manipulation, the latter prohibited behaviours that make market prices artificial, 
which was called artificial price-based manipulation.   
The majority of the examples introduced within the ACER’s guidance document341, 
such as wash trades, improper matched orders, pump and dump schemes etc., are 
derived from the experience of US Courts in prosecuting under the SEA’s fraud-
based market manipulation rule of 10(b)-5. The development of judicial practice in US 
courts for over a hundred years342 has led to a belief that market manipulation is a 
type of fraud as it involves covert and disguised positions and intentions343. Such a 
conclusion was reasonable, since judicial history with respect to market behaviour 
that resulted in artificial prices in relevant products has been silent and the majority of 
                                                          
336 George Washington pointed at “monopolisers, forestallers and engrossers” as culprits of inflated 
commodity prices during the Revolution and asserted individuals responsible should be “hung in gibbets”. See; 
Ibid., 14  
337 In 1817, the New York Stock Exchanges adopted the prohibition of fictitious sales. Ibid, 14 
338 Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, ‘Should the Law Prohibit Manipulation in Financial Markets?’ 105 Harvard 
Law Review, 503  (1991). For further details on pools, see; Steve Thel, 'The Original Conception of Section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act', Stanford Law Review, 42 (1990), 385, 38.  
339 17 C.F.R.  § 240.10b-5 (2011) 
340 The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936,  7 U.S.C. § 13b (2010), see; 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/pdf/lii_usc_TI_07_CH_1.pdf  
341 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 36-40  
342 For further information on the history of market manipulation, see; Jerry Markham, (2015)    
343 Frank H. Easterbrook, ‘Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures Markets’ (1986) 59/2, The 
Journal of Business 103 
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the prosecutions carried out in US law involved certain types of deceitful and 
fraudulent behaviour.  
The approach taken in SEA’s fraud-based manipulation rule was also adopted by 
other US sector specific regulators. Particularly in the energy sector, with the rapid 
increase in the trading of derivatives markets in the 2000’s providing liquidity and 
means for market participants not only to hedge their positions in the energy markets 
but also to invest in financial instruments, the US Congress enacted the Energy 
Policy Act in 2005344 (EPAct), which introduced fraud-based manipulation provisions 
into the Federal Power Act345 and the Natural Gas Act346. Accordingly, the anti-
manipulation rule adopted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
following the reading of the SEA Rule 10b-5, prohibits fraudulent behaviour in the US 
energy markets by traders, who have acted with a requisite intent. This formulation 
does not require FERC to prove price artificiality. Neither does it have to carry out 
extensive economic analysis on price levels. Nevertheless, prosecuting manipulative 
behaviour solely on the basis of a fraud-based definition caused certain complexities 
in practice. In the Radley347 case, the US court found it problematic to construe a 
market behaviour, which intrinsically does not involve any fraudulent or deceptive 
device or scheme, as a fraud-based market manipulation.     
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) also pursued cases against 
traders on the basis of manipulation of energy derivatives348 as its jurisdiction covers 
trading in physical and financial energy commodity exchange. This resulted in an 
overlap of its jurisdiction with the FERC’s. In Amaranth Advisors349, both the FERC 
and CFTC exercised their jurisdiction and initiated enforcement proceedings against 
market behaviours based on the manipulation of future contracts. The CFTC also 
declared that it will apply its provisions to certain energy products that had been 
within the scope of the FERC’s jurisdiction. As the FERC’s ability to prosecute market 
manipulation is limited due to its fraud-based formulation, the CFTC’s enforcement of 
anti-manipulation rules on the basis of price artificiality is of greater importance. 
                                                          
344 Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Public Law 109–58)    
345 The Federal Power Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c (2006) 
346 The Natural Gas Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (2006) 
347 United States v. Radley, 659 F. Supp. 2d 803 (S.D. Tex. 2009). For greater detail, see section; 3.2.3. 
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However, in order to comprehend the relationship between fraud-based and artificial 
price-based manipulation in the energy markets, it is necessary to demarcate the 
legal borderlines between these two types of market manipulations along with the 
ways they converge with or diverge from each other.    
2.3. DEMARCATING FRAUD-BASED AND ARTIFICIAL PRICE-BASED 
FORMULATIONS  
2.3.1. General 
The distinction between fraud-based and artificial price-based manipulation is not 
clear-cut. This is partly due to varying definitions of market manipulation in the legal 
and academic literature. Even though both early legal statutes and US case law 
applied and enforced anti-manipulation rules, there is not any common definition 
which clearly demarcates the extent and characteristics of market manipulation350. 
Identifying manipulation is a difficult task for a regulator. Almost every movement and 
strategy carried out by firms and traders have consequences on market prices and 
determining whether or not such price differences are based on legitimate trading 
activities or manipulative schemes is, in certain conditions impossible, without clear 
indications about the perpetrators’ true intentions. This has resulted in some 
commentators, such as Jerry Markham, considering market manipulation an 
unprosecutable crime351. Daniel R. Fischel and David J. Ross, went further and argue 
that existing market manipulation law must be repealed as it poses a serious threat to 
the well-functioning of markets 352 . Others have proposed various market 
manipulation definitions. Forging an appropriate definition that clearly sheds light 
upon the nature of market manipulation and identifies characteristics that separate its 
functioning from other types of market abuses as well as from legitimate trading 
activities is an issue long discussed intensively in the academic literature. There have 
been various attempts by several commentators to define market manipulation which 
will be analysed in greater detail in the following sections353. The aim of this paper is 
not to provide an alternative market manipulation definition. Neither does it undertake 
                                                          
350 Jerry Markham, (2015), 211; See also Wendy C. Purdue, ‘Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the 
Offense’ (1987) 56 Fordham Law Review 345, 346 
351 Jerry W. Markham, ‘Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices-The Unprosecutable Crime, (1991) 8 Yale 
Journal on Regulation  
352 See; Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, (1991) 
353 See section; 2.4. 
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to provide an evaluation of the effectiveness or the functionality of these definitions in 
addressing manipulative conduct. Instead, it focuses on the borderlines that separate 
fraud-based and artificial price-based manipulations and evaluates how these two 
legal concepts interact with each other in practice.  
In order to comprehend the extent and application of these two concepts, it is 
necessary to address the conceptual problems that the academic literature seeks to 
answer in developing alternative definitions for market manipulation. It can be noted 
that the definitions of market manipulation refrain from establishing two separate 
prohibitions with respect to fraud and price artificiality. The fact that proving price 
artificiality has been traditionally problematic results in the perception that adoption of 
a definition integrating both artificial price-based and fraud-based manipulation would 
alleviate evidentiary burdens. Such a formulation would also be consistent with the 
idea that artificial price-based manipulation intrinsically features the characteristics of 
fraud and therefore should be considered as a part of fraud-based market 
manipulation 354 . To what extent these two concepts can be prohibited under a 
common formulation requires a legal analysis involving the identification of the 
market behaviour each prohibition undertakes to deal with and the legal elements 
that they seek to establish for the enforcement of the prohibitions.  
2.3.2. Fraud-based Manipulation 
2.3.2.1. General 
This type of manipulation involves any deceptive behaviour that is designed to 
mislead other market participants into believing that the value of a certain product is 
lower or higher than its true level or that supply and demand conditions in the market 
are different than actual existing conditions. Such market behaviour has no legitimate 
purpose other than to create a false impression, which causes other market 
participants to act in a manner desired by the manipulator. Even though the legal 
analysis required in US case law to determine whether a fraud-based manipulation 
has taken place may differ from that of EU355, whether or not the manipulator accrues 
any benefit from the fraudulent behaviour is irrelevant in both jurisdictions. Moreover, 
                                                          
354 Frank H. Easterbrook, (1986), 118; Shaun D. Ledgerwood & Paul Carpenter, (2012), 258 
355 For example, the intent requirement, which is an important component of anti-manipulation rules in the US, 
is not required in the EU’s formulation of market manipulation.  
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whether or not the prices change in relation to the products or markets that the 
fraudulent behaviour is related to is also irrelevant.  
2.3.2.2. The Formulation 
The main focus of the prohibition of fraud-based market manipulation is the reliability 
of the information present in the market356. Therefore, the formulation of its legal 
analysis differs from that of artificial price-based market manipulation, which focuses 
on price effects in the markets. Accordingly, SEA, s 10(b)-5 provides that:  
“(i)t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security357.” (italics and parenthesis added) 
SEA’s jurisdiction covers security trading, such as the purchase and sale of equities 
in stock exchanges. In order to apply Article 10(b)-5 to manipulative behaviour, it 
must be proved that:  
(1) a fraudulent or deceptive device, scheme or statement must be utilized;  
(2) such a device, scheme, or statement must be in relation to sale or purchase of 
a product in the stock market; and  
(3) the perpetrator of the device, scheme or statement must act with a requisite 
intent.  
 
 
 
                                                          
356 Craig Pirrong, (2010), 6 
357 17 C.F.R.  § 240.10b-5 (2011) 
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2.3.2.3. Examples of Fraud-Based Manipulation 
This fraud-based definition of market manipulation has been successful in 
prosecuting deceptive and fraudulent practices in the securities markets 358 . 
Traditionally, the nature of a fraudulent device is irrelevant for the determination of 
fraud-based manipulation. Manipulation via fraudulent transactions which do not 
involve real risks and material effects has also been considered fraud359. In other 
words whether market manipulation is transaction-based or information-based is 
irrelevant for the finding of fraud under the SEA’s formulation.  
 
As SEA’s Rule 10b-5 provides, the use of any fraudulent device, scheme, or 
statement in relation to the sale or purchase of a relevant product with a requisite 
intent is prohibited. Such fraudulent devices may involve dissemination of false 
information to the market or entering into transactions that create a false impression 
regarding the relevant products or the conditions of the markets. For example in 
pump and dump schemes, the perpetrator, who buys a large long position with 
respect to a product, disseminates false information, which moves the prices to a 
level favourable to the perpetrator’s position and sells its position at this inflated price. 
Wash trades, on the other hand, involve the perpetrator both buying and selling the 
same product at the same price to create a false impression that there is a lot of 
activity in the market with respect to the relevant product.  
 
Another example of a fraudulent transaction is matched orders, in which the 
perpetrator places a sale or purchase order, with the knowledge that another party is 
placing an identical order, which matches the size and price of the first order. Both 
wash trades and matched orders are transactions used to create a churn in market 
activity. The only difference between them is that while in wash trades it is the same 
person who places both the purchase and sale order, in a matched order, this 
practice is done with a party in a coordinated way.  
 
                                                          
358 Shaun D. Ledgerwood, ‘ Market Manipulation Without Market Power’ (Law360, June 23, 2011) 
<http://www.law360.com/articles/252314/market-manipulation-without-market-power> accessed 10 May 
2016  
359 Emilios E. Avgouleas, (2005), 114. 
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As discussed, both Market Abuse Regulation360 and REMIT361 provide a classification 
as information-based manipulation and transaction-based manipulation. While the 
former concept consists of dissemination of false information as well as a failure to 
make inside information public, transaction-based market manipulation involves 
fraudulent transactions and artificial price-based manipulation, a classification, totally 
at odds with the evolution of the concept in practice. The question of whether a false 
impression is created by the dissemination of false information or a fictitious 
transaction directly affects the applicable rules and the legal analysis required to 
determine the behaviour as manipulative. Of the definitions given in Article 2(2), only 
Article 2(a)(ii) mentions price artificiality as a factor in establishing market 
manipulation. Nevertheless, this article does not require that prices are artificially 
moved as a result of given market conduct. Therefore the legal and economic logic 
that underlies the formulation of EU law is not in harmony with the traditional concept 
of market manipulation. The example-driven approach taken in the ACER’s guidance 
document also fails to provide a pertinent manipulation theory.  
2.3.2.4. Intent Element 
As discussed earlier, EU law does not provide an intent requirement to determine 
whether market behaviour is deemed to be manipulative. In contrast, in US law, the 
intent element constitutes an important part of the legal analysis for market 
manipulation. Even for some commentators, the intention of the perpetrator is the 
only instrument that separates manipulative conduct from legitimate trading362. In 
both fraud-based and artificial price-based manipulation, the regulator is required to 
prove that the perpetrators were intentionally involved in or carried out the relevant 
manipulative schemes. Yet the legal and economic analysis developed by the courts 
for the intent element in fraud-based and artificial price-based manipulations is 
distinct. Compared to that of artificial price-based manipulation, the intent element of 
fraud-based manipulation is less problematic with respect to the evidentiary burden. 
The US courts developed the ‘but for’ test, which evaluates but for the manipulative 
intent, whether the perpetrator would have devised the fraudulent scheme 363 . 
                                                          
360 Article 12, Regulation (EU) No 596/2014  
361 Article 2(2), Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 
362 Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, (1991), 510 
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Accordingly, unless the perpetrator provides an alternative economically feasible 
explanation for the transaction, order, or scheme in question, its behaviour will be 
held manipulative. On what grounds an explanation can be regarded as legally and 
economically feasible is decided on a case-by-case basis. Such a standard of proof 
is also problematic, since in almost every transaction or market behaviour, a 
perpetrator may provide a legitimate explanation to hide its manipulative intent. The 
fact that the case law has not provided any sufficient criteria for the standards of 
proof, results in difficulties in distinguishing manipulative behaviour from legitimate 
trading364. 
Even though the concept of fraud-based market manipulation is not devoid of legal 
uncertainties, the case law developed under the SEA’ rule 10b-5, has been relatively 
successful, when compared to the legal difficulties in identifying price levels under 
CEA’s artificial price-based market manipulation. FERC and later the CFTC itself 
adopted fraud-based market manipulation formulations in their context to benefit from 
the legal precedent of rule 10b-5. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the concept of 
fraud-based manipulation is far from addressing market manipulation in general, due 
to the fact that the markets can be manipulated through several behaviours, which 
cannot be construed as fraud365. Whether or not the concept of market manipulation 
can be regulated by a single catch-all prohibition is not the subject of this paper. 
However, it can be derived from legal practice that while a price effect is not required 
under fraud-based manipulation, a market participant can manipulate prices without 
being involved in fraudulent behaviour.  
2.3.3. ARTIFICIAL PRICE-BASED MANIPULATION 
2.3.3.1. The Formulation 
The CEA’s formulation of market manipulation is different from that of the SEA. The 
CEA applies to trading in physical and financial commodity products in commodity 
exchanges. Prior to the ‘Wall Street Dodd-Frank Reform’ (Dodd-Frank hereinafter)366, 
in order to prove market manipulation,  the CFTC, the US regulatory body overseeing 
trading in commodity exchanges, had to prove that: 
                                                          
364 Albert S. Kyle & S. Viswanathan, (2008), 278 
365 This view is criticised by other scholars. See: Frank H. Easterbrook, (1986)  
366 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
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(1) the perpetrator had the ability to influence market prices;  
(2) the perpetrator specifically intended to create or effect a price or price trend 
that does not reflect legitimate forces of supply and demand; 
(3) artificial prices existed; and 
(4) the perpetrator caused the artificial prices367. 
 
The judicial burden to prove these elements of manipulative conduct under the CEA 
and to provide evidence as to the price levels deemed to be artificial and therefore 
manipulative, has proved to be problematic 368 . Recognising that proving price 
artificiality is a sine qua non for the establishment of the manipulative conduct, US 
case law has failed to provide a firm criterion to identify price artificiality. Early case 
law 369  employed historical price comparisons as benchmarks for identifying 
appropriate price levels. In Great Western Distributors, Inc v Brennan370 the US court 
defined the concept of artificial price as “the price deviated notably from the level 
reflecting the basic forces of supply and demand” (emphasis added). Such a price 
level is identified, in economic language, as a ‘non-equilibrium price’. Accordingly the 
equilibrium price will be determined through monitoring historical price correlations 
and the regulators will identify manipulation when there is a price differentiation that 
cannot be explained through the analysis of market forces. 
2.3.3.2. Determination of an Artificial Price 
The analysis of historical price comparisons as a test of price artificiality has been 
subject to strong criticism in the legal literature. How large a deviation from the 
historical price levels is regarded as enough for a finding of artificiality of the relevant 
prices is an open question. As prices can deviate from historical price levels due to 
factors, which are not related to manipulation, the courts, in these cases, provide no 
legal standards on how to determine the extent of price deviations371. In addition, it is 
                                                          
367 In re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Commodity Futures Law 
Reporter (CCH) ¶ 21,796, 27,287 (CFTC 1982); In re Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 
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Distributors Inc, v Brennan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1953), cert denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953) 
370 Great Western Food Distributors Inc, v Brennan, 201 F.2d 476, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1953), cert denied, 345 U.S. 
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hard to identify the existing size of supply and demand on the basis of historical 
analysis of supply and demand, because the historical prices only provide a reflection 
of an historical level of supply and demand372. The test also provides no comment on 
whether or not historical price levels themselves are artificial373. The test’s failure in 
providing answers to the questions raised by critics led to its omission in the CFTC’s 
later decisions374.   
Another test used by the CFTC for the determination of price artificiality is called the 
‘unusual’ price test375. Accordingly, the artificiality of price levels is determined with 
the severance of the usual pricing mechanisms with no apparent reason other than 
the reference to supply and demand conditions. The unusual price differentials 
between the underlying asset and forward contracts, or the price inconsistencies 
between the prices of similar products on different market zones can be regarded as 
strong evidence for the existence of artificial prices 376 . The determination of an 
artificial price through the unusual price has also proved to be problematic. The test 
does not involve a substantial analysis of the conditions that reflect prices of relevant 
products or markets. It is not clear how certain market conditions may affect the 
prices of similar products in different ways. The test also provides no answer as to 
whether the prices with which comparisons are drawn are themselves subject to 
manipulation. The uncertainty in the normality of the prices used as reference in price 
comparisons results in concerns about the reliability of finding the relevant price 
levels artificial or not377.   
In Indiana Farm Bureau, members of the CFTC were of the view that divergence in 
price levels was a common phenomenon, due to varying levels of demand and 
supply conditions noting that “all market prices are equilibrium responses to the 
various forces operating on them”378. If all the factors that reflect the forces of supply 
and demand are held to be legitimate under the concept of an equilibrium price, the 
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result is that there is no such a thing as an artificial price379 The historical analysis of 
demand and supply does not provide the necessary price correlations in identifying 
the existing conditions of demand and supply for a commodity. Instead, in Indiana 
Farm Bureau, the CFTC adopted that; 
“to determine whether an artificial price has occurred, one must look at 
the aggregate forces of supply and demand and search for those factors 
which are extraneous to the pricing system, are not a legitimate part of 
the economic pricing of the commodity, or are extrinsic to that commodity 
market. When the aggregate forces of supply and demand bearing on a 
particular market are all legitimate, it follows that the price will not be 
artificial. On the other hand, when a price is effected by a factor which is 
not legitimate, the resulting price is necessarily artificial”380. 
Even though there has been an extensive discussion in the academic literature as to 
the type of economic methodology to effectively determine price levels 381 , 
prosecution of market manipulations under the CEA’s artificial price standard has 
remained contentious, due to the difficulty of identifying competitive and non-
competitive price levels, which is also noted by the CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton 
who conceded in 2010 that “in 35 years, there has been only one successful 
prosecution from manipulation”382 . Problems in practice as to the prosecution of 
artificial price-based market manipulation resulted in academic and legal discussions 
as to what type of market behaviour can be deemed manipulative and how market 
players can move prices to an artificial level. Apart from corners and squeezes, which 
require exercise of market power by the perpetrators and will be discussed in detail 
later, judicial history is silent about the extent of manipulative behaviours that move 
the prices of relevant products to an artificial level. Lacking practical certainty, legal 
and academic literature developed the “I know it when I see it” approach, which 
presupposes that it is impossible to detect market manipulations, prior to its effects 
felt in the market. The only feasible approach to the identification of market 
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manipulations intrinsically involves ex-post legal and economic analysis, which have 
also proven to be complicated in practice.  
2.3.3.3. Reforming the Prohibition 
The difficulty in bringing manipulation actions under the CEA’s artificial price standard 
was later addressed in 2010, in the ‘Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform’383 (Dodd-Frank), 
which amended the previous artificial price standard and introduced a market 
manipulation definition encompassing also the SEA’s definition of fraud-based market 
manipulation, expanding the CFTC’s regulatory authority. Accordingly, the CEA 
provides that: 
(i)t shall be a felony … for … (a)ny person to manipulation or attempt to 
manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate, commerce, or for 
future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, or to 
corner or attempt to corner any such commodity or knowingly to deliver 
or cause to be delivered for transmission through the mails or interstate 
commerce by telegraph, telephone, wireless, or other means of 
communication false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports 
concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to 
affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or knowingly to 
violate the provisions of section 6, section 6b, subsections (a) through (e) 
of subsection 6c, section 6h, section 6.384 
Prohibiting the delivery of “false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports”, the 
current formulation of the anti-manipulation rule of CEA after Dodd-Frank, 
encompasses both fraud-based and artificial price-based manipulation definitions. It 
is agreed that the inclusion of the SEA’s rule 10b-(5) definition of market manipulation 
provides access to the judicial precedent of fraud-based case law aligning with the 
anti-manipulation authority of the SEC and the FERC as well as efficiency in 
identifying and prosecuting market manipulation easing the burden required to prove 
price artificiality. However, the need for a new approach to the identification of 
artificial price-based manipulation remains, since the CFTC, for manipulation other 
than fraud, is still required to prove that the market prices are artificially moved, and 
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in order to measure the appropriate remedy for the losses induced by the 
manipulation.  
 
Given the foregoing analysis, the legal literature on anti-manipulation laws is mostly 
sceptical about the requirement of price artificiality as sine qua non in deciding 
manipulation cases. Obliging the courts to employ a very complex analysis of 
markets and economic conditions has made the prohibition of market manipulation 
inapplicable and the tests and approaches developed for the determination of price 
artificiality have been ineffective 385 . The bottleneck in the enforcement of anti-
manipulation rules, has led some commentators to argue that the law should either 
tolerate certain manipulative practices to the extent that they cause no harm386 or 
should not prohibit manipulation at all, due to the complexities in identifying artificial 
prices387.  
2.3.3.4. Examples of Artificial Price-Based Manipulation 
As the literature and case law struggle to define the concept of artificiality, the focus 
of the legal analysis turns on the ability of market participants and the schemes they 
can conduct to move prices, which are not considered as fraudulent under the 
meaning of the SEC Rule 10b-5. The economic theory first provides the concept of 
market power through which the perpetrators move the prices to levels favourable to 
the positions held by themselves and manipulate the markets. Therefore, the oldest 
and the best known example of price manipulation is market power manipulation. 
Whether or not other types of price distortion, such as trade-based manipulation and 
cross-market manipulation are considered under market power manipulation is 
contentious. While some commentators identify them separately from market power 
manipulation, others suggest that the perpetrators of trade-based and cross-market 
manipulation also need to have substantial market power in these types of 
manipulations to move prices. The next section discusses market power manipulation 
and provides a legal analysis of its interplay with other types of price manipulation. 
                                                          
385 “(T)the law governing manipulations has become an embarrassment –confusing, contradictory, complex 
and unsophisticated”, Edward T. McDermott, ‘Defining Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: The 
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386 Thomas A. Hieronymus, ‘Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: Toward A Definition’ (1977) 6/1 
Hofstra Law Review 41, 53 
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2.3.3.4.1. Market Power Manipulation 
2.3.3.4.1.1.Market Manipulation v Market Power 
Though considered as market inefficiency, the holding of market power by a market 
participant is not prohibited by antitrust rules per se388. Antitrust rules are applicable 
only when it is established that a market participant, with a dominant position in the 
market, uses its market power to increase prices of relevant products389 or exclude 
existing or potential competitors in the relevant markets. In order to determine if the 
perpetrator has a dominant position, competition authorities conduct certain 
economic analyses demarcating the relevant geographic and product markets. When 
it is held that the market share held by the market participant accounts for market 
power, the competition authorities, then turn to he question of whether the market 
participant exploited its market power through abusive practices390.  
The general logic with respect to the concept of market power in anti-manipulation 
laws is similar. Market power manipulation involves a market distortion, in which a 
market participant and its associates acquire a substantial share of the demand or 
supply of physical commodities, futures contracts or any other financial instruments 
and use their market power to move prices to a level favourable to them. According 
to the case law, in order to establish that a market participant’s behaviour accounts 
for market power manipulation, the following elements must be present: 
a) a dominant position in deliverable supplies; 
b) a dominant position in the futures market for a certain delivery period; 
c) existence of manipulative intent in gaining dominant positions in futures 
markets and deliverable supplies; and 
                                                          
388 The concept of market power relates to the capacity of market participants by undercutting their 
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d) prices are distorted by the use of these dominant positions391.            
The fact that the concept of market power is an important element in both antitrust 
and manipulation rules leads to misinterpretation by the majority of commentators in 
the legal and economic literature as to the determining factor of these types of 
manipulation. It is argued that the determining factor of market power manipulation is 
whether the dominant position is used to move the price of relevant products such as 
futures or other financial instruments392. The interplay between antitrust rules and 
anti-manipulation laws will be examined in detail393.  However, it is important to note 
that the determining factors of market abuse in antitrust and market power in anti-
manipulation rules are different.  
The use of market power to dictate prices, which is prohibited under antitrust laws, 
and acquiring market power to dictate prices, which is the logic underlying the 
prohibition of market power manipulation should not be confused. Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act and Article 102 of TFEU involve prohibition of the use of market power 
and dominant position for the purposes of distorting competition in the markets. The 
market players, who hold dominant positions in the markets, are subject to antitrust 
laws only if they use their dominance to affect market prices394 or eliminate the 
competition in the markets. In market power manipulation, the perpetrator 
accumulates market power to dictate the prices. Therefore, the accumulation of 
market power and dictating market prices are the market behaviours that are subject 
to market power manipulation. The legal analysis carried out by the market regulators 
must demonstrate that the market power and dominant position was created to affect 
the price of relevant market products and that the market prices were, in fact, 
affected. If the perpetrator establishes that the accumulation of market power is not 
part of a manipulative scheme, that is it has accumulated market power or a 
dominant position as a legitimate trading strategy, the price effects resulted from the 
use of this dominant position cannot constitute market power manipulation and is not 
punishable under anti-manipulation rules395.  
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393 See; chapter 4 
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This interpretation is also in compliance with the concept of attempts at market 
manipulation. As discussed before, both the EU396 and the US397 anti–manipulation 
rules require the intent element with respect to prohibition of attempts to manipulate 
markets. As the existence of the intent element is a sine qua non in establishing such 
violations, the accumulation of market power with the intent to manipulate market 
prices is important in understanding the determining factor of market power 
manipulation. Once it is established that market power has been accumulated for the 
purpose of affecting market prices, the prohibition of attempting market manipulation 
is applicable, irrelevant as to whether the market prices were affected by underlying 
market behaviour. If it is also established that price levels have changed due to the 
accumulation of market power, then the prohibition of market power manipulation 
applies. Therefore reading these two different prohibitions, the prohibition of market 
manipulation and the attempt to manipulate markets, leads to the conclusion that the 
determining factor in regarding a trading activity as manipulation is the perpetrators’ 
requisite intent during its accumulation of market power.  
2.3.3.4.1.2.The Importance of Intent  
US courts acknowledge that the market players that accumulate market power in the 
relevant markets and use this dominant position to move prices at artificial levels can 
only be held liable for market power manipulation, if it is established that the 
perpetrator’s intention in the accumulation of market power was to distort market 
prices rather than a legitimate trading or hedging activity398. This ruling has been 
subject to criticism in the legal literature. Underlining the difficulty of identifying the 
perpetrator’s intent in the accumulation of market power, some commentators argue 
that the intent requirement in market power manipulation should be recalibrated and 
applied to the perpetrator’s reasoning in using its market power to dictate market 
prices399 . It is true that the identification of manipulative intent in US case law, 
especially for artificial price-based manipulations, has proved to be difficult for market 
regulators. However the market behaviour that the perpetrator carried out for the 
                                                          
396 According to Article 2(3) of REMIT; “attempt to manipulate the market’ means: (a) entering into any 
transaction, issuing any order to trade or taking any other action relating to a wholesale energy product with 
the intention of: (…)”. 
397 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010) (2010), § 753 
398 Supra note 378 
399 Craig Pirrong, (2010), 10 
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purpose of moving prices at artificial levels is important for the difference between the 
jurisdictions of antitrust and anti-manipulation laws. The application of the intent 
requirement, contrary to this approach, results in further overlaps and complexities 
for the regulation and functioning of markets. This is a challenge that the national 
regulatory authorities have to deal with in the context of EU law400. 
2.3.3.4.1.2.1. Implications of Intent Element under 
REMIT 
There is no legal uncertainty in the reading of prohibitions under MAR and REMIT 
that both provisions are intended to apply to market power manipulation. Article 12(2) 
of MAR provides that it will be considered as market manipulation if; 
“the conduct by a person, or persons acting in collaboration, to secure a 
dominant position over the supply of or demand for a financial instrument, 
related spot commodity contracts or auctioned products based on 
emission allowances which has, or is likely to have, the effect of fixing, 
directly or indirectly, purchase or sale prices or creates, or is likely to 
create, other unfair trading conditions”401.  
According to the Recital 14 of REMIT;  
“(e)xamples of market manipulation and attempts to manipulate the 
market include conduct by a person, or persons acting in collaboration, to 
secure a decisive position over the supply of, or demand for, a wholesale 
energy product which has, or could have, the effect of fixing, directly or 
indirectly, prices or creating other unfair trading conditions; and the 
offering, buying or selling of wholesale energy products with the purpose, 
intention or effect of misleading market participants acting on the basis of 
reference prices”402. 
However, as the requirement of a requisite intent is not present in EU law for market 
manipulation, the application of these prohibitions to the use of market power 
becomes problematic. It is possible that a market player could accumulate market 
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power through legitimate trading and then decide to use this market power to dictate 
prices. According to the determining factor under anti-manipulation laws, this trading 
activity cannot account for market manipulation and thus is not prohibited as the 
trader does not have a requisite intent during its accumulation of market power. 
However, since the intent element is not part of EU law, how the regulators or courts 
distinguish the manipulative accumulation of market power from legitimate trading is 
an open question. The lack of distinction between legitimate trading and manipulative 
intent with respect to market power manipulation causes concerns on false positive 
market behaviours403. This legal uncertainty is further elevated with the application of 
Article 102, the prohibition on abuse of market power. Since the anti-manipulation 
rules in EU law do not involve an intent requirement and may be applied to the 
market power accumulated as a result of a legitimate trading, both Article 102 and 
anti-manipulation laws may apply and this will result in overlap between jurisdictions 
and regulatory inefficiencies.   
2.3.3.4.1.3.Examples of Market Power Manipulation 
The most well-known examples of market power manipulation are corners and 
squeezes, whose perpetrators acquire a large portion of the buy or sell position in the 
markets404. These types of market practices involve futures markets where exercise 
of their market power distorts the market prices of the relevant products. In corners, a 
market player accumulates a large amount of futures contracts with a certain delivery 
period regarding a deliverable product. The market player also acquires a large 
portion of the underlying product, holding a dominant position in supply of the 
relevant product market. At the delivery date, when the dominant market participant 
forces other parties of the futures contracts to fulfil their contractual obligations, the 
market participants in the sale positions, unable to access the supplies held by the 
dominant market participant, are compelled to settle their contracts at inflated prices. 
The settlement of these contracts at inflated prices moves the market prices to higher 
levels and thus constitutes market manipulation. The rationale behind the practice of 
squeezes represents the opposite side of the logic behind corners. In squeezes, the 
market participant accumulates a large portion of the sell position in the futures 
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markets and fulfils the delivery obligations, which drives the prices of relevant 
products down at lower levels. In each scheme, prices are changed artificially. 
The majority of the case law with respect to artificial-based market manipulation 
involves the market participants cornering the markets to dictate the prices to the 
levels most favourable to them405. This is reflected in the reading of the CEA’s 
artificial price-based definition, which uses manipulation and corner as synonyms in 
the commodity markets.406 Even though they can also be practised in the securities 
market, the commodities markets are more vulnerable to corners, as the market 
participants are able to require physical deliveries and demand and supply side 
substitutions are limited to the characteristics of the underlying products, which allow 
the market participants to easily exploit the illiquidity of relevant markets.  
2.3.3.4.1.4.Irrelevance of Fraud-based Formulation  
Market participants, noticing that a trader is trying to acquire a dominant position in a 
certain product, will economically take necessary measures such as liquidating its 
position before the delivery date to escape the corner or squeeze. Therefore the 
cornering party will try to acquire large positions without the notice of other market 
participants. The characteristic of accumulation of large buy or sell positions in the 
commodity markets as a covert activity caused some commentators to argue market 
power manipulation as a type of fraud, within the context of SEA’s rule 10b-5407. This 
argument was rejected by the US courts in Radley408.  Accordingly, the court found 
that although the perpetrators concealed their accumulation of market power from 
other market participants, this did not constitute fraudulent behaviour as they never 
engaged in a conduct, such as false statements or transactions that created false or 
misleading impressions. Accordingly, it is true that in the majority of manipulative 
schemes, the perpetrators enter into a variety of market behaviours, which involve 
different types of manipulation including fraud-based and artificial price-based 
                                                          
405 Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); Great Western Food 
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manipulation. However, market power manipulation features certain types of market 
behaviour, which cannot be dealt with under a fraud-based manipulation formulation. 
2.3.3.4.1.5.Concerns about Limited Case Law 
Since the CEA’s artificial price-based definition is short in providing further guidance 
on manipulative schemes and how market participants can manipulate prices, and 
market power manipulation is the best known example of this type of distortion, it is 
contentious in the legal literature whether or not holding market power in a relevant 
market is the only way to move prices at artificial level. Some commentators suggest 
that market participants without market power can also impact prices by making 
strategic trading activities at certain time periods409. Accordingly, the products in 
physical and financial markets are linked and trading activities or price changes in 
one market affect the prices of the products in the linked markets. It is argued that 
these types of market manipulation are different from market power manipulation and 
therefore their prohibition requires a different legal analysis involving price relations 
between different products and markets without necessarily establishing that that 
market power or dominant position is used for manipulative schemes. Professor 
Pirrong objected to this type of classification arguing that the market participants that 
enter into such practices can succeed in their schemes only if they have market 
power with respect to the linked products and employ this market power in their 
trading activities410.  
Given the lack of efficient economic analysis, the legal discussion in this context is 
mostly related to how products in different markets are interrelated and to what extent 
this interrelation between physical and financial market affects prices in respective 
markets. Providing the arguments in the legal literature, the next section discusses 
the types of market manipulation regarded by some as different from market power 
manipulation. It also introduces recent studies on the legal and economic analysis of 
market manipulation, which significantly diverge from the traditional understanding of 
market manipulation.  
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2.3.3.4.2. Market Manipulation Without Market Power 
The discussion as to whether or not the holding of market power is fundamental to 
manipulating prices in the relevant markets has led to the adoption of different 
classifications of market manipulation. Professor Pirrong’s view that the undertakings 
must have market power to move prices artificially is criticised by many 
commentators411 . The idea that only the use of market power can move prices 
artificially can result in a wide range of corporate behaviours moving prices artificially 
without resorting to market power allowing those behaviours to remain outside the 
scope of the prohibition of market manipulation.  It is argued that an undertaking 
without market power can also manipulate prices by strategically structured trading 
activities412.  Accordingly, there are two types of market manipulation that move 
prices artificially without necessarily requiring a market power position. Trade-based 
market manipulation is perpetrated through strategic purchasing or selling of relevant 
products at certain time periods to influence the price levels of traded products. 
Contract-based market manipulation, on the other hand, involves cross-market price 
relations that the perpetrators exploit by trading in one market, which has price 
effects on a position held by the perpetrators in a different but linked market. A 
detailed legal analysis is required to demarcate these two types of manipulation.  
2.3.3.4.2.1.Trade-Based Market Manipulation 
Every trading activity in a market, more or less affects prices, since they directly 
reflect demand and supply levels in the relevant markets. For example, a purchase 
agreement for a product, while increasing the demand levels, will also result in a 
decrease in supply levels available for sale, which indicates further price increases 
for the relevant product. Trading for the purpose of profit maximisation is the essence 
of legitimate trading, that is, every market player acts in a manner to maximise profits 
from their trading activities. A purchaser of a product will continue to buy as long as 
the price of the relevant product is less than the amount it is willing to pay. Equally, a 
seller will continue to sell as long as the price of the relevant product is more than its 
                                                          
411 Emilios E. Avgouleas, (2005), 131-132; Shaun D. Ledgerwood and Paul R. Carpenter, (2012), 254  
412 Fischel provides four types of hypothesis demonstrating how trading can cause changes in prices. These are: 
substitution hypothesis; information hypothesis; liquidity hypothesis and; price pressure hypothesis. See 
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average marginal cost. Price relations between demand and supply levels constitute 
the core aspect of legitimate trading strategies in the markets. 
In trade-based manipulation, the perpetrator does not act on the basis of price 
relations between demand and supply levels. Instead, trading activities are designed 
to move prices to a level more favourable for the perpetrator413.  Early examples of 
trade-based manipulations emerged during the operation of ‘the Wall Street Pools’414, 
where traders entered into large-scale trading activities to move prices artificially. In 
order for this type of manipulation to affect market prices, the perpetrator must 
engage in strategic and large-scale trading, which induce other traders to act in the 
same manner, assuming that the perpetrator has private information as to the true 
value of the relevant products. Consequently the price that the perpetrator traded at 
in its manipulative scheme is perceived as the market price for the relevant product 
and thus prices are changed artificially without the need to hold market power. It is 
also possible for the manipulators to affect prices through trading activities in illiquid 
markets. In these markets, due to imbalances between demand and supply levels 
and mismatches between purchasing and selling interests, the perpetrators have 
incentives to move prices through strategic trading, exploiting market illiquidity.  
‘Marking the close’ and ‘Successive bidding’ practices are the major examples of 
trade-based market manipulation. In ‘marking the close’, traders concentrate their 
trading activity at the time when the closing of the relevant markets approaches415. 
This allows the perpetrators to issue excessive bids without being subject to 
offsetting transactions, which moves the closing price of the relevant product in a 
more favourable direction for the perpetrators. The effectiveness of this strategy is 
questioned by some commentators. It is argued that in the majority of market places, 
traders generally concentrate their trading activities during the market closing, due to 
the common policy of monitoring the developments and price movements in the 
                                                          
413 Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, (1992)  
414 These pools are usually divided into two types of traders; bulls and bears. While the former refers to traders 
who intentionally pay higher prices to increase the prices in the relevant markets and sell these products at 
these inflated prices, reaping the profits derived from price differentiations, the latter involves traders selling 
certain products at lower prices to purchase them in the future at depressed prices.  See; Emilios E. Avgouleas, 
(2005), 132-133 
415 Technical Committee of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), ‘Investigating 
and Prosecuting Market Manipulation’, (May 2000), 87. See also; Praveen Kumar and Duane J. Seppi, ‘Futures 
Manipulation with Cash Settlement’ (1992) 47/4 The Journal of Finance 1485, 1486 
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markets before taking a position. Given the high concentration of trading activity at 
the closing of markets, any manipulative trading activity has less ability to move 
prices at artificial level, unless the activity is so large that it constitutes a major part of 
the overall trading activity416. It is argued that since ‘marking the close’ practices are 
too risky to employ and are intrinsically self-deterring, the perpetrators only engage in 
these practices if they hold cross-market positions or related contracts whose value is 
influenced by the closing price417. However, even if such perpetrators hold cross-
market or contractual positions that benefit from the closing price, it is still very 
difficult to affect the closing price through marking the close during the concentrated 
trading activities, which decreases the likelihood of reaping profits from cross-market 
or contractual positions.  
‘Successive bidding’ is a strategy involving successive purchases by the perpetrator 
bidding at prices higher than the prevailing price so as to increase the price of the 
relevant product and sell it at inflated prices, making a significant profit418. The forcing 
of price increases through the ‘successive bidding’ strategy is also questioned by 
many commentators. It is argued that increasing prices through successive bidding at 
high prices is a capital intensive strategy and very expensive without a subsidisation 
from other markets or positions whose value is linked to the manipulated prices419. 
The perpetrator needs prices to increase after its successive bidding practices to gain 
profit from its later sales. Since it is not evident that prices will react to the successive 
bids as desired, the employment of this strategy is also self-deterring and unlikely to 
succeed.  
Due to their self-deterring character as well as the improbability of achieving the 
desired outcomes, the effectiveness of prohibiting trade-based market manipulation 
has been questioned by many commentators420. For example, Fischel argues that 
along with the difficulty of manipulating prices successfully through large-scale 
trading strategies, the prohibition of trade-based market manipulation is inefficient, 
since detecting such practices is a difficult task involving regulatory bodies 
addressing social and economic costs as well as concerns about separating 
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legitimate trading activities from the manipulation421.  Acknowledging the need for 
detecting and enforcing anti-manipulation laws against trade-based manipulation, the 
majority of commentators are critical of this view.  Ledgerwood asserts that as they 
are too risky and self-deterring due to their capital intensive character, this type of 
market manipulation needs subsidies from cross-market or contractual positions, thus 
they need to be considered along with contracts-based market manipulation 422 . 
Pirrong notes that as the perpetration of trade-based manipulation requires large-
scale trading and it is not economically feasible to affect prices for a market player 
who has a small market share in the relevant market, such manipulation also 
constitute market power manipulation and can also be prohibited under anti-
manipulation rules423. The reconceptualisation attempts of these commentators will 
be addressed in later sections, yet it is important to note that there is little consensus 
in the legal and economic literature on the definition, and classification of trade-based 
manipulation.  
2.3.3.4.2.2.Cross-Market Manipulations 
As we have seen, trade-based manipulation is economically feasible only if 
subsidised through cross-market positions whose value is linked to prevailing market 
prices. In cross-market market manipulation, perpetrators who have positions in two 
distinct but interrelated markets, undertake a trading strategy to influence prices in 
one market, which further leads to price changes in the other, from which the 
perpetrators reap benefits. In these schemes, the profits do not come from 
manipulative trading. The perpetrators are aware that there is a price relation 
between two different products so use their contractual position to exploit it to earn 
profits, even if they make loss-incurring transactions in the prevailing market. 
Whether or not the perpetrators undertake further transactions in the prevailing 
market at inflated or depressed prices is irrelevant.  
The identification of cross-market manipulation plays an important role, especially in 
the derivative markets. The value of the products in the derivative markets, such as 
future contracts, is mostly dependant on the value of the underlying products in the 
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physical, or security markets. Any price change occurring in these markets influences 
the prices in the derivatives markets. With the growth of derivative markets during the 
2000’s, the incentives to manipulate prices in these markets increased 424 . 
Perpetrators buying contracts in the derivatives markets, such as future positions for 
an underlying asset, can enter into purchases at inflated prices enabling them to 
exploit inflated returns from their future positions. The profits from future positions 
surpass the losses incurred in the physical or security markets.  
The traders in derivatives markets use the derivative products as either an 
investment tool to seek profits from demand and supply levels or as a hedging 
strategy to reduce the risks arising from their transactions in the prevailing markets. 
The use of derivatives as a hedging strategy renders the separation of manipulative 
acts from legitimate trading activities complicated. The majority of commentators 
sought to evaluate relevant trading activity along with the nature of the perpetrators’ 
activities in the linked markets. According to Ledgerwood, cross-market profits 
derived from positions in the derivative markets should be considered as 
manipulative, if it is held that the perpetrators’ transaction for the underlying asset is 
uneconomic425. Whether a trading activity is regarded as uneconomic is decided 
according to its opportunity costs. To what extent traders are capable of making their 
decisions on the basis of their opportunity costs is an open question. Pirrong 
construes that the existence of cross-market positions held by perpetrators is an 
illustration of the perpetrator’s manipulative intent in entering into large scale trading 
in order to create price impacts in the prevailing markets426. Identifying a separate 
type of market manipulation for cross-market positions is not necessary to prohibit 
these types of market manipulation representing an important aspect of evaluating 
trade-based manipulation. Pirrong asserts that moving prices artificially through 
large-scale trading requires market power, thus cross-market manipulation as an 
aspect of trade-based manipulation can be dealt with effectively under the 
prohibitions of market power manipulation427.   
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Pirrong’s assertion that market prices can be moved at artificial levels only through 
the use of market power is not true for all sectors. Especially in markets with 
imperfect liquidity, small trading activities can also result in price changes leading 
other market players to believe that the settlement price in the underlying market 
represents the true value of the relevant products. Great Western Energy Crisis and 
the Enron crash428 in the early 2000’s are clear examples of how energy market 
prices can be manipulated by market players who have neither market power nor a 
dominant position in the sense of antitrust rules 429 . The strategies employed to 
manipulate prices and nature of the markets the anti-manipulation rules are directed 
across different sectors430. Therefore, a general statement that all artificial price-
based manipulation can be regarded as market power manipulation is problematic. 
Criticising Pirrong’s argument, some commentators note that as the uncertainty in the 
concept of market manipulation remains, a reconceptualisation of market 
manipulations is needed to deal with market inefficiencies more efficiently.  
2.4. The Reconceptualisation of Market Manipulation 
2.4.1. General 
The majority of commentators agree that the traditional formulation of anti-
manipulation law is problematic and inefficient in identifying and preventing 
manipulative market practices. Especially in the US, the CFTC’s policy of combining 
both fraud-based and artificial price-based manipulation to deal with price 
manipulation more effectively with Dodd-Frank caused further complications as US 
case law has developed different prima facie cases for these areas. Furthermore the 
new formulation of the CEA does not provide any guidance as to how a fraud-based 
                                                          
428 In Re Enron Corp. Securities, 586 F. Supp. 2d 732 (S.D. Tex. 2008) See: Paul L. Joskow, ‘California’s Electricity 
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formulation of the anti-manipulation rule can help the prosecution of artificial price-
based manipulation. The uncertainty in defining market manipulation and identifying 
the manipulative intent needed to show that the perpetrators carried out trading 
activity to move prices at artificial levels and manipulate the markets, results in 
concerns as to the separation of legitimate trading from manipulative acts. In order to 
address the inefficiencies in the traditional formulation of anti-manipulation rules, 
several commentators have sought to reconceptualise the concept of market 
manipulation. 
2.4.2. Attempts to Define Market Manipulation  
As mentioned, several definitions for the detection and prosecution of market 
manipulation have been proposed in the academic literature. While some 
commentators, such as Judge Easterbrook, Perdue, Avgouleas, and Ledgerwood, 
have provided single catch-all definitions that apply to all types of manipulation, 
others, such as Pirrong, assert that such an approach would result in inconsistencies 
and inefficiencies in the prosecution of different types of market manipulation431. 
According to Judge Easterbrook, market manipulation should be defined as “conduct 
in which the profit flows solely from the trader's ability to conceal his position from 
other traders and the trades do not move price more quickly in the direction that 
reflects long-run conditions of supply and demand”432. Judge Easterbrook formulated 
his definition on the grounds that all types of market manipulation were, in fact, a 
species of fraud and market prices did not reflect long-term market fundamentals. 
This definition was later criticised by Fischel asking that (w)hat if the trades do not 
move prices at all or move prices in the direction that reflects short-run conditions of 
supply and demand? Most importantly, what happens if the trades move prices in 
one direction because the trader genuinely believes that prices will move in this 
direction, but trader turns out to be wrong and prices ultimately move in the opposite 
direction” 433 . According to Fischel, Judge Easterbrook’s formulation did not 
distinguish market manipulation from legitimate trading activities.  
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Perdue adopted a different approach to defining market manipulation. Instead of 
focusing on the artificiality or reasonableness of prices, Perdue focused on the nature 
of market practice and asks “whether the conduct of the people involves is 
reasonable”434.  Accordingly, market manipulation was defined as uneconomical or 
irrational market conduct, absent an impact on market prices 435 . Avgouleas 
introduced a more detailed definition which considers that market manipulation is a; 
“(b)ehaviour effected through any one, or a combination of any of the 
following: misrepresentations and other false statements or 
concealments, artificial transactions, and trading schemes, which are 
made or structured in such a way as to induce market participants to 
engage in the trading of financial investments or the exercise of rights in 
financial investments. Relevant trading must be in such a direction or the 
exercise of rights must be effected in such a way, as to either lead the 
price of these investments to an artificial level, and/or enable the 
perpetrators of the behaviour to materialize, from interests held in the 
specific or related investments, financial gains that would not be possible, 
in the absence of such behaviour”436. 
This definition encompasses both fraud-based and artificial price-based manipulation. 
It also recalibrates the intent element, providing that the nature of the behaviours, 
misrepresentations, false statements or transactions aimed at moving prices at 
artificial level, in relation to the direction of market participants’ trades, thus following 
the behaviour in question would reveal the intentions of the perpetrator. Markham 
criticised this definition, stating that the definition did not touch upon when prices 
were considered artificial and how the relationship between market misconduct and 
artificial prices was established437.  The CFTC’s experience on the prosecution of 
artificial price-based market manipulation has shown that price artificiality and 
causation elements were very difficult to establish. Avgouleas discussed the gains 
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that perpetrators derived from their positions438. Nevertheless further clarification on 
what types of benefits were considered as these financial gains was missing.  
The formulation of single catch-all definitions was criticised by Pirrong who asserts 
that the prosecution of different types of market manipulation require different 
definitions that specifically address and proscribe relevant market practices 439 . 
According to Pirrong, fraud-based and artificial price-based manipulation should be 
prosecuted under different legal frameworks440. In identifying intent, Pirrong argues 
that market manipulation is an economic offense441 and regulators should focus on 
economic analysis, rather than market participants’ subjective state of mind442. As to 
price artificiality, Pirrong concludes that the only way that market participants can 
move prices at artificial level, other than distorting information through fraud, is 
through the use of market power 443 . Ledgerwood argues that the legislative 
background of market manipulation proved otherwise as there are certain examples 
in the case law that market players manipulate prices without the existence of market 
power or dominant position444.  
Ledgerwood further proposes a different type of formulation to define market 
manipulation. Mirroring the arguments raised by Perdue445, Ledgerwood’s formulation 
includes a third type of market manipulation, called ‘uneconomic trading’ 446 . 
Accordingly there are three types of market behaviour that trigger market 
manipulation; the use of market power, outright fraud and uneconomic trading. 
Ledgerwood establishes a legal framework that involves a single catch-all definition 
to prosecute all types of market manipulation 447 . Adopting a combination of 
taxonomy-based and effects-based approach to the formulation of anti-manipulation 
law, the framework provides an insight into the methods and incentives that market 
participants can have in perpetrating manipulative practices. Therefore, this chapter 
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deems it necessary to include a specific legal analysis to discuss the proposed 
framework.  
2.4.3. The Ledgerwood Framework 
Professor Ledgerwood defines manipulation as;  
“intentionally losing money on transactions that (or make) a price to 
benefit the value of related positions that tie to (or take) that price”448. 
Providing no indication as to whether the behaviours relate to the instruments of 
fraud or they move prices in the relevant positions artificially, this definition features a 
functional approach involving an economic analysis of price relations between the 
market where the conduct has taken place and the market where its effects are felt. 
The nature of the profits reaped by the perpetrator in relation to its conduct reveals 
whether the perpetrator has actually intended to accrue profits and therefore 
manipulated markets.  
Ledgerwood argues that the perpetration of market manipulation requires two 
separate markets, a primary market and a secondary market449. In order for market 
trading to be uneconomic, it is necessary to show that the behaviour in the primary 
market is of a loss-making character on a stand-alone basis. The perpetrator’s true 
profits come from its position in secondary markets whose value is linked to price 
changes in the primary markets. The market regulators must prove that the 
transactions entered into by the perpetrator in the primary market are designed to 
affect prices in the secondary markets. The perpetrator’s manipulative intent is 
important because the loss-incurring character of the behaviour is deemed to be 
manipulation only if it is shown the perpetrator traded with manipulative intent. In 
establishing an intent requirement, the framework mirrors the economic analysis 
approach adopted by Pirrong450. Ledgerwood suggests that in order to prove the 
perpetrator’s manipulative intent, the loss-incurring character of uneconomic trading 
should be assessed along with its opportunity cost on a case-by-case basis451. The 
                                                          
448 Gary Taylor, et al., Market Power and Market Manipulation in Energy Markets; From the California Crisis to 
the Present, (Public Utilities Report Inc., 2015), 16 
449 Ibid., 19 
450 Craig Pirrong (2010), 14 
451 Shaun D. Ledgerwood and Paul R. Carpenter, (2012), 289 
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transactions in the primary market should be of such a nature that the perpetrator 
would have not undertaken such a loss-incurring trade, ‘but for’ the economic 
benefits from positions held in secondary markets.  
The framework lists three elements which are designed to identify manipulation 
conduct and its effects452. The first element is the “trigger”, a market behaviour that 
corresponds to either market power manipulation, outright fraud or uneconomic 
trading. This element examines whether the price making trades by the perpetrators 
distort the market participants’ perception as to the value of a particular product and 
thus cause price changes. The second element, the “target”, is price-taking positions, 
in which the perpetrators hold assets and derive profits from price changes caused 
by the trigger. Such target positions generally consist of contracts in the derivative 
markets such as futures contracts, options, swaps, etc.  The third element the 
framework introduces is the “nexus”, which is the market mechanism that provides 
the linkage between the price making trigger and the price taking target positions. 
Accordingly, in order to hold a trader liable for market manipulation, the framework 
requires that the price movements in trigger and target are interrelated and that the 
trader’s behaviour in the trigger, in fact, caused the price changes in the targeted 
positions. Ledgerwood states that the nexus element is fundamental not only for the 
causal link between market behaviour and price change but also for the assessment 
of manipulative intent, providing economic evidence needed to establish that the 
perpetrator designed its trading scheme based on price relations between different 
products in the different markets453.   
Ledgerwood’s concept of uneconomic trading represents a legal reformulation of 
cross-market manipulation. The legal literature on this concept treats the contract-
based and trade-based market manipulations differently, albeit the existence of the 
former is sometimes considered as evidence that the trader perpetrated the latter 
with a manipulative intent, knowing that its losses will be subsidised. According to 
Ledgerwood, trade-based market manipulation can be better dealt with through 
antitrust laws as in this type of manipulation, all three elements of the legal 
framework occur in the primary markets454. If it is established that the effects of 
                                                          
452 Shaun Ledgerwood & Dan Harris, 2012), 25 
453 Ibid., 32 
454 Gary Taylor, et al., (2015), 19 
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market behaviour occur in markets other than the primary market, Ledgerwood 
concludes that anti-manipulation laws should apply, arguing that the traditional 
antitrust methodology, such as identifying market power, is less useful.    
Ledgerwood’s framework applies to all types of market manipulation455. It is irrelevant 
whether the perpetrator used market power, fraudulent information or uneconomic 
trading to trigger the manipulation. It must be shown that the effects of triggering 
market behaviour occur in a secondary market and it is the market behaviour that 
caused the targeted market outcome. The framework incorporates the intent 
requirement in US case law into the nexus element noting that once it is established 
that the market participant trading activity in the primary market resulted in price 
movements in the secondary market and if it is unreasonable for the market 
participant to act in this manner but for the financial benefits derived from the 
financial positions in the secondary market, the market participant should be deemed 
to have intended to manipulate the market prices. Ledgerwood asserts that this 
approach will solve the problem of proving manipulative intent, which has been one 
of the main problems faced by the courts and legal commentators in the enforcement 
of anti-manipulation laws456. 
2.4.4. Comments on Ledgerwood’s Framework 
Constructing his legal framework, Ledgerwood does not distinguish between different 
types of market manipulation, based on a single market manipulation definition. The 
framework is practical providing a legal standard and, especially for the uneconomic 
trading or contract-based market manipulations, a prima facie case that the legal 
practitioners ought to look for to identify manipulative behaviour, price effects and any 
causal link between them. The trigger and the target are useful for clarifying financial 
positions and incentives held by the perpetrators in devising their manipulative 
schemes. The nexus element requiring cross-market economic analyses is also 
helpful for understanding market fundamentals, providing further guidance on the 
enforcement of market manipulation. Nevertheless the framework’s functioning when 
dealing with market manipulation other than uneconomic trading or contract-based 
distortions is an open question. 
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In his analysis, Ledgerwood generally focuses on cross-market relations and applies 
the framework to uneconomic trading. Asserting that only market behaviours that 
have cross-market price effects should be deemed as manipulation, Ledgerwood 
also addresses market power and fraud-based manipulation to the extent that their 
effects are felt in markets other than those the manipulative schemes are devised in. 
This interpretation leaves a considerable amount of manipulative behaviour outside 
the scope of the framework. Fraud-based manipulation and market power 
manipulation, such as corners, which are the most well-known examples of market 
manipulation and can be perpetrated in one defined market, cannot be dealt with by 
the framework. The omission of these types of practices from the concept of market 
manipulation on the grounds that they are perpetrated in a single market is 
problematic.  
Antitrust rules also do not support a distinction between manipulation and market 
power based on the markets affected. A market participant, possessing market power 
in a relevant market can be held liable for abuse of dominance, due to its activities in 
different but related markets in which it is not dominant. In Akzo 457 , the CJEU 
adopted a wider relevant market encompassing two different yet related sectors, the 
flour additives and plastic sectors. While the defendant was dominant market player 
in the latter, its share in the former was extremely small458. The court found that the 
defendant engaged in predatory pricing practices in the additives sectors. Even 
though these sales were loss-incurring on a stand-alone basis, the profits from the 
plastic sector which had a higher financial turn over were more than enough to 
compensate for the losses incurred in the additives sector. The court concluded that 
the defendant violated Article 102, (then Article 86), through its pricing practices, 
even though they were aimed at a market in which the defendant was not 
dominant459.  In Tetra Pak, the General Court clearly stressed that the defendant’s 
“(…) practices on the non-aseptic markets are liable to be caught by Article 86 of the 
Treaty (now 102 of TFEU) without its being necessary to establish the existence of a 
dominant position on those markets taken in isolation, since that undertaking's 
leading position on the non-aseptic markets, combined with the close associative 
links between those markets and the aseptic markets, gave Tetra Pak freedom of 
                                                          
457 Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities [1991] ECR I-03359, 286  
458 Ibid., para. 40 
459 Ibid., para. 45 
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conduct compared with the other economic operators on the non-aseptic markets, 
such as to impose on it a special responsibility under Article 86 to maintain genuine 
undistorted competition on those markets”460. Accordingly the demarcation of market 
manipulation and the use of market power as a violation of abuse of dominant 
position is not compatible with the approach taken by antitrust law.  
As mentioned above, many commentators have sought to define and clarify the 
concept based on the nature of market behaviours and their effects. Ledgerwood’s 
definition does not provide a specific distinction among the types of market 
manipulation. However its formulation, along with the legal framework, is designed to 
address cross-market manipulation. Certain characteristics, such as the loss-
incurring character of market behaviours, which the framework deems to be 
fundamental for identifying cross-market manipulation, are irrelevant for other types 
of manipulation such as outright fraud, in which the perpetrator manipulates the 
market by dissemination of false information, or wash or matched trades where the 
perpetrators apparently enter into transactions while taking no financial risks in 
manipulating prices.   
2.5. CONCLUSION 
The historical precedents set by manipulation cases in the early twentieth century 
divided the concept into types of manipulations. While the SEA’s fraud-based 
definition proscribes fraudulent activities that deceive other traders with respect to the 
value of securities or the fundamentals of demand and supply levels461, the CEA’s 
artificial price-based definition undertakes to prohibit market behaviours that are 
designed to influence price levels and move prices at artificial levels 462 . The 
prohibition of fraudulent behaviour does not involve any burden on the claimant’s part 
to demonstrate that market prices are affected due to the prohibited act. It is enough 
to show that a reasonable market participant can be induced by the fraudulent device, 
or scheme to act in a certain direction. Whether or not a market is distorted under the 
CEA’s artificial price-based definition, on the other hand, requires an evaluation of 
                                                          
460 Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities [1994] ECR II-00755 
246, para. 122 
461 17 C.F.R.  § 240.10b-5 (2011) 
462 Supra note 374  
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price levels for the relevant products and the relevant markets to establish if prices 
are moved at artificial levels by the manipulative behaviours.  
The concept of artificial price-based manipulation and its interplay with fraud-based 
manipulation has been intensely debated in the legal literature. The case law on price 
artificiality has been less than successful in providing guidance on how to identify and 
prevent price manipulation, and the legal discussions of several commentators on 
this subject are confused and contradictory. Several commentators, such as 
Easterbrook463, assert that the basis of market manipulation is fraud, arguing that all 
manipulative behaviours in practice are of a fraudulent nature, since they hide their 
manipulative intent from the market during the trading activities or make loss-making 
transactions in order to deceive market participants as to market conditions.  This is 
criticised by Professor Pirrong who asserts that fraud-based definitions are not 
suitable in dealing with artificial price-based manipulations464.  
Identifying price levels has proved to be very difficult in case law. The courts even 
struggled to define the meaning of price artificiality and have developed different 
approaches as to when price levels in the markets are considered artificial. According 
to Pirrong, since prices can be moved artificially only through the use of market 
power, the determining factor to determine whether prices have changed artificially is 
whether the perpetrators held market power with respect to the relevant commodity 
and used this power to influence prices. Other types of artificial price-based 
manipulation, such as trade-based and cross-market manipulation also involve 
holding market power, as the perpetration of these schemes requires large-scale 
trading, which is not possible for small market players. Pirrong’s assertion on the 
requirement of market power is partly true. In the majority of commodity markets, 
where the option of a physical delivery of a relevant commodity and friction can arise 
from transportation costs, play an important role in trading activities, market power is 
important to dictate prices. However, in certain sectors with peculiar characteristics, 
such as energy markets, the imbalances between demand and supply levels and 
illiquidity in the markets may allow small market participants to influence prices 
through strategically placed orders. Therefore, limiting artificial price-based definition 
only to the concept of market power manipulation is problematic.   
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Given the uncertainties of the case law on market manipulation, several 
commentators have developed alternative definitions. While Easterbrook 465 , 
Perdue466, Avgouleas467, and Ledgerwood468 propose a single catch-all definition 
encompassing all types of market manipulation, Pirrong rejects this formulation, 
arguing that regulation of fraud-based and market power manipulation under a single 
anti-manipulation rule requires “logical connotations to fit the square market power 
peg in the round fraud and deceit hole”469. Since the legal elements required to prove 
fraud-based and artificial price-based manipulation are different, adoption of a single 
catch-all definition may result in certain market manipulation schemes remaining 
outside the scope of the anti-manipulation provisions.  
Professor Ledgerwood also proposes a framework analysing market manipulation 
under a three-part test, trigger, nexus, and target470. Accordingly, the framework 
establishes three types of triggers for market manipulation, market power, outright 
fraud and uneconomic trading. Providing very little evaluation of market power and 
fraud-based manipulation, the framework focuses on uneconomic trading. 
Ledgerwood constructed his market manipulation definition on the basis of loss-
making trades, where traders intentionally lose money in primary markets to profit 
from positions held in secondary markets. The framework proposed by Ledgerwood 
has important implications for manipulation in energy markets. As will be discussed 
later in greater detail, energy markets are particularly vulnerable to manipulation due 
to periodic constraints in demand and supply, their reliance on indices for pricing. The 
case law on energy markets, such as Amaranth Advisors 471 , DiPlacido 472 , 
Constellation Energy473, clearly illustrate cross-market activities providing incentives 
for traders to exploit price correlations and manipulate the markets without the 
presence of traditional market power. 
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472 In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,970 (CFTC 2008); In re Avista 
Energy, Inc. and Michael T. Griswold, CFTC Docket No.: 01-21, 2001 WL 951736 (CFTC 2001) 
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According to Ledgerwood, other types of manipulation where the trigger, nexus and 
target take place in the same market are outside the scope of his market 
manipulation definition and should be dealt with under antitrust rules 474 . It is 
important to note that the legal theory developed so far has not provided guidance on 
the interplay between anti-manipulation and antitrust rules and distinguishing the 
jurisdictions on the basis of markets affected may cause overlapping regulatory 
jurisdictions of certain types of market manipulation escaping the manipulation 
prohibitions. Such a demarcation is particularly problematic in energy markets, since 
some market behaviour, such as capacity withholding which are generally 
perpetrated in a single market. As discussed, according to the advice document 
published by CESR-ERGEG on dealing with market abuse in energy markets475, the 
practice of withholding the energy supply, which involves generation operators 
reducing their supply capacity to exploit supply-demand imbalances, especially 
during peak demand periods, to inflate energy prices is regarded as a major rationale 
behind the adoption of the anti-manipulation rules under REMIT.  
US law and the academic literature have been rife with confusion over the definition 
of market manipulation.  Establishing a legal framework that applies to both fraud-
based and artificial price-based market manipulation has proved to be very difficult. 
This has resulted in the application of different standards and prima facie rules to 
different types of market manipulation. The rules and academic discussions have not 
sufficed to derive legal conclusions as to what type of legal standards should be 
applied in prosecuting market manipulation in energy markets. Therefore a detailed 
case law analysis on energy market manipulation is important to understand how 
wholesale energy markets can fall victim to manipulative practices and the legal 
standards that are adopted for the prosecution. In Chapters three and four, the thesis 
provides a detailed analysis of US and EU case law on market manipulation in 
energy markets. While in the former, the thesis discovers the extent of manipulative 
practices that can be relevant in energy markets, in the latter particular attention is 
given to certain market practices that EU institutions such as CESR and ERGEG, 
and ACER consider fundamental to cope with and prosecute under a tailor-made 
legal framework, REMIT. Given the particular importance placed upon the 
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prosecution of capacity withholding under EU law, the thesis addresses these types 
of practices separately from other types of market manipulation. Thus, despite being 
a US case, KeySpan, in which the defendants engaged in capacity withholding 
practices is discussed in chapter four. The cases involving other types of market 
manipulation, such as Amaranth Advisors, DiPlacido, and Constellation, on the other 
hand, are addressed in chapter three. 
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3. MANIPULATIVE PRACTICES IN ENERGY MARKETS IN US CASE LAW 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
151 | P a g e  
 
3.1. Introduction 
During the 1970’s, the oil crisis led the US government to adopt certain measures on 
pricing control of oil products such as gasoline and heating oil. These measures 
proved to be ineffective and resulted in US energy price spikes in the late 1970’s, 
which caused serious energy shortages and economic losses across the country. In 
order to mitigate the economic damage, the US government started lifting price 
controls and adopted a market-based approach involving the trading of energy 
products in organised market places such as the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX) and the Chicago Bureau of Trade (CBOT). Energy trading in these 
markets at market rates gave birth to the trading of energy derivatives and futures 
contracts by energy suppliers seeking to manage and hedge pricing risks which 
arose out of the high volatility and oil price increases.  
Trading in derivatives with respect to securities and commodities markets was not a 
new phenomenon. These products had been regulated by the Security Exchange 
Commission (the SEC)476 and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission477 (the 
CFTC) for over forty years before the birth of energy derivatives. While the SEC 
regulates trading in securities, the CFTC’s main focus is the trade of commodities, 
for example in the agriculture sector and especially in the energy sector, with the 
growth of trading in energy products. The CFTC has been active in providing 
regulatory oversight over pricing mechanisms and enforcing the Commodity 
Exchange Act 478  (the CEA) rules, when market distortions occur. Effective 
functioning and reliability of these markets have developed through substantive case 
law on the legality and efficiency of market practices. Market distortions in the energy 
sector, especially at the wholesale level, became visible immediately after the trading 
in energy futures started in NYMEX and CBOT.479 Yet the effective application of the 
                                                          
476 17 C.F.R.  § 240.10b-5 (2012)   
477 Before the CFTC, the Commodity Exchange Authority, a small bureau operating under the State Department 
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479 Certain market behaviours involved use of energy futures contracts as a way of creating fictitious economic 
losses for tax purposes The gaming of oil markets by infamous commodity speculator Marc Rich, who 
employed a so-called “daisy chain” transactions scheme for tax evasion purposes as well as to exploit the dual 
pricing system adopted by the US government against increasing prices during the oil crises, is illustrative of 
the early manipulative practices in energy futures contracts. See; 
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CEA rules to the wholesale energy markets by the CFTC was not substantial, as 
trading in energy futures and derivatives remained thin until the enactment of the 
Commodity Futures Modernisation Act (CFMA) in 2000. 
After the adoption of CFMA 2000 which exempted energy derivatives, such as 
futures, swaps and options traded in over-the-counter (OTC) markets from the 
CFTC’s regulatory oversight, the US energy markets witnessed a huge growth in the 
size of derivatives trading 480 . The absence of regulation with respect to these 
products made the energy derivatives major trading instruments involving not only 
energy suppliers who sought risk management and hedging purposes but also 
speculators who traded on price arbitrage between different products and markets. 
However, the lack of regulatory oversight monitoring the trading practices of 
suppliers and traders was fundamental in the eruption of the 2001 “Great Western 
Energy Crisis” or “California Energy Crisis”, a major collapse of California energy 
markets involving electricity prices in California at unprecedented levels, supply 
shortages, continuous blackouts and extensive government intervention. Several 
factors have been identified with respect to the collapse, such as poor market design 
and deregulation in electricity markets481. However, along with the collusion of other 
market participants, the manipulative schemes 482  developed by Enron, then the 
world’s leading energy giant, owner of pipelines, generation facilities and 
EnronOnline, an OTC trading platform involving trade of $880 billion in energy 
contracts, were fundamental in first giving effect to price spikes between 2000– 2001 
and then the collapse of California energy markets483.  
After the failure of the California wholesale energy supply mechanism, both the 
CFTC 484 , having jurisdiction over commodity futures, and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), having jurisdiction over the physical supply and 
transmission of natural gas and electricity products, commenced investigations into 
what market fundamentals were present in the markets and how practices by traders 
                                                          
480 Allan Horwich, ‘Warnings to the Unwary: Multi-Jurisdictional Federal Enforcement of Manipulation and 
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481 See; Christopher Weare, The California Electricity Crisis Causes and Policy Options (Public Policy Institute of 
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laundering), ‘Fat Boy’ (false reporting), and ‘Death Star’ (circular scheduling). See: Gary Taylor, et al., (2015)    
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changed market conditions and prices during the crisis. The investigations revealed 
that the lack of regulatory authority overseeing market activities and price levels was 
influential in the extent of the energy crisis and availability of effective legal tools in 
the prevention of market manipulation is crucial for the effective functioning of energy 
markets.485. Consequently, both FERC and the CFTC developed market rules and 
legal frameworks that were specifically aimed at prohibiting and prosecuting 
manipulative practices in energy markets. 
In the second section, the chapter discusses jurisdictional issues arising from the 
enforcement of anti-manipulation rules by multiple agencies in the US, such as the 
SEC, the CFTC and FERC.  Focusing specifically on the regulatory authority 
exercised by the CFTC and FERC on energy markets, the chapter also addresses 
the interpretation of anti-manipulation rules by the SEC, important for understanding 
the prosecution of market manipulation by the CFTC and FERC. The third section 
examines case law on market manipulation in energy markets. Analysing the 
traditional approach developed in case law, the chapter provides further 
demarcations based on the characteristics of manipulative practices and energy 
markets. The section first discusses cases involving market power manipulation in 
energy markets. This type of manipulation is prevalent in commodity markets in 
which market participants engage in cornering by accumulating market power. In this 
part, the chapter provides examples of this type of market manipulation as exercised 
in energy markets. The section secondly discusses trade-based market manipulation 
which is a relatively newly defined concept involving manipulative practices that do 
not involve the use of market power within the meaning of market power 
manipulation and fraud. The chapter provides a further demarcation for these types 
of market manipulation noting that market participants can devise several trading 
strategies that are not identical yet constitute trade-based manipulation. The final 
type of market manipulation which the chapter explores in the third section is outright 
fraud providing a case in which market participants manipulate energy markets via 
fictitious activities. The fourth section comprises the conclusion.    
 
                                                          
485 FERC Staff Report, Final Report on Price Manipulation in Western Markets Fact-Finding Investigation of 
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3.2. Available Jurisdictions in US Energy Regulation 
After the 2001 California energy crisis, trading practices in energy markets across 
the US, including the trading of electricity, natural gas and oil supply contracts, were 
put under regulatory scrutiny by multiple jurisdictions. The majority of case law with 
respect to the determination of manipulative market behaviours has been developed 
through investigations initiated by these regulatory agencies. Therefore, an overall 
analysis of the relevant jurisdictions is fundamental to understanding the approaches 
taken by the US regulatory agencies in the enforcement of anti-manipulation rules in 
relation to trading practices in the wholesale energy markets. 
3.2.1. General  
Regulation of wholesale energy markets in the US is carried out by three different 
agencies: the CFTC; FERC; and the Federal Trade Commission, (the FTC). While 
the CFTC regulates commodity exchanges and futures contracts traded in 
exchanges or OTC markets, FERC has a subject-matter jurisdiction over electricity 
and natural gas markets monitoring competition, trading, transmission, and price 
rates in energy products. Both FERC and the CFTC apply anti-manipulation rules to 
prevent and prosecute abusive trading behaviours in these markets. The last 
regulatory agency that regulates energy-related products is the Federal Trade 
Commission (the FTC). For the purpose of addressing manipulative practices, 
especially in natural gas and electricity markets, the chapter does not delve into the 
extent of the FTC’s jurisdiction in regulating energy markets, as their main focus is 
on the markets of crude oil, gasoline and petroleum distillates486, which are outside 
the scope of this chapter. Therefore only FERC’s and the CFTC’s jurisdictions will be 
addressed in detail. 
3.2.2. FERC’s Jurisdiction 
FERC has regulatory jurisdiction in both electricity and natural gas markets. The 
jurisdiction of FERC in electricity markets is defined under the Federal Power Act 
(FPA) 487  . Accordingly, FERC regulates “the transmission of electric energy in 
interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate 
                                                          
486 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110–140, title VIII, § 811, Dec. 19, 2007, 121 Stat. 
1723, 42 U.S. Code § 17301.  
487 The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. (2006). 
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commerce (…)” and has authority and responsibility “(…) over all facilities for such 
transmission or sale of electric energy (…)”488. Section 205 of the FPA states that it 
is also FERC’s responsibility to ensure that rates for jurisdictional power sales and 
transmission services are reasonable so any market practices that directly or 
indirectly affect those rates will be subject to FERC’s jurisdiction489. 
In natural gas, FERC’s regulatory authority is determined in the Natural Gas Act of 
1938490 (NGA). FERC’s jurisdiction in the NGA encompasses;  
“the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in 
interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public 
consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to 
natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, and to the 
importation or exportation of natural gas in foreign commerce and to 
persons engaged in such importation or exportation (…)”491.  
The “first sales” of natural gas products are excluded from the application of this 
provision. What constitute the ‘first sale’ of natural gas is identified in the Natural 
Gas Policy Act of 1978492, which describes as; “any volume of natural gas— 
(i) to any interstate pipeline or intrastate pipeline; 
(ii) to any local distribution company; 
(iii) to any person for use by such person; 
(iv) which precedes any sale described in clauses (i), (ii), or (iii); and 
(v) which precedes or follows any sale described in clauses (i), (ii), (iii), or 
(iv) and is defined by the Commission as a first sale (…)”493. 
After the California energy crisis in 2001, FERC adopted Order 644 in November 
2003 which establishes a code of conduct to prevent and prosecute market 
behaviours that are without legitimate business purpose and affect market conditions 
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with respect to sales and transmission of energy products494.  Accordingly FERC’s 
code of conduct prohibits; 
“(a)ny person making natural gas sales for resale in interstate commerce 
(…) from engaging in actions or transactions that are without a legitimate 
business purpose and that are intended to or foreseeably could 
manipulate market prices, market conditions or market rules for natural 
gas. Prohibited actions and transactions include but are not limited to: (1) 
Pre-arranged offsetting trades of the same product among the same 
parties, which involve no economic risk and net change in beneficial 
ownership (sometimes called wash trades); and (2) Collusion with another 
party for the purpose of manipulating market prices, market conditions, or 
market rules for natural gas.”495 
The prohibition requires that market behaviour has no legitimate business objective 
other than a manipulative intent and it foreseeably affects prices, conditions and rules 
of natural gas markets. In the second part of the rule, FERC also provides examples 
of behaviour that will be regarded as manipulative within the meaning of illegitimate 
business practice. In Order 644, FERC defines wash trades, involving transactions 
prearranged to cancel each out with no actual economic risk496. Such trades are 
designed to create a fictitious liquidity in the trading of products which affects price 
levels that are generally measured based on volume average calculation of sale and 
purchase orders with respect to relevant products.   
FERC’s adoption of anti-manipulation raised some concerns about jurisdictional 
conflict with the CFTC, which has a long history of enforcing anti-manipulation rules 
for commodities markets and also exercises its jurisdiction over trading in energy 
products in regulated markets, e.g. commodity exchanges. FERC’s entrance into the 
prosecution of manipulative practices, part of which is regulated under the CFTC’s 
authority, resulted in concurrent application of multiple jurisdictions and double 
jeopardy questions497. This was the case in Energy Transfer Partners498 in which 
                                                          
494 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, ‘18 CFR Part 284’ (November 17, 2003) Docket No. RM03-10-000; 
Order No. 644 (hereinafter FERC, Order No. 644)  
495 Ibid., 403, 61 
496 Ibid., 22 
497 Allan Horwich, (2006), 397-398 
157 | P a g e  
 
FERC and the CFTC filed a simultaneous action alleging that the same conduct done 
by the defendants violated the anti-manipulation provisions of both jurisdictions. The 
defendants later settled with both regulatory agencies and the case did not lead to a 
serious conflict of jurisdictions as investigation by both regulators proceeded in 
coordination. However, after the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005499 
(EPAct 2005), the regulatory interests of the two agencies later collapsed each other.  
As a reaction to the California energy crisis, the US Congress enacted new 
legislation that changed the regulatory structure of the US energy markets. The 
EPAct 2005 did not extend FERC’s jurisdiction by including new transactions and 
markets that were previously outside the scope of FERC’s authority. Instead, it 
amended both the NGA and FPA by providing an anti-manipulation mandate based 
on SEC’s Section 10b-5500 fraud-based definition of market manipulation. Sections 
315 and 1283 of the EPAct 2005 provide that; 
“(i)t shall be unlawful for any entity, directly or indirectly, to use or employ, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of natural gas and electric energy 
or the purchase or sale of transportation and transmission services subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Commission, any manipulative or deceptive device 
or contrivance (…)”501. 
The EPAct 2005 empowered FERC to prosecute manipulative practices not only by 
direct participants in physical electricity and natural gas markets, but also by any 
entity directly or indirectly committing manipulation in relation to the jurisdictional 
transactions. The legislation also provided additional legal tools and remedies to 
punish and deter violations, including civil penalties up to $1 million per violation, per 
day502.  
In order to implement the EPAct 2005, FERC adopted Order No. 670 503, which 
establishes FERC’s legal jurisdiction over manipulative practices and identifies the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
498 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,086 (2007); CFTC v. Energy Transfer Partners L.P., Civil 
Action No. 3-07-Cv. 1301 (N.D. Tex. 2007) 
499 Supra note 344  
500 17 C.F.R.  § 240.10b-5 (2011)) 
501 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 315, 1283 
502 15 U.S.C § 717t–1 
503 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, ‘18 CFR Part 1c’ (January 19, 2006) Docket No. RM06-3-000; Order 
No. 670 (hereinafter FERC Order No. 670) 
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elements of market manipulation within the meaning of FERC’s anti-manipulation 
mandate. While Section 1c.1 addresses practices in natural gas markets, Section 
1c.2 prohibits market manipulation in electricity markets. Accordingly;  
(a) (i)t shall be unlawful for any entity, directly or indirectly, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of natural gas and electric energy or the 
purchase or sale of transportation or transmission services subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission, 
(1) To use or employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business that operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any entity (…)”504. 
Even though the prohibition deliberately adopts the fraud-based definition of market 
manipulation, FERC interprets it in such a way as to monitor all forms of abuse, 
including fraudulent and artificial price-based manipulation that affect markets over 
which FERC has jurisdiction. The broad interpretation and application of the EPAct’s 
anti-manipulation provisions to certain transactions and markets on the basis of their 
effects on natural gas and electricity markets has resulted in jurisdictional conflict 
between FERC and the CFTC.  
3.2.3. The CFTC’s Jurisdiction  
Given the complexities which arose in the CFTC’s regulatory practice with respect to 
proving artificial prices, the application of the CEA anti-manipulation rules to 
wholesale energy trading has also proved to be far from easy. Initially, the CFTC 
used Section 4(c) of the CEA to deal with early manipulative practices involving the 
trading of energy contracts for tax evasion purposes505. Section 4 (c) of the CEA 
prohibits any transaction involving the purchase or sale of any commodity for future 
                                                          
504 18 C.F.R. §§ 1c.1, 1c.2 
505 The CFTC v Savage, 611 F.2d 270,284 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981)  
159 | P a g e  
 
delivery and of a character of wash sale, accommodation trade or fictitious sale506. 
This provision provided an efficient way, for a while, for the CFTC to prohibit and 
prosecute manipulative practices as it does not require the CFTC to establish that 
prices with respect to the relevant wholesale energy trading are artificial as a result of 
manipulative conduct. However, the application of Section 4(c) to practices which are 
not of the character of a wash sale, or fictitious trade was contested in case law.  
In the Sundheimer 507  case, Section 4(c) did not provide appropriate tools to 
prosecute a rigged trading practice as manipulative. The trades at issue were not of a 
fictitious character and in fact, caused actual change in market positions. They were 
real trades rather than wash trades and therefore outside the scope of the 
manipulation prohibition under Section 4(c). These trades are generally called open 
trade transactions, which are bona fide transactions entered into with a manipulative 
intent and involve actual parties and actual economic risks508. The practices that 
Section 4(c) prohibits are closed market trades, e.g., wash trades and fictitious trades, 
which are non-bona fide transactions, without any engagement in an actual trade or 
economic risks within the market. Such differentiation is also supported in US v. 
Radley, et al., finding that the defendants involved actual bids and offers and thus 
their trading activities cannot be regarded as misleading or fraudulent, irrespective of 
the parties’ motivation509. The court further asserted that “(a)cting in a manner that 
shifts the price of a commodity in a favourable direction is the business of profit-
making enterprises, and if it is done without fraud or misrepresentation, it does not 
clearly violate the CEA”510 Some commentators said that the ruling in US v. Radley, 
et al would render unfeasible the prosecution of manipulation in commodity 
products511.  
In order to prosecute manipulative practices which are not of a fraudulent character, 
and also alleviate the complexities with respect to proving artificial prices, the CFTC 
adopted another strategy. In reaction to the differentiation between open and closed 
market trading, the CFTC started enforcing the prohibition against attempting to 
                                                          
506 7 U.S.C. § 6c 
507 Sundheimer v. CFTC, 688 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 112 (1983) 
508 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,086 (2007), 27 
509 Supra note 347  
510 Ibid., 816   
511 Jerry Markham, (2015), 285 
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manipulate, which does not involve an artificial price standard element. The 
prohibition against such an attempt is included under Sections 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2) 
of the CEA, which authorises the CFTC to decide whether one or multiple market 
participants directly or indirectly manipulated or attempted to manipulate the market 
price of any swap, or of any commodity, in interstate trading, or for future delivery512. 
In order to hold defendants liable for the attempted manipulation, the CFTC has to 
prove  
(1) that the defendants intended to manipulate prices and, 
(2) that there should be some overt act committed in furtherance of that intent.513  
Whether the defendants have the ability to affect prices artificially, or whether price 
artificiality as a result of a manipulative practice exists is irrelevant in the finding of 
attempted manipulation.  The adoption of this new strategy proved to be very 
beneficial for the CFTC which prosecuted forty-two energy undertakings and thirty-
one individuals on the basis of false reports and attempted manipulation between 
2002 and 2009514.  
A turning point in the CFTC’s enforcement of anti-manipulation rules was DiPlacido in 
2009, in which the CFTC won its first victory, finding a defendant liable for market 
manipulation by successfully establishing that the defendant was able to affect prices 
artificially and in fact artificial prices existed as a consequence of the defendant’s 
conduct515. As will be discussed in greater detail later, in this case the CFTC applied 
the four-part test516 to a market behaviour which involved actual bids and offers. 
Basing its justification on the ruling of Henner 517, the CFTC stated that artificial 
prices had been created by DiPlacido, who in his bids and offers, which accounted 
for a large portion of the trading activity for the relevant periods, paid more or less 
                                                          
512 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, 13(a)(2) 
513 In re Hohenberg Brothers, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 20,271 at 21,477 (CFTC 
Feb. 18, 1977). 
514 For cases prosecuted under false reporting and attempted manipulation provisions, see: Jerry Markham, 
Law Enforcement and the History of Financial Market Manipulation, (M.E. Sharpe Inc., (2015), 276, footnote 88.  
515 In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,970 (CFTC 2008) 
516 According to the traditional four-part test for artificial price-based market manipulations, the CFTC must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that:  
(l) the respondent had the ability to influence market prices; 
(2)the respondent specifically intended to influence market prices;  
(3) an artificial price existed; and 
(4) the respondent caused the artificial price. In re Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 23,786 (CFTC 1987). 
517 In re David G. Henner, 30 Agric. Dec. 1157, CEA Docket No. 161. (CFTC September 15, 1971) 
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than what was required without legitimate factors and thereby moved prices at an 
artificial level518.  
DiPlacido was the only successful prosecution of market manipulation by the CFTC 
under the traditional four-part test in more than forty years of commodity markets 
regulation519. In order to overcome the historical shortcomings of the CFTC’s anti-
manipulation authority, “the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act” 520  (Dodd-Frank) gave the CFTC additional market manipulation 
authority. Similar to the prohibition adopted under Sections 315 and 1283 of the 
EPAct 2005 which are based on SEC Rule 10(b), Section 753 of Dodd-Frank 
provides that: 
“(i)t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use or employ, 
or attempt to use or employ, (…), any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance (…)521”.  
Accordingly, the CFTC is not required to decide on whether the practices at issues 
were intended to move or did move market prices at artificial level. This new authority 
aligned the CFTC with FERC and the SEC in the enforcement of anti-manipulation 
rules. The broad, catch-all formulation allows the regulatory authority to reach all 
forms of manipulative practices that deceive or defraud market participants. 
Furthermore, the new authority also provides the CFTC access to case law 
developed under SEC Rule 10(b) which results in increased certainty in enforcement 
practice. 
The CFTC stated that “to account for the differences between the securities markets 
and the derivatives markets, the Commission will be guided, but not controlled, by 
the substantial body of judicial precedent applying the comparable language”522.  
Implementing the new manipulation authority, the CFTC adopted “Final Rule” 523 
                                                          
518 In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,970 (CFTC 2008), 18  
519 Shaun D. Ledgerwood, (2010), quoting remarks by Bart Chilton a member of the CFTC who stated that “(…) 
35 years, there has been only one successful prosecution for manipulation”.  
520 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010)  
521 Ibid., § 753 
522 In re Total Gas & Power North America, Inc., and Therese Tran, CFTC Docket No. 16 -03 (December 7, 2015) 
523 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 76 Final Rule 41398, (17 C.F.R. Part 180) Prohibition on the 
Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices - Prohibition on Price 
Manipulation 
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180.1. Accordingly, the CFTC is required to establish that the respondents, either 
intentionally or recklessly; 
(1) use or employ, or attempt to use or employ any manipulative device, 
scheme or artifice to defraud, 
(2) make or attempt to make any untrue or misleading statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made not untrue or misleading, 
(3) engage, or attempt to engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business, which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any person, (…)524. 
In Rule 180.2, the CFTC also retains the old manipulation definition providing that 
“(i)t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to 
manipulate the price of any swap, or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for 
future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity525.”  Therefore the 
adoption of the new fraud-based definition does not deprive the CFTC of its authority 
over artificial price-based manipulation and the traditional four-part test can still be 
relied on in cases where the manipulative practices are not considered to be of a 
fraudulent character. Even though, it is noted that the structure of fraud-based anti-
manipulation rules is formulated to reach all forms of manipulative conduct, the 
CFTC, persuaded by its failure in Sundheimer and US v. Radley, chose to 
differentiate two separate anti-manipulation rules and keep both authorities under its 
legal framework.   
After Dodd-Frank, both FERC and the CFTC have similar anti-manipulation 
provisions based on SEC’s Section 10(b). While the CFTC keeps two different 
prohibitions and interprets the fraud-based and artificial price-based definition as 
different types of market manipulation, FERC applies its fraud-based authority 
reaching all types of manipulative practice. Both FERC and the CFTC regulate 
trading in wholesale energy markets and the agencies’ jurisdictions have overlapped 
in prosecuting manipulative practices on several occasions. However, uncoordinated 
                                                          
524 17 CFR Part 180, § 180.1   
525 Ibid., § 180.2  
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and even contradictory interpretations on the regulatory side can give rise to 
uncertainty with respect to the application of anti-manipulation rules.      
3.2.4. The Collision of Jurisdictions in the Energy Trading 
In the wake of the California crisis, both FERC and the CFTC, under their 
jurisdictions, initiated investigations into reasons for the price spikes  which had 
occurred throughout the collapse of the energy markets. Actions were brought 
against market participants who had engaged in manipulative practices exploiting the 
wholesale energy markets during the crisis. While the CFTC brought an action 
against the defendants’ manipulative bidding activities in the EnronOnline which was 
settled later526, FERC, publishing a final report on price manipulation during the 
crisis527, issued orders for gaming practices that violated regional market rules and 
tariffs under its jurisdiction528. The concurrent exercise of regulatory authorities did 
not cause jurisdictional conflict between FERC and the CFTC during the crisis. 
However, the variety and complexity of manipulative schemes 529  employed by 
perpetrators in exploiting price relations and market rules affected the approach 
taken by the agencies in the regulation of energy markets. 
After the California crisis, FERC as a federal energy regulator, overseeing inter-state 
market conduct of energy undertakings, adopted market rules specifically aimed at 
prohibiting market manipulation in energy markets530. The application of these anti-
manipulation rules is not limited to the physical trading of wholesale energy markets. 
After the enactment of the EPAct in 2005 which gave FERC the ability to exercise its 
jurisdiction over practices in regulated markets that are under the jurisdiction of the 
CFTC, FERC can also bring actions against trading activities in exchanges that affect 
prices and conditions in FERC-jurisdictional markets531 . The bidding activities in 
exchanges involving, for example, future contracts over which the CFTC has 
exclusive jurisdiction can be subject to regulatory proceedings brought by FERC 
                                                          
526 According to the terms of settlement, one of the traders in the EnronOnline, Hunter Shively, was required 
to pay $300,000 to the CFTC to settle the case on contested bidding practices. See; CFTC v. Enron Corp., & 
Hunter Shively, H-03-909, 2004 WL 594752 (S.D.Tex. 2004) 
527 FERC Staff Report (2003)  
528 Ibid., ES-15  
529 Supra note 482  
530 Investigation of Terms and Conditions of Public Utility Market-Based Rate Authorisations, 105 F.E.R.C ¶ 
61,218 (2003), reh’g denied, 107 FERC ¶ 61,175 (2004) at Appendix A (Market Behavior Rules Order) 
531 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, ‘18 C.F.R. Part 1c’ (January 19, 2006) Docket No. RM06-3-000; 
Order No. 670, 16 
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against market participants on the basis of their effect on prices in the physical 
trading of wholesale energy products.  
The extent of the jurisdictional complexity was further elevated with the number of 
critics increasing after the California energy crisis as to the ineffectiveness of the 
CFTC’s regulatory oversight over OTC trading532. In reaction to its lack of authority 
over the regulation of OTC trading, the CFTC started to monitor energy trading in 
exchanges and other regulated markets more closely, bringing proceedings against 
attempts to manipulate using the false reporting prohibitions533. The regime, which 
had been created by CFMA 2000, that exempted trading in energy products in the 
OTC markets from the CFTC’s authority 534  was later repealed by the CFTC 
Reauthorization Act of 2008535, which expanded the CFTC’s jurisdiction over OTC 
trading activities and created a new regulatory authority, called “Significant Price 
Discovery Contracts (SPDCs) 536 , including OTC energy contracts previously 
exempted under CFMA 2000.  
The first case that both FERC and the CFTC brought manipulation claims against a 
market practice was Energy Transfer Partners 537 , in which the defendant was 
accused of manipulating index prices by employing uneconomic trades in physical 
wholesale natural gas markets in favour of its financial positions and concealing its 
market position as a net buyer of natural gas. The action brought in Energy Transfer 
Partners was coordinated between FERC and CFTC, as the defendants settled with 
them paying respectively $30 million and $10 million. It was Amaranth538, which first 
gave rise to concerns on conflicting jurisdictions.  
In Amaranth the defendants were alleged to have manipulated the prices of natural 
gas products traded in an exchange, which is under the CFTC’s authority, yet 
                                                          
532 Jerry Markham, (2015), 340 
533 See; supra note 512  
534 The exemption regime created after the CFMA 2000 was called “Enron Loophole”, as it was the direct result 
of Enron’s lobbying activities, in which it had a particular interest with respect to its trading platform, 
EnronOnline that provided market participants the OTC trading services. See; Mark Jickling, ‘The Enron 
Loophole’ (July 7, 2008) CRS Report for Congress  
535 Title XIII of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, H.R. 2419, Pub.L. No. 110-234 (2008) 
536 Jerry Markham, (2015), 310 
537 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,086 (2007); CFTC v. Energy Transfer Partners L.P., Civil 
Action No. 3-07-Cv. 1301 (N.D. Tex. 2007) 
538 Amaranth Advisors L.L.C. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2007); CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., et. al., 523 F. 
Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
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affected the value of financial positions in the OTC market, over which FERC 
exercises jurisdiction. Both the CFTC and FERC, in compliance with their 
jurisdictions, filed an action against the defendants on the basis of their trading 
activities. The defendants argued that FERC lacked jurisdiction on the grounds that 
the trading activity at issue was employed in a regulated market over which the 
CFTC had exclusive authority, which was also supported by the CFTC in a 
memorandum presented to the District Court of Appeals in 2013539. In response, 
FERC, citing United States v. Reliant Energy, argued that its jurisdiction did not pre-
empt the CFTC’s anti-manipulation jurisdictions540. As Amaranth later settled with 
FERC by agreeing to pay $7.5 million in addition to a civil penalty of $5.5 million, the 
district court rejected the claim that FERC lacked regulatory jurisdiction over the 
trading at issue on the basis of the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction.   
The jurisdictional conflict between the two agencies was further elevated after the 
adoption of the Dodd-Frank and Reauthorization Act of 2008. Its new anti-
manipulation rule based on SEC’s rule, Section 10(b), along with the grant of 
jurisdiction over OTC trading, expanded the CFTC’s authority in the energy markets 
extensively. Furthermore, the dual formulation of its new anti-manipulation rules as 
including two separate prohibitions for fraud-based and artificial price-based 
manipulation differentiated from the formulation of anti-manipulation provisions in 
both FERC’s rule 1c and SEA, caused concern about conflicting anti-manipulation 
enforcement for a market practice to which multiple jurisdictions apply. Both the 
EPAct 2005 and Dodd-Frank instructed the two agencies to develop a memorandum 
of understanding541 (MOU) to address the concerns on overlapping jurisdictions and 
to ensure that any conflicting or duplicative regulation was avoided. By January 2014 
the agencies finally agreed on a memorandum that provided steps which the 
agencies could follow when they encounter activities that may involve overlapping 
                                                          
539 Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
540 United States v. Reliant Energy, 420 F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Cal. 2006) 1043, 1045 (quoting United States v. Borden 
Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (“[I]t is a cardinal principle of construction that … when there are two acts upon 
the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both” and “Congressional intent behind one federal statute should 
not be thwarted by the application of another federal statute if it is possible to give effect to both laws.”)). 
541 Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Public Law 109–58),  § 26(4)(c)(1); The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), § 1034(d) 
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jurisdictions542. How this MOU will help the agencies overcome jurisdictional conflicts 
remains to be seen. 
3.3. Manipulative Practices in US Case Law 
An extensive analysis of case law will provide an insight into how market participants 
can employ manipulative schemes with respect to wholesale energy trading 
exploiting price relations between different energy products. Traditionally, US case 
law distinguishes three types of market manipulation. Despite the intensive 
arguments in the academic literature as to their classification and characteristics543, 
they can be simply listed as; (1) market power manipulation, (2) trade-based 
manipulation (called open market transactions) and, (3) outright fraud (called closed 
market transactions)544. As the evaluation of these manipulative schemes under the 
traditional market manipulation classification will be useful in understanding how the 
application of anti-manipulation rules to wholesale energy trading differentiates from 
other markets and commodities, the chapter follows the traditional approach, listing 
the manipulative schemes under the concepts of market power, trade-based and 
fraud-based manipulation. 
3.3.1. Market Power Manipulation 
3.3.1.1. Overview 
Manipulative market schemes in which the perpetrator uses its acquired market 
power to move prices artificially are generally called corners and squeezes. These 
types of practices involve the accumulation of large buy (long) or sell (short) positions 
in futures contracts for a particular deliverable product with a particular delivery 
period. They must also possess a large enough portion of the underlying product so 
that other parties cannot fulfil their obligations under the futures contracts unless they 
have access to the perpetrator’s holding of underlying products. Unable to have 
access to enough supplies, the counterparties of the perpetrators are forced either to 
find and bring additional supplies from outside the market at extra cost, or to settle 
                                                          
542 Memorandum of Understanding Between The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and The Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission Regarding Information Sharing and Treatment of Propriety Trading and Other 
Information, (January 2, 2014).  
543 See Craig Pirrong, (2010); Shaun Ledgerwood & Dan Harris, (2012); Frank H. Easterbrook, (1986); Daniel R. 
Fischel & David J. Ross, (1991); Jerry Markham, (2015), 204-212 
544 Craig Pirrong, (2010), 5 
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with the perpetrator on a cash basis at higher prices. In either case, the perpetrator is 
responsible for high price levels from which its large positions profits significantly.  
In the energy markets, there are two cases that can be characterised as corners 
within the meaning of market power manipulation; Apex Oil v Di Mauro545 and the 
CFTC v Parnon546. Both cases concern oil deliveries and involve the accumulation of 
a position in the futures market that exceeded the available deliverable supply. A 
detailed analysis on the market practices in these cases follows. 
3.3.1.2. Apex Oil v Di Mauro547 
This case involves a claim by Apex, an oil company selling heating oil to its 
customers through futures contracts traded on NYMEX, alleging that the defendants 
squeezed Apex’s short position by collectively conspiring to force Apex to deliver 
heating oil for February 1982. Apex was a big seller of heating oil for that period, 
holding a short position on 4,378 out of 4,906 outstanding contracts and according to 
NYMEX rules, buyers of heating oil generally can make requests from the sellers as 
to date and method of the deliveries. If the shorts’ deliveries do not match the 
conditions required by the longs, they may be obliged to pay for default penalties. 
Apex’s efforts to change delivery dates and methods proved to be unsuccessful and 
the plaintiff had to purchase oil from other markets to fulfil its contractual obligations 
as determined by the buyers. Apex avoided default penalties at a considerable cost.  
Apex brought both antitrust and manipulation claims, claiming that the defendants, by 
conspiring to squeeze the plaintiff’s short positions in NYMEX heating oil futures 
contracts had violated the Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2 as well as Section 9(b) and 
13(a) of the CEA, the prohibition of manipulation or attempts to manipulate provisions. 
Apex alleged that the methods and date required by the buyers for the delivery 
obligations aimed at reducing the available supply that Apex could access to fulfil its 
contractual obligations. In order to supply the defendants, Apex was forced to seek 
additional supplies at extra cost, which moved market prices to higher artificial levels. 
Accordingly it is alleged that the defendant’s squeeze of Apex’s short positions was 
in violation of not just anti-manipulation provisions but also antitrust rules. 
                                                          
545 Apex Oil Co. v. Di Mauro, 713 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
546 CFTC v. Parnon Energy Inc., 11 Civ. 3543 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)  
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The US District Court for the Southern District of New York allowed antitrust claims 
based on Section 1 of the Sherman Act548 to be taken forward but did not find that 
the defendants’ activities were in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act549 nor the 
anti-manipulation provisions under the CEA550. According to the District Court;  
“(t)he acquisition of market dominance is the hallmark of a long 
manipulative squeeze. For without the ability to force shorts to deal with 
him either in the cash or futures market, the manipulator is not able to 
successfully dictate prices because a short may buy [the commodity] from 
other sources and deliver against his commitments”551 
In Apex, the Court found that the defendants had not had enough physical oil to force 
Apex to settle with them at artificially high prices. The economic analysis 
demonstrated that the deliverable supply that Apex could have purchased for its 
contractual obligations exceeded their requirements by 2.5 times. Apex’s ability to 
access 2,700,000 barrels of oil for the immediate supply of heating oil illustrated that 
the defendants lacked the dominance to dictate to Apex a cash settlement and thus 
move prices to artificially high prices552.  
3.3.1.3. The CFTC v Parnon Energy Inc.553 
In this case the US District Court for the Southern District of New York investigated a 
manipulation claim by the CFTC, alleging that the defendants, Parnon and other 
traders in 2008 manipulated the West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI) prices 
which is the cost of a thousand barrels of oil that is delivered to Cushing (an 
important delivery location for crude oil trading in the US). The manipulative scheme 
devised by the defendants consisted of three types of WTI contracts: (1) futures 
contracts; (2) physical contracts; (3) calendar spread contracts554. Futures contracts 
involve transactions for buying or selling of WTI for delivery at a fixed time in the 
future and can be traded on different markets, such as NYMEX and InterContinental 
                                                          
548 Ibid., 594 
549 Ibid., 599 
550 Ibid., 601 
551 Ibid., 602, citing In re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796 (CFTC 1982). 
552 Ibid.  
553 CFTC v. Parnon Energy Inc., 11 Civ. 3543 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)  
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Exchange, (the ICE, an OTC trading platform). The earliest delivery month for a 
futures contract is near month, which is the month for which the delivery of crude oil 
is traded and the trading of a futures contract for a near month is no longer tradeable 
after the fixed expiration day. For example, the expiration day for a NYMEX WTI 
futures contracts to be delivered in February 2008 is January 22. After that, March 
2008 becomes the earliest delivery month, near month for WTI futures contract555. 
Physical contracts involve the trading of WTI contracts for the following month. 
Market participants can trade physical contracts until three business days after the 
expiration day for the near month futures contracts. A near month futures contract 
becomes a physical contract after the expiration day. In this three day-period, which 
is called the “cash window”, parties try to balance their positions and make 
arrangements for the near months deliveries 556 . The price of physical trades is 
determined based on the average settlement price and total volume of contracts for 
crude oil to be delivered in the near month. 
Calendar spread contracts are contracts priced at the difference between the 
average settlement price of oil to be delivered in the near month and the average 
settlement price of oil to be delivered in the followings months after the near month. 
Longer-term futures contracts are generally priced higher than near-term futures 
contracts due to additional costs, such as storage, insurance, financing and several 
other expenses that are all included in the calculation of settlement prices. This price 
relation is termed “contango”557. If any tightness can occur in the immediate supply of 
oil in the overall market, the price of closer-term futures contracts can be higher than 
longer-term futures contracts. This price relation is called “backwardation”558. Market 
participants who purchase calendar spread contracts buy the WTI in the near month 
and sell the same amount of WTI in the following month, benefitting from the higher 
near-term supply prices. 
Between January 8 and 18, the defendants entered into transactions, purchasing 4.6 
million barrels of WTI oil which accounted for 92 per cent of the overall supply and 
kept their positions until January 22, the last trading day for the near-month WTI 
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futures contracts. Commercially the defendants had no need for this amount of oil 
and were expected sell the excessive amount at a considerable loss during the 
three-day cash window period in order to balance out their purchase transactions. 
However, the defendants also acquired large long positions of February/March 
calendar spreads equal to 13.6 million barrels of oil, profiting from higher near-term 
WTI futures prices. These calendar spreads are sensitive to end-of-month balances 
of oil supply. 
The defendants’ accumulation of large amounts of oil during the relevant time period 
in January resulted in tight supply during the cash window, and moved the price of oil 
for February at a level higher than that for following months causing a market 
outcome of backwardation. In order to balance their physical position, the defendants 
dumped all of their 4.6 million barrels on the market at a considerable loss, on 
January 25, the last day of the cash window. Due to the scale of the sale of oil at low 
prices for balancing purposes, the market condition turned from backwardation to 
contango, which is called the “burying the body effect”. However, the profits derived 
from backwardation in the February/March price spreads more than subsidised the 
defendants’ losses incurred from the balancing of physical positions.  
In 2011, the CFTC brought an action before the US District Court for the Southern 
District of New York alleging that the defendants had manipulated and attempted to 
manipulate both physical and futures markets for WTI contracts during the relevant 
periods between January and March 2008559. The Court noted that there are two 
different provisions for the prohibition of market manipulation and the underlying 
factor that the alleged scheme was based upon was the abuse of market power 
rather than fraud. Applying the artificial price-based prohibition, the Court approved 
the CFTC’s finding that the defendants’ activities during the cash window did not 
constitute fraud, and the scheme did not involve misstatements or material omissions. 
Instead, the defendants established market dominance over a deliverable supply of 
the WTI, and used this dominance to create tightness and affect prices for a relevant 
trading period, which increased the value of the positions the defendants held in 
calendar spread contracts. According to the court, the alteration of market conditions 
between backwardation and contango clearly illustrated the defendants’ ability to 
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affect prices and constituted evidence that the manipulative scheme, in fact, created 
artificial prices in the market560. 
The manipulative scheme employed in the CFTC v Parnon Energy Inc differed from 
the traditional corner and squeeze cases, such as Apex Oil v Di Mauro. In corners 
and squeezes, the perpetrators devise their manipulative scheme in one single 
market rendering other market participants unable to fulfil their contractual obligation. 
However, in the CFTC v Parnon Energy Inc, rather than forcing the other parties to 
settle for higher prices, the defendants sought to derive profits from their positions 
held in calendar spread contracts, which are different yet the value of which is still 
tied to conditions in the physical and futures markets for WTI. In order to analyse 
how the acquisition of market power played a role in the CFTC v Parnon Energy Inc. 
different from traditional corner and squeeze cases, the characteristics of market 
conditions under which the manipulative schemes carried out in these cases should 
be evaluated in more detail.     
3.3.1.4. Evaluation 
It is important to note that the underlying products that became subject to anti-
manipulation investigations in both Apex Oil v Di Mauro and the CFTC v Parnon 
Energy Inc were crude oil and by-products of oil. Trading in oil markets differentiates 
from trading in natural gas and electricity in certain ways. Oil markets are not 
regarded as network-based markets as the capacity restraints with respect to 
transport and storage of oil products do not give rise to particular concerns in 
designing the markets 561 . In electricity and natural gas markets, building large 
positions in both futures and physical markets is not probable as electricity cannot be 
stored in large quantities and natural gas requires facilities that are specifically build 
for the storage of natural gas. The demand and supply mechanism for these 
products is carried out instantly with a balancing system to ensure the availability of 
supply whenever the demand for power arises and that demand and supply prospect 
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are always matched to system requirements. As the perpetrators of market power 
manipulation cannot build large positions in electricity and natural gas due to lack of 
storability, these examples of market power manipulation in Apex Oil v Di Mauro and 
CFTC v Parnon Energy Inc involved oil products rather than electricity or natural gas. 
Apex v Di Mauro is a clear example of traditional market power manipulation 
involving corner and squeeze practices. It is an early case addressing a market 
practice that took place in 1982, well before the effective use of futures and 
derivatives for hedging and speculation purposes in energy markets started in the 
2000’s. The defendants’ scheme in Apex v Di Mauro was related to the trading of a 
single product, heating oil, in a single market, the NYMEX.  Estimating the availability 
of supply along with the large short positions held by Apex Oil v Di Mauro, the 
defendants were able to dictate their delivery standards forcing the plaintiff to seek 
additional supplies at additional costs. After futures contracts and other derivatives in 
energy markets became subject to hedging mechanisms and speculative trading562, 
arbitraging price differences between two products or for the same product between 
two markets or with different delivery durations, traders discovered the prospects of 
new positions that can be valuable on the basis of market changes that can be 
affected by prices in different but linked markets. CFTC v Parnon Energy Inc. is 
illustrative as to how these price relations can be exploited in manipulative schemes. 
CFTC v Parnon Energy Inc. is characterised as a type of market power manipulation, 
as the court directly noted that it was the use of market power that gave effect to 
market manipulation. However the conduct committed by the defendants did not 
account for a corner or squeeze563. Aware that the tightness of oil supply for a 
particular delivery month can affect positions held in calendar spread contracts, the 
defendants in CFTC v Parnon Energy Inc sought to exploit price relations between 
these interlinked markets, by creating a temporary tightness that moved the value of 
positions in calendar spread contracts to a more favourable level. Even though the 
defendants used their market power to create the tightness in the supply, this market 
practice can be characterised as a type of trade-based or in particular cross-market 
manipulation as they derived their profits from cross-market positions.   
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173 | P a g e  
 
CFTC v Parnon Energy Inc. blurs the distinction between market power and trade-
based manipulation. The defendants’ manipulative scheme involved both the use of 
market power and cross-market price relations. It is established in case law that 
market power is not substantial in the determination of market manipulation 564 . 
However, as will be addressed in greater detail, the perpetrators’ ability to affect 
prices was an important factor in identifying manipulative practices in trade-based 
market manipulation cases. The establishment of the ability to affect prices and the 
existence of artificial prices has proved to be difficult in case law. The CFTC’s 
struggle in the enforcement of artificial price-based anti-manipulation provisions 
directed FERC towards adopting SEC’s fraud-based rule, Section 10(b) in its anti-
manipulation provisions 565 . However, in its investigations, in order to prove the 
perpetrators’ manipulative intent, FERC also undertook a legal analysis of whether 
the perpetrators had the ability to move prices to artificial levels, which is very similar 
to the analysis committed to identify whether the perpetrators accumulated and used 
market power in manipulating prices566. CFTC v Parnon Energy Inc. provides a good 
example illustrating the complexities between the concepts of market power and the 
ability to affect prices in anti-manipulation regulation.   
3.3.2. Trade-Based Market Manipulation 
3.3.2.1. Overview 
The legal analysis carried out against manipulative practices differs based on 
regulatory agencies and anti-manipulation provisions. For a procedure by FERC 
under the SEC’s Rule Section 10(b), whether the relevant market practices at issue 
are fraudulent is irrelevant for the determination of market manipulation567. This is not 
the case for the CFTC. After the adoption of the Dodd-Frank, the distinction of 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent market manipulation became important to identify anti-
manipulation procedure to be followed under a regulatory investigation. Even though 
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the legal analysis applied by both agencies in enforcing anti-manipulation rules looks 
similar, incoherence in respective anti-manipulation rules results in uncertainty for the 
classification of manipulative practices.  
The underlying factor behind the characteristics of trade-based market manipulation 
is that these market practices often involve strategic and large scale trading activities 
and the legal analysis necessary for the determination of this type of manipulation 
does not require the regulators to establish that the perpetrators hold market power 
with respect to the products at issue568. As it is also characterised under artificial 
price-based manipulation developed under the precedent of the CFTC, rather than 
SEC’s fraud-based formulation, price artificiality as a result of trading activity is 
crucial for a finding of manipulation. “Marking the close” and “successive bidding569” 
practices are regarded as the prominent examples of trade-based manipulation570. 
However identifying these types of market practices as manipulative and therefore 
illegitimate on the basis of artificial prices without resorting to market power analysis 
gives rise to legal questions on factors that make a trading activity manipulative. The 
case law and academic literature have also failed so far, in providing an appropriate 
definition that demarcates the concept of trade-based market manipulation571.  
Given the lack of clarity in the concept of trade-based market manipulation, the 
chapter provides an example of trade-based manipulation case law where the 
regulatory agencies did not include an assessment of market power in their anti-
manipulation inquiry, and market practice did not directly involve outright fraud and 
fictitious trades without actual financial risks.  The case law indicates several types of 
trading activities that traders and energy suppliers employ in manipulating markets 
and prices. Generally, these market participants commit gaming of market rules 
exploiting loopholes in energy market design to derive financial profits. The 
manipulative schemes may involve multiple positions in different but interlinked 
markets. In these schemes, the perpetrators seek to achieve a certain outcome in a 
market that affects prices in a different market according to which the perpetrators’ 
positions profits. Finally, these manipulative practices can also exploit capacity 
restraints and congestion payment mechanisms developed by transmission system 
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operators and system providers to mitigate congestion risks related to transmission 
of energy products. The term that the case law uses in defining such practices is 
“open market transactions”572.  Accordingly, the chapter identifies three types of 
trade-based market manipulation: 
(1) gaming of market rules; 
(2) cross-market manipulation; and 
(3) congestion-related manipulation.  
3.3.2.2. Gaming of Market Rules 
As a liberalised and network-based sector, energy markets require a set of market 
rules governing trading and an uninterrupted flow of energy products that are 
fundamental for the objectives of security of supply and functioning of competitive 
energy markets. However these market rules and designs are not free from flaws 
and loopholes, which, once spotted, have been exploited by market participants. This 
section involves energy markets cases in which perpetrators were found in violation 
of anti-manipulation provisions, by exploiting profits and payments from the gaming 
of market rules. 
3.3.2.2.1. Rumford Paper Company573 
In this case, FERC alleged that the defendant, the Rumford Paper Company, which 
operates a lumber mill and also a generation facility for paper production, violated 
Section 1c.2 of FERC’s Order 670, an anti-manipulation rule for the electricity 
markets, by engaging in fraudulent behaviour and exploiting ISO New England Inc.’s 
(ISO-NE) Day-Ahead Load Response Program (DALRP).  ISO-NE, the regional 
transmission system operator for New England, consisting of a transmission network 
involving six states, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont574, designed the DALRP to introduce incentives for electricity 
consumers to reduce their load during peak demand hours575. Demand for electricity 
is generally inelastic. Consumers are generally willing to pay more, rather than 
reduce their consumption levels. By designing the DALRP, the ISO-NE intended to 
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provide an additional incentive for customers to reduce their demand levels during 
peak demand hours in which the price of electricity is more expensive than other 
hours of the day.  
In 2007, Rumford, in compliance with the instructions of the Competitive Energy 
Services (CES), an independent energy services company providing consulting 
services to suppliers and consumers with respect to energy-related issues, 
established a scheme to receive payments under the ISO-NE’s DALRP, without 
reducing its energy consumption during peak hours of the day. During the initial load 
baseline period in which Rumford’s energy demand was calculated by an average of 
hourly meter data from 7:00 am through 6:00 pm for five business days after the sign 
up for the system of DALRP, Rumford ceased the operation of its generation facility 
and bought its electricity need from external suppliers for which it paid $120,000576. 
Once its load baseline was calculated, Rumford started to generate electricity and 
use it again for production purposes.  Even though Rumford did not reduce its 
electricity demand for the peak hours, it started to receive payments from DALRP, as 
the purchases of electricity from external suppliers reduced after the re-operation of 
its generation facilities. For over six months between 2007 and 2008, by gaming the 
ISO-NE’s DALRP rules, Rumford was paid for a demand reduction response that, in 
fact, never happened577.  
FERC alleged that Rumford had violated 18 C.F.R. Section 1c.2, which prohibits any 
market participant from:   
“(1) using a fraudulent device, scheme or artifice, or making a material 
misrepresentation or a material omission as to which there is a duty to 
speak under a Commission-filed tariff, Commission order, rule or 
regulation, or engaging in any act, practice, or course of business that 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any entity;  
(2) with the requisite scienter;  
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(3) in connection with a transaction subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission”578. 
According to FERC, Rumford’s scheme to receive payments from DALRP constituted 
a fraudulent scheme or artifice on the basis of misrepresentations with respect to the 
defendant’s true levels of demand and its willingness and ability to reduce that 
demand. By perpetrating the scheme, the defendant incurred financial losses by 
purchasing electricity needed as a result of the curtailment of the generation capacity 
for a certain period of time. However these losses were recouped with the payments 
received via DALRP.  
3.3.2.2.2. J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation579 
The defendant, J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation (JPMVEC) operated 
several electricity generators with relatively high heat rates, that is, they were less 
efficient than newer and more modern generation facilities which produced more 
output at less expensive prices. Therefore the defendant’s generation units were 
mostly out of money and not picked up by the transmission system operators that 
JPMVEC served580. In order to make its energy operations more profitable, JPMVEC 
developed a strategy that exploited the market rules to receive extra payments from 
its bidding activities.  
The relevant markets in which the defendant carried out its bidding strategy were the 
California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and Midcontinent Independent 
System Operator (MISO), regional transmission and market operators in the Midwest 
and California regions. In these markets buyers (such as entities that serve electricity 
to end users and retail customers) and sellers (such as generators) of electricity 
submit their bids and offers involving prices at which they are willing to trade. These 
prices differ considerably based on the transmission route that power flows from the 
point (source)  that suppliers inject the power that is delivered by the transmission 
operator to another point (sink) where buyers receive it. Each route in the 
transmission system is called a “node”, and these nodes have different congestion 
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levels and capacities. The price of electricity is determined on the basis of each node 
in what is called “locational marginal prices” (LMPs)581.  
Regional transmission system operators generally operate two markets for the 
electricity supply. These are Day-Ahead markets and Real-Time markets. In Day-
Ahead markets, suppliers and buyers of electricity are transacting for the delivery of 
electricity on the next day. In Real-Time markets, electricity is transmitted on the day 
that trading takes place. While Day-Ahead markets are the main markets in which 
the bulk of the energy needs are supplied in a given location, Real-Time markets 
operate as a balancing mechanism, where suppliers and buyers resort to balancing 
their shortages or additional energy needs. As they serve different purposes, Day-
Ahead and Real-Time prices of electricity are usually different, even if they are 
traded for the same hour. These price differences allow market participants to benefit 
between Day-Ahead and Real Time markets. A generator whose generation is 
picked up by the transmission operators for electricity supply in the Day-Ahead 
market can pay another generator to supply on the next day in the Real-Time market, 
(called  
“buying back the Day-Ahead Award”)582, if the prices are lower than the ones in the 
Day-Ahead market. In so doing, generators acquire profits from trading of electricity 
between Real-Time and Day-Ahead markets on the basis of price differences without 
even being obliged to deliver electricity to a transmission grid.  
Transmission system operators usually make payments to suppliers at the market 
rate which is the average price of all bids in each node across the transmission grid. 
In certain instances transmission system operators can also provide “make-whole” or 
“uplift” payments, when they commit a generator whose bids on the Day-Ahead 
market was higher than these market rates in order to compensate the generator’s 
“bid cost”583 that includes the cost of electricity that the generator produces at its 
minimum operational level and the cost of electricity that is produced at any level 
above the minimum operational level. Accordingly, when a transmission system 
operator commits a generator whose bid is higher than market prices, it will pay the 
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generator its bids rather than market rates by making additional make-whole 
payments on the basis of the generator’s operation level. This payment system is 
called “Bid Cost Recovery” (BCR)   adopted under market rules584. 
In order to make its old and inefficient electricity generators more profitable, the 
JPMVEC designed a bidding strategy exploiting the market rules on the BCR system. 
Accordingly JPMVEC issued successive bids over market prices in Day Ahead 
markets to ensure that CAISO and MISO picked up its generation. Once its 
generation was picked up for Day-Ahead market, it bought back its Day-Ahead 
award in the Real-Times market, paying another supplier to produce the electricity. 
While CAISO and MISO made make-whole payments under the BCR system to 
JPMVEC in Day-Ahead markets to compensate its bid cost, JPVEC paid market 
prices to other generators to supply in Real-Time markets. Through this bidding 
scheme and the gaming of market rules, JPMVEC extracted substantial profits from 
trading between Day-Ahead and Real-Time markets. 
FERC alleged that JPMVEC’s practices operated as a fraud in the electricity market 
and violated its anti-manipulation rule for electricity markets, Section 1c.2585. The 
defendant’s bids were not made on the basis of the aggregate forces of demand and 
supply in the market and not aimed at profiting from market fundamentals. In fact, 
JPMVEC made loss-incurring trades in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time markets which 
were uneconomic but for the payments received from the BCR system. By exploiting 
the market rules on make-whole payment mechanism, the JPMVEC created artificial 
market conditions which led the CAISO and the MISO to make unnecessary uplifting 
payments to the defendant586.    
3.3.2.2.3. Coaltrain Energy L.P., et al.587 
This case involves a financial firm, Coaltrain, which devised a trading strategy to 
receive certain payments from the PJM Interconnection LLC (PJM) under the 
Marginal Loss Surplus Allocation (MLSA) system 588 . The PJM is a regional 
transmission organisation in a 13-state region, operating as wholesale Day-Ahead 
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and Real-Time electricity markets and managing the flow of electricity through the 
transmission grid under market rules589. Electricity prices in the PJM are dependent 
on the specific locations and nodes within the transmission grid.  Each node has two 
points; i) the source, where the power is injected to the grid and ii) the sink where the 
power is delivered to its final destination. When the congestion at a specific node 
occurs, price difference between the source and the sink will grow, as the price of 
electricity being lower at the source will increase at the sink.  
The congestion levels in each node differ widely and locational marginal prices 
(LMPs) also vary in the same grid. There are three elements used in the calculation 
of LMPs: (1) energy price, which is the same at each node; (2) congestion cost which 
varies on the basis of capacities available in the transmission system; and (3) line 
losses which represent the heat losses occurring at the grid during the flow of 
electricity590.  The PJM adopted the MLSA system to provide compensation for the 
line losses the suppliers incurred during the flow of electricity in the grid. This system 
operates as a mechanism to distribute surplus revenues that the PJM collects for line 
losses to market participants. 
The PJM also provides Up-To-Congestion (UTC) transactions, virtual products of 
purchase and sale contracts with no physical obligation591. First developed as a 
hedging strategy for risks arising out of price differences due to congestion, these 
products were later used by speculators to profit from price arbitrage between the 
congestion levels at both Day-Ahead and Real-Time markets. A market participant 
who buys the UTC product from the PJM pays the price difference between the sink 
and the source for a specific node in the Day-Ahead market and receives the price 
difference between the sink and the source for the same node but in the Real-Time 
market. The buyers of the UTC transactions monitoring the direction of transmission 
congestion and its effects on prices between the sources and the sinks on the 
transmission system profit or lose money on the basis of deviations in prices and 
congestion levels.  
The trading scheme at issue involved the UTC transactions that are aimed at 
receiving MLSA payments rather than profiting from price differences. Despite being 
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a virtual trading instrument with no obligation to make or receive delivery of electricity, 
the UTC transactions act in the transmission systems similar to physical trades. The 
PJM market rules dictate that each party to a UTC transaction is also required to 
reserve transmission capacity equivalent to the amount determined under the 
transaction and the parties to the transactions who have booked and paid for the 
transmission service in compliance with the PJM’s market rules are also entitled to 
claim MLSA payments. Coaltrain paid fees for its reservation of transmission 
capacity devised its UTC trading strategy to collect these MLSA payments592.  
In order to make its scheme profitable, Coaltrain had to engage in large trading of 
UTC transactions. Each transaction required an equivalent capacity reservation in 
the transmission grid and had the risk of increasing congestion causing differentiating 
prices between the source and the sink exposing Coaltrain to the risk of incurring 
losses from its UTC transactions as a result of these price changes.  For the 
profitability of its scheme, Coaltrain had to make sure that congestion levels at the 
transactional node were minimal and that price differences between the source and 
the sink remained stable 593 . Accordingly, Coaltrain’s UTC transactions involved 
specific transmission nodes with relatively low congestion levels and insignificant 
price differences. Without the risk of increasing congestion, Coaltrain was able to 
engage in large trading in UTC transactions and collected significant revenues from 
MLSA payments.  
FERC alleged that Coaltrain’s trading of the UTC transactions to make profits on 
MLSA payments was fraudulent and violated its anti-manipulation rule for electricity, 
Section 1c.2 594 . According to FERC, a legitimate trading activity in the UTC 
transactions should involve seeking profits from price differences between the 
transactional sources and sinks on the basis of estimated congestion levels.  
Coaltrain, on the other hand, embraced a different strategy specifically looking for 
transmission paths that involve limited congestion and price differences to enter into 
the UTC transactions which provided very little or no profits to their holders. 
Furthermore, Coaltrain continuously lost money due the transmission fees it paid for 
the capacity reservations required by the PJM market rules for the UTC transactions. 
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The main purpose of the relevant trading activity was not seeking profits from 
arbitraging price differential as it was loss incurring and uneconomic. Coaltrain lost 
more than $96,000 on the price spreads and $3.93 million total when transmission 
fees were included but these losses were surpassed by the profits of $8.05 million 
derived from MLSA payments595. FERC found that engaging in large uneconomic 
trading in the UTC transactions to collect MLSA payments constituted a fraudulent 
trading activity and was in violation of the Commission’s anti-manipulation provisions. 
3.3.2.2.4. Evaluation 
3.3.2.2.4.1. General 
The gaming of market rules by finding and exploiting loopholes in the design of 
energy markets constitutes a violation of anti-manipulation rules and therefore is 
prohibited596. In these types of practices, the perpetrators seek to establish a market 
position which will be paid or benefitted with the grant of certain rights on the basis of 
market rules. These payments and financial positions are generally designed by the 
transmission operators to provide a balancing and compensation mechanism for 
losses incurred in the transmission system. A trading strategy that specifically aims 
at receiving these payments and financial rights at the expense of financial risks 
associated with the fundamentals of demand for and supply of energy available in 
the market is considered to be distorting the well-functioning of these markets and 
against the main purposes for which these market rules were adopted597.  
3.3.2.2.4.2. Identifying Gaming 
The nature of the trading activity is important in establishing the perpetrators’ intent 
for the gaming of market rules. A legitimate trading activity which is carried out on the 
basis of market fundamentals may also claim such payments. The attainment of 
these financial benefits alone does not constitute market manipulation. For a trading 
activity to constitute a gaming of market rules, it should be demonstrated that in 
engaging in the trading activity, the perpetrators specifically aimed at reaping 
financial benefits granted by these financial rules applied in connection with the 
                                                          
595 Ibid., 75 
596 Comments of The Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON), Fact-Finding Investigation Into Possible 
Manipulation of Electric and Natural Gas Prices, DOCKET NO. PA02-2-003 3 See; 
http://www.elcon.org/Documents/FERCFilings/CAISOgamingcomments.pdf  
597 Coaltrain Energy, L.P., et al., 154 FERC ¶ 61,002 (2016), 102 
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market conditions as a result of the relevant trading activity598. The legal analysis 
should identify that the relevant trading activity is uneconomic and not feasible to the 
extent that it would not be employed by the perpetrators without the financial benefits 
provided under the market rules599.  
This assertion does not place a burden on the market participants always to act in an 
economic manner as each market participant can unintentionally engage in 
uneconomic activities on a stand-alone basis that is a fundamental part of a 
legitimate trading activity and for the well-functioning trading environment. The 
market participants’ persistence in uneconomic trades and the continuous attainment 
of the related benefits are important in identifying the manipulative nature of the 
relevant market practices 600 . Therefore, each legal analysis investigating an 
allegation of market manipulation through gaming market rules should clearly 
demonstrate that the underlying factor that leads market participants to employ such 
practices is the availability of financial benefits that can be acquired in their 
connection.  
3.3.2.2.4.3. Gaming as Fraudulent Behaviour 
A market activity that constitutes the gaming of market rules can be fraudulent. The 
perpetrators can devise fraudulent schemes to deceive other market participants or 
transmission system operators or other market providers that conditions required by 
market rules for the application of a financial payment are met, while the necessary 
conditions are not present. This was the case in Rumford Paper Company in which 
the perpetrator deceived the market operator with respect to its load-reduction 
capacities by withholding its generation capacity for a certain period. It can be argued 
that the perpetrator’s decommissioning of its own generation facility for the relevant 
period constitutes an outright fraud as it is a material misrepresentation and omission 
of the fact that it needed less energy for the operation of its lumber mill. However, the 
perpetrator did not just provide fraudulent reports as to its levels of energy 
consumption. It, in fact, created a real position by purchasing electricity from external 
suppliers, instead of producing it in its generation facility. On a stand-alone basis the 
perpetrator’s activity was uneconomic, as it increased the perpetrator’s energy 
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costs601. The trading activity was only profitable when the benefits from ISO-NE’s 
DALRP are included. Even though it can be regarded as fraudulent, deceiving other 
market participants and market operator as to the perpetrator’s true load-reduction 
capacity, the practices of withholding generation capacity and resorting to external 
electricity supplies cannot be considered as fictitious trades and thus outright fraud.   
3.3.2.2.4.4. Gaming as a Non-Fraudulent Behaviour 
Non-fraudulent activities can also give rise to concerns about market manipulation 
through gaming of market rules. In both J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Cooperation602 
and Coaltrain Energy L.P., et al.603, the perpetrators engaged in trading activities that 
did not operate as a fraud on the side of other market participants and transmission 
service providers. The characteristics of the market practices did not involve a 
material misrepresentation or an omission of a fact in market fundamentals and the 
perpetrators manipulated the markets without distorting the information available in 
the market. The gaming of market rules in J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Cooperation 
and Coaltrain Energy L.P., et al., was not based on deceiving other market 
participants’ and market operators’ perception of market conditions. One can assert 
that the manipulative practices employed in J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy 
Cooperation and Coaltrain Energy L.P. et al. should also be regarded fraudulent, as 
FERC found that these market practices violated its anti-manipulation rules which are 
based on SEC’s Rule Section 10(b) fraud-based formulation. In applying its anti-
manipulation jurisdiction, FERC defines the concept of fraud as encompassing “any 
action, transaction, or conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing, or 
defeating a well-functioning market604”.  FERC’s interpretation of fraud is designed to 
address all types of market manipulation including fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
market activities and therefore not enough to identify that the market practices 
investigated in J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Cooperation and Coaltrain Energy L.P., 
et al. are fraudulent by nature.    
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3.3.2.3. Cross-market manipulation 
Wholesale energy products can be traded in different markets under different 
conditions. They can be traded on the basis of contract duration such as long-term or 
short-term contracts. They can be traded in different trading venues such as 
exchanges or OTC facilities. They can also involve different contractual obligations 
as certain contracts require the parties to make and take physical delivery of energy 
products, others involve financial obligations on the basis of price movements related 
to the underlying products. Each energy product in the wholesale energy trading has 
a particular trading behaviour and is treated differently by market operators and 
traders. However, these market products also have significant price relations that a 
change or development in market fundamentals for one or multiple energy products 
can affect the trading of other energy products significantly. In cross-market 
manipulation, perpetrators try to reap financial benefits exploiting price relations 
between the trading of different energy products605. 
Prices of wholesale energy products are generally interlinked with each other through 
benchmarking instruments. Benchmarks consist of prices which are determined via a 
formula involving pricing data accumulated from different market participants 
participating in multiple segments of wholesale energy markets 606 . These 
benchmarks can be determined in trading venues, such as exchanges which usually 
organise a settlement period in daily, weekly or monthly trading hours to demonstrate 
the price levels at which relevant wholesale energy products are traded. These types 
of benchmarks are called “settlement prices” 607. Several pricing benchmarks are 
also provided by independent reporting agencies collecting information from market 
participants on a voluntary basis and publishing pricing and market reports. The 
reports and magazines that provide pricing information with respect to wholesale 
energy products are called “indexes”608.  
                                                          
605 Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, (1991), 523; ; Emilios E. Avgouleas, (2005), 144 
606 See: Ofgem, Pricing Benchmarks in Gas and Electricity Markets – A Call For Evidence, (June 6, 2013) 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/40363/pricing-benchmarks-gas-and-electricity-markets.pdf  
607 For example the settlement price of the Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures contract is an important benchmark 
for natural gas extensively used by market participants in their hedging and trading activities. See: 
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/natural-gas/natural-gas.html  
608 Index prices are published by trade press entities such as Natural Gas Intelligence and Platts. The major 
index prices include Gas Daily and Platts Inside FERC. See: 
https://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/ProductsServices/Products/gasmarketreport.pdf  
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These benchmarks are fundamental to the design of manipulative schemes. The 
pricing information determined and published in these benchmarks is again used in 
energy markets. The majority of energy trading taking place in either exchanges or 
OTC markets refers to these instruments in their pricing of wholesale energy 
products609. Therefore, in cross-market manipulation, the perpetrators who seek to 
exploit price relations between different markets often aim at affecting benchmark 
prices. This section provides examples of cross-market manipulation in US case law 
involving market participants by affecting settlement periods and indexes, seeking to 
move market prices to levels more favourable to their positions.  
3.3.2.3.1. In re Avista Energy Inc.610 
This case involved a manipulation claim by the CFTC against the defendants, Avista 
Energy, Inc. et.al.,  who sought to manipulate the settlement price of two electricity 
products, the electricity futures contracts for delivery at Palo Verde (PV) and 
California Oregon Border (COB), (collectively Western) traded in NYMEX between 
April 1998 through August 1998 (the “Relevant Period”)611. According to NYMEX 
rules, the last day for trading Western contracts was the fourth business day before 
the first calendar day of the delivery month. For example, for an electricity futures 
contract to be delivered to PV in August 1998, the last trading day was July 28, 1998. 
NYMEX rules also established an expiration day for trading in options contracts, 
which immediately precede the last futures trading day, that is July 27, 1998, 
according to the example given above. The settlement price of options contracts 
traded in NYMEX would be determined on the basis of the average price of 
transactions that take place during the last two minutes (the Close) of the expiration 
day for options contracts612.  
Prior to the relevant period of April-August 1998, the defendants had also entered 
into options contracts in the OTC markets whose value is derived from the settlement 
price determined during the Close on NYMEX’s expiration day for options trading.  
The defendants had financial incentives to exploit the price relations between the 
                                                          
609 Ofgem, Wholesale Energy Markets in 2015, (September 9, 2015) 35 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2015/09/wholesale_energy_markets_in_2015_final_0.pdf  
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options contracts in NYMEX and the OTC markets. Any price fluctuations in NYMEX 
options contracts for electricity futures delivery to PV and COV would affect the value 
of the options contracts the defendants entered into in the OTC markets. Accordingly, 
options traded in the OTC markets would profit, when the increase or decrease in the 
settlement price for NYMEX Western options contracts exceeded certain price 
thresholds.  
In order to move the settlement prices for the relevant periods in NYMEX, the 
defendants devised a scheme involving selling options at very short prices to move 
prices down or buying options at high prices to move prices up in relation to the 
positions held in the OTC options trading. The defendants’ trading activity was 
concentrated on the close (last two minutes) of the options expiration day and as the 
market for Western electricity futures contracts was illiquid with a very low volume of 
trading, the defendants could increase and decrease the settlement prices with large 
buy and sell orders613. The defendants incurred substantial financial losses during 
their large trading as they sold at lower prices to decrease and bought at higher 
prices to increase the settlement prices. However, the larger positions held in the 
OTC options markets were more than enough to compensate for these losses. 
The findings in Avista were important to a related case, DiPlacido614, which was 
brought against an employee of Avista Energy Inc., overseeing and operating the 
company’s business on the NYMEX trading floor. This was the CFTC’s first victory in 
its history of anti-manipulation prosecution. In these cases, the CFTC alleged that the 
defendants’ trading activity between NYMEX and the OTC options contracts 
constituted market manipulation and attempted manipulation under Section 9 of the 
CEA, the anti-manipulation provision. In Avista, the CFTC and the defendants settled 
with the latter paying more than $2 million in penalties615. In DiPlacido, on the other 
hand, the defendant refused the CFTC’s settlement offer, and the case went to 
decision which found that the relevant trading activity employed by the defendants 
constituted a violation of the CEA’s anti-manipulation rules.    
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614 In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,970 (CFTC 2008) 
615 Ibid., 14 
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3.3.2.3.2. Energy Transfer Partners616 
In this case, Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. et. al., the defendants, employed two 
distinct manipulative schemes involving wholesale trading of natural gas in multiple 
hubs on December 23, and 28, 2005. In their first scheme, the defendants 
manipulated the next month’s fixed price gas markets at Houston Ship Channel 
(HSC), a major trading hub, in which natural gas contracts are traded for daily, 
weekly, monthly and longer terms. The fixed price gas markets at HSC are markets 
where the price for natural gas is determined on the basis of bilateral trades or 
agreements, similar to the OTC transactions. Market participants buying and selling 
in these markets use a price index, Platts Inside FERC (IFERC), which publishes 
monthly prices of natural gas for delivery at HSC. The defendants’ scheme, 
manipulating the next month’s fixed price markets at HSC, involved a large selling 
activity of natural gas contracts at relatively low prices and reporting these 
transactions to indexes. As the defendants’ share constituted more than 80% of total 
sales in the market, reporting the transactions moved down the average price for 
natural gas calculated by the index617.  
Suppressed index prices benefited the defendants in two ways. First, the defendants, 
though engaging in high selling activity at HSC, were net buyers of natural gas, that 
is, the amount of natural gas the defendants purchased in the market exceeded the 
amount that they sold618. By suppressing the index prices through their selling activity, 
the defendants acquired price benefits in purchasing natural gas at depressed prices. 
Second, the defendants also entered into financially based swaps based on the price 
difference between the IFERC index price and the settlement price for natural gas 
contract traded in NYMEX 619 . The defendants, sellers of the swap agreement, 
received the settlement price of NYMEX and paid the IFERC index price. As they 
suppressed the IFERC index price by their short selling activity, the defendants 
acquired significant benefits from their swap agreements. The strategy proved to be 
useful for the defendants as they practiced it eight more times620. 
                                                          
616 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,086 (2007) 
617 Ibid., 3 
618 Ibid., 4 
619 Ibid., 5 
620 Ibid.,  
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In their second scheme, the defendants also manipulated daily natural gas prices for 
delivery at Waha and Permian, two other natural gas hubs, where natural gas 
contracts are delivered and traded between market participants621. In these markets, 
defendants sold index swaps which benefitted on the basis of price differences 
between daily and monthly IFERC index prices, according to which, the defendants 
benefitted from low daily prices in comparison with monthly prices. In order to make 
their swap positions profitable, the defendants entered into a trading scheme 
involving selling fixed price daily gas at Waha and Permian hubs on December 23, 
2005 and December 28, 2005 and buying back a similar volume of natural gas on the 
same day. Selling at low prices, the defendants drove down the daily natural gas 
prices and increased the value of their index swap positions.  
FERC alleged that the defendants’ practice of depressing prices violated its Market 
Behaviour Rule 2, the anti-manipulation rule for natural gas before EPAct 2005 
preceding Section 1c.1 constituted according to which “any person making natural 
gas sales for resale in interstate commerce (…) is prohibited from engaging in 
actions or transactions that are without a legitimate business purpose and that are 
intended to or foreseeably could manipulate market prices, market conditions, or 
market rules for natural gas”622. Citing the SEC’s precedent on market manipulation 
creating a downward pressure on prices, FERC found that the defendants’ short 
sales constituted manipulation as they created impressions that did not represent the 
actual conditions on demand and supply. Accordingly, it is noted that “(t)he failure to 
disclose that market prices are being artificially depressed operates as a deceit on 
the market place and is an omission of a material fact”623.  
FERC also found that the trading activity the defendants engaged in was of an open 
market character in which the perpetrators manipulated the markets by placing buy 
and sell orders. FERC argued that these practices also operated as a deceit on the 
market as the defendants’ concealment of their role as a net buyer of natural gas 
constituted fraud and was therefore manipulative. FERC’s view in Energy Transfer 
Partners illustrated the opposite to that of the CFTC, as the latter distinguished fraud-
based market manipulation from these trade-based open market practices and 
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adopted two distinct anti-manipulation provisions for the prosecution of these 
practices separately after the Dodd-Frank. As discussed before, Energy Transfer 
Partners was the first case that both FERC and the CFTC brought concurrent 
enforcement of their anti-manipulation provisions on the basis of the same trading 
activities624. Even though the defendants later settled with both agencies, the case 
illustrates a good example of the differences between the regulatory approaches 
taken by the two agencies to the prohibition of market manipulation in energy 
markets. 
3.3.2.3.3. Amaranth Advisors L.L.C. et al.625 
The CFTC and FERC initiated subsequent proceedings against the defendants, 
Amaranth Advisors and its main trader, Brian Hunter, finding that they manipulated 
and attempted to manipulate the settlement price for NYMEX Natural Gas Futures 
Contracts (NG Futures Contract) which operated as a fundamental benchmark for 
pricing in other financial and physical natural gas contracts 626 . If there was a 
difference between the approaches to the existence of price artificiality, the agencies’ 
formulations of anti-manipulation charges were also different. As discussed above, 
the CEA’s definition of market manipulation requires the CFTC to establish that 
existing market prices are artificial as a result of the perpetrators’ practices, which 
has turned out to be difficult to prove. Therefore instead of applying the four-part test 
under its artificial price-based definition, the CFTC applied its attempted prohibition 
alleging that the defendants attempted to manipulate the NG futures contracts by 
intending to affect market prices and engaging in an overt act in furtherance of that 
intent627. FERC, on the other hand, under no obligation to establish the existence of 
artificial prices, identified that the defendants’ activities deceived other market 
participants as to the existing forces of supply and demand in the market by 
artificially affecting the price of physical and financial contracts628.  
The settlement price for the NG Futures Contracts that the defendants sought to 
affect was a fundamental component of the valuation and profitability of several 
financial and physical markets. The NG Futures Settlement Price is the volume-
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625 Amaranth Advisors L.L.C. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2007) 
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weighted average price of transactions carried out during the settlement period which 
is the last 30 minutes of the last trading day, the third-to-last business day of the 
month before the near month the delivery is to take place629. For example the last 
business day of August 2007 was August 31 and thus the last trading day for 
contracts for which delivery would take place in September was on August 29 
between 2:00-2:30 pm, the last 30 minutes of the trading day. As the liquidity of 
trading activity during the settlement periods was reduced and the majority of the 
market participants sought to balance their positions for delivery obligations, the 
defendants concentrated their trading activity during these periods as they had a 
better opportunity to affect settlement prices by engaging in large scale trading630. 
The trading activity was also designed to create price trends during the settlement 
periods signalling the other market participants about the price levels at which they 
were willing to trade631.   
The defendants had several financial and physical positions, including swaps, 
options, physical basis and index transactions that profited from the affected NG 
futures settlement prices632. Swap agreements, by their nature, involve its parties 
betting as to levels of prices determined as benchmarks under the contracts. In their 
selling of natural gas futures swaps, the defendants paid the buyers the NG Futures 
settlement price and received a fixed price. Moving down the NG Futures settlement 
prices below the levels of fixed prices, the defendants acquired significant benefits 
from their swap positions.  As the defendants were able to affect the NG Futures 
settlement price in pursuant to their will, the relevant swap agreement was not a bet 
at all. The defendants’ scheme of exploiting the pricing relations between the NG 
Futures Contracts and its financial swap agreements is a clear example how a cross-
market manipulation operates in wholesale energy markets. 
The defendants also entered into options agreements whose value was based on the 
changes of price levels during the NG Futures Contracts settlement periods633. An 
Options contract gives its buyer a right but not the obligation to buy or sell a fixed 
number of futures contracts for a specified month at a particular, ‘strike’ price. There 
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are two types of options contracts; call options and put options. While the former 
provides the right to buy, the latter gives the buyer the right to sell the futures 
contracts. In both agreements, the buyer of the options makes a payment, an option 
premium, to the seller for the duration of the options agreement. Affecting the NG 
Futures settlement prices through their trading activity, the defendants were able to 
benefit from their positions in the options markets.  
The defendants were also aware that there was a strong relationship between the 
NG Futures settlement prices and transactions involving the physical delivery of 
natural gas 634 . Pricing of certain natural gas transactions between buyers and 
suppliers of natural gas referred to the NG Futures settlement prices as benchmark 
prices. Furthermore the natural gas indexes published by several trade press entities 
such as Platts or Natural Gas Intelligence (NGI)635 and referred to by sellers and 
buyers of natural gas in pricing their contracts, also use the NG Futures settlement 
price as an important component in calculating their index prices. Any manipulative 
activity that changes the settlement prices for the NG Futures Contracts would affect 
physical delivery of natural gas directly through physical transactions or indirectly 
through index transactions.  
FERC found that the defendants violated its Section 1c.1, anti-manipulation rule for 
natural gas by trading in NYMEX NG Futures Contracts to manipulate the settlement 
price, which operated as a benchmark for several FERC-jurisdictional physical and 
financial transactions. The trading scheme in NYMEX was uneconomic on a stand-
alone basis. The defendants continuously lost profits or received payoffs that were 
less than that from a legitimate, price-taking trading activity636. The trading activity 
was only profitable when the defendants’ profits derived from other financial and 
physical positions were taken into account. The value of these positions increased in 
correlation with a decline in the NG Futures settlement prices. As the defendants’ 
physical and financial positions were in a scale larger than their sales in NYMEX, the 
profits from the former outweighed the losses incurred from the latter and therefore 
created enough of an incentive for the defendants to engage in the relevant scheme, 
though it was loss-incurring. Citing the CFTC’s decision in Avista, FERC concluded 
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that such a trading strategy constituted a clear example of open market transactions, 
which involves real trades and real economic risks in contrast to fictitious, closed 
market transactions and was therefore prohibited637.    
FERC’s decision was later challenged by the CFTC alleging that it had exclusive 
jurisdiction over futures trading in regulated markets such as NYMEX and FERC did 
not have any regulatory authority over trading in the NG Futures Contracts638. The 
CFTC’s authority over futures markets was not contested by FERC, acknowledging 
that mere trading activities that take place in NG Futures Contracts are in the 
province of the CFTC and outside its jurisdiction. However, the scope of the relevant 
trading activities was not limited to the NG Futures contracts as the defendants also 
engaged in activities in FERC-jurisdictional transactions, such as the physical basis 
and index transactions, and trading of swaps and options in the OTC markets, e.g., 
ICE. The defendants later settled with both the CFTC and FERC paying more than 
$30 million penalties. Yet FERC’s ruling against the Amaranth trader, Brian Hunter, 
was later rejected by the federal court on the grounds that FERC was devoid of 
regulatory jurisdiction over a trader’s activities limited to the trading floor of 
NYMEX639.  
3.3.2.3.4. Total Gas & Power North America Inc. Total et al.640 
The defendants, Total Gas & Power North America, Inc. and the company’s 
employees working in the trading department, called ‘the West Desk’ were alleged to 
have manipulated the price of natural gas at four regional trading hubs; Southern 
California (SoCal), Permian, Waha, and San Juan, between June 2009 and June 
2012 in order to move index prices at a level profiting their linked financial 
positions641. The defendants engaged in a scheme which consisted of trading in 
several monthly physical contracts involving monthly fixed price, physical basis and 
monthly index contracts. Monthly fixed price contracts are transactions in which the 
price of the underlying product is fixed by the parties. In physical basis transactions, 
the parties use the settlement price of NYMEX futures contracts as a benchmark 
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price for the delivery of natural gas in the upcoming month642. Finally, as the name 
indicates, in index transactions the parties agree to refer to index-published prices.  
The defendants’ financial position which benefitted from the monthly physical 
contracts, involved two swap contracts; financial basis swaps and financial index 
swaps 643 . Financial basis swaps profit from the price difference between the 
settlement price of NYMEX and a monthly index prices at a particular location. The 
buyers of these swap contracts benefit from higher locational index prices in 
comparison to the settlement price of NYMEX. In index swaps, the parties exchange 
price risks between the monthly index prices and the daily index price in relation to a 
particular location. The buyers of the index swaps pay the monthly index price in 
return for the daily index price and therefore benefit from lower monthly index and 
higher daily index prices. 
Throughout their manipulative trading activity, the defendants entered into large buy 
orders to increase the monthly index prices when their related financial positions 
profited from higher prices and large sell orders to decrease the monthly index prices 
when their related positions profited from lower prices644. The trading activity was 
strategically concentrated on bidweeks, which are the last five business days of the 
month, in which the market participants report their transactions to trade press 
entities, Platts and NGI, for the calculation of index prices. The defendants also 
engaged in strategic early trading activities which created trends in the markets and 
signalled other market participants with respect to expected price movements 
throughout the trading period. The buy and sell orders submitted by the defendants 
were not motivated to pay lowest or be paid at highest prices. Instead, the 
defendants aggressively hit the bids by paying high prices and made sure that their 
sale offers were at prices low enough that other market participants immediately 
lifted them.  
FERC identified several factors indicating the fraudulent nature of the trading 
strategy the defendants adopted645. For example, the relevant trading activities were 
of an uneconomic character. The transactions entered into were self-defeating on a 
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stand-alone basis, involving large buy and sell orders at respectively high and low 
prices, which were the opposite of trading activity that a profit-seeking trader would 
choose. The defendants continued to engage in this uneconomic trading strategy in a 
consistent pattern and also failed to provide legitimate explanations as to their 
motives in developing the relevant trading strategy.  FERC concluded that the 
defendants’ market practices during the relevant periods at the relevant trading 
locations were fraudulent and therefore in violation of its anti-manipulation rule 
Section 1c.1 and Section 4A of the NGA646.  
The relevant trading activity also became subject to the CFTC’s anti-manipulation 
authority which enforced its jurisdiction over trading in commodity futures pursuant to 
Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the CEA647. The CFTC brought two manipulation claims 
against the defendants 648 . First, it asserted that the relevant trading activity 
constituted an attempt to manipulate the monthly index settlement prices of natural 
gas at four trading locations649. Second, the defendants also violated the CFTC’s 
Regulation 180.1, a fraud-based anti-manipulation provision adopted after the Dodd-
Frank. In its decision the CFTC cited the SEC’s decision of In re Donald L. Koch650 in 
which the SEC found that a conduct of “marking the close” constituted a manipulation 
under its fraud-based rule of 10b-5. The CFTC’s finding of Regulation 180.1 violation 
in this case, in relation with the SEC’s decision in In re Donald L. Koch, is important 
as the relevant trading activity was of a character of an open market transaction over 
which the CFTC traditionally applied its jurisdiction of artificial-price based 
manipulation651. After the Dodd Frank, the CFTC kept its traditional manipulation 
provision to apply to market behaviours which are not fraudulent or involve an artifice 
of fraud. However, in this case, the CFTC applied its attempt and fraud-based 
prohibitions rather than its traditional approach, which gives rise to concerns as to 
how the CFTC will demarcate these two types of market manipulation prohibition and 
under what conditions an open market activity will trigger an anti-manipulation 
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648 In the matter of Total Gas & Power North America, Inc., and Therese Tran, CFTC Docket No. 16 -03 (CFTC 
2015) 
649 Ibid., 7 
650 Ibid., 9, citing; In re Donald L. Koch, SEC Release No. 3836, 2014 WL 1998524, (2014) 
651 Jerry Markham, (2015), 329 
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enforcement on the basis of the CFTC’s traditional artificial price-based market 
manipulation authority. 
3.3.2.3.4. BP America Inc., BP Corporation North America Inc. et 
al.652 
This case involved a manipulation claim by FERC against the defendants, BP 
America Inc., BP Corporation North America Inc., et al. who had devised a scheme 
to profit from their financial positions related to differences between daily physical 
natural gas prices at the Houston Ship Channel (the HSC) and the Henry Hub. After 
Hurricane Ike, which caused the collapse of HSC gas prices, realising that their 
financial positions had a potential to gain millions of dollars, when the daily price 
spread at the Henry Hub and the HSC became wide, the defendants developed a 
trading strategy to make sure that that price spread between the two hubs remained 
wide and even grew wider653. The defendants had two financial index swap positions 
in the HSC and the Henry Hub. They were selling index swaps in the HSC meaning 
that they were paying the daily index price and receiving the monthly index price for 
natural gas654. In the Henry Hub, the defendants paid the monthly index price and 
received the daily index price for natural gas655. The profitability of these financial 
positions was later determined as a spread between the HSC and the Henry Hub 
meaning that the relevant financial positions profited more if the difference between 
daily physical natural gas prices in the HSC and the Henry Hub increased.  
In order to suppress daily index prices in the HSC, the defendants entered into a 
number of trading activities on a large scale selling daily natural gas contracts at low 
prices and reporting these trades to trade press entities publishing indexes656. The 
defendants’ trading activities also involved the purchase and transportation of 
physical natural gas from an external trading hub, the Katy, to sell in the HSC thus 
further suppressing the daily natural gas prices. In accessing external supplies, the 
defendants used the BP’s, the parent company, underutilised Houston Gas Pipeline 
(HPL) to transport natural gas from the Katy to the HSC657. The new supplies brought 
                                                          
652 BP America Inc., BP Corporation North America et al., 144 FERC ¶ 61,100 (2013) 
653 Ibid., 48 
654 Ibid., 17 
655 Ibid., 18 
656 Ibid., 25 
657 Ibid., 27 
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with the HPL provided the defendants efficiency in suppressing natural gas prices 
further, as they exerted an additional competitive pressure on the existing supplies at 
the HSC as well as allowing the defendants to avoid engaging in more costly trading 
alternatives, such as buying and reselling practices. Finally, the defendants also 
employed a strategy of early and heavy fixed-price gas sales to affect the early 
market condition at the HSC creating pricing trends that induced other market traders 
to follow the pricing levels set by the defendants’ early sales658.  
FERC alleged that the defendants’ trading of physical daily natural gas contracts was 
manipulative as their main motive was to affect the index prices which determined 
the profitability of the defendants’ financial swap positions at the HSC and the Henry 
Hub659. The defendants’ buying and selling activities could not be characterised as 
profit-maximising based on the forces of demand and supply. The defendants were 
eager to buy natural gas at the Katy hub, hitting every offer from natural gas 
suppliers irrespective of price. The trading activity aimed at acquiring large quantities 
of supplies even at the expense of paying high prices relative to the market prices. 
On the other side of the scheme, the defendants offered the supplies at low price 
levels to make sure that the offers were immediately lifted by other market 
participants moving down the market prices further. Such a trading activity was not 
economic and on a stand-alone basis could only be profitable when the profits 
derived from the swap spread positions held by the defendants were taken into 
account 660 . Accordingly FERC concluded that the defendants’ trading activities 
engaging in uneconomic trades to affect prices exploiting the price relations between 
the physical and financial markets was fraudulent under the Section 1c.1 and 
therefore constituted a market manipulation. 
3.3.2.3.5. Barclays Bank PLC, Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, et  al.661 
The defendants, Barclays Bank PLC, a major participant in the US electricity markets, 
plus its employees working in the trade department, were alleged to have 
manipulated the prices of several wholesale electricity products at four different 
locations, Mid-Columbia (MIDC), Palo Vere (PV), South Path 15 (SP), and North 
                                                          
658 Ibid., 31 
659 Ibid., 68 
660 Ibid., 41 
661 Barclays Bank PLC, Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, et al., 141 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2012) 
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Path 15 (NP), between November 2006 and December 2008662. FERC asserted that 
the defendants engaged in a pattern of loss-incurring trading activities in daily 
electricity contracts traded on the ICE, a market platform for wholesale trading in a 
number of markets, to benefit from financial swap positions.  The relevant trading 
activity involved several buy and sell orders in order to move the index prices up or 
down related to financial positions. 
The defendants acquired several financial swap positions in relation to daily 663 , 
monthly664 and balance of month (BOM)665 index prices, which were calculated by 
trade press entities on the basis of trading data reported by the market participants. 
According to the financial swap positions, when the defendants were buying the 
financial swaps, they would be paying a fixed price in return for a floating index price. 
On the other hand, selling the financial swaps, the defendants would be paying a 
floating index price in return for a fixed price. In order to suppress the monthly 
electricity prices during the bidweek, the defendants entered into large buy orders in 
daily markets throughout the relevant months. These large buy orders were loss-
incurring on a stand-alone basis 666 . However, the defendants also engaged in 
financial swaps for daily and BOM index prices, which profited from high index prices 
compensating for the losses incurred during the daily trading. The large physical 
electricity position accumulated through daily trading activity was later offered in the 
bidweek at relatively low prices moving down the monthly index prices. Even though 
the defendants’ activity in the bidweek was also loss-incurring, the profits derived 
from financial swap positions in relation to low monthly index prices were more than 
enough to compensate for these losses. As a result, the defendants reaped 
significant profits from their trading in a combination of physical and financial 
products. 
                                                          
662 Ibid.,  2 
663 The daily index prices were calculated as the average price of all day-ahead transactions for a specific day 
on the ICE. Ibid., 7 
664 The monthly index prices were calculated as the average price of all day-ahead transactions for a specific 
month on the ICE. Ibid.,   
665 The BOM contract “means a strip of two or more Daily Contracts, tradeable on a Business Day (“the Trade 
Day”) in a contract month, starting two Business Days forward from such Trade Day continuing through to the 
end of the contract month”. See: Section UUU1 - Contract Rules: ICE Futures UK Natural Gas Daily Financial 
Futures Contract 2, https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/circulars/14101_attach_2.pdf  
666 Barclays Bank PLC, Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, et al., 141 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2012), 28 
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It is important to note that the relevant trading activities in Barclays were not of a 
fraudulent character as the trading activities at issue were mostly based on the 
defendants’ transactions of buying and selling physical and financial electricity 
products at the wholesale level without engaging in a mechanism that operated as a 
deception or fraud over other market participants667. However, FERC developed an 
overarching concept of fraud within the meaning of its anti-manipulation prohibition 
as including any market activity, transaction, or conspiracy for the purpose of 
distorting or defeating the proper functioning of wholesale energy markets668. This 
concept is contested in the academic literature. Accordingly, FERC found that the 
trading of daily electricity products on the ICE with respect to the delivery of 
electricity at four different locations operated as fraud and therefore violated Section 
1c.2, the anti-manipulation prohibition for electricity products669. 
3.3.2.3.6. Evaluation 
3.3.2.3.6.1.  Overview  
Market participants often engage in cross-market transactions for hedging and 
trading purposes. The energy firms operating at multi-market levels have a clear 
insight into the profitability of interrelated price movements among markets and 
generally incorporate specific trading desks in their organisational structure to design 
and monitor these cross-market transactions. Deriving profits through price arbitrage 
between different markets and prices, predictions of price movements based on 
market fundamentals670, or hedging risks arising out of deviations in price levels, are 
considered the essence of legitimate trading and crucial for increasing competition 
and liquidity in the markets as well as providing a means for convergence in prices 
between different delivery points. The legitimacy of these practices relies on the 
market principle that the traders operating in the energy markets and making 
predictions based on their perception of market fundamentals, act in a profit-
                                                          
667 See: Matthew Evans ‘Regulating Electricity-Market Manipulation: A Proposal for a New Regulatory Regime 
to Proscribe All Forms of Manipulation’ (2015) 113/4 Michigan Law Review  
668 Supra note 503 
669 Barclays Bank PLC, Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, et al., 141 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2012), 37  
670 In Total Gas & Power North America, Inc. et al. one of the defendants explained the type of fundamentals-
based trading he was following in natural gas market as “supply and demand balance sheet” that forecasts 
“what is going to happen to storage at the of a month, at the end of a season, the idea being that of storage is 
forecast to be full or more than full, it is bearish [to sell] [and if] storage is forecast to come in way under the 
working gas capacity, then that would be a bullish [to buy] indicator”. See In the matter of Total Gas & Power 
North America, Inc., and Therese Tran, CFTC Docket No. 16 -03 (CFTC 2015), 21 
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maximising manner671. While the sellers’ main objective is to receive the highest 
return from their transactions, buyers of energy products seek to pay the lowest price 
possible based on the demand and supply levels available in the market. Pricing of 
these energy products between sellers and buyers on the basis of the forces of 
supply and demand is fundamental for the functioning of the markets.  
Cross-market manipulation occurs when the market participants intervene in the 
determination of market prices in a manner to profit from their related financial or 
physical positions. The revenues derived from these positions are no longer based 
on the perpetrators’ perception of market fundamentals 672 . In fact, the relevant 
transactions involve no risk exposure to price changes as a result of deviations 
between supply and demand, which is present in the legitimate trading of price 
arbitrage. The perpetrators directly move prices at a level that they know will affect 
the value of their related positions and do not need at all the predictions of market 
fundamentals to profit from their trading activities. As the majority of the firms 
operating in the wholesale trading in energy products incorporates a specific trading 
department in their corporate organisations monitoring price relations between 
multiple markets, the perpetrators are able to oversee and profit from these pricing 
relations673. 
3.3.2.3.6.2. The Perpetration of Misconduct  
In cross-market manipulation, the perpetrators profit from a portfolio of different 
physical and financial positions. First the perpetrators engage in trading of a specific 
physical natural gas or electricity product. These trades are regarded as price 
making, as they are fundamental in moving prices at a level that is profitable for the 
perpetrators’ positions in other related markets. The trading of physical energy 
                                                          
671 “(T)rading with the purpose of obtaining the best price (…) does not constitute, in itself, a violation of the 
Commodity Exchange Act.” In re Hohenberg Brothers, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
20,271 (CFTC 1977) 
672  “(W)hen a price is affected by a factor which is not legitimate, the resulting price is necessarily artificial.” In 
re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
21,796 (CFTC 1982)  
673 Note that the majority of cross-market manipulative strategies discussed above were perpetrated by 
trading desks such as ‘Texas Team’ in BP America Inc. et al., and ‘West Desk’ in Total Gas & Power North 
America, Inc. et al., which are incorporated to manage and trade the parent companies’ assets in energy 
markets, overseeing price movements and relations between multiple markets and contracts. See: BP America 
Inc., BP Corporation North America et al., 144 FERC ¶ 61,100 (2013); In the matter of Total Gas & Power North 
America, Inc., and Therese Tran, CFTC Docket No. 16 -03 (CFTC 2015). 
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products is usually determined on the basis of their contractual terms with respect to 
the duration of their delivery obligation spanning from daily to yearly delivery periods. 
The perpetrators can engage in trading of these contracts to increase or decrease 
the price of the relevant contracts. For example, in order to decrease market prices 
for daily electricity contracts which involve an obligation to deliver a certain amount of 
electricity for the next day, a market participant can take part in a large scale sale at 
prices lower than the prices at which other market players are trading. In contrast, a 
market participant seeking to move up prices for monthly natural gas contracts, 
which require the sellers to deliver a certain volume of natural gas in the next month, 
would engage in a large buy orders at higher prices. These trading practices at 
higher and lower prices will directly affect the perception of other market players of 
market conditions and the average market price for the trading of the relevant energy 
products is determined on the basis of the perpetrators’ low or high selling and 
buying activity, rather than the forces of supply and demand available in the market. 
Therefore the markets in which the perpetrators employ their trading strategies to 
determine prices are identified as price making positions.      
Cross market manipulation involving schemes that aim at distorting benchmark 
prices are also called ‘benchmark manipulation’674. In this type of practice, the price 
making activities that the perpetrators engage in aim at affecting benchmark prices 
such as settlement prices for exchanges 675  or the index prices the trade press 
publish on the basis of transaction reports they receive from traders operating in the 
markets676. These settlement and index prices are called price taking positions as 
they are calculated based on the volume-weighted average price of all fixed-price or 
physical basis transactions executed in relevant markets and relevant trading 
periods677. The functioning of these price benchmarks is crucial for the functioning of 
the markets as they operate as indicators of the relevant price levels and forces of 
supply and demand. In that regard, these benchmarks also operate as price making 
instruments and the majority of market participants trading in markets refer to these 
benchmarks in the pricing of their transactions. Any distortion in the determination of 
                                                          
674 Article 12(1)(d), Regulation No 596/2014 
675 See supra note 607.  
676 Supra note 606  
677 NYMEX Exchange Rulebook 220 Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures See: 
http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/NYMEX/2/220.pdf  
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these benchmark prices gives rise to concerns on existing market conditions and true 
levels of supply and demand.  
Benchmark prices also determine the profitability of several financial instruments 
such as swaps and options, which are regarded as benefiting positions. The 
perpetrators of cross-market manipulation hold substantial positions in financial 
instruments, either buying or selling them on the basis of deviations in benchmark 
prices. The perpetrators are generally eager to incur losses in their physical trading 
as long as their financial positions are large enough to compensate and further 
benefit from changes in prices. However, the profitability of financial positions in 
relation to price levels in the physical markets requires an extensive analysis of 
market information, including available demand and supply, as well as market 
liquidity and tendencies among other market participants. In order to execute a 
successful cross-market manipulation, the perpetrators are obliged to have a clear 
insight into the levels of volume and timing required for the trading activity to affect 
the average price of the underlying product being traded in the market. Accordingly, 
the perpetrators need to accumulate enough physical contracts prior to buying or 
selling activity during the trading period. Further, prices that the perpetrators are 
trading should be low or high enough to move the average prices traded in the 
relevant market, which in turn determines the settlement and index prices. The 
perpetrators also need to make sure that the settlement and index prices affected by 
their trades in physical markets are at levels that are profitable to the positions they 
hold in financial markets. The perpetration of cross-market manipulation requires an 
extensive market analysis involving the deviations between financial and physical 
positions. Otherwise the financial risks associated with the trading strategies pose a 
great economic threat to the perpetrators of cross-market manipulation.    
3.3.2.3.6.3. Legitimate Trading vs Manipulative Conduct  
Separating legitimate price arbitrage or hedging practices from exploiting price 
relations between physical and financial positions is fundamental in the analysis of 
cross-market manipulation678. Within the context of legitimate trading, the financial 
instruments such as options and swaps are often used for hedging or profit-
maximising purposes. Options are financial contracts that grant their buyer the right 
                                                          
678 Supra note 167  
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but not an obligation to make or receive delivery of an underlying product at a fixed 
price679. If a contract grants the right to receive a certain amount of delivery at a fixed 
price, this contract is identified as a “call option”680. If a contract grants the right to 
make a certain amount of delivery at a fixed price, this contract is identified as a “put 
option”681. In either case, the buyer of option contracts makes a payment in return for 
the right to make or receive delivery, which is called a ‘premium’, negotiated between 
the parties of the option contract 682 . For the buyer of options contracts, the 
associated financial risks are limited to the amount of premium. For the seller, on the 
other hand, the financial risks with respect to the option contracts is unlimited, as 
they may be obliged to make or receive the delivery at a fixed rate irrespective of 
market prices. In order to show how options contracts operate as a hedging or 
trading strategy, hypothetical scenarios would be helpful683. 
3.3.2.3.6.4. Legitimate Trading in Options Contracts  
In the first scenario, consider an electricity producer who is concerned about market 
prices for electricity for next year delivery. According to its financial portfolio, the 
producer seeks to generate X amount of electricity for at least Y price. If the prices of 
electricity for next year delivery will be lower than Y, the producer will lose money 
from its generation business. In order to hedge this price risk, the producer enters 
into a put option contract buying the right but not an obligation to make delivery of X 
amount of electricity at Y price684. By buying the put option contract, the producer is 
no longer concerned about a decrease in electricity prices for next year delivery as it 
has the right to sell X amount of electricity at Y price685. If the prices increase in the 
next year, the producer can just let the option contract expire as it can sell its output 
at higher market prices. The only economic loss incurred by the producer is the 
                                                          
679 Leonard R. Higgins, The Put-and-Call, (Effingham Wilson, London, 1906), 6 
680 Ibid., 6 
681 Ibid., 6 
682 Ibid., 7 
683 For detailed understanding of strategies see: Australian Securities Exchange, ‘Options Strategies: 26 Proven 
Options Strategies’ (2011) <http://www.asx.com.au/documents/resources/UnderstandingStrategies.pdf> 
((accessed on 10 March 2016) 
684 There are two types of put options traded in financial markets; the American option meaning that the right 
to sell can be exercised any time prior to expiration day and the European option the holder of which can 
exercise its right only on expiration day. See;  Australian Securities Exchange, ‘Understanding Options Trading’ 
(2015), 4, < http://www.asx.com.au/documents/resources/UnderstandingOptions.pdf> (accessed on 10 March 
2016) 
685 Ibid., 5 
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premium it pays to the seller of the put option for the grant of the right. The seller, on 
the other hand, has the obligation to receive the delivery of X amount of electricity at 
Y price, if the producer exercises its right under the put option contract. The 
economic loss the seller incurs will depend on the decrease in market prices, as it 
could buy X amount of electricity at market prices lesser than Y price without the 
option contract. The seller’s financial benefit is limited to the premium it receives from 
the buyer.  
In the second scenario, consider an electricity distributor who buys electricity to resell 
in the retail market to the final costumers and is concerned about an increase in 
market prices for electricity to be delivered in next year. The distributor determines 
that the highest price it is willing to pay for X amount of electricity is Y. Any amount 
that is higher than Y will cause economic problems for the distributor. In order to 
hedge this economic risk associated with a possible price increase, the distributors 
enters into a call option contract which provides the right but not an obligation to 
receive the delivery of X amount of electricity at Y price for the next year686. By 
buying the call option contract, the distributor is no longer concerned about a 
prospective price increase in the electricity market as it can buy the necessary 
amount at a price level it is willing to pay, on the basis of the call option contract. The 
only economic loss the distributor incurs until the execution of the contract or the 
expiry date is the premium paid to the seller of the contract. The seller is obliged to 
make the delivery of X amount of electricity at Y price to the distributor, if the 
distributor exercises its right under the call option contract. The financial risk 
associated with the option contract depends on the difference between Y and 
prospective price increases in the next year. In return for this financial risk, the 
financial benefit the seller derives from the contract is limited to the premium paid by 
the buyer. 
In the third scenario, consider a trader who seeks to derive profits from price 
changes in the electricity market. This scenario includes many facets as the 
profitability of each options contract differs based on the position of the trader as a 
buyer or seller. A trader can sell and buy call and put options. In order to profit from 
buying or selling options contracts, the trader will analyse the relevant market 
                                                          
686 Ibid., 3 
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conditions, such as storage, transmission constraints and supply and demand levels 
available in the relevant market687. When the trader sells a call option contract, it has 
an obligation to sell X amount of electricity at Y price, when the buyer exercises its 
right to receive delivery. If the market prices for electricity decreases during the 
contractual period, the buyer of the contract will never invoke its right to receive 
delivery as it can access to cheaper supplies anytime at the market rates. The trader, 
in this scenario profits from premium it received from the buyers688. If the market 
prices for electricity increase, the buyer of the call option would have an incentive to 
exercise its right to receive delivery. If the trader is also an electricity generator, the 
trader will produce the X amount of energy to fulfil its obligation under the contract. If 
the trader does not have a generation facility, it will resort to other producers buying 
the X amount of energy at market rates higher than Y price to supply its customer. In 
either position, the trader incurs losses from the difference between Y and higher 
market rates. This scenario is illustrated in Figure One below. 
Short Call 
         
Loss 
  Y- Y Y+ 
  Short 
Call 
Profit 
 
 (Figure One)689 
When the trader buys a call option, it will have a right but not an obligation to receive 
X amount of electricity at Y price690. In this position, the trader will look for price 
increases for the delivery of electricity to profit from the options contract. When 
                                                          
687 FERC Enforcement Staff Report of The Division of Energy Market Oversight, ‘Energy Primer A Handbook of 
Energy Market Basics’, (Energy Primer), (July 2015), 113 
688 Australian Securities Exchange, (2015),  5 
689 Australian Securities Exchange, (2011), 2 
690 Australian Securities Exchange, (2015), 11 
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electricity prices increase during the contractual period, the trader can sell the 
options contract that provides its holder the right to buy certain amount of electricity 
at lower than market prices. The financial benefits the trader derives from the options 
contract depends on the difference between Y and market prices. The economic risk 
the trader has taken with respect to the options contract is limited to the amount of 
premium it pays to the seller. If electricity prices drop, the options contract will have 
no or little value and the economic loss the trader incurs can be no more than the 
premium paid for the contractual period. The situation is reversed when the trader 
buys a put option meaning that it will have a right but not an obligation to take X 
amount of electricity at Y price691. In order to profit from this contract, the trader will 
seek price decreases for the delivery of electricity for the contractual period. Once 
the prices decrease, the value of the options contract which gives its holder the right 
to sell electricity at prices higher than market prices will increase and become more 
profitable. Again the financial benefits the trader will derive from the options contract 
depend on the difference between Y and market prices and the economic losses it 
can incur is limited to the premium it paid to the seller for the contractual period. This 
scenario is illustrated in Figure Two below. 
Long Put 
        
Loss 
    Y-  Y Y+ 
  Long 
Put 
Profit  
 (Figure Two)692 
When the trader sells a put option, it has an obligation to buy X amount of electricity 
at Y price, when the buyer exercises its right to make delivery693. If the market price 
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for electricity increases, the buyer of the options contract would never invoke this 
right as it can sell the same amount of energy at market prices higher than Y. The 
trader profits from the premium it receives from the buyer and can also trade this 
contract with other market participants, as the contract will continue to produce value 
for the contractual period. However, a decrease in market prices will lead the buyer 
to exercise its right to make delivery. In this position, the trader will have several 
options. It can first accept the delivery and use it for its own consumption. It can also 
find another electricity consumer who will accept the offer at market prices, which is 
lower than Y. The difference between market prices and Y will be the economic loss 
incurred by the trader. Finally, the trader can settle with the buyer of the put options 
contract financially paying a certain amount of compensation, which will be higher 
than Y. The trader again will incur financial losses.  
The profitability of these options contracts depends on the trader’s analysis of market 
fundamentals. If the trader decides that the market prices of electricity for next year 
delivery is too volatile and could incur financial losses as a result of the options 
contracts, it can also hedge this risk by entering into reverse options contracts with 
other traders or generators. These types of trades are called ‘Box Spread’694. The 
trader can balance its losses with the profits it can derive from its reverse positions. 
For example, a trader who sells a put options contract, meaning that it is obliged to 
receive delivery once the buyer executes the contract, can hedge its risks by buying 
a call option contract to supply the same amount of electricity at the same price for a 
corresponding delivery period. In so doing the trader balances its put options contract 
with another call option contract and hedges the financial risk associated with the 
prospective price changes in  the electricity market for next year delivery. 
3.3.2.3.6.5. Legitimate trading in Swaps 
Swaps, another types of important financial instrument that perpetrators of cross-
market manipulation use, involve an exchange of payments based on the value of 
energy products subject to the agreement between parties 695 . In general, swap 
agreements stipulate an exchange of a fixed and a floating price between buyers and 
sellers. Accordingly a buyer of a swap pays a fixed price and in return receives a 
                                                          
694 Ibid., 26 
695 There are various swap agreements based on the exchanged products. See; CFTC Glossary, 
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/glossary/opaglossary_o.htm.  
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floating price. The economic risk the buyer takes is limited, as it is not obliged to pay 
more than the fixed price. On the other hand, the seller’s economic risk with respect 
to the swap agreement is unlimited since it pays the floating price which depends on 
changes in fundamentals of markets.  In energy markets, the swap agreements 
include the exchange of different types of prices such as index prices and settlement 
prices. For example, a basis swap involves the exchange of a settlement price for a 
particular energy product such as the settlement price for NYMEX Natural Gas 
Futures Contracts (NG Futures Contract) for a particular month and an index price 
such as the price of natural gas to be delivered at Houston Ship Channel (HSC) for a 
particular month696. In such a swap agreement, while the buyer pays the settlement 
price for NG Futures Contract which is a fixed price, the seller pays the floating index 
price.  
Swaps can provide useful tools for traders to benefit from arbitraging price 
differences between different products and to hedge price risks associated with 
changes in market fundamentals 697 . As an instrument to earn profits, in swap 
agreements the parties generally enter into a bet involving a claim that the price of an 
underlying product will be higher or lower than the other product subject to exchange. 
The party who receives more than it pays profits from this swap agreement. Parties 
of swap agreements trade their positions to other market participants until an 
expiration day, and the value of the parties’ positions change in accordance with 
market fundamentals directly or indirectly affecting the prices of underlying products.  
Market participants also use swaps as a hedging mechanism against risks 
associated with price changes in physical markets698. For example a natural gas 
supplier who supplies natural gas to its customers based on the settlement price for 
NG Futures Contract as a benchmark price may seek protection from a potential 
plummet in NYMEX prices. In so doing, the gas supplier can enter into a swap 
agreement with another party, paying floating settlement prices in return for receiving 
a fixed price which is enough to compensate its operation costs. When the decrease 
in the settlement price occurs, the supplier’s loss will be compensated from the price 
difference between the settlement price and the fixed price. If the unexpected 
                                                          
696 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,086 (2007), 3 
697 Jerry Markham, (2015), 7 
698 See: S. Stoft, et al., ‘Primer on Electricity Futures and Other Derivatives’ (1998) Environmental Energy 
Technologies Division, University of California at Berkeley, 33-41 
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happens and the settlement price increases, then the supplier benefits from its 
supply contracts fixing the NG Futures Contracts as the benchmark price, yet incurs 
losses from its swap agreement, paying a higher settlement price in return for 
receiving a lower fixed price. Receiving neither profits nor losses, in both situations, 
the supplier hedges its price risks associated with the changes in market prices.  
In a similar way, a distributor who acquires natural gas to supply retail markets to 
final consumers and a trader who engages in various trades and is exposed to 
several price risks can enter into swap agreements for hedging purposes. 
Accordingly a distributor who buys natural gas based on the settlement price for NG 
Futures Contracts can hedge the risk of a potential price increase in the NYMEX by 
entering into a swap agreement with another party paying the settlement price of NG 
Futures in exchange for receiving a fixed price. A trader finding that the prices of 
energy products for a particular market and particular period can also employ swap 
agreements with other traders to hedge risks related to its financial position. For 
example a trader who previously sold basis swaps meaning that it pays the index 
price, such as Platts’ IFERC, and receives a settlement price for NG Futures 
Contract, can hedge its financial risk by buying an equal volume of basis swap, 
paying the settlement price and receiving the index price. Consequently, after the 
swap agreements, the distributor and the trader are no longer concerned as to 
whether the settlement price increases or decreases, as they have hedged their 
financial risks. 
It is important to note that the scenarios provided above are not exclusive. The 
traders and market participants employ a diverse range of trading activities, buying 
and selling physical and financial products to create a financial portfolio that benefits 
from price movements as a result of manipulative trading. The majority of these 
energy products traded in the regulated markets such as NYMEX and the OTC 
markets such as ICE are standardised, meaning that they differ on the basis of their 
commodity, quantity, delivery date, and delivery point or cash settlement699. The only 
variable that is not standardised in the wholesale energy markets is the price of 
underlying products, as market participants are free to determine the price levels at 
                                                          
699 Supra note 17   
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which they want to trade their physical or futures contracts700. The overall price levels 
and movements calculated based upon the volume-weighted average price of all 
fixed-price or physical basis transactions executed in relevant markets and relevant 
trading periods, in turn determines the value of financial contracts such as swaps and 
options, which are identified as price taking instruments, the value of which depends 
upon price movements in price making positions. The scenarios provided above 
clearly indicate that the profitability of swaps and options that the traders and other 
market participants are trading are based upon market fundamentals, such as 
storage, transmission constraints and demand and supply levels available in the 
relevant markets.   
3.3.2.3.6.6.  Manipulative Trading  
In cross-market manipulation, the perpetrators seek to exploit pricing relations 
between price making and price taking positions. In all the scenarios above, a 
legitimate trading or hedging activity involves an economic risk related to price 
changes in the relevant markets. The market participants either seek protection from 
economic losses or try to profit from price changes associated with market 
fundamentals. In cross-market manipulation, the perpetrators employ trading 
schemes that are specifically aimed at affecting the price making positions in favour 
of the positions held at the price taking level, creating a ‘win-win’ situation701. In these 
positions, the perpetrators, in fact, do not bet at all, based on their predictions on 
price movements. Instead, they directly intervene in the determination of prices 
moved up and down pursuant to the perpetrators’ price taking positions.  
The perpetration of cross-market manipulation cannot be exclusively defined as a 
type of market activity, which directly results in artificial increases in market prices. It 
rather requires a combination of market activities that are specifically designed and 
utilised in furtherance of price movements directed pursuant to price taking financial 
positons. As the case law on cross-market manipulation suggests, the perpetrators 
are often involved in large scale trading activities, accumulating a market position, 
such as engaging in large buy or sell orders, that gives them the ability to move 
prices up or down pursuant to their price taking swap and options contracts. Once 
                                                          
700 Energy Primer, (2015), 109 
701 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,086 (2007), 4 
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these large positions are acquired, the perpetrators exercise a trading strategy 
designed to create a price movement that will be accepted and followed by other 
market participants trading in the same market. It is important to note that the 
accumulation and exercise of such market positions and trading strategies are not 
alone regarded to be manipulative702. Such practices can be held manipulative only if 
it is shown that it is the perpetrators’ intent, in designing and exercising such trading 
strategies, to reap profits from their price taking positions through exploiting their 
price relations with market activities in price making instruments. 
3.3.2.3.6.7. Behaviour that Affects Prices 
3.3.2.3.6.7.1. Scale of trading 
In order to exert pressure on the settlement and index prices which are calculated 
based upon the volume-weighted average price of all fixed-price or physical basis 
transactions, the perpetrators have to engage in large scale trading activities 
accounting for a significant proportion of all volumes transacted in the relevant 
pricing making market.  While higher market shares can correlate with increases in 
prices on the buying side, they can also correlate with price decreases when 
transacted on the selling side703. For example, in Energy Transfer Partners, in which 
the defendants were found to be suppressing prices to benefit from their financial 
position, the defendants’ sales of fixed price gas contracts to delivered at HSC 
accounted for 80% of total sales transacted during the relevant period 704 . By 
dominating the trading of next month fixed price natural gas on the selling side, the 
defendants were able to create a downward pressure on market prices. Again in 
Barclays, the defendants’ selling and buying activities designed to move daily fixed 
price electricity prices up and down constituted 24 per cent of the total daily fixed 
price electricity trading during the relevant periods diverging from ten per cent to 58 
per cent705.  
Even though the levels of market liquidity is an important factor for the perpetrators’ 
accumulation of large market positions, market manipulation can happen in both 
illiquid and heavily traded markets. In DiPlacido, the NYMEX futures in the COB and 
                                                          
702 In re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
21,796 (CFTC 1982) 
703 CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., et. al., 523 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), 45 
704 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,086 (2007), 3 
705 Barclays Bank PLC, Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, et al., 141 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2012), 4 
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PV were considered illiquid on the basis of low volume and open interest as well as a 
wide bid-ask spread demonstrated during the relevant trading period706. This was 
also supported by other experienced floor brokers and traders who noted that an 
order of 25-30 contracts was large enough to dictate prices. FERC found that the 
defendants’ trading activity accounted for more than 50 per cent of the total trading 
activity on the buying side of the market707. In TGPNA, however, the defendants 
manipulated the price of natural gas at four of the most heavily traded markets 
(SoCal, Waha, Permian, San Juan) in the south western United States over a period 
of three years. In this case, the defendants’ trading constituted 80 per cent of total 
volume of fixed price trading at SoCal, and even reached 100 per cent market share 
in Waha, meaning that the defendants were part of every single contract to be 
delivered at Waha traded on the ICE708.   
Even though the legal analysis developed through case law does not stipulate a 
demonstration of a traditional, antitrust concept of market power in furtherance of a 
manipulative activity, FERC included the calculation of market shares that the 
perpetrators held with respect to the total volume-based trading activity in relevant 
periods and trading locations. These concentrated trading activities create upward or 
downward price movements by conferring to defendants a transitory but substantial 
market power, signalling other market participants with respect to market trends 
boosting price effects709, and engaging in an explicit or tacit collusion with other 
traders recognising and participating in the manipulative scheme710.In BP America 
Inc. in which one of the defendants was a vertically integrated company, owning 
assets in both trading and transmission of natural gas markets, the perpetrators also 
allocated all capacity of their transmission pipelines, HPL, to boost their trading 
activity and market power711. The CFTC and FERC have consistently concluded that 
                                                          
706 In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,970 (CFTC 2008), 5 
707 In re Avista Energy, Inc. and Michael T. Griswold, CFTC Docket No.: 01-21, 2001 WL 951736 (CFTC 2001), 5 
708 In the matter of Total Gas & Power North America, Inc., and Therese Tran, CFTC Docket No. 16 -03 (CFTC 
2015), 42 
709 “Causation of artificial prices is established when it is demonstrated the artificial market prices resulted from 
the conduct of a trader, or group of traders acting in concert, rather than the legitimate forces of supply and 
demand”. See In re Avista Energy, Inc. and Michael T. Griswold, CFTC Docket No.: 01-21, 2001 WL 951736 
(CFTC 2001), 5, citing Cargil v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); In re 
Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796 
(CFTC 1982)  
710 CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., et. al., 523 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), 33 
711 BP America Inc., BP Corporation North America et al., 144 FERC ¶ 61,100 (2013), 23 
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identifying market power is not a requirement under the enforcement of anti-
manipulation rules712. However the case law on cross-market manipulation clearly 
suggests that the perpetrators’ acquisition of large buy and sell orders and 
engagement in concentrated trading activity constitute important elements in 
establishing the relation between the perpetrators’ trading scheme and price 
movements in the relevant markets.    
3.3.2.3.6.7.2. Timing of trading 
The case law provided above also illustrates that strategic timing of concentrated 
high trading activities engaged in by the perpetrators is another important factor to 
promote price movements in the relevant trading locations. For example, in BP 
America Inc., the perpetrators specifically developed an early and heavy trading 
activity during the trading sessions713 to induce other market participants to enact 
transactions in such a way to steer the market in their preferred direction. In 
DiPlacido, the defendants orchestrated their trading strategy to take place in ‘the 
Close’; last two minutes of options expiration days in each month, which began at 
3:23 pm and ended at 3:25 pm714. In Energy Transfer Partners, the perpetrators 
again concentrated their trading activity in the last-half hour of the closing day for 
monthly natural gas trading in the NYMEX to amplify their downward pressure on 
prices at HSC715. In the majority of regulated exchanges and the OTC markets, 
prices of energy products are determined during a specific balancing period such as 
closing sessions in daily and bidweeks in monthly markets and the perpetrators 
usually accumulate and exercise their large price making positions in these narrow 
and concentrated trading periods. Therefore the timing of trading activities is 
important in cross-market manipulation. 
 
 
                                                          
712 Supra note 564  
713“ICE next-day, fixed-price gas trading begins when the first trade is consummated. In 2008, physical gas 
trading at HSC typically began between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m. ET. On most days, there was consistent trading 
volume between 8:30 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. Trading would typically slow by 10:00 a.m. and was usually finished 
by 11:00 a.m”. see; BP America Inc., BP Corporation North America et al., 144 FERC ¶ 61,100 (2013), footnote 
107 
714 In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,970 (CFTC 2008), 52 
715 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,086 (2007), 5 
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3.3.2.3.6.8. Intent 
FERC established that the acquisition of market power and early and heavy trading 
activities during certain trade periods are not enough to hold a market participant 
liable for violating anti-manipulation rules. Market participants can engage in these 
practices and cause upward or downward price movements without a clear 
manipulative intent. In certain market conditions, such as shortages, transmission 
constraints, or outages in production, market participants can acquire market power 
based on illiquidity and cause price increases in the relevant markets716. Accordingly, 
in order to assess manipulative intent, the case law evaluates whether the market 
power or large positions in markets are created as a result of the perpetrators’ intent 
to move prices artificially. In so doing, the regulatory agencies, the CFTC and FERC 
seek to identify the nature of the defendants’ activity, analysing whether the 
defendant would engage in a similar price making activity without holding financial 
positions and whether the market practices would be economic without the profits 
derived from financial positions. If the regulatory agencies find that the relevant 
market practices are uneconomic without financial benefits, then the defendants are 
considered to be in the sphere of anti-manipulation provisions and can be held liable 
for the violation of cross-market manipulation. 
The case law provided above clearly promulgates that the uneconomic nature of the 
perpetrators’ trading activities is a fundamental factor in establishing their 
manipulative intent. In Energy Transfer Partners, FERC identified that the defendants’ 
transaction selling and buying back the similar volumes of fixed price daily gas at 
Waha on December 23 and 28 were uneconomic as they had no legitimate reasons 
to transact such loss-making trades, but for an intent to suppress market prices717. In 
DiPlacido, the CFTC also found that the defendants’ selling of electricity futures 
contracts was manipulative, since the instructions delivered to the brokers on the 
NYMEX floor, from the defendants were to sell the contracts at as low a price as 
                                                          
716 In In re Indiana Farm Bureau, aware of the tight supply in the grains market as a result of demand pressures 
from the Soviet Union, the defendants caused a dramatic price increase by standing for delivery. The CFTC 
concluded that the market conditions that caused the tight supply in the grains market were not a result of a 
market practice engaged in by the defendants and thus there was no causation between price increases and 
the defendants’ conduct. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796 (CFTC 1982), 25 
717 Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,086 (2007), 4 
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possible to secure a certain settlement price718. In Barclays, the defendants were 
found to be eager to incur losses in relation to their fixed-price physical trading to 
move the index prices in a direction benefiting their related financial positions719. In 
BP America Inc. FERC again identified that the defendants preferred to lose money 
on their next-day, fixed-price physical trading at HSC, even though more profitable 
alternatives were present720. In Amaranth, the defendants’ trading activities in NG 
Futures Contracts are considered self-defeating without the benefits from opposing 
large financial and physical positions721.   
It is important to note that the legal analysis developed under cross-market 
manipulation is not designed to punish any market participant that engages in trades 
that can be considered uneconomic compared to alternative trading practices. It is 
reasonable to expect market participants to incur losses from their trading activities 
and they can seek hedging mechanisms to eliminate or minimise such losses which 
are associated with the financial risks taken. In order to separate manipulative 
uneconomic trading activity from legitimate market practices that produce financial 
losses, the regulatory agencies seek a consistent pattern of trading activity722 that 
proceeds for a certain period of time. Accordingly, taking into account the large 
positions held and strategic trading activities employed, the CFTC and FERC will find 
the perpetrators liable for cross-market manipulation, once they engage in 
uneconomic trading activity in a consistent pattern and the losses incurred in price 
making positions clearly correlates with the benefits derived from price taking 
positions.  
3.3.2.4. Congestion-Related Manipulation 
Electricity and natural gas markets are network-bound industries meaning that 
transmission of energy products from suppliers to consumers requires a capacity-
restricted fixed infrastructure. The system of fixed infrastructure operates as nodes, 
which involve two points; a source, where energy is injected to the system and a sink 
where it is delivered to load. Each supplier of energy is also required to book the 
                                                          
718 In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,970 (CFTC 2008), 48 
719 Barclays Bank PLC, Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, et al., 141 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2012), 34 
720 BP America Inc., BP Corporation North America et al., 144 FERC ¶ 61,100 (2013), 39 
721 CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., et. al., 523 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), 33 
722 In the matter of Total Gas & Power North America, Inc., and Therese Tran, CFTC Docket No. 16 -03 (CFTC 
2015), 68 
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necessary capacity equivalent to its contractual obligations. Pricing of energy differs 
in each node due to changes at congestion levels, exposing the supplier to different 
price risks associated with the functioning of the transmission system. The market for 
supply and transmission of energy products is orchestrated and monitored by a 
transmission system operator, which is required to ensure that demand and supply 
levels available in the market are balanced.  
In order to mitigate the financial risks arising from congestion occurring in the 
transmission system and balance the levels between supply and demand required 
for system integrity, transmission system operators issue “Financial Transmission 
Rights” (the FTRs) which allow their holders to claim financial compensation when a 
difference occurs between prices in the source and the sink as a result of congestion 
in the transmission system 723 . Congestion occurs when the amount of energy 
demanded exceeds the capacity available in the transmission lines. Such a condition 
causes energy prices to decrease at source and increase at the sink, resulting in 
financial risks for traders required to book the capacity necessary to execute buying 
and selling orders. The FTRs are established to mitigate these financial risks and 
allow their holders to receive payments from transmission system operators, when 
congestion occurs at a specific node with which the FTRs are associated. 
Transmission system operators mostly operate a dual market system consisting of 
Day-Ahead Markets (DAMs) designed to fulfil supply obligations and Real-Time 
Markets (RTMs) established to balance system conditions diverging from that of the 
DAMs. Demand for and supply of energy products in these markets differ. The 
majority of energy demand is supplied in the DAMs. In these markets, the 
transmission system operators collect and match bids and offers for energy products. 
Any divergence from these bids and offers scheduled in the DAMs is balanced with a 
separate auction market in the RTMs in which transmission system operators again 
collect and match bids and offers submitted by the market participants. The 
establishment of these two different supply markets with different demand and supply 
purposes creates two different pricing mechanisms for market participants.  
                                                          
723 William W. Hogan, ‘Electricity Market Design; Financial Transmission Rights, Up To Congestion Transactions 
and Multi-Settlement Systems’, (July 16, 2012) 3 
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The dual pricing system also provides market participants mechanisms to balance 
their supply requirements and arbitrage price differences between the DAMs and the 
RTMs724. Accordingly a market participant who predicts that the price for an energy 
product for a specific hour in the DAMs will be higher than its price in RTMs, can 
place bids and offers to sell an amount of energy in the DAMs and buy the equivalent 
amount of energy in the RTMs, receiving payments in the former while paying in the 
latter. These types of market trading activities are called ‘Virtual Trading’ and are 
very common in energy markets. Through virtual trading, market participants make 
profits as their revenues in the DAMs are higher than the payments made in the 
RTMs. Market participants can place both virtual supply bids (incremental bids) 
meaning that they submit an offer to sell a certain amount of energy at a certain price 
and virtual demand bids (decremental bids) in which they submit an offer to buy a 
certain amount of energy at a certain price725. 
Even though the physical volume traded in these virtual trading strategies is zero, 
each virtual trade creates effects on price and congestion levels. Economically, a 
virtual supply bid tends to decrease relevant energy prices, while a virtual demand 
bid does the opposite 726 . Transmission system operators require each market 
participant to book transmission capacity corresponding to the amount provided 
under the virtual trades for the integrity of transmission. Congestion-related 
manipulative practices involve market participants aiming at reaping profits from their 
positions in FTRs by engaging in virtual trading activities. Accordingly a perpetrator 
who wishes to make profits by artificially affecting congestion levels via virtual trading 
to increase the value of its FTRs engages in an illegitimate trading activity and 
violates anti-manipulation provisions.  The chapter presents two cases in which the 
defendants were alleged to be in violation of anti-manipulation rules due to their 
activities in virtual and FTRs trading.  
3.3.2.4.1.  Constellation Energy Commodities Group, Inc.727 
In 2008, FERC’s office of enforcement initiated an investigation into the Constellation 
Energy Commodities Group (CCG) which was active in physical power trading in and 
                                                          
724 Energy Primer, (2015), 51 
725 Shaun Ledgerwood & Johannes P. Pfeifenberger, (2012) 7 
726 Energy Primer, (2015), 64  
727 Coaltrain Energy, L.P., et al., 154 FERC ¶ 61,002 (2016) 
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around the New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) control area, on the 
grounds that from October 1 to November 18, 2008, the CCG’s virtual bids departed 
significantly from legitimate trading activities creating an unwarranted difference 
between DAMs and RTMs for the benefits derived from its contract for different (CFD) 
positions, which consisted of financial swaps, transmission congestion contracts and 
FTRs728. The profitability of the CFD positions depended on a price divergence 
between the NYISO’s DAMs and RTMs. Accordingly, the CCG sought to decrease 
prices in the DAMs by engaging in virtual supply contracts to increase the value of its 
CFD positions729. Each virtual supply bid submitted by the CCG established a market 
assumption that the available electricity in the DAMs are more than enough to supply 
demand in the market, creating a downward pressure on prices. However, as the 
CCG was also required to book necessary capacity reservations corresponding to 
the amount of electricity contracted in the virtual supply bids, the congestion levels at 
the transmission system increased resulting in an increase in the value of FTRs 
associated with the congested transmission lines730. The supply bids submitted in the 
DAMs were later offset by the equivalent virtual demand bids in the RTMs. 
The CCG also engaged in virtual demand bids in the DAMs market, where it was 
buying the CFD positions. The CCG’s virtual demand bids created a market picture 
showing that there was a greater demand for electricity in the market to the extent 
that available production levels were not enough to meet it. The higher demand 
levels created by the virtual demand bids increased market prices in the DAMs and 
decreased the value of the CFD positions allowing the CCG to buy the CFD positions 
at depressed prices. By buying at low and selling at high prices, the CCG derived 
substantial profits from its CFD trading731.  
FERC found that the perpetrator’s trading of CFD was manipulative as it significantly 
departed from legitimate virtual trading activities732. Economically, a virtual trading 
activity is profitable as long as the price difference between the DAMs and the RTMs 
remains. The CCG, however, continued to place virtual supply and demand bids to 
the point that the relevant trading activity was no longer profitable and was in fact, 
                                                          
728 Ibid., 1 
729 Ibid., 3 
730 Ibid., 4 
731 Ibid., 
732 Ibid., 5 
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loss-incurring. FERC identified that in carrying out the virtual bidding strategies, the 
perpetrator was indifferent to the price levels in the DAMs and the RTMs and 
engaged in these loss-incurring practices in a consistent pattern. The CCG’s trading 
of virtual bids were only profitable when the benefits from its trading of CFD positions 
were taken into account.   
3.3.2.4.2. Louis Dreyfus Energy Services L.P. 733    
As in Constellation, this case also involved a manipulation claim on the basis that 
Louis Dreyfus Energy Services L.P. (LDES) engaged in virtual supply (incremental) 
and virtual demand (decremental) bids for the benefit of the FTR positions held in 
one of the nodes, Velva in North Dakota, integrated in MISO’s control area, from 
November 2009 to February 2010 734 . The LDES’s virtual trading activities were 
uneconomic producing $390,353 financial losses at Velva during the relevant 
period735 . However the benefits derived from FTR positions related to the price 
changes and congestion levels created by the virtual supply and demand trades 
exceeded $3,344,000. FERC found that the LDES’s trading pattern of virtual bids in 
DAMs and RTMs were manipulative and violated its anti-manipulation rule736. 
3.3.2.4.3. Evaluation 
The fact that the virtual trades imposed no delivery obligations on parties did not 
result in a conclusion that these instruments were purely financial with no impact on 
physical markets. On the contrary, as long as they are large enough, they can 
directly affect price differences between DAMs and RTMs. The main reason why 
these types of market activities are allowed under energy market rules is that they 
play a central role in converging price differences between DAMs and RTMs737. 
While each virtual demand bidding in the DAMs creates an upwards price pressure, 
the corresponding virtual supply bidding in the RTMs pushes market prices down. In 
a heavily traded market these virtual trades result in similar prices for energy on both 
side of the markets and provide a single price. In other words, each virtual trading 
                                                          
733 MISO Virtual and FTR Trading, 146 FERC ¶ 61,072 (2014) 
734 Ibid., 3 
735 Ibid., 4 
736 Ibid.,  
737 Shaun Ledgerwood & Johannes P. Pfeifenberger, (2012), 9-11  
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activity which is based on price differences between the DAMs and the RTMs 
undermines its further profitability by causing the convergence of these prices.  
Price effects are not the only impact that virtual trades have on physical trading of 
energy products. These trading activities can also cause artificial congestion or 
aggregate existing congestion levels. In both Constellation and Louis Dreyfus, the 
perpetrators sought to create artificial congestion at specific nodes to benefit from 
their FTRs and other congestion-related financial positions. The price relations 
between virtual trades and the FTRs are analogous to the interplay between price 
making and price-taking positions under cross-market manipulation. In both schemes, 
market participants seek to exploit price relations between two different but 
interlinked markets through engaging in uneconomic and large scale trading. The 
FTRs and other financial products can be used as legitimate hedging or investment 
strategies that provide effective risk management and profit-maximising tools for 
market participants.   
The chapter includes congestion-related market manipulation separately from cross-
market manipulation, since the FTRs, the main financial positions the perpetrators 
seek to derive profit from, are different from other financial positions like swaps and 
options. They are peculiar to energy markets while swaps and options are heavily 
traded across several financial markets from securities to different types of 
commodities markets such as agriculture, metals and others. The number of the 
FTRs available in each node is limited to the node’s physical constraints. The 
transmission system operators issue the FTRs on the basis of a simultaneous 
feasibility test and establish a certain threshold which limits the scale of positions 
market participants can acquire and hold. However such a threshold is not present in 
the trading of other financial contracts. Market participants can continue to enter into 
these financial instruments as long as a counterparty willing to transact is present. 
The availability of financial instruments provides the perpetrators a broader spectrum 
in establishing price-making and price-taking positions in cross-market manipulation. 
Therefore congestion-related manipulation which is peculiar to energy markets and 
limited to transmission constraints is addressed separately from cross-market 
manipulation.  
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3.3.3. Outright Fraud 
3.3.3.1. Overview 
The concept of outright fraud is different from other open market transactions such 
as market power and trade-based manipulation. As mentioned above, US federal 
courts, with respect to the application of the CFTC’s rule Section 4(c), in Sudheimer 
and Radley, differentiated manipulative practices as open and closed market 
transactions 738 . While the former relates to manipulation through actual market 
transactions with actual parties and economic risks, such as market power and trade-
based manipulation, the latter involves fictitious and wash trades that do not have 
any material effect on markets. The underlying factor in a market power manipulation 
is the perpetrators’ accumulation of market power to trigger market manipulation. In 
trade-based manipulative schemes, the perpetrators can engage in various 
transactions that can either be fraudulent, triggering manipulation through distorting 
other market participants’ perception of market fundamentals, or non-fraudulent, 
manipulating markets or prices without imposing a deception on market participants. 
In outright fraud, market participants can engage in market manipulation by either 
providing false information to the market or by the omission of material information739. 
In energy markets, the Deutsche Bank case illustrates a clear example of outright 
fraud as a market practice triggering market manipulation.  
3.3.3.2. Deutsche Bank Energy Trading, LLC740 
FERC alleged that the defendant, Deutsche Bank Energy Trading LLC, violated its 
anti-manipulation rule Section 1c.2 by submitting false information with respect to its 
activities at 17 MW Silver Peak intertie in CAISO from January, 2010 to March, 2010 
to profit from its positions in Congestion Revenue Rights (CRRs) which are financial 
transmission rights issued and auctioned by the CAISO741. The defendant engaged 
in consecutive scheduling practices exporting electricity through Silver Peak intertie 
and importing the equivalent amount at Summit742. The defendant entered into this 
export and import scheduling as wheeling-through transactions, meaning that the 
defendant was using the CAISO’s grid just for transit purposes and electricity flowing 
                                                          
738 Supra note 180  
739 Gary Taylor, et al., (2015)    
740 Deutsche Bank Energy Trading, L.L.C., 140 FERC ¶ 61,178 (2012) 
741 Ibid., 1 
742 Ibid., 2 
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through Silver Peak and Summit was not injected into the transmission system to 
serve a load inside the CAISO743. The defendant continued to schedule exports at 
Silver Peak and imports at Summit, conveying false information to the market that it 
used the CAISO’s transmission grid to transport electricity that was produced and 
delivered outside the CAISO. However, it was revealed that the defendant also 
scheduled exports and imports on the Sierra Pacific Power (SPPC) system outside 
the CAISO corresponding to its schedules at Silver Peak and Summit744.  
Capacity schedules between the CAISO and the SPPC created a circular scheduling 
mechanism between Silver Peak and Summit. FERC identified that the defendant’s 
wheeling through transactions, in fact, involved no physical flow of electricity across 
the transmission lines and created an artificial congestion that increased the value of 
CRRs related to the congestion levels at the Silver Peak intertie. In its scheduling 
practice across the Silver Peak and the Summit, the defendant incurred economic 
losses from capacity reservations, paying significant amount of transmission costs for 
electricity flow that had never occurred. The sole purpose of the defendant engaging 
in the circular scheduling was to render its CRRs profitable as the capacity 
reservations transacted for the purpose of electricity flow were uneconomic and self-
defeating. Accordingly, FERC concluded that the defendant’s circular scheduling 
activity was manipulative. 
3.3.3.3. Evaluation 
Deutsche Bank provides a clear example of how a market participant can engage in 
manipulation without involving real parties and real economic risks. The defendant 
employed its strategy to profit from its CRRs which were based on the congestion 
levels at the Silver Peak intertie. The act of circular scheduling 745  between the 
CAISO and the SPPC operated as a fraud on market participants, disseminating 
false information that the defendant, through wheeling-though agreements, was 
transmitting electricity by using the Silver Peak and the Summit to supply a load 
outside the CAISO’s transmission grid. In fact the defendant engaged in no buying or 
selling with respect to the amount of electricity scheduled to the CAISO and injected 
                                                          
743 Ibid., 3 
744 Ibid.,  
745 For practices of circular scheduling in the ‘Great Western Energy Crisis of 2001’, see;  Gary Taylor, et al., 
(2015), 165 
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no power into these transmission lines. The transmission costs required for the 
scheduling were not deterrent as the revenues from its CRRs positions outweighed 
the financial losses.  
The defendant’s manipulative strategy in Deutsche Bank is very similar to the market 
practices discussed under the congestion-related market manipulation. Both types of 
market manipulation involve schemes that aim at creating artificial congestion levels 
at targeted transmission lines and collecting revenues from positions held in FTRs 
markets. However, it is important to note that congestion-related market manipulation 
is a trade-based manipulation and consists of virtual demand and supply bids which 
perpetrators place in order to affect congestion levels. These trades contain real 
trades and economic risks. Under congestion-related manipulation, a perpetrator can 
realise its manipulative scheme, only if its bids and offers are awarded by the system 
operator in the DAMs or matched in the RTMs by other market participants. These 
manipulative strategies have physical effects on other market participants with whom 
the perpetrators transact as part of their manipulative strategy. The collective effects 
of virtual demand and supply bids were zero on the physical supply in the market as 
these bids balanced each other in the RTMs. In Deutsche Bank, the defendant 
engaged in no physical transactions that affected other market participants’ physical 
position in the electricity supply. Therefore, they were addressed separately from 
other trade-based congestion-related manipulative practices. 
3.4. Conclusion  
3.4.1. Jurisdictional Dimensions 
Traditionally, the SEC and the CFTC have been the major regulatory agencies that 
have intensively applied and enforced their anti-manipulation rules to securities and 
commodities markets under their jurisdiction. While the SEC adopts a fraud-based 
formulation of market manipulation, the CFTC, before the adoption of the Dodd-
Frank, used an artificial price-based definition which stipulated the determination of 
price artificiality as a result of manipulative activity. Case law developed under the  
SEC’s fraud-based provision and the SEC’s experience in enforcing anti-
manipulation rules against perpetrators resulted in other regulatory agencies, such 
as FERC746 and the FTC747, to adopt identical anti-manipulation rules with a specific 
                                                          
746 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 314, 1284 
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referral to the SEC’s precedent on manipulative practices. The artificial price 
standard, however, has proved to be difficult for the CFTC to implement. It was not 
until DiPlacido, 2008 that the CFTC had successfully prosecuted a market participant 
for market manipulation748. Eventually, the CFTC followed in the footsteps of FERC 
and the FTC and adopted a fraud-based market manipulation provision after Dodd-
Frank.  
The CFTC developed several strategies to overcome the difficulties originating from 
its artificial price-based provision. Accordingly it started using the CEA’s Section 4(c) 
that prohibits wash trades, accommodation trades and other fictitious trades in a 
manner to deal with all types of manipulative activities, similar to the SEC’s 
application of its fraud-based formulation. This strategy failed in US v. Radley, et al. 
in which the CFTC tried to show the defendants’ cornering of TET propane futures 
contracts as a type of fraud and therefore violating its anti-manipulation provisions749. 
The court noted that the CFTC had failed to show that the defendants engaged in 
activities that deceived other market participants’ perception of legitimate forces of 
demand and supply and a mere concealment of buying large positions to corner 
markets was not sufficient to find that the defendants’ cornering activity was 
fraudulent750. In other words, a fraud-based market manipulation claim did not suffice 
to prosecute a market power manipulation or other activity that does not inherently 
operate as a deception or fraud over other market participants.  
Such a differentiation between fraud and other types of market manipulation has not 
been present in the SEC’s case law. This issue was specifically addressed in SEC v 
Masri751 in which the court identified the issue as whether the SEA’s fraud-based rule 
Section 10b-5 which has traditionally been applied to fictitious trades with no rational 
purpose and specifically intended to create false impressions in markets was also 
applicable to open market transactions through which perpetrators can manipulate 
markets and prices by entering into aggressive short selling or large purchases 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
747 According to Section 811 of the Energy Independence and Security of 2007 which granted the FTC to 
impose penalties for the manipulation of crude oil, gasoline or petroleum distillates; “(i)t is unlawful for any 
person, directly or indirectly, to use or employ (…) any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
(…)”.Energy Independence and Security of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 § 811, 121 Stat. 1723 (2007)   
748 Supra note 519 
749 Supra note 347 
750 Ibid., 18 
751 SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
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rather than merely disseminating false information. Applying a legal standard known 
as ‘sole intent’ standard’ the court found that the concept of fraud under the Section 
10(b) was also applicable to open market transactions, as long as they are 
perpetrated with manipulative intent to affect prices of securities 752. Accordingly, with 
respect to the manipulation of prices through open market transactions, the SEA’s 
fraud-based rule §10b-5 does not require the SEC to establish that perpetrators’ 
trading activity involves fictitious trades or disseminating false information to create 
false impression. Instead, the court concluded that proving that the defendant would 
not have conducted the transaction but for the manipulative intent is sufficient to 
impose liability for market manipulation.  
3.4.2. Fraud-Based v Artificial Price-Based Definitions 
Traditionally, for a market activity to be in violation of SEA’s rule Section 10b-5, the 
SEC was required to show that: (i) a fraudulent or deceptive device, scheme or 
statement was utilized; (ii) such a device, scheme, or statement was in relation to the 
sale or purchase of a product in the stock market; and (iii) the perpetrator of the 
device, scheme or statement acted with a requisite intent753. The court’s ruling in 
SEC v Masri changed this traditional legal framework, when it was applied to 
manipulative practices other than those amounting to fraud or deception within the 
meaning of the first element. Accordingly the establishment of manipulative intent on 
the basis of the ‘but for’ test is enough for an open market transaction, such as 
market power and cross-market manipulation to be prosecuted under SEA’s rule 
Section 10(b). 
According to the artificial price based formulation of the CEA, in order to impose 
liability for market manipulation, the CFTC has to prove that (i) the perpetrator had 
the ability to influence market prices; (ii) the perpetrator specifically intended to 
create or effect a price or price trend that does not reflect legitimate forces of supply 
and demand; (iii) artificial prices existed; and (iv) the perpetrator caused the artificial 
prices754. The legal framework developed under the artificial price test does not 
differentiate between fraud and non-fraud market practices. It is important to note 
                                                          
752 Ibid. See also; Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.2001) (‘manipulation’ can be illegal solely 
because of the actor’s purpose”). 
753 17 C.F.R.  § 240.10b-5 (2011) 
754 Supra note 367  
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that the CEA also adopted Section 4(c) prescribing wash trades, fictitious trades and 
accommodation trades and can be regarded as equivalent to the SEA’s rule Section 
10b-5. This results in the application of the artificial price test limited to the non-fraud, 
open market transactions, excluding frauds such as wash trade and fictitious trades 
which are dealt with under Section 4(c). However, the SEC’s application of the rule 
Section 10(b) to an open market transaction on the basis of the sole intent standard 
gives rise to concerns on the conformity of legal standards adopted by these two 
regulatory agencies in prosecuting manipulative practices. 
While the establishment of price artificiality and causation between the perpetrators’ 
conduct and artificial prices have been the main obstacles to a successful 
prosecution of manipulative practices by the CFTC, the sole intent standard on the 
basis of the ‘but for’ test applied in SEC v Masri to a market power manipulation 
provides the SEC a regulatory flexibility in prosecuting open market transactions. The 
sole intent standard is not acknowledged by FERC. Even though its anti-
manipulation rule is identical to the SEC’s rule Section 10(b), FERC specifically 
noted in TGPNA, that it did not adopt a ‘but for’ test in addressing open market 
transactions755. As previously mentioned, FERC’s definition of fraud encompasses all 
types of market conduct that distort well-functioning of energy markets 756 , 
irrespective of whether they are open market transactions or fictitious trades with no 
actual economic risks or rational purpose.  
After the enactment of Dodd-Frank, which conferred a fraud-based formulation of 
market manipulation on the CFTC based on the SEC’s rule §10(b), the CFTC no 
longer referred to the ‘but for’ test. Instead, in Regulation 180.2, it retained the 
traditional artificial price-based prohibition to deal with market practices that it 
deemed non-fraudulent in character, while referring to the new fraud-based 
formulation for fraudulent market practices. However, in TGPNA 757 , the CFTC 
applied its fraud-based prohibition, Regulation 180.1, to an open market transaction, 
to which it had previously applied its artificial price-based prohibition. It can be 
argued that rather than the SEC’s ‘but for’ test, the CFTC chose to apply FERC’s 
approach identifying all types of market practices that distort the well-functioning of 
                                                          
755 Total Gas & Power North America Inc., et al., 155 FERC ¶61,105 (2016) 
756 Coaltrain Energy, L.P., et al., 154 FERC ¶ 61,002 (2016), 100 
757 In the matter of Total Gas & Power North America, Inc., and Therese Tran, CFTC Docket No. 16 -03 (CFTC 
2015) 
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energy markets as fraudulent. This conclusion gives rise to questions of why the 
CFTC retained and on what occasions it can apply its artificial price-based rule, while 
it chose to prosecute all types of market manipulation under a single fraud-based 
prohibition. The inconformity in the formulation and the application of anti-
manipulation rules along with the concurrent regulation of multiple authorities causes 
further ambiguities for energy markets, which require particular attention by the 
CFTC and FERC during the regulatory proceedings initiated in accordance with the 
MoU. 
The definitions provided by the anti-manipulation rules adopted by the SEC, FERC 
and the CFTC give no guidance as to what types of market practices give rise to 
manipulation concerns or which factors can be regarded as relevant in identifying the 
illegitimacy of any market conduct. The absence of a clear legal framework that 
specifically separates manipulative conduct from legitimate trading practices has 
often been regarded as an approach called “I know it when I see it”758 which implies 
adopting ex-post enforcement mechanisms rather than precautionary measures. 
Criticising this vague “I know it when I see it” approach759, the academic literature 
has developed several alternative definitions that seek to identify what market 
manipulation is760. Both the traditional approach developed under case law and the 
alternative frameworks offered in the academic literature focus on the nature of the 
price making market activities, the activities that the perpetrators design to 
accomplish a certain market outcome that is valuable for their positions in markets. 
Therefore they constitute nothing more than a restatement or reconceptualisation of 
the legal analysis carried out by the courts in prosecuting manipulative practices 
throughout case law.  
3.4.3. Demarcation of Manipulative Practices  
The chapter does not undertake to provide an alternative definition for market 
manipulation. Rather it seeks to identify the characteristics of practices in US energy 
markets that were deemed to be manipulative under US case law. The legal 
approach, focusing on the characteristics of price making activities, provides only a 
                                                          
758 Supra note 334 
759 Shaun Ledgerwood, et. al., ‘Defining Market Manipulation in a Post-REMIT World’ (2011) The Brattle Group 
Discussion Paper, 2; Jerry Markham, (2015), 211  
760 Emilios E. Avgouleas, (2005), 114; Shaun D. Ledgerwood & Paul R. Carpenter, (2012); Craig Pirrong, (2010), 
14-15  
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differentiation between fraudulent and trade-based practices which has also proved 
to be problematic from a regulatory point of view as it fell victim to diverging 
definitions from different regulatory agencies. In this regard, the chapter also takes 
into account the price taking positions that the perpetrators seek to exploit and 
substantially affect the nature and formulation of manipulative practices. In so doing, 
the chapter provides a demarcation of US case law on energy market manipulation 
by first, adopting the traditional differentiation between market power and trade-
based manipulation as well as fraud and second, providing additional classifications 
based upon the positions that the perpetrators seek to profit from. Such an additional 
differentiation reveals the impact of price taking positions on the perpetration of 
manipulative practices. 
Accordingly, the chapter provides three different types of market manipulation in 
energy markets: (i) market power manipulation; (ii) trade-based manipulation; (iii) 
outright fraud. This differentiation is based on the traditional approach developed by 
case law on market manipulation. While market power manipulation was a feature of 
commodity markets which had been under the jurisdiction of the CFTC761, fraudulent 
practices such as wash trades, matched orders762, and pump and dump763 schemes  
were addressed by the SEC under its rule Section 10b-5764.  
3.4.3.1. Market Power Manipulation 
The chapter identifies that the cases in which perpetrators engaged in market power 
manipulation involved petroleum products rather than electricity and natural gas. 
There are physical characteristics that render such products not susceptible to 
market power manipulation. It is not feasible for the perpetrators to hold substantial 
amounts of deliverable supply available in the market for these products. While 
electricity cannot be physically stored in great quantities, storage of natural gas 
generally functions for balancing purposes rather than for long-term usage. Therefore 
the cases in which the perpetrators manipulated prices through using market power 
involved petroleum products such as crude oil and heating oil, which require 
                                                          
761 Craig Pirrong, (1994), 947 
762 Manipulation is a ‘term’ that “refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged 
prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.” See; Santa Fe Indus. Inc. 
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). See also; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).  
763 See; SEC v. Cavanagh, et al., 98 Civ. 1818 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
764 17 C.F.R.  § 240.10b-5 (2011) 
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relatively low capital intensive investments for storage and transportation. For 
outright fraud, the chapter provides Deutsche Bank in which the defendant engaged 
in circular scheduling practice as an example of how market participants can 
manipulate energy markets through fictitious trades. There are numerous ways 
through which market participants can manipulate prices, such as disseminating 
false information in markets or false reporting to indexes, which operate as fraud and 
deception over other market players. The underlying factor that the chapter deems 
important for the determination of such practices as a different type of market 
manipulation is the fact that they involve no actual trades or real economic risks, in 
contrast to open market transactions.  
3.4.3.2. Trade-Based Manipulation 
3.4.3.2.1. Overview 
The classification of trade-based market manipulation as a different type is relatively 
new due to the difficulties faced by the CFTC in bringing anti-manipulation claims 
against market participants without market power and has been contentious in the 
academic literature. While some commentators address trade-based manipulation 
under market power manipulation765, others consider it as a distinct market practice 
differentiating it from market power manipulation and outright fraud 766 . Some 
commentators even recommend the regulatory agencies to refrain from prohibiting 
trade-based manipulation due to the difficulties in separating legitimate market 
practices from manipulative conduct 767 .  Trade-based market manipulation is 
generally identified as market behaviour that is not characterised as market power 
manipulation in which perpetrators corner markets accumulating large positions that 
amount to market power and outright fraud where prices are manipulated through 
fictitious trades, dissemination of false information or false reporting practices. 
However, the chapter reveals that perpetrators employ a diverse range of trading 
strategies for manipulating markets and prices. Each of these manipulative schemes 
devised by the perpetrators involves different underlying factors and physical and 
financial positions.  
                                                          
765 Craig Pirrong, (1994), 945 
766 Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, (1992), 529 
767 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, (1991); Albert S. Kyle and S. Viswanathan, (2008); George A. 
Davidson, ‘Squeezes and Corners: A Structural Approach’ (1985) 40 Business Law 1283 
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3.4.3.2.2. Gaming of Market Rules  
First, the chapter identifies that the perpetrators manipulate markets through gaming 
the market rules. Energy markets operate on the basis of several market rules, called 
tariffs, governing sale and purchase transactions, the transmission of energy 
products and establishing capacity and balancing mechanisms. In these markets, 
market operators establish numerous payment options to compensate financial 
losses incurred by market participants as a result of using transmission systems or 
provide incentives to direct market participants to behave in a certain way. In 
Rumford Paper Company, for example, the perpetrator sought to manipulate the 
DALRP system which was designed to steer market participants towards reducing 
their loads during peak hours 768 . In both J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy 
Cooperation769 and Coaltrain Energy L.P. et al770, the relevant manipulative schemes 
aimed at exploiting payment mechanisms, respectively make-whole and MLSA 
payments which were designed to compensate market participants’ losses during the 
use of transmission grids. It is important to note that these manipulative practices 
involve a trading activity, that is, they are plausible only with a counterparty entering 
into a transaction with the perpetrators, distinguishing these types of market 
manipulation from certain outright fraud claims in which market participants do not 
need a counterparty for the perpetration of manipulative scheme. It is irrelevant 
whether counterparties also share or are aware of the perpetrators’ manipulative 
intent771. 
3.4.3.2.3. Cross-Market Manipulation 
Exploiting the price relations between different markets and products is identified as 
the second type of trade-based manipulation, cross-market manipulation. In these 
manipulative strategies, the market participants who often operate specific trading 
desks which oversee the trade of physical and financial energy products in wholesale 
energy markets, engage in price-making transactions mostly in physical markets that 
affect the profitability of their positions in other physical or financial markets. There 
                                                          
768 Rumford Paper Company, 140 FERC ¶ 61,030 (2012) 
769 In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding Strategies, 144 FERC ¶ 61,068 (2013) 
770 Coaltrain Energy, L.P., et al., 154 FERC ¶ 61,002 (2016) 
771 US anti-manipulation law does not distinguish manipulative practices on the basis on their unilateral or 
collusive nature. However such differentiation is of great importance in the legal analysis under antitrust rules. 
The issue of manipulative behaviour as a collusion or abuse of market power is discussed in Chapter four.   
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are three important elements the regulatory agencies refer to in establishing the 
perpetrators’ manipulative intent. First the regulatory agencies identify the 
uneconomic nature of the price making transactions meaning that they are loss 
incurring and self-defeating on a stand-alone basis, without taking into account the 
positions the value of which is tied to price movements that occur as a result of 
uneconomic trading activities. The chapter provides several scenarios of trading 
activities that distinguish legitimate trading strategies from manipulative practices.  
Second, the perpetrators strategically place their bids and offers so that they create a 
price trend followed by other market participants increasing the impact on prices. 
Finally, the perpetrators engaging in cross-market manipulation accumulate large 
trading positions which account for exceeding 50 per cent and in some cases 
reaching 100 per cent of the trading activity during the relevant periods to give effect 
to their price making strategies. As mentioned above, it is established in case law 
that the holding of market power is not a prerequisite for the perpetration of market 
manipulation. However, case law also indicates that the accumulation of large 
positions and market power is important to obtain the derived price impact, even 
though such positions are on a temporary basis.      
3.4.3.2.4. Congestion-Related Manipulation 
The final type of trade-based market manipulation the chapter identifies is 
congestion-related market manipulation in which the perpetrators engage in market 
practices to derive profits from financial transmission rights in relation to congestion 
occurring in the transmission systems. These market practices seem identical to 
cross-market manipulative schemes as both involve market conduct in physical 
energy markets affecting profitability of positions in other financial and/or physical 
positions. In cross-market manipulation, the perpetrators engage in physical 
transactions that affect index or settlement prices for the underlying physical product 
and determine the profitability of financial and/or physical positions in relation to the 
price movements in index and settlement prices. In congestion-related manipulation, 
the perpetrators engage in transactions that affect congestion levels at the 
transmission system determining the profitability of their related financial 
transmission rights.  
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An important feature that distinguishes congestion-related practices from cross-
market manipulation is that in the former case, the financial transmission rights that 
perpetrators can accumulate are limited to the amount that market operators issue 
for congestion purposes 772 . In cross-market manipulation, the perpetrators can 
engage in financial transactions as long as a counterparty is present. It is also 
important to note that congestion-related market manipulation is intrinsic to the 
energy markets as these markets are network-based industries meaning that the 
functioning of markets is dependent on the availability of fixed infrastructure and 
capacity. Cross-market manipulation, on the other hand, can be perpetrated in other 
commodity or securities markets. Therefore, the chapter identifies congestion–
related manipulative practices as a different type of market manipulation specific to 
energy markets.    
Market manipulation has several adverse consequences for competitive wholesale 
energy markets. These market practices undermine the credibility of certain 
mechanisms and price benchmarks that are necessary for the functioning of trading 
in energy products. Price signals in manipulated markets do not stimulate market 
forces on the basis of aggregated demand and supply levels. Market participants 
who engage in buying and selling in energy products are harmed due to manipulated 
prices. While producers are harmed selling at lower prices due to downwards 
pressure on prices by short selling practices, consumers suffer from higher prices as 
a result of buying at higher prices creating an artificial upward movement in prices. 
Prevention and mitigation of such adverse effects are the main objectives of anti-
manipulation law. However, neither regulatory agencies nor academic literature have 
agreed upon a common approach in defining and prosecuting market manipulation.  
3.4.4. Convergence of Approaches 
The current regulatory practice for the prosecution of market manipulation is based 
on the SEA’s rule Section 10(b), as both FERC and the CFTC after Dodd-Frank 
adopted the SEC’s precedence on market manipulation. The US Supreme Court has 
continuously noted that the concepts of fraud in common-law and Section 10(b) are 
different, which results in ambiguities as to the definition of fraud under anti-
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manipulation 773 . FERC identifies all types of market practices that distort the 
functioning of energy markets as fraud. Such a catch-all interpretation of fraud can 
be vulnerable to judicial rejection as where the CFTC fell victim in US v. Radley. 
Therefore an extensive economic analysis that takes into account not only price-
making activities but also price-taking positions that perpetrators derive their profits 
from, is vital in understanding the pricing relations the perpetrators exploit as well as 
the characteristics of manipulative practices that the perpetrators employ. The 
demarcation of market manipulation on the basis of such an economic analysis will 
facilitate the development of appropriate definitions for different types of manipulative 
practices and provide legal tools for the enforcement of anti-manipulation rules. 
Despite controversies between artificial price-based and fraud-based anti-
manipulation rules, US case law on energy market manipulation provides significant 
implications as to manipulative practices perpetrated in energy markets, which are 
fundamental in understanding the types of practices that are prohibited under 
REMIT’s anti-manipulation rules. Undertakings can devise several plans that can 
circumvent loopholes in market rules, exploit pricing relations between different 
products, congest transmission lines to earn profits, and deceive other participants 
as to market conditions or the true value of certain products. Some types of 
manipulation, such as market power manipulation, that are common in other 
commodities, (e.g. oil) are not the case for electricity and natural gas markets, while 
other types of practices such as congestion-related manipulation constitute energy-
specific manipulative schemes. The next chapter discusses the implications of US 
case law on the enforcement of REMIT’s anti-manipulation regulations in EU 
wholesale energy markets. It also takes into account differences between US and 
EU energy markets, such as capacity withholding activities which was addressed as 
a major type of market manipulation in the EU, while, in the US, is considered a 
mere exercise of market power.   
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4.1. INTRODUCTION  
Compared to the US, case law on market manipulation in the EU is far from being 
complete. The only case that has resulted in a penalty for finding of a breach under 
REMIT’s anti-manipulation rule was brought against Iberdrola, a major electricity 
producer in Spain774.  As will be discussed, hereinbelow, in greater detail, the case 
involved a capacity withholding activity, through which the perpetrator sought to 
increase electricity prices in the wholesale markets. The Spanish Competition 
Authority (the SCA) concluded that this type of market activity was in violation of 
REMIT’s anti-manipulation rule and imposed a fine of €25 million for the violation775.  
Even though the case constituted the first instance in which the anti-manipulation 
regime set out under REMIT was enforced, capacity withholding activities have long 
been subject to investigations by national competent regulators and competition 
authorities as violations of competition law. There have been several cases and 
investigations at both national and EU levels that have involved alleged capacity 
withholding practices by one or multiple electricity generating companies in order to 
increase prices in wholesale electricity markets. In fact, the SCA itself has regularly 
dealt with this type of activity since the early 2000’s, long before the adoption of 
REMIT776.  
Prior to the adoption of REMIT, competition authorities at both national and EU 
levels investigated capacity withholding activities as violations of Articles 101 and 
102 of the TFEU. At national level, the investigations were generally carried out in 
close cooperation with national energy regulators providing significant market data in 
furtherance of the identification and the prosecution of these activities777. At EU level, 
the Commission also engaged in similar investigations and addressed concerns 
about their effects on the competitiveness of European wholesale energy markets778. 
                                                          
774 First Economic Sanctions for REMIT Breaches in Europe, (Lexology, 16 February, 2016), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=66b554d0-514c-40b3-b4fb-67374a43b111   
775 ACER, REMIT Quarterly Issue No 4, Q4 2015, Ljubljana, https://www.acer-remit.eu/portal/remit-quarterly-
doc  
776 Resolución del Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia del Expediente 552/02 EMPRESAS ELÉCTRICAS, de 7 
de julio de 2004. 
777 John Ratliff and Roberto Grasso (2012), 'Unilateral conduct in the energy sector: An overview of EU and 
national case law', E-Competitions 44203, 
http://www.oiguskantsler.ee/sites/default/files/IMCE/unilateral_conduct_in_the_energy_sector_-
_an_overview_of_eu_and_national_case_law.pdf  
778 German Electricity Wholesale Market (COMP/39.388) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C36/8 
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The Commission’s conclusions therein and its findings in the Energy Sector Inquiry 
of 2007779 and subsequent consultation documents including the advice document 
by CESR/ERGEG780 in 2008 and the impact assessment by the Commission in 
2010781, together paved the way for the adoption of REMIT in 2011. Similar concerns 
were also included in merger cases in which the Commission addressed economic 
incentives that merging undertakings could hold as to capacity withholding 
practices782. These merger cases will not be included in the case law analysis below 
as they do not provide any allegations in relation to violations of Articles 101 or 102 
TFEU.  
It is important to note that, even though capacity withholding practices constituted a 
major concern in the formulation of the new sector-specific regulations783, REMIT’s 
market manipulation prohibition adopted a far-reaching definition for market 
manipulation prohibition which was designed to address a wide spectrum of market 
conduct784. This was confirmed later by ACER providing that certain types of market 
practices such as wash trades, marking the close and dissemination of false or 
misleading market information, are also regarded as violations subject to REMIT’s 
anti-manipulation provision785. The case law on the application of REMIT’s market 
manipulation prohibition to these market practices has not yet developed, as the 
extensive monitoring practices of wholesale energy markets by national competent 
authorities has only started as recently as 2016. In this regard, the analysis provided 
under US case law is fundamental in identifying the spectrum of market practices 
that anti-manipulation rules under REMIT are adopted to deal with.  
This chapter first discusses the case law on capacity withholding practices by market 
participants at national and EU levels, involving both the pre- and post-REMIT eras. 
It initially evaluates case law on capacity withholding under competition law to 
provide an insight into how market participants increase their profits by reducing their 
output. Next, the study explores how a similar market practice was prosecuted as 
                                                          
779 Supra note 20  
780 Supra note 21 
781 Supra note 22 
782 EDF/British Energy (COMP/M.5224) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C288/5;   EDF/Segebel (COMP/M.5549) 
Commission Decision [2009]  OJ C235/26 
783 CESR and ERGEG, (2008), 26 
784 Recitals 13 and 14, Regulation No 1227/2011  
785 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 36-40 
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market manipulation under REMIT. The legal analysis this section provides is 
fundamental in identifying the implications of this new sector-specific framework on 
the prosecution of capacity withholding practices in European energy markets.  
As discussed in Chapter three, capacity withholding practices were also under legal 
and regulatory scrutiny in the US. Due to the approach FERC has taken to these 
practices, the thesis incorporates US case law on capacity withholding into this 
chapter to identify differences and similarities between the legal approaches taken 
by EU and US authorities. Finally, following the demarcation that US case law 
provides, this section discusses the implications of REMIT for manipulative practices 
other than capacity withholding. 
4.2. CAPACITY WITHHOLDING 
4.2.1. Overview 
The Energy Sector Inquiry of 2007 specifically found that manipulation of wholesale 
electricity prices by electricity producers who withheld part of their generation 
capacity constituted a significant factor for high energy prices in the EU786. The 
findings of the Sector Inquiry were later cited by CESR and ERGEG in their 
consultation paper which provided a proposal for the establishment of a tailor-made 
market abuse framework for the European energy sector including contracts relating 
to supply and transmission of energy products 787 . In its impact assessment 
document 788 , the Commission stressed that the proposed tailor-made legal 
framework should establish effective mechanisms for the prevention and the 
prosecution of capacity withholding practices in wholesale energy markets. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise to see that, the first case in which the anti-
manipulation regime under REMIT was applied involved capacity withholding 
practices by electricity generators, rather than other types of market manipulation.  
There are two types of capacity withholding practices789. First, electricity producers 
can withhold their capacity physically by reducing their output through, for example, 
scheduled or unscheduled maintenance periods for generating plants. In liberalised 
energy markets, the availability of generation facilities for short-term energy supply 
                                                          
786 The Inquiry, 150 
787 CESR and ERGEG (2008), 26 
788 REMIT Impact Assessment, (2010), 4 
789 The Inquiry, 132-133 
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has a tremendous impact on energy prices for relevant wholesale markets790. Even 
though the liberalisation packages did not include a specific requirement for the 
structure of national wholesale markets, a continuous harmonisation process has 
resulted in the adoption of pool market models in all Member States, which are 
called energy-only markets791. In these markets, electricity is only procured for day-
ahead or intraday supply through auctions in which electricity producers and other 
suppliers place bids and offers for either selling or buying electricity products. 
Transmission system operators or market operators, depending on the level of 
market liberalisation and design, oversee demand and supply levels, procuring or 
removing capacity to keep the transmission system balanced. In so doing, 
transmission system operators and market operators determine price levels for 
electricity by identifying a single market price at which bids and offers for demand 
and supply during the auctions intersect, that is, paid for all energy produced and 
supplied for that particular hour792.  
Each producer prices its output based on marginal operational costs of its generation 
plants793. The operational cost for each power plant differs on the basis of several 
factors such as the fuel type that is used for generation and the technology of the 
power plant. While low-margin power plants operate as a baseload generation 
producing electricity continuously, high-margin power plants operate only during the 
peak-demand periods when the demand for electricity reaches its highest levels. 
Therefore, during the peak demand periods, electricity prices become more 
expensive. Knowing or correctly estimating demand and supply levels for peak-
demand hours, producers have an incentive to physically withdraw their capacity 
especially in the baseload power plants, so that higher margin power plants can be 
                                                          
790 Ibid., 112-113 
791 Supra note 11  
792 David Newbery, ‘Missing Money and Missing Markets: Reliability, Capacity Auctions and Interconnectors’ 
(2015) Cambridge University Energy Policy Research Group, 5 
793 David Newbery, et al., ‘A Review of the Monitoring of Market Power The Possible Roles of TSOs in 
Monitoring for Market Power Issues in Congested Transmission Systems’ (2004) ENTSO, 30; Jens Perner and 
Christoph Riechmann, ‘Energy Market Design with Capacity Mechanisms’, in Leigh Hancher, Adrien De 
Hauteclocque and Malgorzata Sadowska (eds), Capacity Mechanisms in the EU Energy Market: Law, Policy, and 
Economics (OUP 2015) 59, 61-62 
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called in to supply the necessary demand, which drives the price of electricity to 
higher levels where bids and offers for energy intersect794.   
Second, electricity producers can withhold their capacity economically by simply 
raising the price of their energy over a competitive level795. Even though marginal 
operational costs of generation plants are low, producers bid in wholesale energy 
markets asking higher prices for their energy with the expectation that the market 
operator or transmission system operator would have to pick up their generation due 
to their pivotal position or the generation from other market players who have asked 
lower prices for their generation, which are still higher than the actual marginal cost 
of the former generation plants. In both physical and economic capacity withholding 
practices, bids and offers for electricity demand and supply intersect at higher price 
levels and thus increase the single marginal price that is determined by market 
operators or transmission system operators. Since the price where bids and offers 
intersect will be the market price for electricity and paid to all supplying market 
participants, every supplier whose generation is picked up by the market operator 
and transmission operator will benefit from higher prices, which gives rise to 
concerns about collusion and abuse of collective market power among electricity 
producers to fix wholesale electricity prices. These concerns are further elevated due 
to the characteristics of the European wholesale energy markets which still suffer 
high concentration, low liquidity levels and vertical integration in the majority of 
national wholesale markets with very limited cross-border interconnection.  
As mentioned above capacity withholding has been a major concern in European 
wholesale energy markets and was constantly cited by EU institutions in identifying 
the need for a tailor-made legal framework. Before the adoption of REMIT, such 
conduct was primarily subjected to proceedings under EU competition law. Even 
though the new market abuse regime under REMIT was provided by the 
Commission as complementary rather than an alternative to EU competition law, the 
legal literature and national competent authorities regarded the new market abuse 
regime and market manipulation prohibition, in particular, as necessary to effectively 
                                                          
794 David Newbery, et al., ‘A Review of the Monitoring of Market Power The Possible Roles of TSOs in 
Monitoring for Market Power Issues in Congested Transmission Systems’ (2004) ENTSO 11 
795 The Inquiry, 133 
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prosecute capacity withholding activities796, since the legal tools that EU competition 
law had to deal with such conduct were not efficient. An extensive analysis of EU 
case law involving both pre- and post-REMIT prosecution of capacity withholding 
activities, is important in understanding the legal implications of the new market 
abuse regime under REMIT and its interplay with EU competition law. 
4.2.2. Case Law on Capacity Withholding Before REMIT 
Prior to the adoption of REMIT, capacity withholding practices were investigated at 
both EU and national levels. At EU level, the Commission considered these practices 
as a violation of Article 102 of the TFEU, the prohibition of abuse of dominance. 
German Wholesale Energy Market 797  constitutes the only case in which the 
Commission investigated a capacity withholding practice as a possible violation of 
Article 102 of TFEU. The case was resolved with a commitment decision 798 
according to which the defendant agreed to relinquish its assets in a number of 
generation plants and to reduce its overall market share in wholesale energy 
markets. At national level, allegations of capacity withholding as violations of Articles 
101 and 102 had been made in several Member States, such as Belgium, Denmark, 
Italy, and Spain. In this section, the chapter first discusses the Commission’s 
prosecution of capacity withholding at EU level, followed by an analysis of 
enforcement activities by national competent authorities.   
4.2.2.1. EU Level 
4.2.2.1.1. German Wholesale Energy Market 
This case involved the Commission’s allegation that E.ON abused its dominant 
position in the wholesale energy market for electricity in Germany within the concept 
of Article 102 TFEU by withdrawing some of its available generation to raise prices to 
the detriment of consumers. The Commission identified the relevant product market 
as the wholesale market for electricity including imports and generation of electricity 
for further sale799. The relevant market assessment did not differentiate between 
                                                          
796 Adrien de Hauteclocque & Malgorzata Sadowska, ‘Antitrust Law; A Missing Piece in a Regulatory Puzzle?’ in 
Leigh Hancher, Adrien De Hauteclocque and Malgorzata Sadowska (eds), Capacity Mechanisms in the EU 
Energy Market: Law, Policy, and Economics (OUP 2015), 193-196 
797 German Electricity Wholesale Market (COMP/39.388) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C36/8 
798 Article 9, Regulation 1/2003 
799 German Electricity Wholesale Market (COMP/39.388) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C36/8, para. 11 
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short-term and long-term supply or the contracts that are traded either bilaterally or 
at spot-trading markets. Accordingly, the analysis of relevant markets encompassed 
all electricity traded at the wholesale level, considering that each contract for sale of 
electricity such as day-ahead, intraday, weekly, monthly, and longer-term contracts 
were interchangeable from the demand side and thus substitutable. As to the 
geographic market, the Commission identified that it was limited to the territory of 
Germany due to low levels of interconnection between Germany and its 
neighbouring states 800 . Competitive pressure imposed by imports remained 
insignificant.  
According to the Commission, the German electricity wholesale market was 
dominated by three companies; RWE, E.ON and Vattenfall, whose market share 
together reached 67 per cent of total generation capacity801. Their control over cheap, 
baseload power generation was even more dominant, as their market share 
accounted for 77 per cent of total cheap generation capacity in Germany802. Potential 
competitors were prevented due to the high entry costs intrinsic in the energy sector 
as introducing additional supplies requires capital intensive projects such as building 
new generation plants to produce electricity or new transmission lines to bring 
supplies from neighbouring countries. Along with their vertical integration operating 
both at supply and transmission levels, these companies enjoyed significant control 
over conditions and prices in the German wholesale market. 
In the German spot market for wholesale supply of energy, each generation unit had 
different marginal costs determining the price levels of their bids in the market. The 
difference between cheap and expensive generation units sometimes reached 
sevenfold803. Accordingly, cheap production units operated as baseload suppliers 
that run 24 hours of a day, while expensive units were only picked up when demand 
for electricity increased, especially during peak-hours. The alignment of generation 
plants on the basis of their marginal operational costs was called ‘merit order’. The 
Commission referred to the 2007 Energy Sector Inquiry to illustrate the determination 
of market price on the basis of the interplay between the merit order of generation 
plants with the demand and supply curve. 
                                                          
800 Ibid., para. 12 
801 Ibid., Table 1  
802 Ibid., para. 15 
803 Ibid., para. 35 
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804 
As mentioned, in short-term wholesale energy markets, the market operators or 
transmission system operators identify a single marginal price where the bids and 
offers intersect. This price corresponds to the marginal operational cost of the last 
generation plants picked up to supply demand. According to the illustration above, 
this price will be the marginal operational cost of the Combined Cycle Gas Turbine 
(CCGT), where demand for electricity intersects with available supply. This price is 
designated as the market clearing price which is paid to all electricity generators 
supplying power to the electricity grid for a specific supply period, which are, as the 
illustration above shows, hydro, nuclear, lignite, coal and CCGT power plants. 
Accordingly the Gas Turbines (the GTs) are not selected by transmission system 
operators or market operators and thus are outside the merit order. High electricity 
prices are not only a benefit to the last generation unit called by the market operator 
or transmission system operator. All electricity generators that stand at the left of the 
demand curve benefit from high electricity prices.  
Identifying the shifts in the average marginal costs during January 2003, January 
2004, January 2005 and December 2005, the Commission used a comparison 
between merit order curves of all plants greater than 25 MW operated by companies 
using a generation portfolio higher than 100 MW 805 . It was found that certain 
                                                          
804 The Inquiry, Figure 40, 123  
805 German Electricity Wholesale Market (COMP/39.388) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C36/8, para. 32 
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generation plants of E.ON did not operate at their full capacity and withdrew part of 
their generation capacity to increase electricity prices during the investigated time 
period between 2002 and 2007. Due to the withholding of cheaper generation plants, 
the German market operator sought more expensive generation units to supply 
demand for each hour.   
The capacity withholding activity allegedly engaged in by E.ON can be simply 
illustrated through the figures below. As a dominant undertaking who owns a 
portfolio of generation assets, E.ON operates several generation plants including 
hydro, nuclear, coal, and CCGT. A certain amount of capacity withdrawal from any of 
these generation plants (say; coal) may result in the German market operator 
seeking additional supplies from more expensive generation plants such as gas 
turbines (GTs) which determine the market price for electricity for that particular hour 
as the last picked generation facility. All generation plants that remained to the left of 
the demand curve received this new price determined on the marginal operational 
cost of GT and thus would benefit from capacity withholding. E.ON lost profits it 
could have made, if it had operated the relevant plants. However, holding a dominant 
market position and assets from a portfolio of generation plants, E.ON compensated 
these losses through its remaining plants which profited from the higher electricity 
price.  
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806 
The Commission also noted that further profits could be derived from the long-term 
effects of artificially increased electricity prices807. A continuous practice of capacity 
withholding for a longer time period can be reflected by prices in long-term and 
forward contracts which generally follow the price trends in short-term wholesale 
electricity contracts. A seller in a long-term electricity contract may have a financial 
incentive to withhold its generation in short-term markets irrespective of whether its 
losses are subsidised by the profits derived from the remaining power plants. 
Conduct exploiting pricing relations between short-term and long-term electricity 
markets has more of the character of cross-market manipulation which will be 
discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. However, this two-pronged approach 
by the Commission to E.ON’s allegedly manipulative conduct clearly demonstrates 
that an analysis of market manipulation requires monitoring of differing positions that 
can be exploited by market participants through a single manipulative conduct.  
It is important to note the case did not result in an infringement decision by the 
Commission against E.ON. This is in line with the policy the Commission seeks in 
issuing Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003808 according to 
which, it avoids exercising extensive legal analyses of relevant markets, dominant 
positions and decisions of abuse. The Commission has refrained from holding E.ON 
                                                          
806 See: Malgozata Sadowska, ‘Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets’ 
(PhD Thesis, EDLE, 2013) 146-149 
807 German Electricity Wholesale Market (COMP/39.388) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C36/8, para. 38 
808 Recital 13, Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16.12.2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1 
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liable in exchange for some commitments including divestiture of certain generation 
plants809. It did not provide a detailed legal and economic analysis on withholding 
activities in relation to price increases in the wholesale electricity prices. Instead, it 
preferred to reiterate the findings of the 2007 Energy Sector Inquiry without going 
into details of the market data. Even though alleging that E.ON was collectively 
dominant with RWE and Vattenfall, the Commission held only E.ON responsible for 
the conduct and left open the question of other companies’ contribution 810 . 
Establishing a dominant position based on the calculation of a joint market share 
stemmed from the concern that the sole market share held by E.ON only accounted 
for 20-30 per cent of total capacity811. According to the Commission guidance on 
abuse of dominance, this does not suffice for the Commission to find it a dominant 
position812.  
The Commission’s analysis in this case does not provide clear guidance on the 
prosecution of capacity withholding practices in EU competition law. Several 
concerns were raised by some commentators813 as to the effectiveness of divestiture 
measures, adopted as a remedy for the contested behaviour. It was asserted that 
the types of generation plants that the defendant was obliged to discard from its 
generation portfolio did not affect its ability to increase single marginal prices through 
capacity withholding814 . Nevertheless, the case is of particular importance as it 
represents the first attempt by the Commission to deal with capacity withholding 
practices as an infringement of EU competition law.   
4.2.2.2. National Level 
4.2.2.2.1. Electrabel (Belgium) 
This case involved a 2014 decision by the Belgian Competition Authority (the BCA) 
which rejected claims that Electrabel, the largest electricity supplier in Belgium, 
abused its dominance in Belgian generation, wholesale and trading market by 
                                                          
809 German Electricity Wholesale Market (COMP/39.388) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C36/8, paras. 59-75 
810 Ibid., para. 24 
811 Ibid., Table 1 
812 Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings [2009] OJ C45/2, para. 
14  
813 Malgozata Sadowska, ‘Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets’ (PhD 
Thesis, EDLE, 2013)  
814 Ibid., 137 
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withholding its generation capacity and submitting purchase orders at very high 
prices on Belpex, the Belgian Electricity Spot Market815. The allegations originated 
from a report by the Belgian Energy Markets Regulator (the CREG) in 2009816 which 
identified that the abnormal increase in electricity prices from €50/MWh to 
€2500/MWh between 2007 and 2008 might account for a possible manipulation of 
electricity prices by Electrabel 817 .  In close cooperation with the CREG, the 
investigatory body of the BCA, provided an analysis of electricity prices in the 
relevant period concluding that Electrabel committed two types of conduct in 
violation of Article IV.2 of the Code of Economic Law and Article 102 of TFEU818. 
First, Electrabel was alleged to withhold part of its electricity generation from Belpex 
resulting in increases in electricity prices between 2007 and 2008. Second, the 
investigatory body asserted that Electrabel engaged in fictitious sales and double 
use of tertiary services which is a type of balancing service generators provide by 
reserving a part of their generation capacity for the grid operator to be called upon at 
short notice to relieve system imbalances.  
The Competition College, the decision-making body of the BCA, rejected the 
investigatory body’s allegation of capacity withholding, while approving the finding of 
abusive use of tertiary services819. Electrabel claimed that it did not hold a dominant 
position in the Belpex electricity spot market as it was a price-taking market 
participant which lacks a pivotal position in electricity generation in Belpex’s day-
ahead market820. Rejecting Electrabel’s claim, the College held that even though 
Electrabel was not in a pivotal position in the Belpex day-ahead market, the liquidity 
                                                          
815 Marc Martens & Peter Willis, ‘Electrabel decision outlines application of competition rules to withholding 
capacity and electricity pricing’ (Bird&Bird, 29 August, 2014) 
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2014/belgium/electrabel-decision-outlines-application-of-
competition-rules-to-withholding  
816 CREG, « Etude 860 relative aux comportements sur le marché de gros de l’électricité en Belgique durant 
2007 et les six premiers mois de 2008 », du 7 mai, 2009. 
817 Peter Willis, ‘Belgian competition authority prosecutor accuses Electrabel of abuse of dominance’ 
(Bird&Bird, 13 February ,2013) https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2013/belgian-competition-
accuses-electrabel-abuse-dominance0213  
818 Projet de décision du 29 novembre 2013, affaire CONC-I/O-09/0015 : Marché de gros de l’électricité; See: 
Cleary Gottlieb, ‘EU Competition Law Quarterly Report, Belgium’ (Q3, July-September, 2014) 
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/cleary-gottlieb-national-competition-
report-q3-2014.pdf   
819 Belgian Competition Authority, Press Release n°11/2014 (12 November, 2014) 
https://www.belgiancompetition.be/sites/default/files/content/download/files/20141112_press_release_11_
bca.pdf  
820 Marc Martens & Peter Willis, (2014)  
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levels in the market and the positions held in downstream markets were sufficient to 
conclude that Electrabel was a dominant market player in the Belgian wholesale 
electricity market821. The College found that Electrabel’s withholding of generation 
capacity did not constitute an abuse of dominance, focusing first on the intent of 
Electrabel. Accordingly, during the contested period, withholding of generation 
capacity was not a clear-cut violation of competition law, as the case law lacked 
clear precedents on such conduct 822 . Furthermore, the College provided that 
Electrabel had a legitimate reason in withholding its capacity, keeping the withheld 
capacity as a reserve for the risk that it would have to pay penalties as a result of its 
balancing requirements 823 . The objective sought by Electrabel in withholding 
generation capacity was to secure its positions in the balancing market rather than to 
increase electricity prices in the Belgian wholesale market. Finally, the College 
identified that the capacity withheld constituted only around 1.1 per cent of total 
capacity in the spot market and thus did not suffice to cause the alleged price 
effects824. 
The College’s referral to the intent of Electrabel and the dearth of legal precedent on 
the prosecution of capacity withholding activity under competition law are illustrative 
as to the ambiguity at national level on the application of EU competition law rules to 
the European energy markets. The analysis of intent in establishing anti-competitive 
conduct under EU case law is not decisive.  According to the European Union Court 
of Justice, (the CJEU);   
“The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of 
an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the 
structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the 
undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, 
through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal 
                                                          
821 Ibid. 
822 Stibbe, ‘Belgian Competition Authority  fined Electrabel EUR 2 million for abuse of a dominant position’ 
(Lexology, September ,1 2014, Belgium) http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=177531a1-f5f7-40fc-
bcad-7e9930d23933  
823 The majority of spot markets require each market participant to sign a balancing market requirements 
contract which grants transmission system operators to require market participants to provide additional 
power to, or reduce power from the transmission grid when it is identified that the demand in the upcoming 
hour would be higher or lower than the expected levels projected under the spot markets. See: Petri 
Mantysaari, (2015), 535-539   
824 Marc Martens & Peter Willis, (2014)  
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competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of 
commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the 
degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition825.  
The finding of the CJEU indicates that the perpetrator’s intent is irrelevant in 
establishing whether the contested conduct is anti-competitive826. However, this is 
not an established case law principle that is followed in every antitrust analysis827. 
The case law also provides that the finding of an anti-competitive object with respect 
to a contested conduct is sufficient for a finding of an Article 102 violation. In Michelin 
II, the General Court (GC) stated that “establishing the anti-competitive object and 
the anti-competitive effect are one and the same thing”828. A market conduct without 
anti-competitive effects can be regarded as an abuse of dominance on the basis of 
its perpetrator’s intent829.  
The College considered the intent element of the market conduct along with its 
extent in and effects on the Belgian wholesale electricity market. The withheld 
capacity accounted for only 1.1 per cent of total capacity and thus was regarded as 
unappreciable. Concluding that the conduct had very limited anti-competitive effects 
on the market, the College went on to decide whether the object of withholding 
capacity was anti-competitive. On the basis of lack of clear precedent on this type of 
conduct as well as the possible existence of a legitimate reason, namely securing 
positions under the balancing market, the College answered this question negatively 
and decided that Electrabel did not abuse its dominant position in the Belgian 
wholesale electricity market.  
As illustrated in the figure above, the ability of a withholding practice to influence 
price results does not depend on the extent of electricity withheld. The economics of 
capacity withholding does not require a certain threshold as to the needed electricity. 
As long as transmission system operators are required to call in more expensive 
                                                          
825 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v. EC Commission [1979] ECR 461, 91  
826 Pinar Akman,  ‘The role of intent in the EU case law on abuse of dominance’ [2014] E.L. Rev. 316 
827 Ibid., 333 
828 Case T-203/01 Michelin v. Commission (Michelin II) [2003] ECR II-4071, 239; See also; Case T- 
219/99 British Airways plc v. Commission [2003] ECR II-5917, 293; AstraZeneca (Case COMP/A.37.507/F3) 
Commission Decision [2006] OJ L332/24  
829 Pinar Akman, (2014), 333 
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plants to supply demand as a result of capacity withholding, the extent of the 
withholding activity is irrelevant. The College’s decision admits Electrabel’s evidence 
providing that Electrabel did not hold a pivotal position in Belpex. How the College 
calculated the pivotality of Electrabel is an open question, as the 861-page decision 
is not open to the public830.  However an extensive analysis of supply and demand 
levels during the designation of generating plants to supply the transmission grids is 
substantial in identifying the pivotal positions. The pivotal supplier index and other 
instruments that are fundamental tools to identify pivotal positions in wholesale 
energy markets, will be discussed in greater detail.  
4.2.2.2.2. Italian Cases 
4.2.2.2.2.1. Edipower/Enel 
In 2010, the Italian Competition Authority (the ICA) issued two decisions, on the 
basis of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, against Edipower and Enel due to their activities 
in Sicily in which they held, respectively, 26 per cent and 45 per cent market share831. 
Enel produced electricity through CCGTs and turbogas (TG) plants, while Edipower 
had one oil plant that was generally operational during peak hours and was thus 
important in setting electricity prices. The case originated from a notice832 by the 
Italian Energy Regulator which provided that the findings of its investigation on 
electricity prices in Sicily between November 2008 and January 2009 indicated a 
possible withdrawal in electricity generation capacity in Sicily, since neither the 
availability levels at the generation system nor the fluctuations in fuel costs sufficed 
to explain extremely high zone-based prices833 experienced in Sicily between 2008 
and 2009.  
                                                          
830 Marc Martens & Peter Willis, (2014)  
831 Alessandro Noce, ‘Abuse of Dominant Position by Energy Incumbents: the Italian Experience’ (Athens, June 
2013) https://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/2106181.PDF  
832 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, ‘Press Release: Electricity Market: Antitrust Authority 
Accepts and Enfrces the Commitments of the Main Energy Companies Active in the Sicily Macro Area’ (Rome, 
January 2011) http://www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-releases/1924-i721-a423-edipower-tolling-and-enel-
dynamics-in-the-setting-of-electricity-market-prices-in-sicily-closure-of-investigation.html  
833 Due to transmission constraints and congestion levels, there are multiple zones where electricity is priced 
differently across Italy. Accordingly, there are seven physical national zones in Italy; Calabria, Northern-Italy, 
Central-Northern Italy, Central-Southern Italy, Southern Italy, Sardinia and Sicily. See Angelica Gianfreda and 
Luigi Grossi, ‘Zonal Price Analysis of the Italian Wholesale Electricity Market’ (EEM 2009, June 2009)   
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The ICA initiated two distinct proceedings against Edipower and Enel. With respect 
to Edipower, the ICA found that tollers834 of Edipower’s oil plant adopted a common 
strategy in submitting their bids to increase prices in the day-ahead market for peak 
hours. The investigation identified that the tollers of Edipower colluded in their 
bidding activity to give effect to their economic withholding and to fix higher prices 
during peak hours when Edipower’s oil plant was price-setting for the merit order of 
Sicilian wholesale electricity market. Therefore, the ICA held that the bidding activity 
carried out by the tollers of the Edipower’s oil plant constituted a violation of Article 
101 TFEU835. 
As to Enel, the investigation, first, focused on the available generation capacity in its 
CCGT and TG power plants offered by Enel in the Italian day-ahead electricity 
market. Analysing the generation capacity that was declared to be available and that 
were actually offered in the day-ahead market, the ICA found no physical withholding 
of generation capacity by Enel836 . The investigation highlighted the problems in 
measuring the available capacity that could have been offered in the Italian day-
ahead market and the difference between the capacity declared and the capacity 
offered seemed to be explained by technical constraints in generation. The ICE held 
that the findings of the investigation did not support the existence of an illegitimate 
activity as the main reason for the reduction in the available capacity offered in the 
day-ahead market. 
The investigation later focused on Enel’s bidding activity with respect to its CCGT 
and TG generation plants. The ICA found that during a small part of peak hours, 
Enel submitted prices for its CCGT plants which were up to three times higher than 
their variable costs837. The prices Enel offered for electricity produced from its TG 
power plants were also higher than those offered by its competitors, even though 
difference between their variable costs were not substantial. The ICA identified that 
the bids submitted by Enel for its CCGT and TG power plants accounted for 
                                                          
834 Tolling agreements in electricity markets allow firms to use the generation service of power plants. In these 
agreements, firms buy fuels for the generation plants and sell the output. In exchange, plant operators receive 
a fee for their production service.   
835 John Ratliff and Roberto Grasso (2012), para. 133 
836 Alessandro Noce, (2013)  
837 Ibid., 
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economic capacity withholding raising electricity prices in day-ahead electricity 
markets and thus were in violation of Article 102 of TFEU. 
4.2.2.2.2.2. EGL/Repower/Tirreno Power 
The case involved a cartel of three generating plants which allocated the market and 
fixed prices for ancillary services in Central-Southern Italy838. On 14 June, 2012, the 
ICA imposed fines on EGL, Repower, and Tirreno Power (the generators, hereinafter) 
which operated power plants in the area of Naples for engaging in a concerted 
practice in breach of Article 2 of Law 287/1990 Italian Competition Act and Article 
101 of TFEU839. The concerted practice involved the allocation of the markets for 
providing balancing services on Sundays and during holidays in Naples from April to 
August 2010840. The relevant balancing service was the procurement of reserve 
resources for local voltage support841. After the day-ahead and intraday markets 
closed, the Italian TSO Terna evaluated positions in electricity supply and demand 
and opened these markets to secure system balancing. The contested conduct 
involved manipulation of electricity prices for ancillary services markets in Central-
Southern Italy in relation to the capacity withholding practices in day-ahead and 
intraday markets. 
In order to secure that their output was pivotal for the balancing of the system, the 
generators engaged in a concerted act of physical and economic withholding of their 
capacity in the day-ahead market. Due to the geographic location of generation 
plants, and technical constraints in grids that supply electricity from markets other 
than central-southern Italy, the generators knew that they were the only market 
players which could provide balancing services for voltage support in the area of 
                                                          
838 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, ‘Press Release: Electricity Market: investigation launched 
into Egl, Repower and Tirreno power concerning a possible service dispatch agreement’ (Rome, October 2010) 
http://www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-releases/1831-i736-electricity-market-investigation-launched-into-
egl-repower-and-tirreno-power-concerning-a-possible-service-dispatch-agreement.html  
839 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, ‘Press Release: Electricity market: Repower Italia, EGL 
Italia and Tirreno Power penalised for agreement restricting competition’ (Rome, June 2012) 
http://www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-releases/2000-electricity-market-repower-italia-egl-italia-and-
tirreno-power-penalised-for-agreement-restricting-competition.html  
840 Javier Ruiz Calzado et al., ‘Energy and restrictive practices : an overview of EU and national case law’ (e-
Competition Bulletin, N° 70451, December 2014) https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/energy-and-
restrictive-practices-eu-case-law   
841 Peter Willis & Simone Cadeddu, ‘Italian ancillary services cartel highlights risks of electricity market 
transparency’ (Bird&Bird, 24 July, 2012) https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2012/italian-ancillary-
services-cartel-highlights-risks-of-electricity-market-transparency  
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Naples. If these generators were not picked up in day-ahead or intraday markets on 
Sundays and holidays, the only way for Terna to secure the system balance was to 
procure electricity from these generators under ancillary markets842.  
Accordingly, from April to August 2010, the generators, in collusion, physically and 
economically withheld their generation from day-ahead and intraday markets to 
create a demand for balancing services in ancillary markets 843 . The strategy 
continued with each generator rigging the bids for voltage support to ensure higher 
returns from their balancing services. In order for the functioning of the cartel, each 
generator consecutively won the auctions for balancing services during holidays. 
During the relevant period, the price of electricity procured in the ancillary markets on 
Sundays and holidays was more than two and half times the price of that traded in 
day-ahead markets The scheme was brought to an end after the withdrawal of EGL 
whose generation plant had twice the size of two other generators and thus had an 
incentive to leave the cartel844.  
Even though the ICA was unable to identify direct evidence of collusion, the 
allocation and timing of the bidding practices were sufficient to infer the agreement 
between the generators in the ancillary markets. While the prices the generators 
offered in ancillary markets reached €140 MW/h during the relevant period, their 
margins in the day-ahead markets were nearly zero, meaning that they provided no 
or very limited amount of electricity in day-ahead markets845. The ICA refuted the 
generators’ allegation that the practice was a competitive adaptation between market 
players rather than an anti-competitive concerted practice, providing that the bidding 
practices and the allocation of auctions were instantaneously adjusted without a 
transition period846. Moreover the generators’ activity during the relevant period was 
in stark contrast with that in 2009 when they had regularly offered their generation in 
the day-ahead market. Withholding their output in day-ahead markets in 2010 
provided greater opportunities for greater returns from the sales in ancillary markets. 
The symmetry in the bidding strategies and the allocation of auctions between these 
generators could only be explained via a concerted practice designed to exploit 
                                                          
842 Ibid.  
843 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, (2012)  
844 Peter Willis & Simone Cadeddu, (2012)  
845 Ibid.  
846 Ibid. 
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Terna’s obligation to provide system security. Exploiting the linkage between day-
ahead and ancillary markets, the generators rigged their bids in these markets to 
allocate these returns.  
4.2.2.2.2.3. Enel/Sorgenia 
On 6 October, 2016, ICA announced that two energy companies, Enel and Sorgenia, 
were being investigated for a suspected abuse of dominance under Article 102 of 
TFEU847. The case originated from a notification from the Italian Energy Regulator 
who also informed ACER and initiated proceedings under REMIT against two power 
producers848. The investigation related to strategies of withholding by four units of a 
coal-fired power station operated by Enel and Sorgenia’s CCGT which together 
supply power to Southern Italy.  As in EGL/Repower/Tirreno Power, the ICA, here, 
also alleged that Enel and Sorgenia engaged in capacity withholding practices in 
day-ahead markets with the expectation that their generation would provide greater 
revenues in ancillary services markets. However, the ICA did not provide any 
allegations of collusion between Enel and Sorgenia as it did in EGL/Repower/Tirreno 
Power. Rather, it investigated the contested conduct on the basis of Article 102 and 
asked whether Enel and Sorgenia abused their dominant position in the relevant 
markets849. 
The contested market behaviours involved physical capacity withholding practices by 
Sorgenia and economic capacity withholding practices by Enel. The ICA identified 
that during the relevant time period, Sorgenia refrained from offering its output in the 
day-ahead markets. Enel, on the other hand, submitted bids at prices higher than 
those it submitted in previous years. This resulted in either exclusion of its output 
from day-ahead markets or when the submitted bids were picked up by the Italian 
transmission system operator, Terna, at the day-ahead market, buying back the 
relevant bids at the intraday market so that the generation plants would only operate 
under the ancillary market to supply voltage support services. Given the limited 
                                                          
847 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, ‘A498A-A498B - Aumento costi in bolletta, istruttoria 
Antitrust su Enel e Sorgenia’ (Roma, ottobre 2016), http://www.agcm.it/stampa/comunicati/8411-a498a-
a498b-aumento-costi-in-bolletta,-istruttoria-antitrust-su-enel-e-sorgenia.html cited in; Peter Willis, ‘Italian 
competition authority investigates suspected abuses in Italian electricity balancing markets’ (Bird&Bird, 18 
October, 2016) https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2016/italy/italian-competition-authority-
investigates-suspected-abuses-in-italian-electricity-balancing-markets  
848 Peter Willis, (2016)  
849 Ibid.  
255 | P a g e  
 
output from these generation plants, Terna would be required to seek balancing 
services under ancillary markets. These generators reap greater returns from selling 
their output in these markets at prices higher that those paid in day-ahead markets.    
Reviewing the relevant markets, the ICA noted that ancillary services markets are 
distinct from wholesale electricity markets which consist of bilateral contracts and 
spot markets and distinguished further that ancillary services markets are also 
divided into two markets on the basis of their timeframes, an ex ante balancing 
market and a real-time balancing market 850 . While the former utilises Terna to 
procure electricity to resolve network constraints in each zone and to ensure the 
consistency of voltage levels, the latter allows Terna to monitor balancing between 
electricity supply and demand and to sustain reserves. The ICA identified that 
voltage support in Southern Italy, in the area of Brindisi, in particular, can only be 
supplied by a limited number of plants851. Apart from those owned by Sorgenia and 
Enel, a plant owned by EniPower can be called in for voltage support services. 
However, the findings in the announcement shows that the generation plants owned 
by Sorgenia and Enel would still be pivotal, irrespective of the level at which 
EniPower’s plant operated.  Enel and Sorgenia are obligatory trading partners for 
Italian transmission operator Terna and thus held to be dominant in the relevant 
electricity markets. 
Two price comparisons were provided to show the excessiveness of prices offered 
by Enel and Sorgenia852. The first comparison involves the difference between the 
prices offered by Enel and Sorgenia during the relevant period and the prices offered 
in past years for the same time period. Second, the ICA compared the prices paid in 
ancillary markets with those of the day-ahead markets. The findings of the price 
analysis showed that there were dramatic price differences between those charged 
in the contested period and those in past years and day-ahead markets. The ICA 
noted that this close correlation between capacity withholding practices and the 
corresponding price changes provided strong evidence of the abuse of a dominant 
position853. The ICA’s investigation continues. 
                                                          
850 Ibid.  
851 Ibid. 
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256 | P a g e  
 
The Italian Energy Regulator which notified the ICA as to the relevant bidding activity, 
has also initiated a separate investigation of the same activities as to whether they 
constitute market manipulation under REMIT 854 . The regulator had already 
proscribed the firms to stop their bidding activity and submitted the details of bidding 
practices to ACER and the European Commission855. The legal implications under 
these enforcement proceedings are discussed later in greater detail. However, this 
case is of particular importance as it represents the first instance in which the same 
market practices are being investigated by both an energy regulator and a 
competition authority under, respectively, REMIT and competition law and the 
number of similar cases is likely to rise as a result of data reporting obligations 
arising from REMIT and the new European financial regulations.   
4.2.2.2.2.4. Endesa/Iberdrola/Union Fenosa/Hidcantabrico 
In November 2001, the Spanish energy regulator submitted a report to the Spanish 
competition authority (the SCA) involving findings of unusually high prices in the 
electricity day-ahead market for a 3-day period856. On the basis of the report, SCA 
opened a competition law investigation into the bidding practices of four electricity 
generating firms, Endesa, Iberdrola, Union Fenosa, and Hidrocantabrico857. In 2004, 
SCA concluded that these firms abused their dominant positions by exploiting 
weaknesses in the Spanish electricity market design 858  and distorted electricity 
prices in the Spanish wholesale electricity market once they were picked up to 
produce in certain regions that suffered congestion in transmission grids. Accordingly, 
a fine of €901,520 was imposed on each firm859. 
According to the findings of SCA, the firms identified expected supply shortages in 
the relevant geographic regions and submitted bids at high prices on certain days to 
ensure that their generation would not be selected by the Spanish transmission 
system operator on the Spanish day-ahead market and thus economically withheld 
                                                          
854 Ibid. 
855 Ibid.  
856 OECD, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, ‘Annual Report in 
Competition Policy Developments in Spain 2004’ [2015] DAF/COMP(2005)32/06, para 30 
857 Resolución del Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia del Expediente 552/02 EMPRESAS ELÉCTRICAS, de 7 
de julio de 2004.  
858 When the contested bidding practices occurred, the Spanish wholesale electricity market consisted of just 
one spot market in which participants placed their bids and offers just once. A separate spot market for 
balancing mechanisms was missing. See; John Ratliff and Roberto Grasso (2012), para 151  
859 Ibid., para. 152  
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their generation capacity. On the basis of the data of the last twelve months of peak 
hour electricity prices, SCA stated that the prices submitted  by the firms for the 
relevant 3-day period far exceeded their variable costs and were considerably higher 
than those offered in previous years. Due to the system restrictions and congestion 
levels at the transmission grids, the transmission system operator was forced to seek 
supplies from these firms at these unusually high prices to balance demand and 
supply on the markets for technical restrictions, ‘restricciones técnicas’ 860 . SCA 
identified that the firms were pivotal suppliers in the market for technical restrictions 
and thus were considered dominant. Even though the contested abuse took place in 
the day-ahead markets, where the firms were not dominant, dominance in technical 
restrictions markets where the anti-competitive effects of the conduct took effect was 
sufficient for SCA to hold the firms responsible for the abuse of market dominance861.  
The SCA also found that the specific weaknesses in the Spanish wholesale 
electricity market design were critical in the development of bidding schemes as the 
auction process allowed the market participants to submit only ‘one bid’ for electricity 
supply on  the day-ahead market862. The bids submitted at high prices and thus not 
selected on the day-ahead market were called in later for the markets for technical 
restrictions. The ‘one bid’ auction design was an important factor that created the 
opportunity for the firms to foresee when their supplies would be pivotal and the 
transmission system operator would be forced to resort to their supplies despite the 
high prices. In the following years, the ‘one bid’ system was changed into a ‘dual bids’ 
system which involves two different auction procedures for day-ahead markets and 
the market for technical constraints. While the former continues to function as the 
main wholesale market in which the general demand and supply levels are 
calculated, the latter involves a separate auction session in which electricity 
producers bid for balancing services. In other words, the transmission system 
operator no longer calls in generators based on their bids at day-ahead markets, but 
rather opens a new auction in which generators compete with each other, and 
submit bids to supply the market for technical restrictions. In this new auction design, 
                                                          
860 The markets which the transmission system operators established for acquiring balancing services are 
called different names in different states. In terms of their functioning and purpose, the market for technical 
restrictions in Spain is very much the same as the ancillary services market in Italy. 
861 John Ratliff and Roberto Grasso (2012), para. 153  
862 Ibid., para. 151  
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the generators are no longer able to derive profits from the market for technical 
restrictions on the basis on their economic withholding activity in the day-ahead 
market.  
On 27 January, 2010, the Spanish Supreme Court annulled SCA’s decision, after an 
appeal by Union Fenosa, finding that the generators at issue did not commit a 
violation of competition law by their activities during the relevant 3-day period in 
2001863. According to the Court, SCA erred in finding an abuse of dominance based 
on sporadic practices in very limited and temporary market conditions. The firms’ 
temporary pivotal position for a period of three days did not suffice to find that these 
market players were dominant in the wholesale energy markets. SCA should have 
considered the economic risk of being excluded from the market for technical 
restrictions as well. The firms did not know whether their bids were finally awarded 
by the transmission system operator in the market for technical restrictions. There 
could be other market participants whose bids were also not selected in the day-
ahead market but were called in later to the market for technical restrictions since 
their bids were lower than those submitted by the firms. Moreover, the Court also 
found SCA’s finding of high prices as unlawful, noting that the determination of high 
prices based solely on a comparison with historical prices did not show that the bids 
submitted by the firms exceeded their average variable costs and thus were anti-
competitive. According to the court, rather than an analysis of historical prices in the 
day-ahead market, SCA should have focused on usual costs incurred by the firms in 
the market for technical restraints in determining whether or not the prices submitted 
by the firms were excessive.  
The Supreme Court’s decision is an important turning point for the prosecution of 
capacity withholding practices in wholesale energy markets under competition law.  
SCA, based on its findings in 2004, adopted similar decisions against several market 
participants, imposing fines that have amounted to €56.5 million864. SCA abandoned 
its investigations in September 2011, after the Court’s annulment. The reasoning 
                                                          
863 International Competition Network, ‘Case Annex to IC Unilateral Conduct Working Group: Report on the 
Analysis of Refusal to Deal with a Rival Under Unilateral Conduct Laws’ (Istanbul, April 2010), 56 
864 See; Resolución del Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia del Expediente 601/05 IBERDROLA CASTELLÓN, 
de 8 de marzo de 2007; Resolución del Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia del Expediente 602/05 VIESGO 
GENERACIÓN, de 28 de diciembre de 2006; Resolución del Consejo del Expediente 624/07 IBERDROLA, de 14 de 
febrero de 2008; Resolución del Consejo del Expediente 625/07 GAS NATURAL, de 25 de abril de 2008. 
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underlying the Supreme Court’s decision shows that traditional tools in identifying 
dominance were insufficient to address market power concerns in wholesale energy 
markets. Calculation of market shares and concentration levels with broadly defined 
relevant markets did not provide market data that was necessary to detect the 
exercise of market power in electricity markets. Some commentators and regulators 
argued that the findings of the Supreme Court against SCA’s decisions of capacity 
withholding along with its decision in a later REMIT case involving similar capacity 
withholding claims clearly illustrate that competition law is not a suitable forum for 
dealing with market abuse in energy markets865. Nevertheless, whether or not the 
formalistic approach in competition law is sufficient to deal with capacity withholding 
and whether or not competition law is a suitable forum to address abuse in energy 
markets are two distinct questions. It is reasonable to conclude that traditional 
competition law methodologies are insufficient to address the complexities of energy 
markets. The suitability of competition law, on the other hand, requires an evaluation 
of the legal and economic tools available for the assessment of market power in 
energy markets. These questions are discussed later in greater detail. 
4.2.3. Case Law on Capacity Withholding After REMIT 
Data collection based on REMIT began in October 2015 for standardised contracts 
and in April 2016 for non-standardised contracts. Until then, investigations into 
market conduct for possible breaches of REMIT provisions had been carried out on 
the basis of notifications from market participants, persons professionally arranging 
transactions in wholesale energy products (the PPATs), and information from public 
sources. ACER, in its 2015 annual report on its activities under REMIT, reports that 
there were 78 cases reported between 2013 and 2015866. The report shows that 44 
of these cases involved allegations of market manipulation in relation to Article 5 of 
REMIT. In the majority of these cases, the national competent authorities and ACER 
either found insufficient evidence to support a manipulation claim or issued no 
sanctions against identified breaches, except for giving warnings as to possible 
repetitions.  As of 2017, the only case that has resulted in a sanction on a firm for a 
breach of the prohibition of market manipulation is Iberdrola by SCA on 24 
                                                          
865 The CREG, Belgian Energy Regulator, provides that it will use REMIT to deal with such market misconduct. 
See; Marc Martens & Peter Willis, (2014). See also, Leigh Hancher, (2013);  Christopher Jones (ed),(2016), 311  
866 Supra note 97  
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November, 2015. There are also other ongoing cases in which the national 
competent authorities investigated for a breach of Article 5 of REMIT, such as the 
investigation against Enel and Sorgenia by the Italian energy regulator as discussed 
above. It is reasonable to expect that more investigations and decisions will follow as 
data reporting for standardised and non-standardised contracts as well as 
notifications as to possible breaches of anti-manipulation rules increase. However, 
as of January 2017, case law analysis on the prosecution of market manipulation 
under REMIT is limited to Iberdrola. 
4.2.3.1. Iberdrola (Spain) 
On November 24, 2015, SCA established that Iberdrola, the second largest 
electricity generator after Endesa867, had committed market manipulation in Spanish 
wholesale electricity markets in violation of Article 5 of REMIT and fined the firm €25 
Million for the breach868. The finding stemmed from Iberdrola’s activities during a 
time period between 30, November and 23, December, 2013. According to SCA, 
Iberdrola engaged in physical capacity withholding during the relevant period to 
increase prices of electricity traded in the wholesale electricity market. The decision 
was contested by Iberdrola and the case is currently in appeal.  
The alleged manipulative conduct involved a reduction of the electricity supply 
offered to the Spanish wholesale market by Iberdrola. SCA claimed that the firm 
deliberately withheld water at its Duero, Sil and Tajo hydroelectric power plants, 
which together constituted nearly half of the total hydroelectric capacity in Spain869. 
While the amount of electricity dispatched from these hydroelectric plants before the 
relevant period reached 45 GWh with average daily prices at around €45-55/MWh, 
electricity offered by Iberdrola reduced to 13 GWh between 30 November and 23 
December, despite the higher prices during the relevant period870.  The withholding 
activity caused an increase of €7 MWh in the wholesale electricity prices and ten per 
                                                          
867 Delloite. (ND). European Energy Market Reform, 4 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources/gx-er-
marketreform-spain.pdf  
868 Peter Willis & Hermenegildo Altozano, ‘Spanish authority fines Iberdrola €25m in first REMIT market 
manipulation infringement decision’ (Bird&Bird, 4 February, 2014) 
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2016/spain/spanish-authority-fines-iberdrola-25m-in-first-remit-
infringement-decision  
869 Supra note 775  
870 Peter Willis & Hermenegildo Altozano, (2014)  
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cent in retail prices as the relevant period intersected with a government tendering 
process which determined prices for domestic end-users of the following period871.   
SCA identified that reservoirs held in the hydroelectric capacity of these three power 
plants during the relevant period were higher than those in past years. Historical 
analysis revealed that Iberdrola’s production figures from these plants were 
considerably larger in previous years, despite the lower water levels at their 
reservoirs. Economically, Iberdrola should have had an incentive to increase its 
output as the financial profits it could have derived from per MWh, increased due to 
high electricity prices during the relevant period and its water reservoirs were 
available for further production. Nor could the withholding be justified on the basis of 
forward prices. Iberdrola could not claim that it had held withheld its capacity with the 
expectation of higher electricity prices in upcoming months, as forward contracts 
prices were at levels lower than those in the day-ahead market. According to SCA, 
the main motive behind Iberdrola’s withholding of capacity in its three hydroelectric 
units was to render operational its more expensive CCGT plants which would move 
the merit order in the Spanish wholesale electricity market to more expensive 
generation plants and set electricity at higher prices so that it could derive more 
profits from its overall output.  SCA estimated that the financial benefit accrued by 
Iberdrola from increased electricity prices reached € 21.5 million for the relevant 
period872. 
Iberdrola objected to SCA’s allegations, claiming that the contested practice was 
carried out for legitimate reasons. On December 16, 2015, the firm’s Chief Executive 
Officer, Jose Ignacio Sanchez Galan said that;  
“Those days, we were buying, not selling, we are a producer of wind and 
hydro. There was a tremendous drop, no wind. If we do not have enough 
energy to supply our customers, we are forced to buy. So if we are forced to 
buy, we have no interest to increase the price.873” 
                                                          
871 First Economic Sanctions for REMIT Breaches in Europe, (Lexology, 16 February, 2016), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=66b554d0-514c-40b3-b4fb-67374a43b111   
872 Peter Willis & Hermenegildo Altozano, (2014)  
873 Jim Polson, ‘Iberdrola Appealing Fine for Manipulating Market, CEO Says’ (Bloomberg, December 2015) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-16/iberdrola-appealing-fine-for-manipulating-market-
ceo-says  
262 | P a g e  
 
Galan’s comment on the “tremendous drop”, in the firm’s hydroelectric capacity 
contradicts SCA’s finding of water reservoirs held available during the relevant 
period. Whether Iberdrola was forced to buy and in fact did buy electricity from other 
producers to supply its consumers or whether the available reservoirs held in its 
hydroelectric capacity were sufficient remains to be seen during the judicial review. 
This case is of great importance for the future of the regulation of European 
wholesale energy markets. It is the first time that a national competent authority has 
applied the prohibition of market manipulation to an energy supplier. The legal 
analysis carried out by SCA did not include an identification of relevant markets in 
the Spanish wholesale markets. Nor did it discuss whether Iberdrola held market 
dominance or a pivotal position for electricity supply. The findings of SCA provide 
significant legal implications as to the differences in enforcement procedures under 
REMIT and competition law. 
4.2.4. Evaluation 
4.2.4.1. Types of Capacity Withholding 
As mentioned above, the EU authorities continuously argued that a specific, tailor-
made legal framework was required to deal with certain types of market abuse such 
as capacity withholding activities, in wholesale energy markets 874 . Economic 
literature and case law also suggested that parties would withhold their capacity 
either physically or economically875. While the former indicates a reduction in output 
deliberately perpetrated to move merit curves to expensive power plants, the latter 
involves a strategic bidding activity that is designed to be not selected, yet again to 
ensure demand and supply for energy is settled at expensive power plants. In 
physical withholding, perpetrators may allege that the contested practices stem from 
expected or unexpected maintenance measures in generation facilities. In fact, 
electricity producers may present various reasons for not continuing electricity 
production. The legitimacy of withholding practices were widely discussed, during the 
consultation period, prior to the publication of the CESR-ERGEG’s advice document 
in 2008 and it was accepted that in certain conditions, a capacity withholding activity 
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875 The Inquiry, 132-133. See also; David Newbery, et al., (2004), 17; Shaun D. McRae & Frank A. Wolak, ‘ How 
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could be justified on the basis of legitimate reasons. Consequently, REMIT adopted 
the concept of ‘Accepted Market Practices’ to provide a safe harbour for market 
participants in engaging in certain practices876. The legitimacy of these reasons will 
be evaluated on case by case basis. 
In economic withholding, generators submit bids at high prices during capacity 
auctions in wholesale markets. Whether or not a bid submitted to a wholesale market 
is high depends on the marginal operational costs of generation plants877. An energy 
producer is expected to price its output on the basis of operational costs of its 
generation plants and a mark-up price including certain fixed and variable expenses. 
Each generation capacity has different operational costs depending on fuel types, 
and generation technology. An analysis of price levels should include any external or 
internal factors that affect operational costs. When such factors do not correspond to 
price levels at which bids are submitted, generators can be presumed to be engaged 
in a targeted bidding strategy to achieve a certain market outcome. Therefore, while 
the legal analysis in economic withholding practices focuses on price relations 
between submitted bids and operational costs, the issue in physical withholding 
activities is based on the legitimacy of reductions in generation output. In either case, 
the price of wholesale electricity would be lower but for the withholding activities.  
4.2.4.2. Feasibility 
4.2.4.2.1. Generation Portfolio 
Both physical and economic withholding practices are loss-incurring, that is, 
generators which engage in withholding practices forego financial profits that could 
have been derived from the withheld generation878. Therefore the sustainability and 
profitability of such practices require perpetrators to hold other positions that render 
them profitable879. There are different ways that an electricity producer can benefit 
from withholding. The existence of a portfolio of generation facilities, for example, 
may provide financial incentives for generators to engage in capacity withholding. As 
mentioned above, while less expensive generation plants operate as baseload 
power, more expensive plants become operational only when there is a peak 
                                                          
876 Article 2(2)(a)(ii), Regulation No 1227/2011. See also; ACER’s Guidance (2016), 73-76 
877 David Newbery, et al., (2004), 30 
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demand when baseload power plants do not suffice to supply. Producers which have 
a generation portfolio and generate electricity from different types of generation 
facilities and resources such as renewables, nuclear power, coal, lignite, gas 
turbines or combined combustion gas turbines may seek to reduce operation of their 
less expensive generation facilities such as renewables or nuclear power to have 
more expensive gas turbines or CCGTs included in merit curves. As the last selected 
plants determine the market price for electricity produced in this particular hour, the 
price that a withholding generator would receive from its overall production increases. 
Market participants profit more from their output, despite the lower levels of 
production. 
4.2.4.2.2. Sales in Balancing Markets 
EU case law also provides that generators may engage in withholding activities to 
profit from higher prices in balancing markets 880 . Wholesale electricity markets 
consist of wholesale spot881 and balancing markets882. While the former operates as 
the main markets in which market operators determine demand for and supply of 
electricity on the basis of expected use, the latter is designed to ensure that demand 
for and supply of electricity is balanced. Differences between electricity produced 
and electricity consumed pose significant threats to the integrity of transmission 
systems to the extent that slight deviations between demand and supply may result 
in the collapse or malfunctioning of transmission grids883. In order to ensure that 
demand for and supply of electricity matches all the time, transmission system 
operators or market operators open a separate balancing market in which electricity 
is procured on the basis of actual demand. The generators which have flexible 
generation facilities with lower start-up costs and better transmission connections 
have a comparative advantage and thus can be pivotal in supplying these markets. 
Through withholding supply in wholesale markets, generators make sure that more 
electricity is needed in balancing markets and their output is pivotal for demand. As 
the price of electricity in balancing markets is more expensive than that in wholesale 
markets, perpetrators derive more profits from withheld capacity.  
                                                          
880 See: Endesa/Iberdrola/Union Fenosa/Hidrocantabrico; EGL/Repower/Tirreno Power; Enel/Sorgenia 
881 For more information on wholesale spot markets, see: Petri Mantysaari, (2015), 198 – 225    
882 REMIT considers balancing markets as part of wholesale energy markets. Article 2(4), Regulation No 
1227/2011. 
883 Petri Mantysaari, (2015), 313 
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4.2.4.2.3. Cross-Product Positions 
Producers of electricity may also have incentives to engage in capacity withholding 
due to their positions in long-term contracts or other contracts such as financial 
derivatives. Continuous high prices in wholesale markets may affect prices in long-
term supply contracts. A producer which bilaterally contracted with consumers or 
other suppliers to sell large amounts of electricity for a long supply period may have 
an incentive to increase prices in day-ahead or intraday markets, if these prices 
directly or indirectly affect the price of electricity determined under long-term supply 
contract. This was the Commission’s main concern in German Electricity Wholesale 
Market884, in which E.ON, selling electricity through both wholesale markets and 
long-term contracts, allegedly withheld its capacity to increase prices. The losses 
incurred due to non-operated facilities were compensated via profits gained in the 
overall sale of electricity at higher prices. A similar pricing relationship may also be 
relevant for financial contracts which derive their value based on fluctuations in 
wholesale electricity markets. Nevertheless, this type of market practice should be 
regarded as cross-market manipulation, despite involving capacity withholding.  
4.2.4.3. Perpetration 
Case law indicates that there are a number of factors required to ensure the 
profitability of withholding practices. Accordingly, a market participant seeking to 
profit from withholding its capacity should have a market power in comparison with 
the total generation capacity available for the particular geographic region and time 
period. The analysis of market power is not limited to the mere calculation of market 
shares. In certain market conditions, such as periods of high demand, (e.g., 
Edipower/Enel), or the unavailability of transmission capacity, (e.g., Enel/Sorgenia), 
generators may acquire a pivotal position in supplying electricity for the relevant 
period or the relevant location. Furthermore, the generation portfolio held by the 
withholding producers (e.g. German Electricity Wholesale Market) should have 
cheaper generation facilities to the extent that withholding these facilities creates 
sufficient capacity shortages that more expensive generation facilities are called in. 
The profits from operating units must surpass the losses from the withheld capacity. 
While the analysis of market power focuses on the ability of a generator or 
                                                          
884 German Electricity Wholesale Market (COMP/39.388) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C36/8 
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generators to affect prices in wholesale electricity markets, the analysis of a 
generation portfolio evaluates whether one or more generators have an incentive to 
withhold capacity from wholesale electricity markets. 
An electricity producer who seeks to raise profits through capacity withholding will do 
so, only if it knows when the planned withholding activity will result in expected price 
increases. Other factors, such as the ability and the incentive to withhold capacity, 
are closely related to market information, such as when to exercise the relevant 
bidding activity.  In all of the cases discussed above, the generation companies 
exploited specific time periods such as peak hours and specific locations where only 
a limited number of suppliers could participate in balancing services. This was 
strikingly clear in EGL/Repower/Tirreno Power, in which the companies knew that 
they could exercise their collective market power in the Italian ancillary services 
market only if none of them was picked by the Italian transmission operator, Terna, 
to generate power in the day-ahead market885. The pivotality of each firm led them to 
cooperate to give effect to withholding practices. Without the information on the 
periods of higher demand and pivotality, these generation companies would have 
incurred substantial financial risks, as the withheld capacity can always be supplied 
by other competing, low-cost generation companies.  
4.2.4.4. Legal Analysis under Competition Law 
4.2.4.4.1. Prohibitions 
Withholding their capacity, electricity producers either alone or collaboratively seek 
to move market prices at higher levels to earn more profits from their output886. 
Under EU competition law, these types of activities are prohibited as violations of 
competition law under Articles 101 and 102 of TFEU.  Article 101 directly provides 
that all agreements, decisions or concerted practices which constitute price fixing 
and output limitation may account for a distortion of competition887, as they cause 
consumers to pay higher prices and not receive the desired quantities888. These 
                                                          
885 Peter Willis & Simone Cadeddu, (2012)  
886 Economic analysis shows that the perpetration of capacity withholding does not require a collusive conduct 
by multiple undertakings. See; Carolyn A. Berry, et al., ‘ Analysing Strategic Bidding Behaviour in Transmission 
Networks’ in Harry Singh (ed), Game Theory Applications in Electric Power Markets (IEEE Power Engineering 
Society Winter Meeting, New York, 1999)  
887 Article 101(1)(a), (b) of the TFEU 
888 Christopher Jones (ed), (2016), 166 
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types of agreements are generally considered as “hardcore restraints” 889  and 
“restrictions by object”890, meaning that the Commission and national competition 
authorities are not required to show negative effects on trade to prove that these 
agreement are anti-competitive and a distortion to competition891. These agreements 
are presumed to have negative effects on competition and are thus prohibited.  
Article 102 of TFEU, on the other hand, prohibits the abuse of dominance by 
undertakings through imposing, inter alia, unfair prices and limiting production892. In 
Sirena v. Eda, the CJEU noted that particularly high price levels of products can 
reveal an abuse of dominance, unless there is a justification by any objective 
criteria893. In General Motors, the Commission adopted the concept of excessive 
pricing to illustrate unfair pricing practices894. The concept was further elaborated in 
United Brands in which the Court explained that a price would be deemed 
“excessive”, if it unreasonably deviated from the economic value of the product895. In 
order to identify whether a price is based on its economic value, the Court introduced 
a two-stage test providing that excessive prices “could, inter alia, be determined 
objectively if it were possible for it to be calculated by making a comparison between 
the selling price of the product in question and its cost of production, which would 
disclose the amount of the profit margin. The questions therefore to be determined 
are whether the difference between the costs actually incurred and the price actually 
charged is excessive, and, if the answer to this question is affirmative, whether a 
price has been imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to 
competing products. Other ways may be devised of selecting the rules for 
                                                          
889 Commission, ‘Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU (formerly Article 81(3) TEC)’ 
(Communication) OJ 2004 C101/97: Vol II App C13, para 23. 
890 In European Night Service v. Commission, the General Court found that agreements containing certain 
provisions fixing prices or sharing markets will automatically be held to restrict competition under Article 101, 
T-374, 375, 384 and 388/94 European Night Service v. Commission [1998] ECR II-3141 198, para 136. See also; 
Competition Authority v. Beef Industry Development Society Ltd, the CJEU held that agreements between 
competitors to reduce capacity had as their object the restriction of competition. Case C-209/07 Competition 
Authority v. Beef Industry Development Society Ltd [2008] ECR I-8637 643.  
891 Case C-49/92 P - Commission v Anic Partecipazioni [1999] ECR I-4125, para 99.; Case C-209/07 Competition 
Authority v. Beef Industry Development Society Ltd [2008] ECR I-8637 643, para 16 
892 Article 102 (a), (b) of the TFEU 
893 Case 40/70 Sirena S.R.L. v Eda S.R.L. and others [1979] ECR-03169 236, para 17 
894 Case C-26/75 General Motors Continental NV v Commission of the European Communities, [1975] ECR I-
01367 150, para 12, 22. 
895 Case C-27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European 
Communities [1978] ECR-I00207 22, para 235 
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determining whether the price of a product is unfair”896. Accordingly, in order to 
determine whether a price is excessive, the court first evaluates actual costs and 
prices. This is followed by a comparison of the price with those of the company’s 
competitors. Since the holding in United Brands, the CJEU has engaged in several 
price comparisons, such as price-cost margin analysis, price comparisons between 
markets or rivals, price comparisons across geographic areas, and comparisons 
over different time periods897.    
4.2.4.4.2. Capacity Withholding as Excessive Pricing 
4.2.4.4.2.1. General 
The concept of excessive pricing is highly contested in economic and legal literature 
as well as case law. In Trinko 898,  the US Supreme Court noted that “(t)he mere 
possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices – 
at least for a short period- is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it 
induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the 
incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unless it is 
accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct”.  The term “anticompetitive 
conduct” in the decision refers to Section 1 of the Sherman Act which is equivalent to 
Article 101 of the TFEU, and Section 2 of the Sherman Act which mirrors the concept 
of exclusionary abuse of dominance under EU competition law. Accordingly, US 
antitrust law does not proscribe exploitative practices by monopolists, unless it 
coincides with an anti-competitive agreement or an exclusionary abuse of market 
power such as margin squeeze, tying and bundling, or predatory pricing practices899.  
This is similar to the Commission’s approach900 which holds that price regulation is in 
contrast to the concept of a free market economy and should not be applied without 
finding that the market in question suffers a natural or legal monopoly and thus did 
not enforce Article 102 against pricing practices. The complexity of excessive pricing 
cases stems from the difficulties in identifying the correct benchmark price that 
                                                          
896 Ibid., para 251-252 
897 Christopher Jones (ed), (2016), 365 
898 Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP, 3540 US 398, 407 (2004) 
899 Donal F. Turner, ‘The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to 
Deal’ (1962) 75(4) Harvard Law Review 655, 669.  
900 Philip Lowe, ‘Consumer Welfare and Efficiency – New Guiding Principles of Competition Policy?’ (13th 
Internation Conference on Competition and 14th European Competition Day, Munich, March 2007)  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2007_02_en.pdf  
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competition authorities regard as the price that would have been in place but for the 
anti-competitive conduct 901 . The two-pronged analysis developed under United 
Brands is not regarded as illustrative as a cost/price analysis and the concept of 
economic value does not indicate the extent of value and types of costs to be 
included in final prices. The Commission, in Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of 
Helsingborg, concluded that the test developed by the CJEU in United Brands, is 
very difficult to apply, providing very little guidance on how to determine unfair 
prices902.  
4.2.4.4.2.2. Enforcement at EU level 
The limited case law on capacity withholding at EU level can be explained by the 
EU’s reluctance to enforce competition law against excessive and unfair pricing 
practices903. Even though capacity withholding practices by energy producers were 
considered a major problem for the competitiveness of European energy markets in 
the 2007 Energy Sector Inquiry, the first and only enforcement action by the 
Commission on this issue came only in 2008, against E.ON in German Wholesale 
Energy Market904. The evidence used by the Commission in its holding of capacity 
withholding by E.ON was based on the findings of the Sector Inquiry which had 
calculated the load factors of major electricity producers in Germany to identify 
generation facilities which are not optimally operated905. The Commission broadly 
described its finding of capacity withholding in German Wholesale Energy Market, 
without providing details on when the German electricity producers engaged in 
withholding practices and how they colluded to give effect to price increases. Even 
though E.ON, RWE and Vattenfall are together held collusively dominant in the 
broadly defined German wholesale electricity market, the Commission alleged that 
                                                          
901 Christopher Jones (ed), (2016), 366-367 
902 Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg (Case COMP/A.36.568/D3) Commission Decision [2004], para 
217  
903 “The existence of a dominant position is not itself against the rules of competition. Consumers can suffer 
from a dominant company exploiting this position, the most likely way being through prices higher than would 
be found if the market were subject to effective competition. However, the Commission in its decision-making 
practice does not normally control or condemn the high level of prices as such. Rather it examines the 
behaviour of the dominant company designed to preserve its dominance, usually directly against competitors 
or new entrants who would normally bring about effective competition and the price level associated with it.” 
XXIVth Report on Competition Policy, (Commission, 1994), para 207. See also; Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, 
(2014), 579 
904 German Electricity Wholesale Market (COMP/39.388) Commission Decision [2008] OJ C36/8 
905 The Sector Inquiry did not seek to analyse whether relevant market participants, in deed, committed 
excessive pricing or capacity withholding practices.  
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E.ON alone accounted for capacity withholding and thus was in violation of Article 
102 of the TFEU. As the case was settled under the “Commitment Decisions” 
procedure under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003906, the decision did not provide an in-
depth analysis on how the generators’ activities infringed EU competition law907. 
Instead, the investigation concluded with poorly evaluated divestiture obligations on 
E.ON’s generation assets908.  
4.2.4.4.2.3. Enforcement at National Level 
At national level, more insight is given into how competition law rules are applied to 
capacity withholding practices. National competent authorities from Belgium, Italy 
and Spain initiated several proceedings against electricity producers for withholding 
practices. The proceedings included allegations of violation of both Articles 101 and 
102 of the TFEU. The cases clearly established that capacity withholding activity was 
a form of exercise of market power. The perpetrators could engage in such practices 
by either abusing their own market power (e.g. Enel/Sorgenia, 
Endesa/Iberdrola/Union Fenosa/Hidrocantabrico) or colluding with other market 
participants (e.g. EGL/Repower/Tirreno Power) to give effect to the desired price 
increases. Moreover, it was also implied that the analysis of the application of 
competition law to electricity markets required innovation in the legal approaches 
taken by competition authorities and courts. For example, in the Italian cases, the 
ICA defined relevant markets narrowly on the basis of market characteristics and 
transmission constraints. The ICA established a zone-based pricing mechanism that 
involved pricing of electricity based on the transmission constraints between different 
geographic locations, so called ‘zones’, rather than a single Italian transmission 
market 909 , contradicting the Commission’s practice which defined markets for 
                                                          
906 Supra note 266  
 
907 Regulation 1/2003 provides two procedural regimes for the investigation of anti-competitive practices to 
the European Commission. While Article 7 serves as the standard infringement procedure when the 
Commission believes that there is sufficient evidence to hold a market participant liable for a violation of 
competition law rule, Article 9 establishes ‘the Commitment Decisions’ procedure through which the 
Commission engages in negotiations with market participants and concludes binding decisions that the market 
participants undertook to comply with. Article 9 has been effectively used by the Commission in pursuing its 
energy liberalization agenda, as it has enjoyed a wider margin of appreciation in designing commitments. 
However, it is also provided that concerns arise as to the uncertainties in the application of competition law 
due to excessive use of the Commitment Decisions. Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, (2014), 983 
908 Malgozata Sadowska, (2013), 88 
909 Angelica Gianfreda and Luigi Grossi, (2009) 
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transmission of electricity in a broader manner910. Another example is SCA’s finding 
of temporary dominance in Endesa/Iberdrola/Union Fenosa/Hidrocantabrico, 
concluding that market power on electricity prices by producers was exercised for 
only a three-day period.    
Even though the national competent authorities played an active role in fighting 
capacity withholding practices in electricity markets, their approaches to the 
enforcement and prosecution of such activities were far from being consistent. The 
Italian Competition Authority can be considered more successful in prosecuting 
capacity withholding as a violation of competition law. The Italian wholesale 
electricity market has been segmented into multiple sub-markets on the basis of 
transmission constraints. The determination of market power in these markets was 
carried out via an evaluation of pivotal positions held by electricity producers rather 
than through a calculation of market shares in electricity generation911. In Electrabel, 
the Competition College, the decision-making body of the Belgian Competition 
Authority, the BCA concluded that there had been no violation of abuse of dominant 
position, pointing out the defendant generator’s lack of anti-competitive intent in 
withholding its capacity from the Belgian wholesale electricity market. The reason 
behind this evaluation stemmed from the finding that the withheld capacity 
accounted for only 1.1 per cent of total capacity available in the Belgian wholesale 
electricity market, which, as the Competition College considered, was insufficient to 
affect electricity prices in the respective market912. The College also remarked that 
whether or not capacity withholding practices constituted violations of competition 
law was not clear according to EU case law. The Spanish Competition Authority’s 
approach was different. It specifically identified temporary markets that arose due to 
exceptional congestion problems and held that the positions held by the Spanish 
electricity producers in these markets could be considered dominant as they could 
act independently of their competitors to set prices at higher levels. Nevertheless, 
SCA’s decision was later quashed by the Spanish Supreme Court which rejected the 
ability to affect prices temporarily as a factor in determining dominance913.  
                                                          
910 Sydkraft/Graninge (Case COMP/M.3268) Commission Decision [2003] OJ L2985, paras 74, 75. 
911 Peter Willis & Simone Cadeddu, (2012)  
912 Supra note 822  
913 Malgozata Sadowska, (2013), 153 
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The legal analysis carried out in Iberdrola highlights legal implications of the 
differences between EU competition law and REMIT in prosecuting capacity 
withholding practices. As mentioned above, in order to hold an undertaking liable for 
an Article 102 violation, the competition authorities are required to show that this 
undertaking holds dominance in relevant markets. Iberdrola’s market share in the 
Spanish wholesale electricity market was 20 per cent914, not sufficient to establish 
dominance under EU competition law. The concept of wholesale electricity markets 
is defined very broadly under EU case law which encompasses; 
• the production of electricity in power plants, 
• import or export of electricity via interconnectors and 
• the sale on the wholesale market to 
o traders,  
o regional distribution companies and,  
o occasionally large industrial final users, only if they are directly 
connected to the transmission grid and able to be directly 
supplied on the wholesale market915.  
Moreover, competition authorities are obliged to establish that electricity producers 
hold at least 40 per cent of the market share in these broadly described relevant 
markets. In paragraph 12 of the Guidance Paper, the Commission explains that the 
calculation of market shares is not the sole indicator of dominance, as barriers to 
entry or expansion and countervailing buyer power are also important factors in 
demarcating the market power undertakings can exert in relevant markets 916 . 
However, the Commission’s approach to market shares was not welcomed by EU 
courts. In Telefonica, the General Court held that it was the calculation of market 
shares indispensable for the assessment of market dominance rather than the 
                                                          
914 Supra note 867  
915 Sydkraft/Graninge (Case COMP/M.3268) Commission Decision 2003/297/EC OJ C 297/22; EDP/ENI/GDP 
(Case COMP/M.3440) Commission Decision 2005/801/EC, [2005] OJ L302/69; E.ON/MOL (Case COMP/M.3696) 
Commission Decision 2006/622/EC OJ L253/20; RWE/Essent (Case COMP/M.5467) Commission Decision 
23/06/2009 OJ C222/1; EDF/British Energy (Case COMP/M.5225) Commission Decision 22/12/2008 OJ C38/8 
916 Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings [2009] OJ C45/2, para 12 
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existence of the ability to increase prices.917. In United Brands the CJEU suggested 
that market shares below 40 per cent would be unlikely to raise concerns about 
market power918. Accordingly, capacity withholding practices would be prosecutable 
under EU competition law, only if they were perpetrated by major electricity 
companies with large incumbent powers. The companies with less market presence 
can easily withhold their capacity with impunity, which raises concerns about “Type 2 
errors” in competition law meaning that courts or competition authorities fail to 
proscribe agreements, conduct or mergers where there is actual or likely anti-
competitive harm919.  This was, in fact, the case after the Spanish Supreme Court’s 
annulment of SCA’s decisions on capacity withholding practices under competition 
law. 
4.2.4.5. Legal Analysis under REMIT 
4.2.4.5.1. Identification of Prima Facie Case 
SCA, in Iberdrola, applied REMIT’s anti-manipulation rules to the defendant 
generator and did not engage in a legal analysis of the dominant position to hold that 
the defendant generator violated Article 102 of the TFEU. ACER’s guidance on the 
application of REMIT specifically identifies capacity withholding as a type of price 
manipulation920 and Article 2(2)(a)(ii) of REMIT defines pricing manipulation as  
“entering into any transaction or issuing any order to trade in wholesale 
energy products which: (…) secures or attempts to secure, by a person or 
persons acting in collaboration, the price of one or several wholesale 
energy products at an artificial level, unless the person who entered into 
the transaction or issued the order to trade establishes that his reasons for 
doing so are legitimate and that that transaction or order to trade conforms 
                                                          
917 Case T-336/07 Telefonica SA and Telefonica de Espana v European Commission [2012], paras. 166, 148-150, 
2008 OJ C83/6, the appeal from Wanadoo Espana/Telefonica (COMP/38.784) Commission Decision of 04 July, 
2007 
918 In fact, the CJEU examined lower market shares and did not directly dismiss the possibility of undertakings 
with lower market shares holding dominance in several cases. See Case C-250/92, Gottrup Klim v. KLG [1994] 
ECR I-5641, in which the Court evaluated as to whether a company with 36 and 32 per cent of share in two 
different markets held dominance, which it responded as negative. The lowest market share, the Court 
deemed dominant under its case law is 39.7 per cent. See; British Airways plc v. Commission Case C-95/04 
[2006] ECR I-2331 
919 Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, (2014), 57-58 
920 Supra note 191   
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to accepted market practices on the wholesale energy market concerned 
(…)”.   
This article lists five elements for a market behaviour to be prohibited as market 
manipulation. First, there must be any transaction or order to trade in wholesale 
energy products921. Second, this transaction or order to trade must secure or attempt 
to secure the price of wholesale energy products at a specific level. Third, this new 
price level must be artificial. Fourth, the artificial prices are caused by the relevant 
transaction or order to trade. Fifth, reasons presented by perpetrators for engaging in 
such transactions or orders to trade are not legitimate or regarded as accepted 
market practices by other regulatory frameworks.  
4.2.4.5.1.1. Securing the Price of a Wholesale Energy 
Product 
The second, third and fourth elements are of particular importance in finding a 
capacity withholding activity is a violation of REMIT’s anti-manipulation rules. The 
second element requires a capacity withholding practice to affect or attempt to affect 
the price of a wholesale electricity product. This element is related to the ability of 
each market participant in affecting wholesale electricity prices. The determination of 
merit curves by transmission system operators or market operators is fundamental 
for the assessment of power generators’ abilities to increase prices of wholesale 
electricity markets. This ability does not require large market shares. The analysis of 
market shares does not provide sufficient tools to measure how dominant electricity 
producers can increase prices by withholding their capacity922. In fact, a producer 
with a high market share may not be able to increase prices through withholding its 
capacity, if other market players have enough capacity to offer the same amount of 
electricity at the same prices. On the other hand, a producer with a relatively small 
market share can easily increase the price of wholesale electricity product, if it knows 
when its capacity is pivotal for the supply of a certain amount of electricity at a 
certain price.  This is incorporated in REMIT which specifically refrains from using 
                                                          
921 Article 2(4), Regulation No 1227/2011 
922 Gary Taylor, et al., (2015), 38 
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the term “dominant position” and instead, describes the ability to secure prices as 
“decisive position”923.  
The legal analysis under the second element is very similar to those carried out by 
the national competition authorities before REMIT. The assessment of a dominant 
position for the electricity producers in these cases was based on the pivotality of 
their generation facilities in given merit curves. In describing dominant positions held 
by the relevant electricity producers, BCA, ICA and SCA put particular focus on the 
supply levels at respective merit curves. The establishment of the ability to affect 
electricity prices was a fundamental factor for the national competition authorities in 
identifying dominant positions held by the electricity producers. This was in 
compliance with the General Court’s approach in AstraZeneca, in which market 
power was defined as “(…) the ability of an undertaking to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of its competitors, its customers and, ultimately, consumers, in 
the sense that it is in particular able to maintain prices at a higher level while 
retaining a much higher market share than those of its competitors (…)”924. The 
producers which ensured that their capacity was necessary for the supply of 
electricity at certain price levels and at certain periods were able to act independently 
of their competitors and operated as price-setting rather than price-taking market 
participants. Accordingly the assessment of dominance by the national competition 
authorities in capacity withholding cases is similar to that of the ability to affect prices 
in wholesale energy products under REMIT’s anti-manipulation rule.   
4.2.4.5.1.2. Artificial Price 
The third element focuses on the analysis of price artificiality in wholesale electricity 
markets. REMIT describes artificiality as price levels that are “not justified by market 
forces of supply and demand, including actual availability of production, storage or 
transmission capacity and demand”925.  The formulation of a legal approach to the 
application of the concept of artificiality is important for the enforcement of REMIT 
against market manipulation. Two different approaches can be taken for the 
establishment of artificiality. First, national competent authorities may identify that 
prices in wholesale electricity markets are artificial, once it is found that one or 
                                                          
923 Recital 14, Regulation No 1227/2011.  
924 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v. Commission [2010] ECR II-2805, para 267. 
925 Recital 13, Regulation No 1227/2011. 
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multiple electricity producers active in the relevant wholesale markets withheld their 
capacity. Given the reference to the availability of production facilities as a factor that 
impacts market forces of supply and demand, the definition in REMIT may indicate 
the adoption of such an approach. This analysis may provide legal advantages with 
respect to relieving competent authorities from identifying competitive benchmark 
prices and engaging in complex price evaluations including price-cost margin 
analysis, price comparisons between markets or rivals, price comparisons across 
geographic areas and comparisons over different time periods.  
This is, in fact, the approach adopted by the CFTC in DiPlacido 926  on the 
enforcement of an anti-manipulation law under the artificial price-based definition of 
the Commodity Exchange Act (the CEA)927. As discussed above, under US case law, 
the identification of price artificiality by the CFTC had proved to be very difficult to 
satisfy until DiPlacido as it had required the CFTC to establish artificiality on the 
basis of prices rather than a manipulative conduct. The complexity of the context 
was further elevated due to the stance of US law on pricing behaviours which is 
stricter than that of EU law in forbidding competent authorities to act in the manner of 
price regulators928. In order to avoid burdensome price evaluations, in DiPlacido, the 
CFTC changed its approach to price artificiality and held that once it was established 
that perpetrators engaged in a conduct that was uneconomic and did not represent 
true forces of supply and demand, prices would be presumed artificial929.    
Nevertheless, the applicability of this approach to capacity withholding practices is 
problematic. The economics of merit curves under wholesale electricity markets 
does not lead to the conclusion that any withholding activity would directly result in 
price increases in wholesale electricity products. It can affect prices, only if withheld 
capacity is pivotal, meaning that the relevant generation capacity is needed to supply 
a certain amount of electricity at a certain price for a certain period of time. As long 
as wholesale electricity markets include other electricity producers which can 
produce a similar amount of electricity at similar price levels, price changes that are 
required to establish artificiality will not arise.  In other words, a withholding activity 
may create no price change that can be presumed artificial under this approach. The 
                                                          
926 In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,970 (CFTC 2008) 
927 Section 6(c) of 7 U.S.C. § 13b (2010)  
928 William J. Baer & Edith Ramirez, (2014), AAI The American Antitrust Institute, 3-4  
929 In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,970 (CFTC 2008), 18 
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identification of price change is a requirement for national competent authorities to 
identify a withholding activity manipulation and they can do so only after engaging in 
extensive pricing evaluations including cost/price analysis and comparisons between 
markets products and time periods.  
The second approach is similar to those taken by the CFTC before DiPlacido930 and 
the national competition authorities in the aforementioned cases under EU 
competition law. Accordingly, competent authorities establishing that capacity 
withheld by perpetrators in furtherance of their scheme were pivotal in wholesale 
electricity markets, engage in pricing evaluations to establish price artificiality. Even 
though the CFTC’s experience with these pricing evaluations was problematic under 
US case law, the EU, despite the existence of limited case law, has been more 
successful in prosecuting pricing abuses under competition law. SCA included price 
evaluations also in Iberdrola under REMIT to determine whether the withholding 
activity had artificially increased pricing in the Spanish wholesale electricity market.  
The second approach is more suitable for the determination of withholding activities 
as a market manipulation under REMIT.  
It is important to note that the concept of market manipulation under REMIT is not 
limited to capacity withholding practices. EU case law on market manipulation is 
limited and does not suffice to provide a more detailed legal analysis as to how anti-
manipulation rules could be applied in European wholesale energy markets. The 
chapter’s consideration of a second approach as appropriate for the prosecution of 
capacity withholding practices may not be true for that of other manipulative 
practices under REMIT. In order to identify the scope of REMIT’s market 
manipulation prohibition, the chapter discusses possible scenarios in relation to the 
examples provided under EU soft law and the enforcement activities under US case 
law. The latter clearly illustrates that the second approach which would be suitable 
for the prosecution of capacity withholding practices may lead to significant problems 
for that of other manipulative practices. As discussed under US case law, the 
                                                          
930 “[T]o determine whether an artificial price has occurred one must look at the aggregate forces of supply and 
demand and search for those factors which are extraneous to the pricing system, are not a legitimate part of 
the economic pricing system, are not a legitimate part of the economic pricing of the commodity, or are 
extrinsic to that commodity market”. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, [1982-1984 Transfer 
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796 (CFTC 1982). For further information on approaches taken by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission to the prosecution of artificial price-based market manipulation see; 
Jerry Markham, (2015) 
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CFTC’s experience in market manipulation under artificial price-based definitions 
which required extensive pricing evaluations for the determination of price artificiality, 
clearly showed the difficulties inherent in the adoption of this approach to 
prosecuting other types of pricing manipulation such as cross-market manipulation931. 
The identification of different legal standards for different types of market 
manipulation, on the other hand, undermines the adoption of a single coherent legal 
methodology applying to all types of market manipulation.   
4.2.4.5.1.3. Causation  
Reading Article 2(2) of REMIT indicates a causation element for a finding of market 
manipulation. It prohibits market conduct that secures or attempts to secure prices of 
wholesale energy products at an artificial level. Price results in a market may hinge 
upon several factors that are not manipulative or anti-competitive. In wholesale 
energy markets, for example, price increases may be a result of constraints in 
transmission networks or shortages in supply of several resources such as, oil, 
natural gas, or low levels of rainfall932. Changes in wholesale electricity prices due to 
such factors may not be deemed artificial and manipulative. In order to establish 
price artificiality, competent authorities should provide evidence showing that price 
changes in wholesale electricity markets stem from capacity withholding activities, 
rather than from these external factors. 
The approaches provided above for the establishment of price artificiality are 
fundamental for the role played by the causation element in the finding of capacity 
withholding as market manipulation. Under the first approach which the CFTC 
adopted in DiPlacido, the causation does not constitute a major element for the 
establishment of market manipulation. As mentioned in DiPlacido the mere 
identification of conduct that is uneconomic and does not reflect the true forces of 
demand and supply would suffice to establish that prices were artificial933. Under this 
approach competent authorities may establish the causation element by simply 
proving that electricity producers withheld their capacity for a certain period of time. 
Whether or not the perpetrators’ withholding caused price changes or whether there 
were price changes at all is irrelevant to the legal analysis.  
                                                          
931 Shaun Ledgerwood & Dan Harris, (2012), 4  
932 Petri Mantysaari, (2015), 398-399 
933 In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,970 (CFTC 2008), 18 
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Under the second approach, the causation element represents a major part in pricing 
evaluations. In determining manipulation at wholesale electricity markets, competent 
authorities identify capacity withholding practices and corresponding price 
changes934. This analysis also includes the impact of factors other than capacity 
withholding on prices such as shortages in resources and transmission constraints. 
The causation element does not require competent authorities to precisely prove that 
capacity withholding is the sole reason for price changes in wholesale electricity 
markets. Instead, a proof of the proximate cause of the artificial price suffices to 
sustain a charge of manipulation935.  This does not mean that a mere finding of 
capacity withholding is sufficient to find market manipulation. The investigation 
should include a cost/price analysis and comparisons in relation toprice fluctuations 
corresponding to withholding activities. This is in line with the analysis carried out by 
SCA in Iberdrola where the electricity producer was found to cause price increases 
between 30 November and 23 December, 2013 by withholding its capacity from 
three of its hydroelectric plants936.    
The identification of the causation element was a major problem in the prosecution of 
market manipulation under the CEA’s artificial price-based rule and the CFTC faced 
difficulties in identifying what a competitive price level would be for a particular 
product before the Dodd-Frank which introduced SEC’s and FERC’s fraud-based 
anti-manipulation rule into the CEA937. Nevertheless, the finding of price effects is an 
important element for establishing capacity withholding as market manipulation. If it 
is shown that despite the withdrawal, wholesale electricity prices do not change or 
reflect the forces of demand and supply, the producer cannot be held liable for 
market manipulation. This case can be subject to further investigation on the basis of 
the prohibition on attempting to manipulate or competition law as an abuse of 
                                                          
934 In re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
21,796 (CFTC 1982) 
935 CFTC v. Parnon Energy Inc., 11 Civ. 3543 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), 23. See further Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, et al., 
‘Revolution in Manipulation Law: the New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical 
Analyses’ (2013) 15(2) U. of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 357, 370. 
936 Peter Willis & Hermenegildo Altozano, (2014)  
937 For example, in in re Indiana Farm Bureau, the CFTC found no violation of its anti-manipulation rule on the 
ground that market conditions that caused tight supply in US grains market had not been a result of a market 
practice engaged in by the defendants but rather due to external factors. The perpetrators, aware of the tight 
supply due to high demand from the Soviet Union, exploited these market conditions, which was acceptable 
under the US law. In re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796 (CFTC 1982).  See; section 3.2.3. 
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dominance by object. Therefore, the elements of artificiality and causation are 
important factors for the analysis of capacity withholding practices under REMIT’s 
anti-manipulation rules. 
It is important to note that capacity withholding practices were outside the scope of 
the CFTC’s anti-manipulation jurisdiction. The CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over 
futures trading and enforces its anti-manipulation rules against mostly cross-market 
manipulations through which perpetrators exploit price relations between futures and 
other markets938. The regulatory history on the application of artificial-price based 
definitions to these types of market manipulation provides legal implications as to the 
application of REMIT’s anti-manipulation rules. The artificiality and the causation 
elements are fundamental for establishing capacity withholding as market 
manipulation. However, the CFTC’s experience of these elements clearly shows that 
they create problems in the prosecution of other types of pricing manipulation.  
The competent authorities in the EU may adopt two different approaches to deal with 
capacity withholding practices and other types of pricing manipulation. While the first 
approach taken by the CFTC in DiPlacido may apply market manipulation other than 
capacity withholding practices, the second approach, which is based on artificial 
price analysis, may be adopted to deal with the latter. However, REMIT does not 
provide two different definitions for pricing manipulation. The adoption of two 
different approaches to the application of the same market manipulation provision 
gives rise to concerns on the integrity and consistency of the anti-manipulation 
regime under REMIT. If the competent authorities adopt the first approach to 
prosecute pricing manipulation, capacity withholding practices would be deemed 
manipulative even if they do not have any impact on wholesale electricity prices, 
which both raises concerns about ‘type 2 errors’939 and renders inapplicable the 
prohibition on attempted market manipulation. If the competent authorities adopt 
artificial-price based analysis as the sole approach to enforce pricing manipulation, 
they may end up having similar difficulties to the ones the CFTC faced in its 
regulatory history. In sum, REMIT’s anti-manipulation rule is not designed to be 
applicable to both capacity withholding practices and other types of pricing 
manipulation.  
                                                          
938 Section 2(a)(1)(A) of 7 U.S.C. (2010) 
939 Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, (2014), 57-58 
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4.2.5. Capacity Withholding in the US 
4.2.5.1. General 
The identification of how capacity withholding practices have been dealt with in US 
case law is a prerequisite in explaining the differences between legal approaches 
taken by the US and EU authorities to the enforcement of anti-manipulation rules. As 
mentioned above, this chapter follows the demarcation of US case law in providing a 
legal analysis of other types of market manipulation in the EU context. However, the 
chapter on US case law does not address the practice of capacity withholding as a 
type of market manipulation. Soft law and consultation instruments in the EU clearly 
point out that capacity withholding practices were a major concern in devising anti-
manipulation rules under REMIT. This is not the case in US case law. During the 
Western Energy Crisis in the early 2000’s, the FERC published a report on price 
manipulation in California energy markets which regarded economic and physical 
withholding practices as efforts to manipulate market prices, finding that the inflated 
bidding strategies of Enron and physical withholding of supply by Reliant Energy and 
BP energy Traders in California electricity markets might be potentially 
manipulative 940 . In these investigations, FERC relied on tariffs of the California 
Power Exchange941, due to the absence of a specific prohibition applied to market 
manipulation in energy markets which was given later in 2005 with the adoption of 
EPAct 942 . Therefore, FERC did not provide a legal analysis on how physical 
withholding practices by Reliant Energy and BP Energy Traders constituted a 
violation of anti-manipulation rules.  
The first and only case that the FERC analysed was whether a withholding activity 
by an electricity generator violated an anti-manipulation rule namely FERC’s anti-
manipulation rule 18 CFR § 1c.2, is KeySpan943. Establishing that the defendant had 
withheld capacity from markets the FERC found that the relevant withholding 
practices did not add up to market manipulation under its rule 1c.2. The finding of 
                                                          
940 Supra note 485  
941 Section 2.1.1. of The California Independent System Operator's (ISO) and California Power Exchange's (PX) 
Market Monitoring and Information Protocol (MMIP). 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/894253/000095013402007966/d97931a1exv99w435.txt  
942 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law 109–58, see; https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ58/PLAW-
109publ58.pdf  
943 FERC Enforcement Staff Report, ‘Findings of a Non-Public Investigation of Potential Market Manipulation by 
Suppliers in the New York City Capacity Market’, Docket No, IN08-2-000 & EL07-39-000 (February 2008) 
https://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/market-manipulation/nyiso-icap.pdf   
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capacity withholding later gave rise to an antitrust investigation by the US 
Department of Justice (the DoJ) under the Sherman Act944. The findings of FERC 
and the DoJ on KeySpan’s conduct are illustrative as to the differences in the 
prosecution of capacity withholding practices under anti-manipulation rules and 
competition law.  
4.2.5.2. KeySpan 
The case involved a capacity withholding practice by KeySpan, a major electricity 
generator in New York State supplying electricity in the New York Independent 
System Operator’s (NYISO) capacity markets. Separate from wholesale electricity 
markets, capacity markets are established for system reliability purposes, ensuring 
the supply of electricity during peak hours or when planned or unplanned generation 
outages occur945. In New York State, generators also submit bids to supply electricity 
in the capacity market, separate from their bids in wholesale day-ahead and real-
time markets. NYISO established a bid cap representing the highest bid a generator 
can submit in supplying electricity in the capacity market. Until 2006 when an 
additional 1000 MW electricity capacity became operational, KeySpan had been in a 
position of indispensable supplier of electricity in the New York capacity markets as 
NYISO had to procure electricity from KeySpan to maintain system reliability in peak 
hours or supply shortages. This pivotal position allowed KeySpan to bid at price caps 
without the incentive to compete with other generators on electricity supply. 
According to the NYISO, this position would no longer exist and electricity prices 
would drop as a result of the new capacity introduced in 2006. 
Nevertheless, electricity prices in the New York capacity market remained 
unchanged despite the additional 1000 MW capacity installed in 2006. Monitoring the 
bids and offers in the capacity markets, NYISO found that KeySpan had reduced its 
output by approximately the same amount as the new capacity and continued to 
place bids at price caps946. Further investigation into KeySpan’s activities in the New 
York electricity market revealed that KeySpan had also entered into swap 
agreements directly with Morgan Stanley and indirectly with Astoria, its major 
competitor in the electricity generation market, mostly operating generation units at 
                                                          
944 U.S. v. KeySpan Corportation, Memorandum & Order, Case 1:10-cv-014115 (SDNY, February 2, 2011) 
945 Energy Primer, (2015), 59 
946 FERC Enforcement Staff Report, (2008), 9 
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low marginal costs 947 . These swap agreements allowed KeySpan to receive 
payments on the condition that electricity prices in the NYISO area remained higher 
than a certain price level. Accordingly, the issue FERC and the DoJ sought to 
resolve in their investigation was whether the relevant capacity withholding activity 
along with the swap agreements between KeySpan, Morgan Stanley, and Astoria 
constituted a violation of anti-manipulation rules and antitrust law. The findings of 
FERC and the DoJ in their investigation differed significantly.   
4.2.5.3. FERC’s Findings 
FERC found that KeySpan’s capacity withholding practice and swap agreement did 
not constitute a market manipulation under its anti-manipulation law948. First, it held 
that KeySpan’s bidding activity did not violate the market rules as it did not exceed 
the price caps designated by NYISO. Having capability and incentive to offer 
capacity at price caps did not necessarily account for a manipulation of electricity 
prices as these caps were anticipated as market-clearing prices until market 
conditions dictated that offering capacity at price caps was no longer feasible on the 
basis of demand and supply levels. FERC concluded that such conditions did not 
exist even after the instalment of new capacity in 2006. Given its large market share, 
KeySpan still profited from its bidding activity at price caps despite the reduction in 
its output. The profits from operating power plants were sufficient to cover the losses 
incurred from the withheld capacity. This business model was rational on economic 
terms and thus constituted a legitimate business reason. The fact that this type of 
activity constituted an exercise of market power was irrelevant for the evaluation of 
market manipulation949. FERC decided that capacity withholding was not a per se 
violation of its anti-manipulation rules. KeySpan exercised its market power by 
reducing its output and bidding at the price caps. The exercise of market power 
might be considered as a factor in the evaluation of market manipulation. 
Nevertheless it was not alone sufficient to hold that KeySpan had violated FERC’s 
anti-manipulation rules by withholding its capacity to continue bidding at price caps. 
Second, FERC also found that swap agreements between KeySpan, Morgan 
Stanley and Astoria were designed to serve legitimate business purposes and thus 
                                                          
947 Ibid., 2 
948 Ibid., 24 
949 Ibid., 17 
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were not manipulative. According to the swap agreements KeySpan profited from 
high electricity prices. The company’s bidding activity was aimed at keeping 
electricity prices at or near the price caps. In other words, KeySpan’s bidding in the 
capacity market directly affected the profits it derived from these swap agreements 
which made KeySpan’s capacity withholding activity even more profitable. However, 
this did not mean that the capacity withholding activity was only profitable due to the 
benefits derived from swap agreements. FERC found that despite the decreases in 
revenues as a result of new capacity installed in 2006, KeySpan’s capacity 
withholding and bidding behaviour was still economically profitable and there was no 
economic evidence that the company would have discontinued its practice in the 
absence of its swap agreement950. KeySpan’s swap agreement served a legitimate 
business purpose which was to offset the decreases in revenues derived from 
electricity generation. Therefore, FERC concluded that KeySpan’s swap agreement 
was not in violation of its anti-manipulation rule, Section 1c.2. 
4.2.5.4. The DoJ’s Findings 
According to the DoJ, KeySpan’s swap agreement with Morgan Stanley and Astoria, 
along with its capacity withholding activities, constituted a violation of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act 951 . While withholding a small amount of capacity had been 
sufficient to ensure that electricity prices in the capacity market were set at price cap 
due to tight demand and supply conditions, with the instalment of new capacity in 
2006, KeySpan was forced to withhold more of its capacity which meant a decrease 
in its revenues from its electricity generation business by as much as $90 million a 
year952. The DoJ identified that KeySpan alternatively could have competed with 
other generators for sales through submitting more capacity at lower prices. This 
would also have resulted in drops in electricity prices benefitting the customers of 
NYISO.  
Instead of competing for sales, KeySpan continued its withholding practice. In order 
to mitigate its losses from its withheld capacity, KeySpan considered buying Astoria, 
which owned generation units with low marginal costs, to adapt to the new market 
conditions. However, this option was later discarded; as such a merger would give 
                                                          
950 Ibid, 20 
951 U.S. v. KeySpan Corporation, Complaint, Case 1:10-cv-01415 (SDNY, February 22,2010), para 37  
952 Ibid., para 3 
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rise to concerns on competition in New York’s wholesale electricity markets. Instead, 
KeySpan entered into an indirect swap agreement with Astoria, using a common 
counterparty, Morgan Stanley, which would enter into two corresponding swap 
agreements with KeySpan and Astoria. According to this scheme, Morgan Stanley 
paid KeySpan the difference between the specified price level and existing electricity 
prices, while receiving the same amount from Astoria953. In fact, Morgan Stanley 
functioned only as an intermediary, as the actual parties to the swap agreement 
were KeySpan and Astoria. Subsidising the losses incurred from the withheld 
capacity, the swap agreement allowed KeySpan to continue to bid at price caps 
which would also benefit Astoria acquiring more revenues from its low cost 
generation units.   
The case concluded with a settlement between the DoJ and KeySpan, according to 
which the latter was obliged to pay $12 million as a disgorgement of profits from its 
swap agreement. This was the first time that the DoJ applied for a remedy in a civil 
antitrust action for a violation of the Sherman Act954. Even though the DoJ asserted 
that the “disgorgement of Keyspan’s revenues will best remedy its anticompetitive 
conduct”, establishing the collusion between KeySpan and its counterparties proved 
to be very difficult. Furthermore, the availability of legitimate business reasons that 
could have explained why the defendants entered into the swap agreements 
presented further challenges for the DoJ to prove the defendants’ anti-competitive 
intent. The consent judgment published after the settlement required KeySpan to pay 
$12 million and the DoJ guaranteed that no further action would be brought against 
KeySpan with respect to this case. The settlement would not constitute “any 
evidence against or an admission by KeySpan with respect to any allegation”955    
4.2.5.5. Evaluation 
KeySpan clearly illustrates how the same market conduct may lead to different 
conclusions from regulatory and competition authorities. FERC, which exercises 
regulatory oversight over the US energy market,956 found that KeySpan’s bidding 
                                                          
953 Ibid., para 28 
954 U.S. v. KeySpan Corportation, Memorandum & Order, Case 1:10-cv-014115 (SDNY, February 2, 2011), 15 
955 U.S. v. KeySpan Corportation, Final Judgment, Case 1:10-cv-01415 
956 FERC’s jurisdiction encompasses “the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale 
of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce (…)” and it has authority and responsibility “(…) over all 
facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy (…)”.16 U.S.C § 824(b)(1) (2006) 
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activity was not in violation of its market manipulation prohibition as the company’s 
withholding activity and swap agreement served a legitimate business purpose. The 
withholding practice was still economically profitable after the introduction of new 
capacity in 2006 and offsetting decreases in revenues as a result of capacity 
withholding provided a legitimate reason for entering into swap agreements. Whether 
or not KeySpan exercised its market power to inflate electricity prices was irrelevant 
for the evaluation of market manipulation. Identifiying that the company would have 
continued to withhold its capacity, if it had not entered into swap agreements with its 
counterparties, FERC concluded that the company’s capacity withholding could not 
be regarded as manipulative under the Section 1c.2.  
The DoJ, on the other hand, was of the view that KeySpan, in violation of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act, colluded with other parties through swap agreements to ensure 
that electricity prices in New York’s capacity markets remained at price caps, despite 
the instalment of new capacity. KeySpan’s withholding activity was not as profitable 
as it had been before 2006 and it would have had to consider competing for sales of 
electricity to increase profits from its operating generation units. Instead, KeySpan 
entered into swap agreements that would profit from high electricity prices which 
provided incentives to continue capacity withholding and bidding at price caps. 
According to the DoJ, these swap agreements would have reduced the generators’ 
incentive to compete for electricity sales as well as harm consumers who would have 
benefitted from lower electricity prices if it were not for these agreements. 
Economic and physical withholding practices are clear examples of how generators 
and suppliers can exercise their market power in energy markets to inflate prices and 
to exploit their dominant position 957 . Nevertheless, neither FERC nor the DoJ 
considered such practices as per se violations of anti-manipulation and antitrust 
rules. FERC explained that such an activity would be manipulative only if it were 
uneconomic meaning that the perpetrator had no legitimate, economic reason to 
engage in such conduct, but for the manipulative intent. This is not compatible with 
the approach taken in REMIT which prohibits capacity withholding without 
investigating whether it is economic or not. REMIT deems capacity withholding 
manipulative, since it is an exercise of market power. The generators who wish to 
                                                          
957 David Newbery, et al., (2004), 17 
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withhold their capacity can do so only if they can show legitimate reasons such as 
maintenance that make the withholding activity necessary for the functioning of 
power plants.  
It is important to note that the DoJ did not approach KeySpan’s capacity withholding 
activity as a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, equivalent to Article 102 of the 
TFEU. This stems from the legal approach taken by the US to the prosecution of 
abuse of dominance through pricing behaviours. As noted in Trinko 958 , US 
authorities have been more reluctant to prosecute exploitative abuse of dominance 
such as excessive or unfair pricing activities. Accordingly, capacity withholding can 
be considered a violation of US antitrust law on two different grounds, either as a 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, if it is found to be part of a collusion 
between two or more undertakings to enable price fixing purposes or as a violation of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act if it also involves exclusionary abusive practices such 
as a margin squeeze, tying or bundling, so called “bad act”. As to the analysis of 
market manipulation, FERC considers that capacity withholding, as a mere exercise 
of market power to change price levels, is a legitimate business practice and thus 
does not constitute market manipulation.   
Read with EU case law, KeySpan clearly shows the differences in approach taken by 
the US and the EU authorities in prosecuting capacity withholding practices. The 
approach taken in EU competition law as to the prosecution of pricing abuses differs 
from that of US authorities. As discussed above, the national European competition 
authorities have been active in prosecuting excessive and unfair pricing practices. In 
EU case law, capacity withholding practices are considered a violation of Article 102 
of the TFEU as they are a form of exercise of market power and establishing that 
perpetrators withhold their capacity in order to exercise their market power is 
sufficient to find a violation of EU competition law. As to REMIT, Iberdrola shows that 
capacity withholding constitutes a clear example of market manipulation. This is also 
supported by soft law instruments959 which had considered that a tailor-made legal 
framework was necessary to deal with such misconduct and paved the way for the 
adoption of REMIT. In sum, capacity withholding practices which are held in violation 
                                                          
958 Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko LLP, 3540 US 398, 407 (2004)  
959 CESR and ERGEG, (2008); REMIT Impact Assessment, (2010) 
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of both REMIT’s anti-manipulation rules and EU competition law are considered 
legitimate business activities under US law.  
4.3. OTHER TYPES OF MARKET MANIPULATION 
4.3.1. Overview 
EU case law on energy market manipulation is not as rich as US case law. Other 
than capacity withholding cases, EU case law does not provide sufficient details on 
other types of market manipulation that would be prohibited under REMIT. Some 
examples of manipulative conduct such as wash trades, improper matched orders, 
pump and dump schemes, etc., that are anticipated to be under the jurisdiction of 
REMIT are given in certain soft law instruments and in ACER’s guidance document. 
The majority of these examples are derived from practices in the US securities 
markets under the jurisdiction of SEC 960 . The chapter does not discuss these 
practices in greater detail as legal documents and case law on energy market 
manipulation provide limited guidance on how such manipulative practices might be 
perpetrated in European wholesale energy markets. Instead, the chapter follows the 
demarcation identified under US case law and discusses the legal implications of this 
demarcation for European wholesale energy markets. 
4.3.2. Market Power Manipulation 
4.3.2.1. ACER’s Definition 
ACER’s guidance document identifies market power manipulation, called ‘market 
cornering’, as a type of price positioning which is defined under Article 2(2)(a)(ii) as 
follows, market conduct which “involves a party or parties with a significant influence 
over the supply of, or demand for, or delivery mechanisms for a wholesale energy 
product and/or the underlying product of a derivative contract exploiting a decisive 
position in order to materially distort the price at which others have to deliver, take 
delivery or defer delivery of the instrument/product in order to satisfy their 
obligations”961. Similarly to that given under US case law962, the definition does not 
provide details on perpetrators’ motives in accumulating control over the deliverable 
product. In US case law, whether or not perpetrators accumulate such control to 
                                                          
960 Gary Taylor, et al., (2015), 194 
961 ACER’s  Guidance (2016), 37 
962 Cargill v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972), paras. 37-39 
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artificially move prices is fundamental in establishing market power manipulation and 
so distinguish these types of practices from mere exercise of market power. For 
example, in Indiana Farm Bureau, the CFTC concluded that the defendants’ control 
over the deliverable product was not a result of a prior scheme but was because of a 
shortage in supplies due to external market conditions and thus the exploitation of 
this control would not be regarded as market manipulation963. Accordingly, In order 
to hold a market participant liable for market power manipulation, it must be 
established that the market participant’s intent in accumulating its control over 
deliverable products is to move prices.  
ACER acknowledges that having a decisive control over the supply of, demand for, 
or delivery mechanisms for wholesale energy products is not sufficient for a finding 
of market manipulation964. Nevertheless, REMIT’s market manipulation prohibition 
does not entail an intent element, meaning that a market participant’s motive in 
engaging in a conduct is irrelevant for the analysis of market manipulation under 
REMIT. This blurs the distinction between the concepts of market manipulation and 
the exercise of market power. A participant may acquire a dominant position due to a 
myriad of reasons, such as tightness in demand and supply, economies of scale, 
natural monopoly, mergers and acquisitions etc.. Under EU Competition Law, Article 
102 of the TFEU applies when dominant undertakings exercise their market power 
through abusive practices such as excessive pricing and does not include an a priori 
intent requirement for the establishment of abuse965. Therefore the current legal 
framework does not distinguish market power manipulation from an exercise of 
market power which results in jurisdictional overlap between EU Competition Law 
and REMIT.  
4.3.2.2. Relevance for REMIT 
Despite these inconsistencies in the legal framework, the concept of market power 
manipulation does not pose serious risks for the enforcement of REMIT in wholesale 
                                                          
963 In re Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
21,796 (CFTC 1982) For the economics of market power manipulation see; Emilios E. Avgouleas, (2005), 147-
154 
964 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 37 
965 Supra note 828  
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energy markets, especially in electricity markets. US case law requires that in order 
to perpetrate a market power manipulation;  
(i) a market participant must hold a large buy (long) or sell (short) position in 
contracts for the delivery of a particular product, 
(ii) this market participant must hold the possession of a large portion of the relevant 
product in its reserves or storages, and  
(iii) the portion held by the market participant must be to the extent that available 
supplies other than the market participant’s possession are not sufficient for the 
counterparties of the contracts to fulfil their obligation.   
The perpetration of this scheme is not possible in European wholesale electricity 
markets. As discussed above, electricity is a product that cannot be stored in 
economically feasible high quantities. As generation and consumption have to take 
place simultaneously, imbalances between demand and supply levels directly affect 
the functioning of transmission grids. It is the transmission system operators’ task to 
ensure this system balancing. In so doing, transmission system operators monitor 
and/or operate wholesale electricity markets in which electricity in large quantities is 
bought and sold in advance, prior to the generation and consumption of the traded 
electricity taking place. It is impossible to hold control over electricity supplies before 
they are generated. Even though a market participant can place large buy or sell 
orders in wholesale electricity markets, demand and supply levels are always 
balanced and settled in balancing markets in which excess and missing quantities 
are compensated at market rates. At this stage, electricity is produced only if a 
simultaneous demand arises. It is impossible for a market participant to force 
generators to make delivery or to force consumers to receive delivery which is not 
simultaneously consumed.  
Wholesale natural gas markets are more prone to market power manipulation than 
wholesale electricity markets. Natural gas, as a deliverable product, can be stored in 
high quantities and its extraction and consumption can take place in different time 
periods. It can also be in a liquefied form, called LNG, and transported across long 
distances without the necessity of an established network connecting production and 
consumption centres. Accordingly, a market participant can commit a market power 
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manipulation in wholesale natural gas markets by holding large long (buy) positions, 
meaning that it enters into contracts as a buyer of natural gas that is to be delivered 
in the future, in the meantime stocking large quantities of natural gas in its storage, 
to the extent that supplies other than those stocked by the market participant are not 
sufficient for counterparties to fulfil their contractual obligations. Having no access to 
economically feasible substitutes, sellers of natural gas have no option other than 
negotiating a financial settlement which could be exploited by the market participant.  
This does not mean that every market participant can corner markets. There are 
multiple factors that render the perpetration of market power manipulation unlikely in 
European wholesale natural gas markets by merely relying on storage facilities. 
Storage capacity constitutes only a limited portion of general natural gas 
consumption across the EU966, and in most member states, market participants do 
not have enough storage capacity to hold a substantial sway over natural gas 
supplies. The construction of storage facilities requires capital intensive projects 
which are undertaken by multiple parties including gas suppliers, banks, insurance 
companies, governments, etc. The related costs inherent in the conclusion and 
realisation of these projects vary due to several factors, such as geographic location, 
corresponding design and equipment requirements, the proximity to pipelines, and 
environmental concerns967. Of the EU member states, only the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Austria have storage capacity that can meet more than 50 per cent of 
their natural gas consumption, while the rest suffer a lack of enough storage capacity 
and rely on other flexibility measures968. 
Access conditions and the allocation of storage facilities are regulated under 
2009/73/EC, The Natural Gas Directive.969. Storage facilities are operated by storage 
system operators which are required to establish compliance and monitoring 
mechanisms ensuring that storage capacity is allocated on a non-discriminatory 
                                                          
966 European Commission, ‘The Role of Gas Storage in Internal Market and in Ensuring Security of Supply’ 
(Luxembourg 2014), 23 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/REPORT-Gas%20Storage-
20150728.pdf   
967 Barry Stevens, ‘Natural Gas Storage is Vital for Future Industry Growth’ (OilPrice, 11 June, 2012) 
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Natural-Gas-Storage-is-Vital-for-Future-Industry-Growth.html  
968 European Commission, ‘The Role of Gas Storage in Internal Market and in Ensuring Security of Supply’ 
(Luxembourg 2014), 10-11  
969The operation and management of storage facilities are dealt with in Article 13 and the third-party access 
rights to the storage facilities are included in Article 33 of Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 July, 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas 
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manner970.  A special regime for capacity allocation is also established, stipulating 
the effective use of existing capacities through firm and interruptible allocation 
mechanisms and the relief of long-term reserve contracts that date back to the pre-
liberalisation era971. Even though the regulatory framework sets out an exemption 
regime for newly constructed storage facilities972, storage system operators are still 
required to refrain from discriminating between system users. Accordingly a natural 
gas supplier which also operates a newly built storage facility cannot reserve all 
capacity for its supply business excluding other suppliers in a discriminatory 
manner973.  
A market participant, on the other hand, can engage in market power manipulation 
without the necessity of access to storage facilities under certain market conditions. 
A dominant undertaking which has access to natural gas supplies through its 
activities in upstream markets and operates as a pivotal supplier for other market 
participants active in wholesale natural gas markets may engage in supply contracts 
in which it holds long positions. When contracts mature and the contracted quantities 
must be delivered, the dominant undertaking can use its pivotal role to corner its 
counterparties which have no substitutes to fulfil their contractual obligation. Even 
though the perpetration of this scheme requires substantial market dominance 
involving very large market shares and vertical integration, the characteristics of 
European natural gas markets are sufficient to allow market power manipulation. 
Almost all European national markets are dominated by state-owned energy supply 
undertakings active in upstream, midstream and downstream segments of the 
natural gas sector and the majority of trading activities is carried out in over-the-
counter markets under bilateral contracts through which dominant suppliers can 
exploit their market power974.  
It is important to note that the market manipulation prohibition under REMIT is not 
the sole remedy that national competent authorities can resort to in prosecuting 
these market activities in European wholesale natural gas markets. EU competition 
                                                          
970 Article 15, Directive 2009/73/EC  
971 Article 33(3) of Article 6(3), Directive 2009/73/EC  
972 Article 36, Directive 2009/73/EC 
973 Article 13 (1)(b), Directive 2009/73/EC 
974 Even though, as of 2015, the OTC trading accounts for 67 per cent of all natural gas traded in the EU, the 
share of hub trading in which natural gas contracts are cleared through an established clearinghouse is 
increasing. Supra note 24 
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law can also play a major role through antitrust proceedings975 and commitment 
decisions 976  under Article 102 of TFEU. How this type of market behaviour is 
prosecuted without giving rise to concerns on the ne bis in idem principle(double 
jeopardy) and overlapping jurisdictions remains to be seen. 
4.3.3. Trade-based Manipulation 
4.3.3.1. Concept 
US case law defines these types of manipulation as ‘open market transactions’ 
providing that they involve actual market transactions in which perpetrators engage 
in actual buy and sell orders with actual parties with economic risks and 
consequences977. These practices differ from fraud-based transactions and outright 
fraud, as the perpetrators of trade-based manipulation do not directly employ 
fraudulent schemes such as wash trades, matched orders or dissemination of false 
information to mislead other traders into believing that certain demand and supply 
levels other than those that represent actual conditions in markets are present. 
Perpetrators rely on their trading activities and their effects on market prices, rather 
than providing false information to markets to deceive other market participants. A 
trade-based manipulation can also operate as a deceit upon markets and other 
traders. Nevertheless, whether or not a trade-based manipulation is of a fraudulent 
character does not lead to the conclusion that such a manipulation is regarded as 
outright fraud. A transaction can be considered as outright fraud, only if it is 
established that it has no actual effects on markets and involves no economic risk 
and net change in beneficial ownership978.  
As discussed above, market power manipulation such as corners and squeezes can 
also be considered a trade-based manipulation, as perpetrators of these practices 
engage in actual trades with actual counterparties to give effect to and profit from 
consequent price changes. In fact the prosecution of these practices under US law 
even predates the identification of trade-based manipulation as a separate type. The 
                                                          
975 Article 7, Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16.12.2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1 
976 Article 9, Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003  
977 Sundheimer v. CFTC, 688 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 112 (1983); United States v. Radley, 
659 F. Supp. 2d 803 (S.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 1991). 
978 See Markowski v SEC, 274 F.3d 525 (D.D.Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002). The District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals stressed that transactions that involved real customers, real transactions and real 
money could not be considered as market manipulation that use fraudulent devices.  
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traditional classification demarcated market manipulation into two types as artificial 
price-based and fraud-based practices did not provide a further classification under 
artificial price-based manipulation. This is because market power manipulation 
constituted the only type of market manipulation through which a market participant 
could move prices at artificial level without resorting to fraudulent or fictitious 
practices979 . This has changed since the advent of derivatives and new market 
platforms which have made it possible for market participants to devise a wide 
spectrum of strategies without resorting to fraudulent behaviour and the concept of 
market manipulation has evolved with market innovation in the preparation and the 
execution of contracts980. These new strategies are of a character different from that 
identified under market power manipulation and, as US case law clearly illustrates, 
they have been effectively used in energy markets. This chapter examines market 
power manipulation and trade-based manipulation as two distinct forms to evaluate 
the legal implications of these new strategies in European wholesale energy markets. 
4.3.3.2. Demarcation of Trade-Based Manipulation 
In analysing the examples of trade-based market manipulation and their implications 
in the EU, the chapter follows the demarcation provided under US case law. As 
discussed in detail, the legal literature, so far, has failed to provide a definition and a 
classification of market manipulation. This is partly because of the difficulties in 
establishing taxonomy of factors that render market behaviour manipulative. It is not 
the aim of this thesis to construct an alternative definition for market manipulation 
which requires extensive econometric calculations, evaluating price relations 
between multiple markets and effects of market practices thereon. Instead of 
providing an alternative definition or choosing one proposed in the legal literature, 
the thesis engages in case law analysis to evaluate on what grounds market 
practices are regarded as manipulative and how they mirror or differ from each other. 
Following the demarcation under US case law, this chapter analyses trade-based 
                                                          
979 Marking the close and successive bidding practices can also be considered as examples of traditional trade-
based market manipulation as these types of activities were frequent in ‘Wall Street Pools’ later in 19th century. 
However, the effectiveness of these strategies proved to be very difficult and risky without supporting cross-
market positions or fraudulent behaviour. See Daniel R. Fishel & David J. Ross, (1991), 520. 
980 Maxwell K. Multer, ‘Open-Market Manipulation under SEC Rule 10b-5 and its Analogies: Inappropriate 
Distinctions, Judicial Disagreement and Case Study: FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule’ [2011] Securities 
Regulation Law Journal, 97  
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market manipulation in European wholesale energy markets in relation to REMIT 
and discussions provided in EU soft law.  
4.3.3.2.1. Gaming of Market Rules 
US case law clearly illustrates that energy markets are prone to gaming practices by 
market participants who seek to exploit loopholes in market rules to reap financial 
benefits from their activities in wholesale energy markets981. The feasibility of these 
market practices does not rely on trading in wholesale energy products. Sell and buy 
orders submitted by perpetrators are either uneconomic or of little value. The trading 
activities are profitable only after the payments meaning that the perpetrators’ 
conduct is not profitable but for the related payments, due under market rules are 
received. FERC concluded that these market practices constitute the gaming of 
market rules and thus are in violation of its anti-manipulation rule. 
4.3.3.2.1.1. In Electricity Markets 
The establishment of a competitive energy market design has been a crucial policy 
objective under the liberalisation of European energy markets seeking to ensure a 
secure and affordable energy supply to all European consumers982. In electricity, 
continuing integration of national markets since the adoption of early liberalisation 
packages has led all Member States to adopt a pool market model, called ‘energy-
only markets’ meaning that all suppliers of electricity submit bids at which they want 
to sell their output in a market which is operated by transmission system operators or 
designated market operators983. These markets consist of sub-markets such as day-
ahead, real-time and balancing markets in which suppliers submit bids on the basis 
of marginal costs at which their generation facilities operate. This process results in 
the establishment of a “merit order” where market operators align suppliers based on 
their bids from cheap to expensive for further dispatch. Market operators select 
generating units from cheaper plants until they satisfy the projected electricity 
demand. The highest bid that is selected by market operators determines market 
                                                          
981 Rumford Paper Company, 140 FERC ¶ 61,030 (2012); In Re Make-Whole Payments and Related Bidding 
Strategies, 144 FERC ¶ 61,068 (2013); Coaltrain Energy, L.P., et al., 154 FERC ¶ 61,002 (2016) 
982 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank, A Framework Strategy 
for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy (COM/2015/080) final 
983 Supra note 11  
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prices that would be paid to all generating units.  While plants with lower marginal 
costs are mostly selected, those with higher marginal costs are often left outside the 
merit order.  
While selecting the cheaper generation units for merit order is useful for the objective 
of providing electricity at affordable prices, this market mechanism gives rise to 
concerns on the reliability of electricity supply as the functioning of these low margin 
generation units depends on several factors such as weather conditions. The volume 
of electricity produced from these units fluctuates considerably over seasons and 
market operators are obliged to look for other supplies from more reliable generators 
which can be very expensive to operate. Nevertheless, these expensive generators 
are generally left out of money in energy-only markets and face decommissioning, 
since they are not feasible to operate. This endangers the market operators’ access 
to reliable and uninterrupted access to electricity and threatens the functioning of 
European wholesale markets when additional demand arises or a malfunction or 
interruption takes place in low margin generation plants. In order to balance demand 
and supply throughout the year and to ensure uninterrupted and reliable access to 
electricity at affordable rates, market operators are required to establish a market 
model that effectively utilises generation units with low and high marginal costs. This 
model often takes the form of “Capacity Mechanisms” through which market 
operators guarantee that a substantial volume is available for use as a reserve 
capacity984. Accordingly, generation units which are generally not included in merit 
orders are paid a premium which is higher than usual market prices determined 
under wholesale markets, to ensure that they stay operational when related market 
conditions arise.   
Even though the availability of such mechanisms is fundamental for security of 
supply, they are also vulnerable to market manipulation by market participants 
seeking to receive additional payments, called capacity payments, outside the prices 
paid under wholesale electricity markets. Market participants either alone or in 
collaboration may engage in certain schemes that lead market operators to make 
these capacity payments. The objective of these schemes does not involve 
                                                          
984 There is a wide range of capacity mechanism designs such as ‘Strategic Reserve’, ‘Capacity Obligation’, 
‘Capacity Auction’, ‘Reliability Option’, ‘Strategic Reserve’. See ACER, ‘Reports on Capacity Remuneration 
Mechanisms and The Internal Market for Electricity’ (30 July 2013). For a detailed information, see also L., 
Hancher, et al., Capacity Mechanisms in the EU Energy Market: Law, Policy and Economics, (OUP 2015) 
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supplying electricity to transmission grids for system balancing and security of supply. 
Rather, market participants transact to create market conditions that lead 
transmission or market operators to make payments on the basis of capacity 
mechanism. The legal analysis must show that the perpetrators’ scheme is profitable 
only after the capacity payments were received due to related market conditions and 
that the perpetrators engaged in such conduct in order to exploit these payments 
rather than profiting from their output or price differential.  
US case law clearly illustrates how payments under capacity mechanisms can be 
exploited by suppliers in electricity markets. In Rumford Paper Company985 , for 
example, the Day-Ahead Load Response Program (the DALRP) was a capacity 
mechanism, the market operator in New England (ISO-NE) adopted to ensure 
system balancing. Accordingly, market participants buying electricity from wholesale 
markets were paid when they reduced their electricity demand during peak hours. 
The scheme devised in Rumford Paper Company allowed the perpetrator to receive 
the capacity payments without reducing its electricity demand in the wholesale 
market. Even though the scheme was uneconomical on a stand-alone basis, the 
payments received through the DALRP were more than enough to compensate the 
losses incurred by the perpetrator. Therefore FERC found that the relevant conduct 
was in violation of its anti-manipulation rule, 18 C.F.R. § 1c.2.   The market conduct 
in Rumford Paper Company constitutes a clear example of ‘gaming’ practices in 
wholesale electricity markets and is relevant to the establishment of capacity 
mechanisms across the EU986. 
4.3.3.2.1.2. In Natural Gas Markets 
In natural gas, the EU adopted several measures establishing entry-exit zones 
across member states, along with the hub-based pricing mechanism in which 
quantities of natural gas are traded in liquid spot markets through forward and 
futures contracts987. A gas trading hub is a liquidity instrument in which exchanges 
                                                          
985 Rumford Paper Company, 140 FERC ¶ 61,030 (2012) 
986 Charles River Associates, Capacity Market Gaming and Consistency Assessment – Final Report, CRA Project 
No D18985-00, September 2013, 41- 42 
987 The restructuring of wholesale markets is still in progress. Despite the considerable success in the north-
western natural gas hubs, “National Balancing Point” (the NBP) in the UK and “Title Transfer Facility” in the 
Netherlands which together host 88 per cent of all hub-traded natural gas in the EU, the majority of natural 
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between the buyers and sellers in the market take place. They may have a physical 
geographical location and can be linked to a physical installation, e.g. the Henry Hub 
in the US and the Zeebrugge gas hub in Belgium. On the other hand, a gas hub can 
also be virtual without physical installations, such as the National Balancing Point 
(the NBP) in the United Kingdom or the Title Transfer Facility (the TTF) in the 
Netherlands. These hubs provide great flexibility to market participants988 and help 
them anticipate the correlations between supply and demand before booking the 
infrastructure capacities, which in turn ensures the effective flow of natural gas and 
effective allocation of existing capacities and also operate as a market-based pricing 
benchmark which is used in the greater geographic region as an indicator of natural 
gas prices.  
Hubs are operated by transmission system operators or independent market 
operators and the reliability of transmission systems requires certain capacity 
mechanisms through which market operators seek to balance between 
demand/supply levels and ensure security of supply. To a limited extent, natural gas 
injected into pipelines can be compressed or expanded when the volume of natural 
gas injected does not match that withdrawn from the transmission system. When this 
flexibility does not suffice to maintain the system integrity, market operators can 
apply measures and charges that provide financial incentives to market participants 
to inject to or withdraw from transmission systems. These measures are called 
imbalance charges and are adopted to ensure system balancing by market 
participants themselves989.  Complexities in a transmission system may also require 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
gas in the EU is still traded through OTC trading.  The hub-based trading only constitutes around 30 per cent of 
all natural gas traded. See supra note 24 
988 Natural gas markets generally consist of three different classes of market participants. Producers are market 
participants who engage in exploration and extraction business to produce natural gas from on-shore or 
offshore natural gas reserves. Suppliers are those which buy natural gas to supply to small/medium sized 
enterprises and households. Shippers are the main market participants that participate in trading in hubs and 
use transmission systems to transport natural gas from producers to suppliers. 
989 There are two types of imbalance charges. First, transmission system operators may pay a certain price to 
market participants who inject natural gas more than had been contracted. As the price paid by the 
transmission system operators is less than market-based rates, market participants incur losses and have an 
incentive to withdraw the excess volume. Second, transmission system operators may charge a certain price 
which is higher than market rates, when it is established that market participants required to inject certain 
volume of natural gas to transmission systems are short of delivery. In order to prevent paying charges higher 
than market rates, market participants inject more natural gas to transmission systems. National Grid, ‘End-to-
end Balancing Guide’ (March 2016), 13. See also; EFET Gas Committee, ‘Framework Guidelines for Gas 
Balancing’ (June 2010) http://www.efet.org/Cms_Data/Contents/EFET/Media/Documents/Public%20-
%20Position%20Papers/EFET%20FG%20on%20Gas%20Balancing.pdf  
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market operators to engage in trading and act as a Residual Balancer 990 . 
Accordingly market operators can buy or sell natural gas to balance pressure 
exerted by supply of or demand for energy. 
Existing case law in the US and the EU does not suffice to provide an insight into 
how certain rules in natural gas markets can become subject to proceedings under 
anti-manipulation provisions. Nevertheless, the measures adopted for transmission 
system balancing constitute clear examples of financial positions that market 
participants can seek to exploit and to derive profits from their activities in wholesale 
natural gas markets. A market participant may find it profitable to receive payments 
on the basis of imbalance charges or a market operator’s participation in wholesale 
markets as a residual balancer. In these situations, case law on gaming of market 
rules provides that the legal analysis should assess whether the trading practice by 
the market participant is uneconomic or of little economic value but for the payment 
received via balancing measures. A competent regulatory or competition authority 
may find a violation of the anti-manipulation rule, if it is established that the practice 
at issue aims at receiving payments or benefits under balancing measures rather 
than profiting from output or price differentials. 
The perpetration of these types of market manipulation is closely related to 
inefficiencies in market design and monitoring measures which together render 
European wholesale energy markets vulnerable to manipulative practices. Certain 
measures, such as capacity mechanisms or imbalance charges, necessary for the 
reliability of transmission system operators and security of supply, can be used by 
market participants in perpetration of their manipulative schemes. The establishment 
of a market design which provides a level playing field along with the security of 
supply is the key for dealing with market manipulation in energy markets. In order to 
increase regulatory oversight and prevent market abuse, the European Commission 
and ACER proposed several market models991. To what extent the proposed market 
designs may be effective in preventing market manipulation remains to be seen. 
 
                                                          
990 National Grid, (2016), 6   
991 See; Gas Target Model and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Internal Market for Electricity, COM(2016) 861 final/2 
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4.3.3.2.2. Cross-Market Manipulation 
Given the advent of derivatives which enabled energy suppliers and traders to 
exploit pricing relations between different contracts and markets, cross-market 
manipulation has become a major concern in wholesale energy products. US case 
law clearly illustrates that perpetrators holding physical and/or financial positions in 
different, yet closely related markets have incentives to exploit the links between 
these positions. Profit maximisation is achieved through a portfolio of positions rather 
than profiting from output or trading in price differentials. Price levels artificially 
determined by these manipulative trades do not represent actual market conditions 
and send misleading signals to other suppliers and traders not justified by the 
existing forces of demand and supply levels.  
Despite providing several examples that are regarded as in-scope for the prohibition 
of market manipulation, REMIT does not directly address and define cross-market 
manipulation. Instead, it holds that effects of manipulation may not be confined to 
markets where perpetration takes place992. It is ACER which provides a definition of 
cross-market manipulation and identifies it as a form of price positioning under 
Article 2(2)(a)(ii). ACER defines cross-market manipulation as “(t)rading on one 
market to improperly position the price of a wholesale energy product on a related 
market”993. The scope of this definition is wide and is not limited solely to price 
effects which occur across physical and financial markets. Various positions such as 
those across borders or between natural gas and electricity can be subject to 
manipulative schemes by market participants who seek to exploit through practices 
in related markets.  
4.3.3.2.2.1. Perpetration 
The perpetration of a cross-market manipulation involves two different but related 
positions; price making and price-taking markets994. While the former represents 
                                                          
992 “Manipulation and its effects may occur across borders, between electricity and gas markets and across 
financial and commodity markets, including the emission allowances markets.” Recital 13, Regulation No 
1227/2011.   
993 ACER’s  Guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of 
the  Council of 25 October, 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency, (4th edn, 2016), 38 
994 Some authors argue that the perpetration of market manipulation also requires a nexus element that 
connects price-making and price-taking positions. This is particularly true in benchmark cases in which 
perpetrators transact to change index prices which in turn affect the profitability of related financial and 
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markets and products where perpetrators engage in transactions, the latter consists 
of positions whose value depends on prices and conditions in the former. Price 
making positions are usually held in physical markets or physical products as 
changes in these positions directly affect the forces of demand and supply. Since 
perpetrators aim at moving prices at artificial levels rather than profiting from output 
or price differentials, manipulative transactions often involve selling and buying 
orders at respectively low and high prices995. Therefore, these transactions are often 
loss-incurring or uneconomic on a stand-alone basis. Price-taking positions, on the 
other hand, may be held in both physical and financial markets and products. For 
example, as in Energy Trading Partners, a market participant which is a net 
purchaser in an energy product or market may engage in short selling at lower prices 
so that it can buy larger volumes at these artificially decreased prices. Accordingly, 
both the price-making and price-taking positions are in physical markets and 
products. The perpetrator’s activity of short selling is uneconomic as it could have 
sold the relevant volume at higher market prices. However, its net buyer position in 
the forward market benefits from lower energy prices which more than compensates 
the losses incurred due to short selling.  
Examples of price-making and price-taking positions are provided by several EU soft 
law instruments, prior to the adoption of REMIT, to stress the necessity of a tailor-
made legal framework to deal with anti-competitive practices in wholesale energy 
markets. The CESR and ERGED, in their advice to the European Commission in the 
context of market abuse in energy markets, pointed out that there are crucial 
interdependencies between electricity and natural gas markets996. Natural gas is a 
major product that is used for electricity generation and price changes occurring in 
natural gas affect prices in wholesale electricity markets. Market participants active 
in both electricity and natural gas supply markets are better positioned to explore 
and exploit these interdependencies.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
physical positions and index prices serve as a nexus for these price making and price taking positions.  
Nevertheless, the chapter does not prefer to address a nexus position as a requirement for defining market 
manipulation as the methods that market participants perpetrate market manipulation evolve based on 
market innovation and a nexus position may not be available for all types of market manipulation.  See; Shaun 
D. Ledgerwood and Paul R. Carpenter, (2012)    
995 Gary Taylor, et al., (2015), 194 
996 CESR and ERGEG, (2008), 6 
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Another significant factor that gives rise to concerns on cross-market manipulation is 
increasing price correlations between different national wholesale energy markets. 
The current developments in the structure of wholesale energy markets, such as the 
establishment of power exchanges and hubs where spot electricity and natural gas 
products are traded, results in transactions in energy products having more of a 
cross-border character. Providing the example of the price correlations in France and 
Germany to illustrate how they create possibilities for cross-border market 
manipulation, the Commission’s impact assessment points out that the correlation 
between prices of neighbouring countries is increasing to the extent that market 
participants active in neighbouring member states may easily foresee how changes 
in market conditions in a national or regional energy market may affect prices in 
neighbouring markets997. Any shortages in energy supply or outages in electricity 
generation in one member state, the triggering member state, may directly affect 
market prices in neighbouring member states, targeted member states and market 
participants which are net buyers of energy products in one or more targeted 
member states have financial incentives to engage in short selling in the triggering 
member state. Detection and prosecution of these manipulative schemes require 
monitoring measures at supra-national level and close collaboration between 
national and community competent authorities.   
Finally, the pricing relations between physical and financial markets or products 
constitute a major concern in wholesale energy markets as to cross-market 
manipulation.  US case law clearly illustrates that the linkages between physical and 
derivatives contracts are vulnerable to market manipulation by undertakings trading 
in both physical and financial markets 998 . Market participants have significant 
incentives to gain profits from derivatives contracts through trading in underlying 
products. Identifying the scope of REMIT’s anti-manipulation provision, ACER 
addresses this type of market conduct as a major example of cross-market 
manipulation999. The impact assessment further refers to Amaranth as a case study 
to demonstrate the adverse effects that the exploitation of price relations between 
                                                          
997 REMIT Impact Assessment, (2010), 9 
998 See: Barclays Bank PLC, Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, et al., 141 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2012); Amaranth Advisors 
L.L.C. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2007); Total Gas & Power North America Inc., et al., 155 FERC ¶61,105 (2016); 
BP America Inc., BP Corporation North America et al., 144 FERC ¶ 61,100 (2013); Barclays Bank PLC, Daniel Brin, 
Scott Connelly, et al., 141 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2012) 
999 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 38 
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physical and financial products could have on energy markets and the necessity of a 
legal framework that specifically deals with this type of market misconduct1000.   
4.3.3.2.2.2. Applicable Frameworks 
It is important to note that the nature of positions that are subject to cross-market 
manipulation is important in determining jurisdictions under which anti-manipulation 
rules are applied. As mentioned above, MAR also includes anti-manipulation rules 
which differ from those adopted under REMIT1001. The scope of MAR is far-reaching, 
including commodity products that affect in-scope financial instruments, which are 
not limited to and extend beyond those provided under Annex I, Section C of 
MiFID/MiFIR 2014 1002 . The only carve-out provision that MAR incorporates is 
wholesale spot energy products which MAR does not apply to, even if they have 
price impacts on in-scope financial instruments1003.  Wholesale energy derivatives 
which can be settled financially and physically are under MAR’s jurisdiction and are 
thus outside the scope of REMIT1004.  
The exclusion of derivatives from REMIT’s jurisdiction is important as it directly 
affects the prosecution of market manipulation in wholesale energy markets. First, as 
MAR is the applicable jurisdiction for market misconduct which includes trading in 
energy derivatives, the competent authorities that oversee and enforce the anti-
manipulation rule would be financial regulators. This requires extensive collaboration 
between energy and financial regulators at both national and EU levels in monitoring 
trading in energy derivatives and detecting market manipulation. Second, these 
types of market misconduct are subject to the enforcement regime under MAR which 
provides that practices violating its anti-manipulation rules would be punishable by a 
term of imprisonment of at least four years.  Despite requiring member states to 
adopt the necessary enforcement mechanisms for the prosecution and the 
punishment of market manipulation, REMIT does not adopt a sanction regime that 
requires harmonisation of penalties for the breaches in its anti-manipulation rules. 
Enforcement powers conferred on competent authorities by Member States at 
national level with respect to the prosecution of market manipulation under REMIT 
                                                          
1000 REMIT Impact Assessment, (2010), 14 
1001 Article 12(1)(d), Regulation No 596/2014 
1002 Article 2(1), Regulation No 596/2014 
1003 Article 2(2)(a), Regulation No 596/2014 
1004 Article 1(2), Regulation No 1227/2011 
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are very diverse1005. Finally, this type of market misconduct is not identified as price 
positioning under MAR. As discussed, ACER stipulates that cross-market 
manipulation in wholesale energy markets constitutes a form of price positioning and 
thus is prosecuted under Article 2(2)(a)(ii) of REMIT. MAR, on the other hand, puts 
forward a new type of market manipulation definition, called Benchmark manipulation, 
to identify and prosecute these types of market misconduct.  
MAR introduces a separate definition for benchmark manipulation which proscribes 
any type of market behaviour, such as transmitting false information or submitting 
transactions seeking to move prices of a particular financial instrument at artificial 
level1006. This demarcation is particularly important for the establishment of cross-
market manipulation in wholesale energy markets, as the majority of cross-market 
practices involve market participants seeking to distort benchmark prices through 
transactions in physical markets to derive profits from financial positions. As 
mentioned above, prior to the adoption of REMIT, EU soft law specifically cited 
Amaranth Advisors L.L.C. et al. to stress the necessity of a tailor-made legal 
framework to deal with market manipulation in wholesale energy markets1007. ACER 
also notes the abuse of price relations between financial and physical products as an 
example of market misconduct and price positioning and thus prosecutable under 
Article 5. Nevertheless, the consequent sector-specific regulation does not apply to 
these types of market manipulation since wholesale energy derivatives are excluded 
from the scope of REMIT. In other words, although market misconduct which is 
similar to that perpetrated in Amaranth Advisors L.L.C. et al. paved way for the 
adoption of REMIT, it is not prosecutable and punishable under REMIT.   
The majority of cases of market manipulation in the US involve the abuse of price 
relations between physical and financial markets through manipulating index 
prices1008. These cases clearly show that index prices constitute a nexus between 
physical and financial positions, that is, perpetrators submit their manipulative 
                                                          
1005 ACER, ‘ACER’s Annual Report on its Activities under REMIT in 2014’ (September 2015), 63 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/official_documents/acts_of_the_agency/publication/remit%20annual%20report%
202015.pdf  
1006 Article 12(1)(d), Regulation No 596/2014 
1007 REMIT Impact Assessment, (2010), 14  
1008 See: Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. et. al., 120 FERC ¶ 61,086 (2007); Amaranth Advisors L.L.C. et. al., 120 
FERC ¶ 61,085 (2007); Total Gas & Power North America Inc., et al., 155 FERC ¶61,105 (2016); BP America Inc., 
BP Corporation North America et al., 144 FERC ¶ 61,100 (2013); Barclays Bank PLC, Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, 
et al., 141 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2012) 
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transactions to indices to affect index prices which determine the profitability of 
related financial positions. Energy derivatives contracts such as options and swaps 
often involve reference to index prices published by trade press entities, such as 
Platts and NGI in the US or Argus and ICIS Heren in the EU which collect 
transactions and information as to particular markets and products to publish index 
prices. The profitability of these derivatives contracts depends on changes in index 
prices. Given that transactions are collected by or reported to indices for index 
publishing, perpetrators engage in manipulative trades in physical markets to move 
index prices at levels profitable to their related financial positions. Despite the 
jurisdictional discussions between financial and sector-specific regulators in the US, 
FERC effectively exercises its authority over these types of market conduct under its 
anti-manipulation rules. The legal framework in the EU, on the other hand designates 
only financial regulators as appropriate authorities under MAR, which considerably 
limits the scope of REMIT’s market manipulation prohibition.  
4.3.3.2.2.3. Commission’s Role 
It is important to note that the Commission is more active than energy and financial 
regulatory authorities in prosecuting cross-market manipulation. How anti-
manipulation rules under REMIT and MAR are enforced remains to be seen, since 
the existing regulatory framework is rather new and case law on cross-market 
manipulation has not yet developed. Nevertheless, the Commission has continuously 
opened proceedings under EU competition law against several market practices that 
can be identified as cross-market manipulation1009. EURIBOR1010 is an important 
example in which the Commission found that the defendants’ fixing of several 
interest rates such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Euro 
Interbank Offered Rate, (EURIBOR) constituted collusion and thus was a violation of 
Article 101 of TFEU1011. EURIBOR is a benchmark interest rate reflecting the cost of 
interbank lending in euros and determining the profitability of several financial 
contracts such as swaps, options and futures, which derive their value on the basis 
                                                          
1009 Euro Interest Rate Derivatives (Case AT.39914) Commission Decision of 4 December, 2013; Yen Interest 
Rate Derivatives (Case AT. 39861) Commission Decision of 4 December, 2013; Ethanol Benchmarks (Case 
AT.40054) 
1010 Euro Interest Rate Derivatives (Case AT.39914) Commission Decision of 4 December, 2013 
1011 European Commission, Press Release, ‘Antitrust: Commission fines banks € 1.49 billion for participating in 
cartels in the interest rate derivatives industry’(Brussels, 4 December, 2013) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-1208_en.htm  
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of fluctuations in interest rates. The Commission concluded that the defendants, 
eight of the biggest international financial institutions which held significant financial 
positions, engaged in information sharing practices as to their submissions to the 
European Banking Federation which calculated and published EURIBOR. In so 
doing, the defendants derived significant profits from their related financial positions.    
The establishment of price fixing cartels among competitors is considered a hardcore 
restriction to trade meaning that given that their objective is to restrict competition, 
these market practices are in violation of EU competition law per se and it is very 
difficult for defendants to establish that their conduct, in fact, increases competition 
across the EU or serves a legitimate business purpose 1012 . In EURIBOR, the 
Commission considered that the defendants’ conduct aiming at distorting benchmark 
prices constituted hardcore restrictions to trade, when they were perpetrated by 
multiple market participants in collaboration and thus in violation of Article 101 of 
TFEU. Imposing fines exceeding $2 million on the banks, the Commission has 
shown that it has no compunction in enforcing Article 101 in unconventional 
situations, beyond the usual price fixing cartels 1013.  
The Commission’s findings under EURIBOR raise important questions as to the legal 
implications underlying wholesale energy markets. It is reasonable to expect that 
misconduct perpetrated by multiple market participants to collaboratively manipulate 
benchmark prices for wholesale electricity and natural gas products would result in 
antitrust proceedings at EU level. However, whether or not the Commission’s 
practice would be the same, if it is established that the relevant benchmark 
manipulation is perpetrated by one dominant trader, rather than multiple market 
participants, is an open question. As mentioned, the Commission has been reluctant 
to enforce Article 102 of TFEU against excessive pricing practices by dominant 
undertakings. In EURIBOR, acknowledging that the reliability of benchmarks is 
crucial for the proper functioning of financial markets, the Commission specifically 
stressed that it was the collusion between banks that was targeted under its antitrust 
enforcement. Therefore, benchmark manipulation by a single market participant may 
not result in an intervention by the Commission under Article 102.  
                                                          
1012 See Commission, ‘Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU (formerly Article 81(3) TEC)’ 
(Communication) OJ 2004 C101/97: Vol II App C13, paras 20, 46 
1013 Supra note 1011  
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At national level, such misconduct can be subject to investigations under MAR and 
competition law. National competition authorities are more active in prosecuting 
excessive pricing practices under Article 102 and can exercise their authority over 
market participants who manipulate benchmarks by using their market power. In 
EURIBOR, the defendants’ conduct was also subject to proceedings at national level 
under financial regulation. In the UK, the Financial Services Authority imposed the 
largest fines in its history on the defendants for their manipulation of LIBOR and 
EURIBOR1014 . The defendants have been fined under different jurisdictions and 
different legal frameworks1015.This may result in overlapping jurisdictions between 
national competition authorities and financial regulators, as the latter can also open 
proceedings under Article 12 of MAR giving rise to concerns about the ne bis in idem 
principle. Even though EU case law provides that the existence of sector-specific 
regulation at national or EU level cannot preclude competition authorities exercising 
their authority under EU competition law1016, the collaboration between competition 
and financial regulators is fundamental for the effective prosecution of market 
manipulation.  
The Commission’s intervention in EURIBOR, also raises questions as to the 
enforcement of competition law to cross-market manipulation which does not involve 
manipulation of benchmark prices.  As discussed, physical wholesale products are 
subject to market manipulation prohibition under REMIT. A cross-market 
manipulation can involve physical wholesale markets in different wholesale energy 
markets. For example market participants can engage in continuous short sales in 
physical electricity or natural gas markets to reduce prices with the expectation that 
achieved low price levels can enable market participants access to energy supplies 
at low prices. The findings in EURIBOR shows that such cross-market practices can 
also give effect to proceedings by the Commission under EU competition law, if they 
are perpetrated by multiple parties through collusive conduct.  
                                                          
1014 See: Financial Conduct Authority, Press Release, ‘UBS fined £160 million for significant failings in relation to 
LIBOR and EURIBOR’ (19 December, 2012) https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/ubs-fined-
%C2%A3160-million-significant-failings-relation-libor-and-euribor  
1015 Banks’ rate fixing activities have also become subject to investigations in the US Also Libor case in the US. 
See: U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, ‘CFTC Orders Barclays to pay $200 Million Penalty for 
Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting concerning LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark Interest Rates’ (27 
June 2012) pr6239-12 http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12  
1016 Case T-336/07 Telefonica SA and Telefonica de Espana v European Commission [2012] 2008 OJ C83/6, the 
appeal from Wanadoo Espana/Telefonica (COMP/38.784) Commission Decision of 04 July, 2007; Case T-
271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477.  
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Furthermore, EURIBOR clearly shows that a misconduct prosecuted by the 
Commission under competition law can also be investigated and sanctioned by 
financial regulators at national level. Even though the application of multiple 
jurisdictions to the same market misconduct may be regarded as problematic for the 
establishment of a consistent single rulebook that governs European energy markets, 
it has not given rise to concerns on the ne bis in idem principle. However, concerns 
can arise when the same misconduct is prosecuted under both national competition 
law and REMIT or corresponding national sector-specific regulation. 
4.3.3.2.3. Congestion-related Manipulation 
This type of market manipulation involves market participants engaging in practices 
to benefit from alterations in congestion levels in national or regional transmission 
systems, rather than trading in output or price differences. Energy markets are 
network-based and pipelines and grids that serve the purpose of transmitting natural 
gas and electricity from producers or generators to other suppliers and consumers 
are capacity-restricted, that is, the amount of natural gas and electricity to be 
transported for a certain time period depends on the capacity of pipelines and grids 
used for transportation. When the amount of energy to be transported exceeds the 
capacity of transmission lines to be used, congestion occurs 1017 . Generally, the 
majority of baseload power plants such as nuclear and hydropower generators are 
located in rural areas far from major consumption centres and where demand for 
energy is low. Congestion generally takes place from geographic regions where 
demand for energy is low to those where it is high. When demand for electricity 
exceeds available transmission capacity, flow from these rural areas to the 
consumption centres is congested. This results in changes in energy prices across 
transmission systems and the division of national or regional markets into different 
pricing zones where energy products are traded.   
 
 
 
                                                          
1017 Petri Mantysaari, (2015), 45 
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4.3.3.2.3.1. Perpetration 
4.3.3.2.3.1.1. Exploiting Congestion Management 
Mechanism 
In order to alleviate congestion levels, transmission system operators have 
developed several capacity allocation and congestion management mechanisms. 
The methods that transmission system operators use in relieving congestion involve 
both financial and physical instruments. Financial congestion management 
mechanisms include financial transmission rights (FTRs) and contracts for difference 
(CfDs). Congestion in a particular transmission line results in price differences 
between the point energy is injected into the system (source) and the point where it 
is withdrawn from the system (sink). While the price for energy decreases at source, 
it increases at sink. The price difference between the source and sink is called the 
congestion price1018 . Suppliers who wish to transport energy at congested lines 
indirectly pay this congestion price by selling their energy output at source at 
decreased prices. FTRs entitle their holders to receive price differences between 
source and sink1019. CfDs, on the other hand, operate as swap agreements through 
which market participants hedge their financial risks arising from congestion levels 
and price differences1020.  
Even though being financially settled, FTRs are not one of the financial instruments 
listed under the MiFID 2014 Annex I, Section C1021. Unlike other energy derivatives 
which can be issued by market participants without any limitations on quantity, FTRs 
can only be issued by transmission system operators and have to reflect the physical 
capacity available in relevant transmission lines. Market participants cannot acquire 
                                                          
1018 Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, ‘Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks I: Financial 
Rights’ [1998] Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No 2093, 2 
1019 ENTSOE, ‘Transmission Risk Hedging Products’ (2012) An ENTSO-E Educational Paper (ENTSO-E Education 
Paper), 8 
https://www.entsoe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/_library/consultations/Network_Code_CACM/20120619_Educ
ational_Paper_on_Risk_Hedging_Instruments_review5.pdf  
1020 Ibid., 11  
1021 Whether or not FTRs constitute financial instruments under financial regulation has been discussed in the 
EU, since such rights have been first introduced in energy markets. Transmission system operators argue that 
even though such rights can be considered as financial instruments, they should benefit from the incidental 
activity exemption under Article 2(1)(c) of MiFID II.  See; Ibid., 29; See also: Eurelectric, ‘Eurelectric’s concerns 
on the negative impact of Financial Transmission Rights being classified as financial instruments under MiFID II 
on the completion of the internal energy market’ (Eurelectric letter to the DG FISMA of 19 November, 2015)  
http://www.eurelectric.org/media/247826/20151119_eurelectric_ftr_letter_to_dg_fisma_final-2015-2220-
0014-01-e.pdf   
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as many FTRs as they want and they can receive these rights only for hedging price 
risks arising from capacity congestion and not for speculation purposes. The CfDs 
also constitute an effective hedging mechanism, as market participants who are 
trading energy products via highly congested transmission lines are exposed to 
serious price risks. These contracts involve two different reference prices at which 
market participants value their positions. Generally, but not necessarily, these 
reference prices consist of one fluctuating and one fixed price. If the difference 
between the fluctuating price and the fixed price is positive, the buyer of CfDs 
receives payment on the basis of this positive price difference. If it is negative, 
however, the buyer of CfDs pays the difference between the fixed price and the 
negative price to the seller.   
In US case law, the availability of FTRs and CfDs has been a major factor for the 
perpetration of congestion-related manipulation. In both Constellation1022.  and Louis 
Dreyfus Energy Services L.P.1023, market participants trading to increase congestion 
levels had significant positions in related FTRs and CfDs which became profitable 
with the changes in congestion levels. In these cases, the perpetrators’ trading of 
wholesale electricity products was uneconomic, leading to limited financial returns or 
even losses. The trading practices were profitable, only after the profits derived from 
related FTRs and CfDs were included. Placing bids and offers for purchase and sale 
of energy products, the perpetrators did not aim at profit maximisation from their 
output or price differences. Rather they sought to increase congestion levels at 
transmission lines which directly affected the profitability of their FTRs and CfDs.  
Even though the use of FTRs1024 and CfDs1025 for congestion management purposes 
is increasing, the development of financial mechanisms is still under development as 
the majority of member states implement physical measures to deal with 
                                                          
1022 Constellation Energy Commodities Group Inc., 138 FERC ¶ 61,168 (2012)  
1023 MISO Virtual and FTR Trading, 146 FERC ¶ 61,072 (2014)  
1024 FTRs have been used in Italy and Spain-Portugal border. See; Economic Consulting Associates, ‘European 
Electricity Forward Markets and Hedging Products – State of Play and Elements for Monitoring’ (Final Report, 
September 2015), VIII 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/electricity/market%20monitoring/documents_public/eca%20report%20on%2
0european%20electricity%20forward%20markets.pdf. Belgium and the Netherlands also introduced FTRs in 
their congestion management mechanism. See EFET, ‘Introduction of Financial Transmission Rights’ (Market 
ESC, Brussels, 3 December, 2015)  
1025 Since 2000, CfDs have been traded in Nordic electricity markets including Sweden, Denmark, Norway, 
Finland as well as in Spanish-Portuguese cross-border transmission networks. See; ENTSO-E Education Paper, 
20  
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congestion1026. Physical instruments that transmission system operators designate to 
alleviate congestion levels include market-based and non-market-based methods. 
Redispatching and countertrading are market-based methods through which 
transmission system operators seek to alter the flow pattern that causes congestion 
at transmission lines. Redispatching involves increasing energy production and 
injecting it at points where energy is withdrawn from congested transmission lines, 
resulting in the counter flow of energy and relieving congestion. In counter-trading, 
transmission system operators engage in energy buying from suppliers and 
producers closer to the point where congested energy is withdrawn and sell on other 
side of the congested transmission line, again resulting in counter-flowing of energy 
and relieving congestion. Transmission system operators also apply curtailment to 
deal with congestion as a non-market-based method. In so doing, transmission 
system operators may require the limitation of energy production from certain energy 
producers or suppliers contributing to congestion in transmission lines. In natural gas 
markets, Article 16 of Regulation 715/2009 limits the congestion management 
measures only for market-based methods. In electricity markets, on the other hand, 
Article 16 of Regulation 714/2009 provides that transmission system operators may 
curtail certain power plants to relieve congestion levels. Nevertheless, the use of 
curtailment is limited to emergency situations and considered only as a secondary 
option after the application of redispatching and counter-trading measures.  
4.3.3.2.3.1.2. Exploiting Price Differences 
The Commission’s decision in Svenska Kraftnät1027provides a clear example of how 
congestion levels impact on prices and the scope of wholesale markets in the EU. 
The case involved an abuse of the dominant position by the Swedish transmission 
system operator (Svenska Kraftnät) on the grounds that by imposing a single price 
zone and limiting electricity exports from Sweden to Denmark to relieve congestion, 
Svenska Kraftnät engaged in discrimination between Danish and Swedish electricity 
markets and thus abused its dominant position in violation of Article 102 of TFEU1028. 
Sweden’s electricity market has been mostly dependent on hydroelectric power 
produced in the northern region of the country, while the major consumption centres 
                                                          
1026 See; Christof Duthaler & Matthias Finger, ‘Financial Transmission Rights in Europe’s Electricity Market’ 
[2008]  
1027 Swedish Interconnectors (Case COMP/39.351)  OJ C 239/4 
1028 Swedish Interconnectors (Case COMP/39.351)  OJ C 239/4, para 42 
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where the bulk of electricity produced is needed is in the South. This led to 
congestion in electricity flow from the north to the south and resulted in Svenska 
Kraftnät engaging in counter-trading measures to relieve the congestion. Sweden 
had a single pricing zone where a single market clearing price determined in the 
national wholesale electricity market was applicable over the country. In order to 
keep this uniform price, Svenska Kraftnät limited electricity exports to Denmark, even 
though the relevant congestion did not take place in the interconnectors that connect 
the Swedish and Danish transmission grids. The Commission found that Svenska 
Kraftnät had violated Article 102 of TFEU by seeking to keep a uniform price in 
exchange for cross-border trade and competition. As a result, Svenska Kraftnät was 
required to divide Sweden into several price zones on the basis of transmission 
capacity and allow Danish customers access to cheap electricity generated in the 
north1029.  
Despite being an antitrust case, Svenska Kraftnät shows how congestion levels at 
transmission lines can affect prices and render wholesale energy markets vulnerable 
to market manipulation. Market participants that have information on available 
transmission capacity and the congestion levels thereof can manipulate wholesale 
energy markets, if such misconduct is also profitable. Consider an electricity 
producer which has high margin generation units producing electricity at expensive 
prices and operates in a country like Sweden, where low margin cheaper electricity 
production facilities are concentrated in certain regions for geographic reasons. It is 
reasonable to expect that transmission lines which convey electricity from cheap 
electricity generators to places with high energy demand would be congested. 
Accordingly, an electricity producer may find itself out of the relevant merit order in 
the wholesale market due to competition from the cheaper power plants. Foreseeing 
when and how transmission lines are congested, this market participant can buy a 
purchase order in the day-ahead market to increase electricity demand and 
congestion. The market participant can offset this purchase order with an equivalent 
sell order in the real-time or balancing market. When congestion at the transmission 
lines takes place, the transmission system operator can apply counter-trading 
measures and call electricity production from the market participant’s high margin 
generation units to alleviate congestion levels at the relevant lines. The market 
                                                          
1029 Swedish Interconnectors (Case COMP/39.351)  OJ C 239/4, para 47 
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participant’s purchase and sell orders can be uneconomic or even loss-incurring. 
Nevertheless, the profits derived from electricity produced for counter-trading would 
be more than enough to compensate the losses incurred in the wholesale electricity 
market.   
4.3.3.2.3.2. Applicable Frameworks  
Congestion-related market manipulation can also account for violations of Articles 
101 and/or 102 of TFEU. Market participants can engage in agreements or 
concerted practices to increase congestion levels at given transmission lines. Such 
schemes can account for said violation, if competent competition authorities find that 
perpetrators are collectively dominant1030. The identification of relevant markets and 
dominant positions constitute key factors in abuse of dominance cases. Whether or 
not the relevant geographic and product markets are determined on the basis of 
pricing zones rather than the scope of national transmission networks, or whether or 
not the analysis of market power should also take into account the identification of 
pivotal positions, substituting or supplementing the calculation of market shares is 
important for the legal analysis carried out under Article 102. Nevertheless, the 
application of Articles 101 and 102 to such market practices also give rise to 
concerns about the ne bis in idem principle.  
The prevention of congestion-related market manipulation requires effective capacity 
allocation and congestion management mechanisms as well as strong monitoring of 
markets by competent regulatory authorities. The determination of pricing zones and 
splitting of energy markets on the basis of capacity constraints are fundamental in 
identifying positions that can be exploited and abused by market participants. The 
EU adopted rules on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) 
along with several other network codes pursuant to the regulations and directives 
under the Third Energy Package1031 which provides legal rules for transparency, 
transit and market structure for both natural gas and electricity. Despite significant 
                                                          
1030 For ‘Collective Dominance’, see; Vivien Rose & David Bailey (eds), Bellamy & Child – European Union Law of 
Competition, (OUP 7th ed., 2013),  779-783 
1031 Third Energy Package involves Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
July, 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, Directive 2009/72/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July, 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity, Regulation (EC) 2009/715 on conditions for access to natural gas transmission networks, Regulation 
(EC) 2009/714 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. 
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progress in the integration of transmission lines between Member States, EU 
wholesale energy markets are still mostly national in scope and there are significant 
price differences among national energy markets.To what extent the existing 
regulatory framework ensures the functioning of wholesale energy markets and how 
EU case law on market manipulation under EU competition law and REMIT develop 
remains to be seen.  
4.3.4. Outright Fraud 
4.3.4.1. Concept 
Outright fraud involves market practices that operate as a deceit upon other market 
participants. The major factor distinguishing transactions that constitute outright 
fraud from those identified as market power and trade-based manipulation is that 
these transactions are aimed at deceiving other market participants as to the 
conditions in markets or value of particular products. As mentioned, US case law 
distinguishes fictitious transactions from real transactions 1032 . Transactions with 
actual parties with actual economic risks and material effects on markets are defined 
as open market transactions 1033 . Market power manipulation and trade-based 
manipulative practices are regarded as open market transactions. When transactions 
do not involve actual trades with actual parties on the basis of economic risks, yet 
still aim at manipulating markets and prices, they are identified as closed market 
transactions and considered to be outright fraud. Wash trades, matched orders, 
pump and dump schemes, pre-arranged and circular trading are all examples of 
closed market transactions1034. 
Market participants can also engage in unilateral acts to deceive other market 
participants and seek financial profits therefrom. These types of practices often take 
the form of distorting information in markets through dissemination or publication of 
false statements to markets. The dissemination can be perpetrated via media 
organisations, internet or other platforms where market participants communicate or 
seek access to necessary market data. Whether or not the relevant false information 
is published under transparency or data reporting obligations under energy or 
                                                          
1032 Sundheimer v. CFTC, 688 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 112 (1983) 
1033 United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir.1991)  
1034 Sundheimer v. CFTC, 688 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 112 (1983); See Markowski v SEC, 
274 F.3d 525 (D.D.Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002); United States v. Radley, 659 F. Supp. 2d 803 
(S.D. Tex. 2009)  
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financial regulation is irrelevant for a finding of market manipulation. Information that 
is disseminated voluntarily or made public under regulatory obligations must be false 
or not completely accurate and must be in a position that has a significant effect on 
prices. ACER refers to the concept of inside information 1035  as a benchmark in 
identifying what type of information is significant enough to affect market prices. 
Such a reference does not provide much clarification in market manipulation cases 
as EU case law on inside information has not yet developed.  
REMIT does not offer a specific definition of outright fraud. Instead it provides two 
different definitions that can be considered as indicating market manipulation as 
outright fraud. Article 2(2)(b) 1036  proscribes dissemination of false information 
through the media or other means. This article does not necessarily relate to the 
existence of a transaction which is required under Article 2(2)(a). Market participants 
who render public false information without engaging in a transaction that gives 
effect to that publication is in violation of Article 2(2)(b). Article 2(2)(a)(iii), on the 
other hand, refers to transactions that employ a fictitious device or any other form of 
deception which gives false or misleading signals  as to wholesale energy products. 
This definition mirrors the fraud-based definition given under SEA’s Section 10(b)1037 
and follows the demarcation of US case law which identifies such transactions as 
closed market transactions meaning that they do not involve actual parties and 
economic risks with material effects on markets.  
4.3.4.2. ACER’s Examples 
In its guidance document, ACER provides a list of examples of outright fraud under 
Article 2(2)(b) and Article 2(2)(a)(iii). Accordingly, pump and dump schemes, circular 
and pre-arranged trading activities and spreading false information through media 
are market misconduct characterised as outright fraud under REMIT’s anti-
manipulation rules. The list does not include wash trades and matched orders. 
ACER specifies that these market practices are prohibited under Article 2(2)(a)(i) 
                                                          
1035 ACER’s Guidance (2016), 39  
1036 Article 2(2)(b) of REMIT identifies market manipulation as “disseminating information through the media, 
including the internet, or by any other means, which gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to 
the supply of, demand for, or price of wholesale energy products, including the dissemination of rumours and 
false or misleading news, where the disseminating person knew, or ought to have known, that the information 
was false or misleading”.  
1037 Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78I; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
316 | P a g e  
 
which proscribes transactions that give false or misleading signals as to wholesale 
energy products. As discussed above, these market practices have been regarded 
as major examples of market manipulation under fraud-based prohibitions 1038 . 
However the reading of Article 2(2)(a)(i) suggests that it identifies trade-based 
transactions other than those involving price positioning, which is defined under 
Article 2(2)(a)(ii).  
The identification of wash trades and matched orders as closed market transactions 
under ACER’s demarcation creates uncertainty as to the distinction between Article 
2(2)(a)(i) and Article 2(2)(a)(iii). While it is sufficient for the former to show that 
signals given by the transactions at issue do not represent actual conditions as to the 
supply of, demand for, or price of wholesale energy products, for the latter, the 
national competent authorities are required to establish that transactions have 
employed a fictitious device or any other form of deception which gives false or 
misleading signals as to wholesale energy products. The phrase that a transaction 
which gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply of, 
demand for, or price of wholesale energy products under Article 2(2)(a)(i) does not 
necessarily indicate that relevant transactions must operate as fraud to result in 
market manipulation. In fact, all types of trade-based market manipulation including 
both market power and cross-market manipulation give false or misleading signals 
as to demand and supply levels existing in market places. Their impact on market 
information does not suffice to classify all types of manipulative practices as outright 
fraud. Trade-based market manipulation constitutes open market transactions which 
materially affect markets and/or prices through actual trades with actual 
counterparties. Accordingly Article 2(2)(a)(i) aims at defining trade-based market 
manipulation which do not constitute price positioning which is defined under Article 
2(2)(a)(ii). Article 2(2)(a)(iii), on the other hand, directly refers to a transaction that 
“employs or attempts to employ a fictitious device or any other form of deception or 
contrivance” to stress that these transactions must operate as a fraud upon markets. 
Therefore, ACER’s reference to wash trades and matched orders as examples of 
market manipulation under the definition provided in Article 2(2)(a)(i) is erroneous.  
 
                                                          
1038 Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78I; Commodity Exchange Act § 4(c),  7 U.S.C. §6c  
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4.3.4.3. Applicable Frameworks 
While the prohibitions on dissemination of false information are included in several 
regulations at national1039  and EU levels1040, EU competition law, as established 
under Articles 101 and 102, does not specifically deal with such market misconduct. 
As mentioned above, while Article 101 deals with agreements and concerted 
practices between multiple market participants, Article 102 prohibits abuse of 
dominance by dominant undertakings through exclusionary and/or exploitative 
conduct. It is reasonable to expect that EU competition law applies to the 
dissemination of false information when it is perpetrated in a way that also violates 
one or more prohibitions under Articles 101 and 102. For example, if relevant 
dissemination practices are perpetrated by two or more market participants in a 
collusive way, competition authorities may interfere and open proceedings as to a 
probable violation of Article 101. However, if such a relationship cannot be 
established, relevant dissemination practices would be left outside the scope of EU 
competition law.  
Closed market transactions constitute violations of EU competition law, Article 101 of 
TFEU in particular, as they involve agreements or collusion between market 
participants aiming at distorting markets and/or prices. Whether or not they involve 
actual trades that materially affect conditions in markets is irrelevant for a finding of a 
violation of Article 101. In fact, the perpetrators’ practices that employ a fictitious 
device, deception or contrivance can account for restriction by object within the 
meaning of Article 101. Wash trades, matched orders, pre-arranged and circular 
trading practices involve multiple parties that seek certain market outcomes such as 
achieving certain price or output levels, and can even account for cartels which are 
regarded by the European Commission as restrictions by object as well as per se 
                                                          
1039 For example, the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 
of 2008 in the UK and; Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb vom, 3 July, 2004 (BGBl. I 2004 32/1414) in 
Germany prohibit dissemination of false information., See Jan Peter Heidenreich, ‘The New German Act 
Against Unfair Competition’ http://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=349#sdfootnote2sym  
1040 For transactions between consumers and undertakings, Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 May, 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the 
internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’); for transactions between undertakings, Directive 
2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December, 2006 concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising (‘Comparative Advertising Directive’)  
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violations of EU competition law1041.  For example multiple suppliers and traders 
carrying out wash trades, matched orders or pre-arranged and circular trading 
practices and submitting these trades to indices to affect index prices can be held to 
be engaging in cartels and thus in violation of Article 101 per se. Consequently the 
concurrent application of competition law and REMIT results in application of multiple 
jurisdictions to the same market conduct and gives rise to concerns about the ne bis 
in idem principle. 
4.3.5. Concurrency of Anti-manipulation and Antitrust Rules and Ne Bis 
In Idem 
The legal analysis of the ne bis in idem principle involves market misconduct that is 
deemed to be manipulative and therefore prohibited under REMIT or MAR. This 
market misconduct can also lead to proceedings under EU competition law as a 
distortion of competition in wholesale energy markets. In this situation, the 
jurisdiction of two authorities can intersect each other and lead to concurrent 
application of regulatory prohibitions and antitrust rules. Perpetrators who are 
troubled due to multiple proceedings opened by two different authorities for the same 
market misconduct can raise a double jeopardy claim to escape from the duplicative 
proceedings. In this regard, the Courts and/or the Commission can assess whether 
the facts of the cases at issue meet the three-fold criteria established under EU case 
law.     
In order to invoke the ne bis in idem principle, defendants are required to show that 
persons, facts, and legal interests protected in the concurrent proceedings must be 
the same. While anti-manipulation rules under REMIT1042 and MAR1043 apply to any 
legal or natural person engaging in or attempting to engage in market manipulation 
on wholesale energy markets1044, Articles 101 and 102 can be enforced against only 
                                                          
1041 “It is not necessary that the agreement expressly or directly fixes the selling or purchasing price: it is 
sufficient if the parties agree on certain parameters of the price composition, such as the amount of rebates 
given to customers.” Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Guidance on restrictions of competition "by 
object" for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice {C(2014) 4136 
final} 
1042 Article 5, Regulation No 1227/2011 
1043 Article 12, Regulation No 596/2014 
1044 Regine Feltkamp & Cecile Musialski, (2013), 26 
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undertakings or associations of undertakings1045. A national competent regulator can 
sanction both legal and natural persons for the violation of the relevant market 
manipulation prohibition. For example a proceeding under REMIT for a violation of a 
market manipulation prohibition can be brought against both undertakings and 
people working in these undertakings and responsible for the relevant manipulative 
conduct. Remedies issued by the national competent regulators on undertakings and 
natural persons can differ. National competition authorities or the Commission, on 
the other hand, can hold only undertakings or association of undertakings liable for 
antitrust violations. People, working in these undertakings and responsible for anti-
competitive conduct, cannot be subject to antitrust proceedings.  
As to the facts that are investigated by concurrent proceedings, defendants must 
show that market practices prosecuted by regulatory and competition authorities are 
the same. If regulatory and competition authorities investigate different practices, 
defendants cannot raise a ne bis in idem claim to avoid concurrent proceedings. For 
example, an electricity generator engaging in a capacity withholding practice to raise 
electricity prices can also have financial positions that profit from higher electricity 
prices. This market conduct can provoke both competition and regulatory authorities 
to exercise their jurisdictions. While the former investigates capacity withholding as a 
violation of Article 102 of TFEU, the latter can consider this scheme as a market 
manipulation in which the perpetrator exploits price relations between physical and 
financial positions. Even though the proceedings opened by competition and 
regulatory authorities are closely related, the facts of these cases are not the same 
and thus do not suffice for the generator to invoke the principle of ne bis in idem.  
The Commission, in Telekomunikacja Polska, identified that the aim of EU 
competition law was to ensure the functioning of undistorted competition in the EU, 
without stipulating any distinction between Article 101 and 102. The legal interests 
protected by market manipulation prohibitions, as included in REMIT and MAR, are 
to ensure integrity of energy and financial markets in which prices reflect fair and 
competitive interplay between supply and demand 1046 , to foster open and fair 
                                                          
1045 The concepts of undertaking and association of undertakings have the same meanings for both Articles 101 
and 102. See; Cases T-68, 77 and 78/89, Societa Italiana Vetro SpA v. Commission [1992] ECR II-1403, para 358. 
Every entity, which, regardless of their legal status, engages in economic activity can constitute undertaking. 
See; Case C-309/99, Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR I-1577 
1046 Recital 1, Regulation No 1227/2011 
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competition1047 and to prevent significant distortions of competition arising from the 
differences between national law1048. Despite the specific emphasis on the purpose 
of ensuring fair competition in REMIT and MAR, the Commission will probably 
consider that the legal interests protected by REMIT and MAR are not the same and 
thus do not suffice to raise a ne bis in idem claim.  EURIBOR1049  is illustrative of the 
approach taken by the Commission, involving an Article 101 proceeding initiated 
against a market practice which had already been prosecuted as market 
manipulation by a national financial market regulator under national financial 
regulation. This case clearly shows that the Commission will apply competition law, if 
it is shown that the relevant market practice distorts competition across member 
states. Whether or not the same market practice is also prosecuted under REMIT or 
MAR is irrelevant for the purposes of an antitrust investigation. Nevertheless the 
same conclusion may not be the case if both antitrust and anti-manipulation 
proceedings are opened at national level. In this case, the analysis of legal interests 
protected and the applicability of ne bis in idem principle are determined on case-by-
case basis.   
4.4. CONCLUSION 
4.4.1. Capacity Withholding 
Even though Iberdrola represents the first and only market manipulation case carried 
out under REMIT, the relevant market misconduct has been subject to several 
investigations and legal proceedings at national level under competition law. These 
cases involved capacity withholding practices by market participants who sought 
profits from artificially inflated electricity prices as a result of reducing their output.  
The national competition authorities investigated these market practices on the basis 
of Articles 101 and 102 which respectively prohibit anti-competitive agreements or 
concerted practices and abuse of dominance.  
Establishing the violation of EU competition law in these cases proved to be difficult 
for national authorities. In Article 101 cases, a high concentration in the energy 
supply provided significant opportunities for market participants to engage in 
collusive behaviour without material contact or agreements between competitors. 
                                                          
1047 Recital 2, Regulation No 1227/2011 
1048 Recital 5, Regulation No 596/2014 
1049 Euro Interest Rate Derivatives (Case AT.39914) Commission Decision of 4 December, 2013 
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Market structures, regulations on transparency and data reporting obligations and 
bidding activities further increased transparency levels and allowed market 
participants to predict applicable merit orders more accurately which, in turn, enabled 
market participants to foresee when their energy output might become pivotal for the 
supply of energy products at certain price levels 1050 . Due to the difficulties in 
acquiring direct evidence such as agreements or meetings between colluding parties, 
national competition authorities mostly relied on allocation and timing of bidding 
practices such as identifying symmetries in instantaneous dealings to prove that 
market participants engaged in a collusion or concerted practice to fix prices and 
share energy markets.   
In Article 102 cases, on the other hand, the identification of dominant positions 
constituted the major obstacle to the finding of violations. EU case law clearly 
illustrates that the national competition authorities have been eager to apply new 
methodologies in measuring and establishing market power and dominant positions 
such as the Pivotal Supplier Index and the Residual Supplier Index. Nevertheless, 
such recalibrations in competition law methodologies in accordance with the 
characteristics of energy markets was hardly accepted by the national courts which 
still relies on conventional methods such as measuring market shares for the 
determination of market power and dominance.   
In Iberdrola, the Spanish Competition Authority SCA; 
i) defined the relevant time periods in which it found the defendant withheld 
its capacity,  
ii) established that the defendant, in deed, committed capacity withholding,  
iii) established that prices moved as a result of withheld capacity, and  
iv) concluded that the defendant’s withholding did not serve a legitimate 
business reason, as it was uneconomic and loss-incurring but for the 
profits derived from withheld capacity.   
Even though the Spanish competition authority did not specifically establish that the 
defendant used its market power and abused their dominant position by withholding 
its generation capacity from the Spanish wholesale electricity market, its legal 
                                                          
1050 Adrien de Hauteclocque & Malgorzata Sadowska, (2015), 191. See also: David Newbery, ‘Electricity 
Liberalisation in Britain: the Quest for a Satisfactory Wholesale Market Design’ (2005) 26 The Energy Journal, 
Special Issue 43-70, 57 
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analysis was similar to that it had done under competition law cases as it applied an 
evaluation of pivotal positions held by the perpetrators in establishing the causation 
between capacity withholding and price changes. In Endesa/Iberdrola/Union 
Fenosa/Hidrocantabrico, SCA similarly identified the relevant time periods in which 
the defendants withheld their capacity and established how these capacity 
withholding strategies influenced electricity prices in the Spanish balancing markets. 
The factor that distinguishes SCA’s legal analysis in Iberdrola from that in  
Endesa/Iberdrola/Union Fenosa/Hidrocantabrico, is that, in the former, SCA did not 
need to establish that the defendant’s pivotal position in the relevant time period 
constituted a dominant position, as the prohibition of market manipulation under 
REMIT does not require undertakings to have dominance. In the latter, on the other 
hand, the identification of the defendants’ pivotal position as dominance was 
fundamental in establishing that the relevant capacity withholding strategy 
constituted an abuse of a dominant position.  
4.4.1.1. Incompatibility of Conventional Antitrust Methodologies 
Despite the willingness of national competition authorities to use pivotal positions 
held by market participants to identify market power and dominant position in 
national wholesale energy markets, Endesa/Iberdrola/Union Fenosa/Hidrocantabrico 
clearly showed that this approach was not accepted by national courts which 
preferred the conventional methodologies such as market share and the HHI index, 
in these decisions. The Commission also followed a similar approach in German 
Wholesale Energy Market and rested its market power analysis solely upon the 
calculation of market shares held by the relevant market participants. This resulted in 
the Energy Sector Inquiry of 2007 and subsequent soft law instruments arguing that 
since EU competition law does not suffice to deal with such practices, a tailor-made 
legal framework was necessary to address anti-competitive conduct peculiar to 
wholesale energy markets. Nevertheless, the development of new indices such as 
the Pivotal Supplier Index (PSI) and the Residual Supplier Index (RSI) clearly shows 
that it is the conventional methodologies rather than EU competition law itself that 
give rise to concerns about competition in wholesale energy markets.   
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Traditional methods for the identification of market power such as the calculation of 
market shares1051 and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)1052 that are commonly 
used in the economics of EU competition law1053, do not suffice to obtain optimal 
results for detecting market power in energy markets1054.  Demand for energy supply 
changes on an hourly basis and transmission of energy products from suppliers to 
consumers is capacity-restricted, that is, the capacity available for supply determines 
the amount and suppliers of energy for a certain period of time. Undertakings with 
relatively small market shares can assess these market and capacity conditions and 
exercise significant market power to affect prices. This was clearly illustrated in the 
Western Energy Crisis of 2001 in which suppliers with less than a ten per cent 
market share in relatively deconcentrated California electricity with market 
participants, none of whom exceeded 20 per cent market share, could significantly 
influence market clearing prices1055.  
4.4.1.2. Adoption of Sector-Specific Methodologies 
The Pivotal Supplier Index (PSI) and the Residual Supplier Index (RSI) are indices 
developed to address the peculiarities of the energy markets. The PSI involves an 
assessment of necessity of a relevant generator to supply load for a given time 
period. The assessment first calculates the difference between total supply and 
demand levels in wholesale energy markets for a given period of time to identify the 
extent of supply surplus. If the difference is positive, the assessment then compares 
this supply surplus with capacity of given generators. Here the calculation uses a 
binary variable which takes two values: either 0 or 1. If supply surplus is higher than 
the capacity of given electricity generation plants, the assessment concludes that the 
value is 0 and generators are not pivotal in serving demand for the given time period. 
If the assessment finds otherwise, the value is 1 and the generators are held pivotal 
                                                          
1051 Market share indices involve calculation of the percentage of market shares that are held by the largest 
companies in a specifically defined relevant product and geographic markets.  
1052 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index provides a concentration ratio in relevant markets. The level of 
concentration is important in the assessment of markets power. For example the market power exercised by 
an undertaking with 20 per cent market share in a highly concentrated market may not be equivalent to that 
of the same undertaking in a deconcentrated market. The HHI evaluates market power on the basis of 
concentration levels at markets. 
1053 Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics (OUP 2012),  87-88 
1054 David Newbery, et al., (2004), 23 
1055 Anjali Sheffrin, ‘Critical Actions Necessary for Effective Market Monitoring’ (October 19, 2001) Draft 
Comments Dept of Market Analysis, California ISO, FERC RTO Workshop, 5  
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and can exercise market power to change clearing prices in energy markets. The 
PSI has been used by FERC since 2004 as an important instrument in determining 
market power in energy markets1056 and is regarded as one of the most reliable 
indicators of market power in wholesale energy markets1057.  
Similar to the PSI, the RSI is also based on the calculation of the necessity of 
generation plants in serving energy demand. The motivation behind the development 
of the RSI is that the PSI, which identifies the necessity of a given generation 
capacity on the basis of supply surplus, does not focus on the extent of market 
power exercised by generation capacity which is less than supply surplus. The PSI 
finds market power only if the capacity of a given generator is higher than supply 
surplus available in the market. However, the economic literature suggests that 
generation capacity that is near to, yet not totally pivotal for, supplying demand can 
also exercise market power and influence the market clearing price1058. In other 
words, even if the value of a given generation capacity in the PSI is 0, this 
generation capacity can still influence the market and exercise market power. The 
RSI provides a ratio of residual supply which is the difference between total available 
supply and the capacity of a given generator over demand.  
   RSI = (Total Supply – Supply by the Given Generator) / (Total Demand) 
If the ratio is more than 100 per cent of total demand, the RSI concludes that the 
given generator is not pivotal. If the ratio is less than 100 per cent, the given 
generation capacity is necessary to meet demand and thus pivotal. The RSI has 
been successfully used by the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) in 
identifying market power in energy markets1059.  
4.4.1.3. Effectiveness of Competition Law 
Even though the establishment of the exercise of market power through the PSI or 
the RSI is sufficient to hold that suppliers abused their dominant position through 
capacity withholding and the legal analysis under Article 102 does not require 
competition authorities to show that suppliers benefit from capacity withholding, 
                                                          
1056 FERC, ‘Order on rehearing and modifying interim generation market power analysis and 
mitigation policy’ (2004) Docket No. ER96-2495-016, et al., 15 
1057 Gary Taylor, et al., (2015), 39 
1058 David Newbery, et al., (2004), 27 
1059 Ibid., 28 
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economically these market practices would not be profitable in competitive markets 
as they would lead to lesser market shares and revenue losses incurred from 
unused generation units1060. By reducing its output, suppliers forego the revenues 
that could have been derived from withheld capacity. Accordingly a generator would 
withdraw its capacity and increase electricity prices, only if such a withdrawal is 
economically profitable.  
The profitability of these market practices depends on the availability of certain 
factors, such as market concentration, transparency, market designs and generation 
portfolios. Electricity can be produced from several resources, such as natural gas, 
nuclear, renewables and coal, which is called an energy mix. The operational costs 
of power plants are mainly dependant on the type of energy source with which the 
electricity is produced. While renewables, and nuclear constitute low-cost energy 
sources, natural gas and coal power plants operate at high marginal costs. In order 
to supply electricity at low prices, market operators use low-cost power plants as 
baseload, that is, these plants remain operational during all hours, while those with 
high marginal costs are called in only when demand for electricity is at its peak, 
called peak-hours. The price of electricity that is to be paid to all supplying plants is 
determined on the basis of the highest cost generation unit that supplied electricity to 
the electricity grid for the relevant time period, the market clearing price.  
Suppliers who own a portfolio of generation assets involving high cost and low cost 
power plants have substantial financial incentives to withhold the capacity in lower 
cost power plants to earn more profits from higher cost power plants. As market 
operators are obliged to call in higher cost generation plants as a result of capacity 
withholding to supply electricity demand, perpetrators can reap more revenues from 
their operating power plants and selling electricity at high prices, even though their 
overall electricity production is reduced. A successful perpetration of these strategies 
is generally pertinent in concentrated and transparent markets in which a market 
participant can easily anticipate when their withholding practices would result in 
higher electricity prices. In these hours, even market participants with a small market 
share in electricity production can result in higher electricity prices and become 
pivotal. The availability of these positions and the evidence that market participants 
                                                          
1060 Ibid., 18 
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acquire benefits in relation to their capacity withholding can also allow competition 
authorities to refute any objective justification claims put forward by the 
perpetrators1061.  
In KeySpan, FERC followed a similar approach concluding that capacity withholding 
practices which aimed at profiting from an overall portfolio of generation assets 
constituted exercise of market power rather than market manipulation. FERC found 
that the defendant’s activity to withhold capacity to increase electricity prices and 
derive more revenues from its other generation assets was an economic and 
legitimate business practice, as it accounted for a mere example of exercise of 
market power. For a capacity withholding activity to be held in violation of FERC’s 
anti-manipulation rules, it must be shown that despite the revenues from other 
generation assets or balancing markets, the market conduct is still loss-incurring and 
uneconomic. The withholding activity must be economic only after the profits from 
other financial or physical positions, such as swaps, options, futures, etc. are 
included. Since the defendant’s market conduct was an exercise of market power 
and economic, FERC found that it did not constitute a violation of its anti-
manipulation rules.  
The market conduct in KeySpan would be a clear example of the abuse of a 
dominant position under EU competition law and Article 102. It is important to note 
that the defendant’s withholding would also remain unpunished under section 2 of 
the Sherman Act which corresponds to Article 102. This is mainly because of the 
difference between the approaches taken by US antitrust law and EU competition 
law to the concept of exploitative abuse such as excessive pricing or monopoly 
pricing practices. These types of market conduct are not identified as abusive under 
US antitrust law. Section 2 only proscribes exclusionary abuses such as predatory 
pricing, margin squeeze, exclusive purchasing, tying and bundling. Nevertheless, 
exploitative abuse and excessive pricing practices have long been regarded as an 
                                                          
1061 Even though Article 102 does not include an exception regime for exercise of market power, the CJEU, in 
Post Denmark, set out two particular grounds of justification: i) Objective necessity, meaning that market 
conduct  was necessary due to external factors; ii) Efficiency, that is, undertakings must show that  
“the efficiency gains likely to result from the conduct under consideration counteract any likely negative effects 
on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets, that those gains have been, or are likely to be, 
brought about as a result of that conduct, that such conduct is necessary for the achievement of those gains in 
efficiency and that it does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most existing sources of 
actual or potential competition”. Case C-209/10 Post Denmark A/S v. Konkurrenceradet,  [2012] ECR I-000,  
para 42 
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abuse of dominance under EU competition law. The difficulties pertinent to the 
prosecution of capacity withholding practices in EU case law stem from the adoption 
of conventional methodologies in measuring market power in energy markets and 
they can be mitigated with the introduction of more suitable methodologies, such as 
the PSI and the RSI. Therefore, the argument that EU competition law is not efficient 
in dealing with capacity withholding practices in energy markets is unfounded.  
4.4.2. Other Types of Market Manipulation 
The interplay between EU competition law and REMIT is not limited to the 
prosecution of capacity withholding practices in wholesale energy markets. There 
are significant questions remaining as to the applicability of REMIT and EU 
competition law to similar market practices. EU case law on market manipulation is 
limited and does not provide detailed guidance on the concurrent application of 
REMIT and EU competition law to wholesale energy markets. ACER provides 
examples of market manipulation to give an insight into what type of market 
practices are considered within the scope of REMIT’s anti-manipulation rules. 
However, these examples are mostly derived from legal experience under US 
regulations on commodities and securities markets and they provide little guidance 
on their application to wholesale energy markets. In order to discover what types of 
activities would be subject to the anti-manipulation rules under REMIT, and how they 
would relate to the prohibitions under Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, the chapter 
follows the demarcation under US case law on energy market manipulation. 
Incorporating the structure of electricity and natural gas markets in the EU, the 
chapter provides an extensive legal analysis on how such practices would be 
relevant in EU wholesale energy markets. Market power manipulation and cross-
market manipulation constitute examples of price positioning under Article 2(2)(a)(ii), 
since these market practices seek to achieve certain price levels in the wholesale 
energy market. Other types of trade-based market manipulation, gaming of market 
rules and congestion-related manipulation are defined under Article 2(2)(a)(i), as 
they aim at exploiting market rules or creating congestion to earn profits. Market 
practices that can be regarded as outright fraud are set out in Articles 2(2)(a)(iii) and 
2(2)(b). While the former addresses fictitious transactions and other transactional 
frauds, the latter proscribes dissemination of false information through media and 
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other means. The chapter shows that market participants may devise a wide 
spectrum of strategies in perpetrating the forms of manipulation defined under Article 
2(2) of REMIT.    
The chapter identifies that the majority of market practices that can account for 
market manipulation under Article 2(2) can also constitute violations of Articles 101 
and/or 102 of TFEU. The concept of excessive pricing as an abuse of a dominant 
position under Article 102 is particularly applicable to price positioning strategies 
through which perpetrators seek to alter prices of wholesale energy products. The 
arguments raised above with respect to the introduction of new market-specific 
methodologies such as the PSI and the RSI play a major role in the identification of a 
dominant position. Competition authorities may find infringements of Article 102, 
when they establish that market participants who engage in price positioning 
strategies hold dominance or pivotal positions in wholesale energy markets. The 
chapter also shows that manipulative practices as defined under Article 2(2) of 
REMIT can also become subject to antitrust investigations under Article 101. This is 
particularly important for strategies where market participants engage in pre-
arranged trades, matched orders, or collusive pricing practices in perpetrating 
market manipulation. Competition authorities can consider these practices as 
collusion and even hardcore cartels when it is established that through these 
practices, perpetrators sought to achieve a certain price level.  
In sum, the legal analysis the chapter provides on the interplay between REMIT and 
EU competition law shows that in most cases, these two jurisdictions will likely 
intersect each other. The same market practices can easily give rise to investigations 
from multiple jurisdictions. The Commission’s proceedings under EURIBOR in which 
perpetrators engaged in benchmark manipulation provide a clear example of the 
concurrent application of EU competition law and sector-specific regulation. REMIT 
does not offer an indication that it has a priority jurisdiction over EU competition law, 
when its anti-manipulation rules are breached. On the contrary, Article 1(2) 
specifically notes that it applies without prejudice to the application of EU competition 
law. The concurrent application of REMIT and EU competition law to the same 
market practices will give rise to concerns on the ne bis in idem principle.  
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Even though REMIT entered into force on 28 December, 2011, Member States were 
not required to confer necessary powers on their national regulators or other 
competent authorities for the enforcement of the Regulation until 29 June, 20131062 . 
Moreover, data reporting obligations only became operational on 7 October, 2015 for 
standardised contracts and 7 April, 2016 for non-standardised contracts1063. In its 
annual report, ACER noted that 33 cases were reported in 2015, 26 of which 
involved breaches of Article 5, REMIT’s anti-manipulation provision, and it was 
expected that reporting by market participants about possible breaches of REMIT 
obligations to the Agency would increase, with growing awareness as to the 
implementation of REMIT in the wholesale energy markets1064. The investigations on 
these reported practices are ongoing, and have not given rise to a formal 
enforcement procedure under REMIT. Nevertheless, this also means that as more 
market data becomes public, more investigations of potential market manipulation by 
competent authorities will follow. The jurisdictional interference by competition 
authorities into these investigations is very likely, according to the existing legal 
framework. Therefore the establishment of a mitigation process for the application of 
multiple jurisdictions is of utmost importance for a coherent and effective regulation 
of EU wholesale energy markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1062 Article 13, Regulation No 1227/2011 
1063 Article 12, Regulation No 1348/2014 
1064 Supra note 97  
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5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
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5.1. OVERVIEW AND FINDINGS 
This thesis provided an extensive legal analysis of the enforcement of anti-
manipulation rules in EU wholesale energy markets. The exploration of the legal 
regime that REMIT established led the thesis to identifying three interrelated 
questions.  
• What is the concept of market manipulation? 
• What types of practices constitute market manipulation? 
• What is the interplay between market manipulation and EU competition law? 
The legal analysis concluded that the concept of market manipulation is far from 
being precise. Academic literature produced several definitions to determine and 
prosecute manipulative conduct1065. Nevertheless, to what extent these definitions 
were sufficient to identify manipulative behaviour has been a matter of discussion. 
Case law was also divided between two definitions which adopted different 
formulations and legal methodologies for the determination of market manipulation. 
While each addressed a certain type of manipulative practice, neither was applicable 
to all. The uncertainty as to the definition of market manipulation led this thesis to 
exploring practices considered to be manipulative, rather than the definitions.  
As prohibition of market manipulation has been newly incorporated into EU law and 
related case law has yet to develop, a comparative approach was needed to 
evaluate what type of practices in energy markets has been subject to enforcement 
procedures under anti-manipulation rules. US case law on energy market 
manipulation has been considered suitable for this comparative study, given the 
myriad of proceedings that have resulted in findings of manipulation. This thesis 
engaged in a demarcation of manipulative practices on the basis of legal and 
financial instruments perpetrators have utilised. Accordingly, undertakings in energy 
markets have perpetrated manipulation through corners, gaming market rules, 
exploiting price relations between different, yet linked, physical and financial 
products, congesting transmission lines or deceiving other undertakings. After the 
evaluation of US case law on energy market manipulation, the thesis explored its 
implications for EU wholesale energy markets. 
                                                          
1065 See Chapter Three 
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The analysis of EU case law identified that there were significant differences 
between energy markets in the EU and the US. The first and only case in which a 
market participant was found in violation of REMIT’s anti-manipulation rule involved 
a capacity withholding practice which was considered as a mere example of exercise 
of market power and thus legitimate in the US. Several EU soft law instruments 
which paved the way for the adoption of REMIT also stressed the necessity of a 
tailor-made legal framework that can efficiently establish and prosecute capacity 
withholding practices. The thesis identified that such practices have been previously 
addressed under antitrust rules at both national and EU level and resulted in 
remedies in relation to Articles 101 and 102 of TFEU. Accordingly, an EU case law 
study on capacity withholding revealed that certain aspects of the legal methodology, 
such as relevant market and dominance analyses, which were developed under EU 
competition law, did not suffice to establish these practices as violations of antitrust 
rules.  
This thesis did not agree with the proposition that EU competition law was not a 
suitable tool to deal with capacity withholding by electricity generators. Several 
sector-specific methodologies identified in legal and economic literature, such as the 
identification of relevant markets in relation to time periods, the PSI and RSI as 
indicators of dominance, and the concept of temporary dominance, can offer 
effective means to enforce antitrust rules on these practices. The importance of this 
approach is two-fold. First, the idea that competent authorities should be flexible in 
adopting legal approaches to the enforcement of EU competition law enables these 
authorities to follow innovation and development in markets and apply antitrust rules 
to a wide range of sectors. Second, the identification of capacity withholding as an 
illegitimate conduct requires the establishment of, on the one hand, price changes 
which are favourable to perpetrators and, on the other, the causation between price 
changes and relevant withholding practices. The establishment of these elements 
can be achieved through close monitoring of merit orders in electricity markets. 
Nevertheless, this is not the case for other types of market manipulation such as 
cross-market, congestion-related manipulation, etc.  The thesis concluded that there 
were significant differences between capacity withholding practices and other types 
of market manipulation with respect to legal methodologies necessary for effective 
enforcement procedures.  
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The EU case law analysis also included several scenarios with respect to 
manipulative practices other than capacity withholding. This thesis illustrated that 
several practices addressed in these scenarios could also give effect to antitrust 
proceedings, if certain conditions were met. Even though a direct reference to such 
an overlap in energy markets could not be possible, the thesis addressed cases from 
other sectors in which both sector-specific regulators and the European Commission 
prosecuted market manipulation on the basis of, respectively, sector-specific 
regulation and EU competition law. This directed the thesis to explore the concept of 
concurrency in EU law and its implications as to the overlap between anti-
manipulation and antitrust rules. 
The concurrent application of sector-specific rules with EU competition law was not a 
new phenomenon in the EU. Telecommunications sector, in particular, has involved 
several cases in which the same market practices were sanctioned concurrently by 
both competition and regulatory authorities. Finding that concurrency was allowed by 
EU courts, this thesis engaged in an analysis assessing the concurrent application of 
anti-manipulation and antitrust rules in EU wholesale energy markets, in relation to 
the concept of ne bis in idem, which is the EU equivalent of the double jeopardy 
doctrine. The analysis indicated that it was unlikely for the ne bis in idem principle to 
constitute a barrier to the concurrent application of multiple jurisdictions to these 
market practices.  
In sum, this thesis concluded several uncertainties with respect to the application of 
anti-manipulation rules and REMIT and the existing legal framework does not 
provide effective mechanisms to mitigate these uncertainties. Apart from that on 
capacity withholding, whose identification as market manipulation is questionable, 
EU case law on market manipulation is very limited and far from providing an insight 
into what types of activities would be subject to proceedings under anti-manipulation 
rules. The uncertainties are further elevated due to the concurrency of EU 
competition law which gives rise to concerns about over-regulation and additional 
regulatory costs, which, in turn, cause detriments to investments and liquidity in EU 
wholesale energy markets. In this regard, the availability of effective mitigation 
measures is of great importance for an effective application of the new legal 
framework. 
334 | P a g e  
 
5.2. MITIGATION 
Based on its findings, this thesis deems it necessary for EU institutions to establish 
necessary mechanisms that can mitigate concerns about the uncertainties, pertinent 
to the adoption and the enforcement of obligations and prohibitions under REMIT. 
Strong cooperation and coordination between regulatory and competition authorities 
are prerequisite for an effective enforcement regime. These mechanisms should 
ensure that the obligations and prohibitions under REMIT are comprehended and 
prosecuted at national level in a harmonised way. Uniformity in legal approaches and 
enforcement procedures is fundamental for a coherent application of the regulatory 
framework REMIT established. The divergences thereof would result in further 
uncertainties as to the operation of energy markets across the EU and regulatory 
arbitrage, that is, market participants would abuse the differences in the regulatory 
regimes between Member States, which would undermine the functioning of EU 
wholesale energy markets.  
This thesis proposes a two-pronged mitigation mechanism that addresses legal 
procedures and the uncertainties with respect to the prosecution of market 
manipulation in the EU. First, it suggests the adoption of a non-binding guidance 
paper by ACER on the application of Article 5 of REMIT to EU wholesale energy 
markets. The proposed guidance should include legal methodologies that give 
competent authorities insight into how to establish abuse of Article 5 and distinguish 
manipulative practices from other legitimate trading practices. Second, the thesis 
proposes that ACER and the European Commission should conclude a 
Memorandum of Understanding concerning the prosecution of market manipulation 
under REMIT and EU competition law. As the thesis clearly put it, the majority of 
market practices that constitute market manipulation under anti-manipulation rules 
can also account for proceedings under EU competition law as violations of Articles 
101 and 102, and this gives rise to concerns about the multiplicity of jurisdictions that 
can exercise authority over the same market practices. The proposed ‘Memorandum 
of Understanding’ should provide guidance on how overlapping proceedings are 
carried out or, if deemed suitable, avoided.  
This thesis suggests that in designing guidance and a memorandum of 
understanding, particular consideration must be given to the operation of wholesale 
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energy markets and market practices therein. ACER should address the elements of 
legal methodology that national competent authorities can follow in enforcing anti-
manipulation rules. The proposed guidance should include details about the 
concepts incorporated in REMIT’s anti-manipulation rules, such as false and 
misleading signals, artificial prices, and forces of supply and demand which, as the 
case law on market manipulation suggests, are of great importance in the 
determination of manipulation. As mentioned, defining market manipulation has 
proved to be a very difficult task not only for the courts but also for academic 
literature which has produced a myriad of alternative definitions each of which 
criticises the other. In that guidance, ACER should discuss direct examples of 
market manipulation, rather than simply giving vague definitions which no matter 
how complicated they are designed, always fall short of addressing all types of 
market manipulation due to continuous market development and innovation. This 
would allow national competent authorities to assess established legal 
methodologies on case-by-case basis and effectively enforce their anti-manipulation 
rules.  
The proposed Memorandum of Understanding should encompass details on how the 
coordination and cooperation between national regulatory and competition 
authorities function in enforcing anti-manipulation rules. National regulatory 
authorities should not be limited only to energy regulators. Financial regulators who 
can open proceedings against in-scope manipulative practices on the basis of MAR 
should also be included in the conclusion of this memorandum. The document 
should address how notices of manipulative practices should be made between 
competition and regulatory authorities and which authority should be granted to open 
proceedings against relevant violations. Particular focus should be given to the 
elimination of the duplicative proceedings by regulators and competition authorities 
with respect to the same market practice.  
Of course, the multiplicity of proceedings can still be the case on the grounds that 
the proceedings opened by one authority may not be considered sufficient to serve 
the remedy sought by the other due to the effects of relevant misconduct. For 
example, a regulatory authority can open proceedings against a market participant, 
while a national competition authority considers that relevant misconduct is of a 
collusive behaviour, rather than unilateral. Again a market practice which had been 
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found to be a legitimate trading activity under anti-manipulation litigation can still be 
subject to antitrust proceedings. Facts and the identity of interested parties are of 
great importance in determining whether a market conduct may account for 
duplicative actions by regulatory and competition authorities. The availability of 
efficient tools with respect to the cooperation and coordination between regulatory 
and competition authorities is fundamental in identifying facts and undertakings 
concerned and evaluating whether concurrent proceedings by regulatory and 
competition authorities are necessary to achieve a sufficient remedy for disputed 
market practices. The proposed memorandum should set effective mechanisms 
through which regulatory and competition authorities evaluate the details of disputes 
and determine, if facts and parties concerned are the same, the appropriate 
jurisdiction that provides the best remedy for relevant market misconduct. This would 
eliminate the concerns about the application of multiple jurisdictions to the same 
market practices.  
This thesis proposes that particular focus should also be paid to the characteristics 
of certain market practices in determining the authority who exercises jurisdiction. 
US case law on energy market manipulation provides significant implications as to 
the practices that have been prosecuted as violations of the relevant anti-
manipulation rules, Sections 1c.1 and 1c.2 for FERC1066 and Rules 180.1 and 180.2 
for the CFTC1067. It is reasonable to expect that these types of practices would be 
dealt with more effectively under anti-manipulation rules. Even though the 
consultation documents by EU institutions suggest otherwise, the thesis considers 
that capacity withholding practices can be prosecuted more effectively under 
antitrust rules. This is supported by some commentators1068 and also in compliance 
with FERC’s findings in KeySpan, in which the Commission concluded that the 
defendant’s activity of generation withholding constituted a basic example of 
exercise of market power rather than that of market manipulation1069. As discussed 
in detail, the complexities with respect to the prosecution of capacity withholding 
                                                          
1066 18 C.F.R. §§ 1c.1, 2 
1067 17 C.F.R. Part 180, §§ 180.1, 2  
1068 Gary Taylor, et al., (2015), 193 
1069 “There is a difference between engaging in (1) market manipulation in violation of section 1c.2, which 
includes fraud or deceit as discussed above and (2) a party exercising market power. Of course, an exercise of 
market power may be a factor to consider in examining whether Part 1c was violated. However, it is not the 
only relevant factor.” See; FERC Enforcement Staff Report, (2008), 17 
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practices under EU competition law stem from conventional legal methodologies that 
proved to be insufficient in identifying relevant markets and dominant positions in 
energy markets which would be established more appropriately with the adoption of 
new, energy-specific methodologies. This approach would clarify the concept of 
market manipulation and its difference from antitrust rules.   
While EU competition law rule can be applied by national regulators in certain 
member states, if they also possess powers to do so, in others, the jurisdictional 
authority to open proceedings under anti-manipulation rules can be conferred upon 
national competition authorities1070. As mentioned, this is why this thesis prefers to 
use the term ‘competent authorities’ rather than directly mentioning regulatory or 
competition authorities. It can be argued that the divergence between member states 
in designating relevant authorities may raise questions as to the conclusion of the 
proposed memorandum. The thesis considers that such a differentiation does not 
pose risks to the development and implementation of the proposed memorandum 
which aims at identifying whether anti-manipulation or antitrust rules should be 
applied, rather than whether regulatory or competition authorities should exercise 
jurisdiction over certain market misconduct. A national regulator may exercise 
competition law against capacity withholding practices, while a competition authority 
can find a market practice that exploits price relations between two different yet 
linked products or markets in violation of anti-manipulation rules under REMIT or 
MAR.  
This thesis considers that this two-pronged approach would sufficiently eliminate 
concerns about legal uncertainties and duplicative jurisdictions related to the 
application of anti-manipulation rules. As non-binding documents, the contexts of the 
proposed guidance and memorandum of understanding are explanatory and thus do 
not give rise to concerns about over-regulation and additional regulatory costs. 
Furthermore, even though the main of focus of this mechanism is on the 
enforcement of anti-manipulation rules under REMIT, other obligations and 
prohibitions can also be incorporated into the mechanism which would promote the 
development of a single rulebook that is relied upon by, and applicable to all, market 
participants operating in wholesale energy markets across the EU.     
                                                          
1070 Supra note 281 
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5.3. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Despite providing a general understanding of the legal framework established after 
the adoption of REMIT, this thesis mainly focuses on the prohibition of market 
manipulation and its interplay with EU competition law rules. It provides an extensive 
legal analysis of case law and discusses the features of practices regarded as 
manipulative in greater detail. Nevertheless, legal implications of REMIT with respect 
to EU wholesale energy markets are not limited to the concept of market 
manipulation. In fact, the prohibition of market manipulation constitutes only a part of 
the legal regime REMIT introduced.  
There are three fundamental research topics that require close attention from 
academic literature so as to shed light upon the interplay between REMIT and EU 
competition law. First, particular attention should be paid to data disclosure 
obligations and their implications in EU wholesale energy products. Concerns about 
these obligations have been stressed by some commentators1071 who argue that 
dissemination of certain market data might increase the risk of collusion between 
market participants and result in possible breaches of Article 101, and also 102, if 
collective dominance1072 should be found. As briefly discussed, there are serious 
uncertainties with respect to the concept of market information that is required to be 
published under REMIT. In December 2014, the Commission Implementing 
Regulation that set forth procedures and principles regarding data collecting and 
reporting obligations for market participants was adopted1073. To what extent data 
disclosure obligations under REMIT and the Commission Implementing Regulation 
would give rise to concerns about anti-competitive market conduct, and that market 
participants complying with these obligations can be held liable under EU 
competition law, requires an extensive research project which involves not only a 
case law analysis, but also an empirical study that explores the types of market 
information evaluated by undertakings in energy industry.  
The second topic that this thesis deems necessary for a research project is the 
interplay between state aids and market designs. This topic is particularly relevant 
                                                          
1071 John Ratliff, (2015), 82 
1072 Supra note 1030  
1073 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014 of 17 December, 2014 on data reporting 
implementing Article 8(2) and Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency, OJ. L 363/121 
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for electricity capacity markets through which member states seek to ensure 
sustainable and secure electricity supply. Providing certain compensation 
mechanisms, these markets keep expensive generation facilities which are 
continuously out of money due to merit order in wholesale markets operational as 
supply reserve, if a shortage in electricity production from cheap power plants occurs. 
These capacity mechanisms should not violate EU state aid rules1074, which prohibit 
“aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States”1075. This topic is particularly important as it can be considered a major area 
where policies of competitive and secure energy supply contradict each other1076. 
Therefore to what extent capacity mechanisms can be designed in a manner that 
complies with the Commission’s competition agenda constitutes an important 
research topic. 
Third, this thesis considers that an extensive study on the interplay between REMIT 
and Directive 2014/104/EU 1077  which introduced the private right of action for 
damages incurred due to infringements of antitrust rules. As discussed, several 
market practices that are prohibited or required may also constitute a violation of EU 
competition law. Conclusion of a breach under REMIT may give effect to private 
damages claims under this directive, if it is also found that relevant rules infringed 
constitute a violation of EU competition law. Even though a full transposition of the 
directive into national legal systems has not been successful in more than half of all 
                                                          
1074 State aid rules are laid down under Article 107, 108 and 109 of TFEU. 
1075 Article 107(1) of TFEU  
1076 In the interim report of the Sector inquiry on Capacity Mechanisms, DG Competition concluded that the 
capacity mechanisms under review were not well designed to address capacity concerns and posed risks ob 
the competitiveness of markets. European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission; Interim Report of the 
Sector Inquiry on Capacity Mechanisms’ (Brussels 2016). See also; Leigh Hancher, ‘Capacity Mechanisms and 
State Aid Control A European Solution to the Missing Money Problem?’ in Leigh Hancher, Adrien De 
Hauteclocque and Malgorzata Sadowska (eds), Capacity Mechanisms in the EU Energy Market: Law, Policy, and 
Economics (OUP 2015); Sonja van Renssen, ‘Capacity Mechanisms: DG Competition and DG Energy Clash over 
Future of EU Energy Market’ (energypost, May 11, 2016) http://energypost.eu/capacity-mechanisms-dg-
competition-dg-energy-clash-future-eu-energy-market/  
1077 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union [2014] OJ L349/1 
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Member States1078, the disputes will likely arise, given increasing levels of monitoring 
practices in energy markets.  
This thesis substantially contributes to the understanding of the new regulatory 
framework under REMIT. It explores the concept of market manipulation and its legal 
implications in EU wholesale energy markets. Nevertheless, the unveiling of the 
Regulation in its entirety requires an atmosphere of intensive discussion in academic 
literature which is currently missing. The concepts of inside information and insider 
trading as well as the development of electricity and natural gas markets are 
relatively new in the EU and thus legal studies that explore these issues are needed. 
In this respect, this thesis also constitutes a ‘call’ for academic attention to these 
issues.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1078 See; http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/directive_en.html  
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